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THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   PLOTINUS 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 
OF  PLOTINUS 

THE  GIFFORD   LECTURES  AT  ST.  ANDREWS, 
1917-1918 


BY 

WILLIAM  RALPH  INGE,  C.V.O.,  D.D. 

Dean  of  St.  Paul's  ;  Hon.  D.D.,  Aberdeen  ; 

Hon.  Fellow  of  Jesus  College,  Cambridge,  and  Hertford  College,  Oxford. 
Formerly  Lady  Margaret  Professor  of  Divinity,  Cambridge. 


IN   TWO  VOLUMES 
VOL.   II. 


LONGMANS,     GREEN     AND     CO. 

39     PATERNOSTER    ROW,     LONDON 

FOURTH  AVENUE  £  3OTH  STREET,  NEW  YORK 

BOMBAY,    CALCUTTA,  AND   MADRAS 


I  feel  certain  of  being  on  the  right  track  when 
I  seek  in  that  which  should  be  the  ground  of  that 
which  is. 

LOTZE. 


SYLLABUS   OF   LECTURES 

LECTURES  XII,  XIII 
THE   IMMORTALITY  OF  THE   SOUL 

The  philosophical  and  religious  belief  in  immortality  came  to  the 
Greeks  from  the  mystical  tradition  associated  with  the  worship  of 
Dionysus.  These  orgiastic  cults  produced  flashes  of  intuition  that 
man  is  immortal.  But  the  belief  was  slow  in  taking  root,  as  the  litera- 
ture shows.  Pythagoreanism,  an  intellectualised  Orphism,  taught  the 
immortality  of  the  Soul,  its  migration  to  other  bodies,  and  the  doctrine 
of  cosmic  cycles.  Plato  argues  in  favour  of  immortality,  but  we  cannot 
find  any  fixed  and  definite  views  on  the  subject  in  his  writings.  Aristotle 
seems  to  have  disbelieved  in  what  we  should  call  personal  immortality. 
The  eschatology  of  the  Stoics  was  vague  and  uncertain  ;  the  Epicureans 
denied  a  future  life  altogether.  Plutarch  is  a  believer,  and  narrates 
visions  of  judgment  not  unlike  those  of  Dante. 

Christian  eschatology  was  by  no  means  consistent  in  the  second 
and  third  centuries.  Tertullian  is  strangely  materialistic  :  his  real 
belief  seems  to  have  been  that  the  soul  dies  with  the  body,  to  be 
raised  again  at  the  last  day  by  a  miracle.  Widely  different  views  were 
held  about  the  intermediate  state.  Clement  and  Origen  accept,  with 
some  reservations,  the  Greek  conception  of  immortality ;  the  resurrection 
of  the  body,  though  not  denied,  is  tacitly  shelved.  Origen  is  notable 
as  teaching  a  succession  of  world-orders,  with  sustained  upward  pro- 
gress. 

For  Plotinus,  the  Soul  neither  comes  into  existence  nor  perishes  ; 
it  is  the  indestructible  principle  of  life.  He  has  no  room  for  bodily 
resurrection  ;  and  rejects  the  popular  notion  of  spiritual  bodies  in  a 
semi-gaseous  condition.  The  distinctions  of  individuals  are  not  lost 
in  the  eternal  world  ;  but  Spirits  are  completely  transparent  to  one 
another  ;  all  that  separates  us  here  will  have  disappeared.  Souls 
which  have  lived  unrighteously  are  reincarnated  in  bodies  of  a  lower 
order,  and  are  sometimes  chastised  by  their  daemon  or  guardian  angel. 
But  only  the  lower  soul  can  thus  fall ;  the  higher  part  is  sinless. 

The  problem  is  how  to  maintain  the  true  view  of  eternity,  as  supra- 
temporal  existence,  without  either  sundering  the  eternal  and  temporal 
from  each  other,  or  reducing  the  world  of  time  to  a  vain  shadow. 
We  know  under  the  form  of  eternity  whatever  we  know  as  sharing  in 
Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty.  Eternity  is  the  kingdom  of  Divine 
Ideas  or  absolute  values. 

The  doctrine  of  reincarnation  offers  us  chains  of  personalities  linked 
together  by  impersonal  transitions.  Nothing  survives  except  the 
bare  being  of  the  Soul,  and  its  liabilities.  The  doctrine  has  found 
strong  support  in  modern  times,  e.g.  in  Krause,  Swedenborg,  Lavater, 
Ibsen,  Maeterlinck,  McTaggart,  Hume,  Goethe,  and  Lessing  speak  of 
it  with  respect. 


viii          THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

LECTURES  XIV-XVI 
THE   SPIRITUAL  WORLD 

V  Spirit '  is  the  best  word  for  Nous.  Reality  consists  in  the  Trinity 
n  Unity  of  Nous,  Noesis,  and  Noeta,  in  which  the  whole  nature  of  the 
Absolute  is  manifested.  Spirit  and  the  spiritual  world  involve  each  other 
and  cannot  be  separated.  Plotinus  is  not  an  idealist  or  mentalist,  in 
the  modern  sense. 

The  doctrine  of  Ideas  in  Plato  and  Plotinus.  The  view  of  Plotinus 
is  that  so  far  as  every  thought  in  Spirit  is  also  an  eternal  form  of 
being,  all  the  thoughts  of  Spirit  are  Ideas.  Each  Idea  is  Spirit,  and 
Spirit  is  the  totality  of  the  Ideas.  The  kingdom  of  the  Ideas  is  the 
true  reality. 

The  categories  of  the  Spiritual  World.  The  category  of  Being  is 
unsatisfactory  ;  Thought  and  its  Object  are  not  a  pair  of  the  same 
kind  as  Identity  and  Difference,  Change  and  Permanence.  The  whole 
theory  of  categories  is  open  to  criticism.  Proclus  supports  my  con- 
tention that  Plotinus  would  have  done  better  to  discard  the  Platonic 
and  Aristotelian  lists,  and  to  make  Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty  the 
attributes  of  Spirit  and  its  world.  It  would  then  be  clear  that  the 
Spiritual  World  is  a  Kingdom  of  Values,  Values  of  truly  existing  Reality. 
Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty  are  in  our  experience  ultimates.  They 
cannot  be  fused,  or  wholly  harmonised,  but  they  have  the  characteristic 
of  mutual  inclusion  which  belongs  to  the  Spiritual  World. 

The  individual  Spirit  is  the  same  life  as  the  individual  Soul,  only 
raised  above  itself  and  transfigured  into  the  Divine  image.  Blessed 
Spirits  are  fully  known  to  each  other  ;  in  heaven  the  whole  is  in  every 
part.  And  they  enjoy  unbroken  communion  with  the  Great  Spirit, 
who  is  really  the  God  of  the  Neoplatonic  religion.  Individuality  is  not 
lost,  but  there  is  distinction  without  separation. 

Eternal  life  is  not  '  the  future  life.'  The  Platonic  doctrine  of 
immortality  is  very  different  from  the  wish  for  survival  in  time.  The 
kind  of  immortality  which  physical  research  endeavours  to  establish 
would  be  the  negation  of  the  only  immortality  which  the  Platonist 
desires  or  believes  in. 

Eternity  is  an  experience  and  a  conception  partly  latent  and  partly 
patent  in  all  human  life.  It  is  life  amid  truths  which  are  neither  born 
nor  die.  The  Christian  schoolmen  intercalated  aevum  between  time 
and  eternity.  '  Spiritual  creatures,  as  regards  their  affections  and 
intellections,  are  measured  by  time  ;  as  regards  their  natural  being,  by 
aevum  ;  as  regards  their  vision  of  glory,  they  participate  in  eternity  ' 
(Aquinas).  Aevum  seems  to  be  perpetual  duration,  and  as  such  a 
symbol  or  sacrament  of  eternity.  We  cannot  dispense  with  modes  of 
envisaging  eternity  which  depend  on  spatial  and  temporal  imagery  ; 
but  popular  religion  has  impoverished  the  idea  of  eternal  life  by  in- 
sisting on  its  pictures  of  a  material  fairyland. 


SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES  ix 

LECTURES  XVII-XIX 
THE   ABSOLUTE 

The  paths  of  Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty  all  lead  up  the  hill  of 
the  Lord.  Plotinus  shows  us  all  three. 

Dialectic  is  the  study  of  first  principles,  which  leads  to  intuitive 
wisdom.  It  shows  us  that  the  common  source  of  Goodness,  Truth, 
and  Beauty  must  be  beyond  existence  and  beyond  knowledge.  The 
duality  in  unity  of  Spirit  and  the  Spiritual  World  points  to  an  absolute 
unity  behind  them.  This  unity  is  beyond  knowledge  and  existence,  and 
is  revealed  only  in  the  mystical  experience.  In  considering  this  train  of 
reasoning,  we  must  remember  that  (i)  the  nature  of  the  Godhead  is 
certainly  unknown  to  us  ;  (2)  we  are  not  cut  off  from  the  highest 
form  of  life  ;  (3)  we  have  in  the  mystical  state  an  experience  of  formless 
intuition.  The  doctrine  goes  back  to  a  famous  passage  in  the  Republic 
and  has  had  a  long  history.  Augustine  says  that  God  is  essentia,  not 
substantia.  Dionysius  describes  God  the  Father  as  '  super-essential 
indetermination  '  ;  and  Erigena  is  not  afraid  to  say,  '  Deus  per 
excellentiam  non  immerito  Nihilum  vocatur.'  For  Plotinus,  the 
One  is  '  beyond  oua-ia  and  beyond  Spirit.'  It  is  what  it  willed  to  be, 
but  it  wills  nothing  not  yet  present.  It  is  all  necessity,  and  the  giver 
of  freedom.  It  does  not  think,  but  abides  in  '  a  state  of  wakefulness 
beyond  Being.'  It  is  infinite,  in  the  sense  that  its  centre  is  every- 
where, its  circumference  nowhere.  It  is  the  First  Cause  and  Final 
Cause  of  all.  Plotinus  does  not  profess  to  explain  how  plurality  can 
emanate  from  unity  :  the  problem  is  equally  insoluble  for  natural 
science.  His  hypothesis  is  that  of  Creation.  '  The  One  could  not  be 
alone.'  It  creates  a  '  second  nature,'  without  passing  out  of  itself 
in  doing  so.  The  activity  of  the  Absolute  is  one-sided.  The  manner 
of  creation  is  incomprehensible  by  us,  because  it  can  never  fall  within 
our  experience ;  the  path  back  to  the  One  can  be  trodden  in  experi- 
ence. The  Plotinian  Absolute  is  different  from  the  Hegelian,  in  that 
for  Plotinus  the  world  is  not  an  essential  factor  in  the  Being  of  the 
Absolute.  We  cannot  deny  the  possibility  of  this  one-sided  creative 
activity  without  surrendering  the  transcendence  of  God,  an  essential 
doctrine  of  theism. 

Plotinus  does  not  call  the  One  the  Beautiful ;  but  he  really  puts 
Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty  on  the  same  level.  '  The  One  is  the 
beginning  and  end  of  Beauty.'  '  The  First  Beautiful,  and  Beauty, 
are  formless.' 

'  The  Good  '  means  the  Perfect.  The  Good  makes  things  what 
they  are  '  good  for,'  and  we  must  not  take  this  in  a  narrowly  ethical 
sense.  The  Good  is  unity  as  the  goal  of  desire.  The  longing  for  self- 
completion  and  self -transcendence  is  universal;  our  whole  life  is  a 
striving  towards  its  proper  goal.  '  Virtue  is  not  the  Good,  but  a 
good.'  All  things  aspire  to  the  Good.  The  '  Spirit  in  love  '  yearns  for 
the  source  of  all  perfection. 

The  character  of  the  Plotinian  mysticism  is  best  illustrated  by  his 
own  descriptions.  They  are  based  on  personal  experience,  and  closely 
resemble  the  visions  of  God  described  by  other  mystics.  The  '  method 
of  abstraction,'  or  via  negativa,  which  is  often  blamed  as  a  progressive 
emptying  of  the  personality,  ending  in  a  blank  trance,  is  really  only 
intense  concentration  on  what  are  believed  to  be  the  essentials  of  the 
quest.  Plotinus  never  despises  the  rich  world  of  concrete  experience, 


x  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

still  less  the  fullness  of  life  in  the  Kingdom  of  the  eternal  Ideas.  Nor  is 
there  (as  some  have  alleged)  any  contradiction  between  his  philosophy 
and  his  personal  religion. 

In  some  particulars  the  mysticism  of  Plotinus  differs  from  the 
prevailing  type  in  Catholic  Christianity,  (i)  There  is  no  occultism  or 
thaumaturgy  in  it,  and  no  lore  of  Divine  favours  and  supernatural 
visitations.  There  are  no  '  bodily  showings  '  and  no  revelations  im- 
parted during  ecstasy.  (2)  There  is  in  Plotinus  no  trace  of  the  experi- 
ence of  dereliction,  '  the  dark  night  of  the  Soul.'  The  absence  of  this 
experience  characterises  philosophical  as  opposed  to  emotional  mystic- 
ism ;  but  it  is  also  connected  with  the  comparatively  slight  conscious- 
ness of  sin  and  alienation  from  God  in  the  Neoplatonists.  (3)  The 
ecstatic  state  is  for  the  Neoplatonist  a  very  rare  experience,  and  is 
reserved  for  those  who  have  climbed  the  heights  of  Divine  wisdom. 
The  mystics  of  the  cloister,  on  the  other  hand,  found  it  by  no  means 
uncommon,  and  tended  to  regard  it  as  an  encouragement  often  vouch- 
safed to  beginners.  Here  much  must  be  attributed  to  expectation  and 
tradition,  and  something  to  the  greater  strain  of  monastic  discipline. 
The  mystical  state  always  follows  intense  mental  concentration,  and 
is  not  confined  to  religious  contemplation.  Poets  and  musicians  have 
described  similar  experiences. 

The  importance  of  ecstasy  in  Neoplatonism  has  often  been  much 
exaggerated,  as  has  that  of  Nirvana  in  Buddhism.  The  mystic  does 
not  crave  for  absorption  or  annihilation,  but  for  deliverance  from  the 
fetters  of  separate  existence  :  he  longs  to  know  that  there  is  '  nothing 
between  '  himself  and  God.  There  is  and  must  be  an  element  of  illusion 
in  the  vision  ;  the  mind  which  thinks  that  it  contemplates  the  One 
really  visualises  symbols  of  the  unlimited.  But  the  idea  of  the  One 
is  capable  of  inspiring  love  and  devotion  for  the  source  of  all  goodness, 
truth,  and  beauty. 

The  object  of  this  love  is  never  personalised,  as  in  Christianity. 
But  the  Christian  mystic  also  transmutes  the  objects  of  his  veneration 
into  Ideas,  and  knows  them,  and  his  fellows,  '  no  more  after  the  flesh.' 
Conversio  fit  ad  Dominum  ut  Spiritum.  Christian  Platonism  invests 
Christ  with  the  attributes  of  the  Neoplatonic. 


LECTURES  XX,  XXI 
ETHICS,   RELIGION,   AND   AESTHETICS 

The  connexion  of  Ethics  with  Metaphysics  became  closer  all  through 
the  course  of  Greek  philosophy,  and  at  its  latest  stage  the  fusion  is 
almost  complete.  For  Plotinus,  the  course  of  moral  progress  begins 
with  the  political  virtues,  which  include  all  the  duties  of  a  good  citizen  ; 
but  Plotinus  shows  no  interest  in  the  State  as  a  moral  entity.  After 
the  political  virtues  comes  purification.  The  Soul  is  to  put  off  its 
lower  nature,  and  to  cleanse  itself  from  external  stains  :  that  which 
remains  when  this  is  done  will  be  the  image  of  Spirit.  Neoplatonism 
enjoins  an  ascetic  life,  but  no  harsh  self-mortification.  The  conflict 
with  evil  is  a  journey  through  darkness  to  light,  rather  than  a  struggle 
with  hostile  spiritual  powers.  Repentance  is  not  emphasised.  The 
desire  to  be  invulnerable  underlies  all  Greek  philosophy,  and  in  conse- 
quence the  need  of  deep  human  sympathy  is  undervalued.  The 
philosopher  is  not  to  be  perturbed  by  public  or  private  calamities. 
Purification  leads  to  the  next  stage— enlightenment.  Plotinus  puts 


SYLLABUS  OF  LECTURES  xi 

the  philosophic  life  above  active  philanthropy,  though  contemplation 
for  him  is  incomplete  unless  it  issues  in  creative  activity.  '  We  ave 
the  activity  of  Spirit.'  His  disparagement  of  mere  action  which  is  not 
based  on  spiritual  enlightenment  is  quite  defensible.  Free  will  means 
spiritual  activity  ;  we  are  not  free  until  our  highest  selves  are  liberated, 
Freedom  does  not  belong  to  our  desires  or  passions,  nor  can  we  control 
the  general  order  of  the  world.  But  our  true  selves  are  not  cogs  in  a 
machine  ;  we  are  the  machine  itself  and  the  mind  which  directs  it. 
'  Exaggerated  determinism  '  destroys  the  idea  of  causation.  Each 
Soul  is  a  little  '  first  cause,'  and  the  Universal  Soul  is  above  the  antithesis 
of  freedom  and  necessity.  '  Necessity  includes  freedom.'  The  highest 
stage — unification — hardly  belongs  to  ethics  ;  but  the  noble  doctrine 
that  '  there  is  progress  even  yonder,'  depends  on  the  doctrine  of  the 
One.  Love,  the  activity  of  the  Soul  desiring  the  Good,  is  never  trans- 
cended. In  spite  of  this,  the  moral  isolation  of  the  sage  may  be  regarded 
as  a  defect  in  Neoplatonic  ethics. 

The  Religion  of  Plotinus  is  really  independent  of  the  Pagan  Gods 
and  their  cultus.  He  allegorises  the  myths  in  the  most  arbitrary 
manner.  But  he  believes  in  the  damons,  who  rule  the  intermediate 
sphere  between  earth  and  heaven.  This  was  a  current  belief  of  the 
time,  which  has  no  inner  connexion  with  his  philosophy.  Similarly, 
magic  and  sorcery,  though  he  dislikes  and  minimises  them,  could  not 
be  repudiated.  Theurgy  is  no  integral  part  of  Neoplatonism  ;  but  the 
school  fell  into  it  later,  and  even  helped  to  elevate  superstition  into  a 
dogma.  Prayer,  especially  the  '  prayer  of  quiet, '  was  the  life  of  religion 
for  the  Neoplatonist.  '  All  things  pray  except  the  One.'  The  main- 
spring of  religion  is  experimental ;  faith  begins  as  an  experiment 
and  ends  as  an  experience.  God  is  at  first  an  ideal,  and  at  last  an 
atmosphere.  Man  may  worship  either  the  Universal  Soul,  or  the 
Great  Spirit,  or  the  ineffable  One.  The  difference  between  Neoplaton- 
ism and  Christianity  have  often  been  exaggerated.  Augustine  finds 
all  Christianity  in  the  Platonists,  except  the  Incarnation.  His  criticism 
remains  the  most  penetrating  comparison  of  the  two  creeds.  The 
Incarnation  and  Passion  of  the  Son  of  God,  with  the  acceptance  of 
suffering  for  others  which  those  doctrines  imply,  do  not  refute  the 
philosophy  of  Plotinus  ;  they  complete  it.  But  the  attempt  of  some 
Christian  Platonists  to  equate  the  three  Divine  hypostases  of  Neo- 
platonism with  the  Trinity  was  not  successful. 

'  The  Beautiful  '  includes,  for  Platonists,  all  that  is  worthy  of  love 
and  admiration.  It  is  thus  impossible  to  separate  aesthetics  from 
ethics  and  religion.  The  beauty  of  the  Soul  is  to  be  made  like  to 
God.  Plotinus  makes  an  advance  in  aesthetic  theory  in  refusing  to 
make  symmetry  the  essence  of  the  beautiful.  The  forms  of  beauty 
are  the  mode  in  which  the  Universal  Soul  stamps  the  image  of  itself 
on  Matter.  The  Soul  in  contemplating  beauty  identifies  itself  with 
the  formative  activity  of  its  own  higher  principle.  Art  does  not  copy 
nature  ;  it  creates,  like  nature,  after  the  model  of  the  spiritual  world. 
His  identification  of  ugliness  with  absence  of  form  is  less  happy.  Ugli- 
ness is  false  form.  But  Plotinus  is  again  valuable  when  he  finds  in 
art  the  recognition  of  hidden  sympathies  in  nature,  which  enable  us 
to  translate  beauty  into  another  medium.  Most  modern  writers  on 
aesthetics  are  indebted  to  Plotinus. 


xii  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

LECTURE  XXII 
CONCLUDING   REFLECTIONS 

There  are  disquieting  resemblances  between  the  period  which 
ushered  in  the  downfall  of  ancient  civilisation  and  the  present  world- 
calamity.  But  we  must  remember  the  Greek  conviction  that  the 
nature  of  anything  is  its  highest  development,  and  find  comfort  in 
the  spiritual  heights  often  attained  by  individuals,  which  may  be  an 
earnest  of  the  achievements  of  humanity  in  the  far  future.  The  educated 
classes  must  prepare  to  practise  an  austerity  of  life  like  that  of  the 
ancient  philosophers  in  the  grievous  time  that  probably  awaits  them. 
The  whole  heritage  of  the  past  is  at  stake  together  ;  we  have  a  sacred 
tradition  to  preserve.  Christianity,  Platonism,  and  Civilisation  must 
stand  or  fall  together.  Christianity  and  Platonism  agree  in  maintaining 
that  values  are  absolute  and  eternal,  and  that  spiritual  things  must  be 
spiritually  discerned.  The  Platonist  can  reconcile  this  with  reverence 
for  reason  and  science.  The  too  facile  optimism  of  Plotinus  in  dealing 
with  evil  must  be  corrected  by  the  Christian  doctrine  of  vicarious 
suffering.  In  our  day  we  have  most  need  to  remember  that  suffering 
is  a  warning  symptom,  not  the  disease  itself.  Our  altruistic  hedonism 
has  thrown  our  whole  view  of  life  out  of  perspective.  We  need  to 
examine  the  conditions  of  real  happiness  and  unhappiness,  which  have 
very  little  to  do  with  external  goods.  Our  false  view  of  life  presents 
civilisation  to  us  in  such  an  ugly  aspect  that  we  dare  not  face  the  facts 
or  obey  the  laws  of  science,  but  fly  to  sentimentalism,  ultimately  the 
most  cruel  of  all  moods.  We  can  help  our  fellows  best  by  purging 
our  own  spiritual  vision.  The  problems  of  civil  government  seem  to 
be  at  present  insoluble.  The  only  deliverance  is  to  correct  our  standard 
of  values,  and  to  set  our  hearts  on  the  '  indivisible  goods  '  which  are 
not  lost  by  being  shared.  To  preach  this  is  the  duty  of  religion  and 
philosophy,  and  not  to  be  the  jackal  of  any  political  party.  The 
Neoplatonic  mystic  must  be  prepared  to  outgrow  many  early  en- 
thusiasms, and  to  break  every  mould  in  which  his  thought  threatens 
to  crystallise.  The  danger  of  arrested  development  is  aiways  present. 
Life  is  a  schola  animantm  ;  and  we  must  be  learners  to  the  end. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF 
PLOTINUS 

LECTURES  XII,  XIII 

IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  * 

THE  Greeks,  like  the  Jews,  soon  outgrew  the  bar- 
barous notions  about  survival  which  are  almost 
universal  among  savages.  Both  peoples,  and  especially 
the  Jews,  for  a  long  period  attached  very  little  import- 
ance to  the  life  after  death  ;  and  when  they  came  at  last 
to  make  the  belief  in  immortality  a  part  of  their  religion, 
this  belief  was  not  even  historically  continuous  with  the 
ideas  of  primitive  soul-cultus,  which  had  their  centre  in 
the  performance  of  pious  duties  to  the  departed  spirit. 
This  belief  in  a  shadowy  survival  could  lead  to  no  doctrine 
of  real  immortality.  The  ruling  idea  in  all  Greek  thought 
about  life  and  death  was  that  deathlessness  is  a  preroga- 
tive of  the  gods.  The  gods,  and  the  gods  alone,  are  the 
immortals.  In  the  national  Greek  religion,  before  it  was 
influenced  by  the  beliefs  of  other  nations,  there  was  no 
tendency  to  break  down  the  barrier  between  the  human 
nature  and  the  Divine.  Greek  ethics  were  largely  based  on 
the  maxim  that  man  must  know  his  place.  There  had  no 
doubt  been  instances,  so  it  was  believed,  when  the  souls 

1  The  great  importance  of  this  subject  has  seemed  to  me  to  justify 
a  more  lengthy  excursus,  or  introduction,  dealing  with  the  growth  and 
varieties  of  the  belief  among  Greek  thinkers,  than  a  strict  attention 
to  proportion  would  have  allowed. 

II.— B 


2     THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

of  heroes  had  been  admitted  into  the  company  of  the 
gods  and  allowed  to  share  their  immortality  ;  but  these 
were  exceptional  and  miraculous  favours,  which  in  no 
way  affected  the  doom  of  ordinary  men.  The  popular 
belief  was  that  after  death  we  have  nothing  to  look  for- 
ward to  except  the  unsubstantial  and  unenviable  con- 
dition of  ghosts,  '  phantoms  of  mortal  men  outworn  ' 
(flpoTtov  e«5o)Xa  KCLJULOVTCW). 

The  philosophical  and  religious  belief  in  immortality 
came  to  the  Greeks  not  from  the  Olympian  religion,  but 
from  the  mystical  religion  associated  with  the  worship 
of  Dionysus.  It  was  perhaps  the  fundamental  sanity 
and  self-restraint  of  the  Greek  genius  which  led  them  to 
view  with  superstitious  awe  and  amazement  the  mani- 
festations of  religious  excitement  with  which  they  came 
in  contact  among  other  peoples.  Even  more  than  other 
nations,  they  were  disposed  to  attribute  the  wild  ebulli- 
tions of  Oriental  and  semi-barbarous  tribes  to  a  '  Divine 
madness  '  (Oela  jmapla)  or  '  possession  by  a  god  '  (evOavari* 
007x09).  It  was  especially  Dionysus,  the  Thracian  god, 
who  '  makes  men  mad.'1  He  was  probably  the  god  of 
religious  ecstasy — of  dancing  dervishes — before  he  became 
the  god  of  wine,  which  produces  similar  effects.  For  our 
present  purpose  the  important  thing  to  note  is  that 
religious  excitement  produced  an  inner  conviction  or 
experience  of  the  Divine  origin  and  destiny  of  the  human 
soul.  The  author  of  the  Contemplative  Life,  in  a  remark- 
able sentence,  says  that  '  the  bacchanals  and  corybants 
continue  their  raptures  until  they  see  what  they  desire.'2 
That  ecstasy  is  a  form  of  madness  was  fully  admitted. 
Galen  defines  it  as  '  brief  madness/  as  madness  is  '  chronic 

1  fa  naive ffdai  fy&yct  avOpwTrovs,  Herodotus,  4.  79.  But  even  Homer 
knew  of  '  Maenads  '  '.  jj.ey6.poio  difocrvro  fj.awa.8i.  t<rr)t  ira.XXo/J.fr'r)  Kpa.dirjv. 
The  deep  impression  which  this  orgiastic  worship  made  on  the  Greek 
mind  is  apparent  throughout  the  literature. 

*  De  Vit.  Cont.  2,  p.  473,  ol  ^KX^VO^VOL  /ecu  Kopv^avnuvres  evdovffi- 
dfavfft  fj.txpis  &v  TO  TroOovpevov  tddxriv.  If  this  work,  which  was  issued 
under  the  name  of  Philo,  is  a  third-century  forgery,  as  Lucius  and 
others  have  argued,  its  value  as  evidence  is  not  great ;  but  the  words 
quoted  are  true  of  the  genesis  of  orgiastic  attempts  to  induce  the 
mvstical  state  at  all  times, 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  3 

ecstasy.'  But  this  did  not  prevent  the  belief  that  a  man 
who  was  temporarily  '  out  of  his  mind  '  might  be  the 
organ  of  some  higher  intelligence,  and  that  in  particular 
the  gift  of  prophecy  is  thus  imparted.  Thus  ecstasy 
helped  to  break  down  the  barrier  between  men  and  gods, 
and  orgiastic  worship  gave  an  empirical  support  to  the 
philosophic  mysticism  which  taught  that  there  is  no 
impassable  cleft  between  the  human  and  the  Divine 
Spirit.  The  weakening  of  the  idea  of  personality  which 
followed  from  its  apparent  diremption  in  ecstasy  pro- 
moted the  belief  in  reincarnation  and  the  transmigration 
of  souls,  which  Euripides  connects  with  Thrace  and 
Dionysus.1  On  the  whole,  we  may  say  that  the  chief 
attraction  of  this  worship  was  that  it  led  up  to  flashes  of 
intuition  that  man  is  immortal,  like  the  gods.  Sentimus 
et  experimur  nos  aeternos  esse,  as  Spinoza  says.  The  Greeks 
attributed  the  warlike  courage  of  the  Thracians  to  the 
teaching  of  their  religion,  that  death  is  a  transition  to  a 
happier  state. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  this  mystical  faith  in  human 
immortality  has  left  many  traces  on  Greek  literature. 
Pindar,  whose  poetry  as  a  whole  does  not  suggest  deep 
spirituality,  professes  to  believe  in  it,  and  Euripides  has 
a  more  genuine  sympathy  with  Orphic  ideas.  The  Greek 
mind  remained,  throughout  its  great  flowering-time, 
posit ivist  and  humanistic.  Even  in  Plato's  Republic 
Glaucon,  who  is  an  ordinary  young  Athenian,  answers  the 
question,  '  Have  you  not  heard  that  our  soul  is  im- 
mortal ?  '  '  No,  really  I  have  not.'2 

Of  the  philosophers,  Thales  is  vaguely  reported  to  have 
taught  that  souls  are  immortal.3  But  neither  he  nor  his 
immediate  successors  can  be  supposed  to  have  believed 
in  the  immortality  of  particular  souls  as  such.  This 
doctrine  belongs  to  the  Orphic  tradition.4  In  Heracleitus 

1  Euripides,  Hecuba,  1243. 

8  Plato,  Republic,  608.    Livingstone,  The  Greek  Genius,  p.  201. 
3  Diogenes  Laertius,  i.  24.    Rohde,  Psyche,  Vol.  2,  p.  144. 
*  Cornford,   p.    179,   emphasises  the  difference  here  between  rhe 
'  Dionysiac  '  and  the  '  Orphic  '  view  of  immortality. 


4     THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

and  Parmenides  we  find  the  two  doctrines  of  immortality 
which  are  implicit  in  mysticism,  separated  out  for  the  first 
time.  Heracleitus  is  the  champion  of  the  Dionysiac  view 
that  life  and  death  follow  each  other  in  an  unending 
cycle  ;  Parmenides,  under  Orphic  influence,  teaches  that 
the  Soul  has  fallen  from  the  realm  of  light  and  reality  to 
the  dark  and  unreal  world  of  bodily  existence.  This, 
however,  is  for  Parmenides  only  '  the  way  of  opinion  '  ; 
he  feels,  it  would  seem,  that  the  substantiality  of  the 
world  of  common  experience  is  not  so  easily  got  rid  of. 
But  he  will  not  give  up  the  unchanging  stability  of 
eternal  substance.  The  most  interesting  fragment  of 
Parmenides  is  that  in  which  he  seems  to  enunciate,  for 
the  first  time  in  Greek  thought,  the  mystical  doctrine  of 
eternity  as  a  timeless  Now,  as  opposed  to  the  popular 
notion  of  unending  succession.  '  There  remains  then 
only  to  give  an  account  of  one  way  —  that  real  Being 
exists.  Many  signs  there  are  upon  it,  showing  that  it  is 
unborn,  indestructible,  entire,  unique,1  unshakable,  and 
unending.  It  never  was,  and  it  never  will  be,  since  it  is 
all  together  present  in  the  Now,  one  and  indivisible/2 
Empedocles  vehemently  repudiates  the  philosophy  of 
Parmenides,  probably  on  the  ground  that  he  reduces 
the  world  of  time  and  change  to  nullity,  and  thus  leaves 
no  pathway  from  appearance  to  reality.  His  doctrine 
of  the  soul's  exile  and  wanderings  is  expounded  in  a 
famous  fragment.  'There  is  a  decree  of  Necessity,  an 
old  ordinance  of  the  gods,  everlasting,  sealed  with  broad 
oaths,  that  whenever  one  of  the  daemons,  whose  portion 
is  length  of  days,  has  sinfully  stained  his  hands  with 
murder,  or  followed  strife  and  committed  perjury,  he 


,  fiovvoyevfs.  Burnet  says  that  fj.owoyevts  is  an  anachronism. 
and  comes  from  the  Timaeus.  He  proposes  fj.ow6v  r  oi'-Xo^ei/ej  '  alone, 
complete.'  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  p.  185. 

8  /ioOvos  5'  ZTI  /Jivdos  odo'io 
XeiTrereu  u>$  &TTIJ/T  •  ravrri  5'  £'TTI  (T^ar'  ^a<rt 
TroXXd  ytidX',  ws  dyti>r)TOV  ebv  /ecu  avui\edpbv  £<TTIV 
/J.ovv6yfv£s  re  Kal  d.Tpe/j.£s  178'  drAco-rov. 

TTOr'  TJV  Ot'5'  IWCU,    ^TTfl  VVV  tffTIV  0/J.OV  7TCU', 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  5 

must  wander  away  from  the  blessed  gods  for  thirty 
thousand  seasons,  being  born  throughout  that  time  in 
all  manner  of  mortal  forms,  passing  from  one  to  another 
of  the  painful  paths  of  life.  For  the  power  of  the  upper 
air  drives  him  toward  the  sea,  and  the  sea  spews  him 
out  upon  dry  land  ;  earth  throws  him  into  the  rays  of  the 
burning  sun,  and  the  sun  into  the  eddies  of  the  air.  One 
receives  him  from  another,  and  all  loathe  him.  Of  these 
I  myself  am  now  one,  an  exile  from  God  and  a  wanderer, 
because  I  put  my  trust  in  raging  strife/1  This  is  the 
pure  Orphic  doctrine,  which  Pindar  also  gives  us  in  the 
second  Olympian  Ode.  The  Soul  sins  by  separating 
itself  from  God,  and  after  many  adventures  finds  its  way 
home  again  to  Him.  The  fall  from  God  is  a  fall  from 
love  and  a  choice  of  '  strife  '  in  the  place  of  harmony. 
The  immortal  Soul  is  said  to  consist  of  love  and  strife 
blended  ;  the  body,  with  its  senses,  is  only  an  '  alien 
garment/  and  perishes  at  death.  When  Empedocles 
describes  the  Soul  as  a  ratio,  or  harmony,  he  means  that 
the  complex  of  discordant  factors  ('  strife  ')  which  it  con- 
tains is  bound  together  by  the  principle  of  unity  ('  love  '). 
As  regards  Parmenides,  it  may  be  true  that  he  rejects 
the  Pythagorean  doctrines  which  he  describes,  and  finds 
truth  in  static  materialism. 

Mr.  Cornford  says  very  well  that  Orpheus,  the  ideal 
of  the  Orphic  brotherhood,  is  '  a  Dionysus  tamed  and 
clothed  and  in  his  right  mind/  In  the  Orphic  legend,  it 


1  ecrnv  dvdyK^s  p^ct,  dtCiv 
didiov,  7rXaTe'e<rcri  Ka 
eiV^  TIS  dfj.7r\aK'r]<n  <p6v($  0t'Xa  yvla 
<  veluf't  0  >  os  K'  tirlopKov  d/j.apTr)cra.s 
8a.ifj.oves  o'ire  fj.a.Kpaiwvos  XeXd^aat  jStoio, 
rpis  fj^Lv  fj.vpias  upas  airb  paKapuv  d\d\tja-0ait 
s  iravTola.  did  xpovov  eidea. 
/3i6roto  jUeTaXXacro-orra 
jitv  ydp  <r<pe  /J.tvos  irbvrovSf  SMKCI, 
TTOVTOS  5'  &  x^wfa  ovdas  a7r^7rru<re,  yaia  5'  ^j  atry&s 
rjeXiov  (paedovros,  6  5'  ald^poy  fyt/3aXe  SiWu, 
AXXos  5'  £1-  #XXou  5^xeTat>  (TTvy£ov<ri  8 
T&V  Kal  ^70.1  vvv  ct/id,  0i/"ydj  6eb6ev  Kal 
iriffvvos. 


1  In  the  first  line  I  adopt  the  emendation  of  Bernays  p^a  for  xpw<>» 


6     THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

was  the  Maenads  who  tore  Orpheus,  the  friend  of  the 
Muses,  to  pieces.  The  Greek  spirit  could  not  be  content 
with  orgiastic  mysticism  ;  the  affinity  between  human 
and  divine  must  be  realised  in  a  calmer  temper,  and  must 
be  made  the  basis  not  only  of  a  cult,  but  of  a  philosophy. 
But  the  Pythagorean  philosophy,  like  most  philosophies 
\vhich  are  also  religions,  attempted  to  combine  logically 
incompatible  ideas.  Pythagoreanism  is  an  intellectual- 
ised  Orphism,  in  which  such  questions  as  the  following 
press  for  an  answer.  Is  the  descent  of  the  Soul  part  of 
a  cosmic  pulsation,  a  circulation  of  the  life-blood  of  the 
spiritual  world,  as  Heracleitus  taught,  or  is  it  a  thing 
which  ought  not  to  have  occurred,  and  which  must  be 
remedied  by  the  discipline  which  leads  to  deliverance  ? 
Is  the  Soul  a  part  of  nature,  or  is  it  radically  alien  from 
nature,  so  that  we  must  live  our  lives  here  as  prisoners  in 
a  hostile  country,  or  at  best  as  pilgrims  escaping  from  the 
city  of  destruction  to  the  far-off  city  of  God  ?  Is  the 
individual  Soul  a  mere  mode  of  a  universal  life,  or  is  it 
an  eternal  and  indestructible  substance  ?  And  is  the 
Universal  Soul  a  group-soul,  of  which  individual  Souls 
are  integral  parts,  or  is  it  a  transcendent  substance,  from 
which  individual  Souls  are  derived,  but  from  which 
they  remain  essentially  distinct  ?  How  Pythagoras  him- 
self was  thought  to  have  combined  some  of  the  earlier 
answers  to  these  questions  is  best  shown  by  the  summary 
of  his  doctrines  preserved  by  Dicaearchus.  He  taught 
'  first,  that  Soul  is  immortal,  then,  that  it  is  transformed 
into  other  kinds  of  living  beings  ;  further,  that  whatever 
comes  into  existence  is  born  again  in  the  revolutions  of 
a  certain  cycle,  and  that  nothing  is  absolutely  new,  and 
that  all  living  things  should  be  treated  as  akin  to  each 
other.'1  But  the  emphasis  is  laid  on  the  fortunes  of  the 
individual  Soul  and  its  purification  or  deliverance  by 
suffering,  both  here  and  hereafter.  The  Pythagoreans  are 
in  Europe  the  inventors  of  purgatory.  Pythagoreanism 
was  a  mystical  philosophy  of  immortality  by  death  unto 

1  Dicaearchus  in  Porphyry's  Life  of  Pythagoras,  18,  19. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  7 

sin  and  new  birth  unto  righteousness.1  An  important 
question  is  whether  the  Pythagoreans  conceived  of  heaven 
as  a  timeless  state,  as  we  have  seen  that  Parmenides  did. 
Baron  von  Hiigel2  has  rightly  insisted  that  '  all  states 
of  trance,  or  indeed  of  rapt  attention,  notoriously  appear 
to  the  experiencing  soul,  in  proportion  to  their  concentra- 
tion, as  timeless  ;  i.e.  as  non-successive,  simultaneous, 
hence  as  eternal.  And  hence  the  eternity  of  the  soul  is  not 
here  a  conclusion  drawn  from  the  apparent  God-likeness, 
in  other  respects,  of  the  soul  when  in  this  condition,  but 
the  eternity,  on  the  contrary,  is  the  very  centre  of  the 
experience  itself,  and  is  the  chief  inducement  to  the  soul 
for  holding  itself  to  be  Divine.  The  soul's  immortality 
cannot  be  experienced  in  advance  of  death,  whilst  its 
eternity,  in  the  sense  indicated,  is  or  seems  to  be  ex- 
perienced in  such  this-life  states  ;  hence  the  belief  in 
immortality  is  here  derivative,  that  in  eternity  is  primary/ 
But  though  the  Orphic-Pythagorean  aspiration  to  escape 
from  the  '  weary  wheel  '  of  rebirths  seems  to  resemble 
the  Buddhist  longing  for  the  timelessness  of  Nirvana,  it  is 
certain  that  the  Pythagoreans  did  not  envisage  the  future 
life  as  unconscious.  In  the  Orphic  Tablets,  the  Soul, 
when  it  arrives  in  the  other  world,  is  forbidden  to  approach 
a  certain  spring,  which  must  be  the  water  of  Lethe,  and 
is  bidden  to  draw  near  another,  '  by  the  lake  of  Memory.' 
The  beatified  Soul,  then,  remembers  its  past.  Here  the 
influence  of  popular  religion  may  be  traced.  The  question 
as  to  the  timelessness  of  the  Pythagorean  heaven  does 
not  admit  of  an  answer,  any  more  than  the  same  question 
about  the  Christian  heaven.  All  religious  eschatology  is 
a  mass  of  contradictions. 

Although  Plato  has  always  and  justly  been  regarded 
as  the  great  champion  of  human  immortality,  it  is  im- 
possible to  find  any  fixed  and  definite  conviction  on  the 
subject  in  his  writings.  His  views  of  immortality,  or  at 


Plato,   Phaedrus,  64,  ovbh  dXXo  ^TrtTTjSetfowriv  ^  &Tro6v/i<TK€iv  re 

VCLl. 

2  Eternal  Life,  p.  27. 


8  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

any  rate  of  the  arguments  by  which  it  may  be  established, 
passed  through  several  phases.    In  the  Phaedo,  the  whole 
argument  is  that  the  theory  of  Ideas  and  the  doctrine 
of  the  immortality  or  divinity   of  the   Soul  stand  or 
fall  together.1    This  position  is  rather  startlingly  different 
from  the  agnosticism  of  the  Apology,  in  which  Socrates" 
says  that  no  one  knows  what  happens  after  death,  but 
there  is  a  considerable  hope  that  the  good  man  may  find 
himself  in  more  congenial  company  than  he  has  met  with 
on  earth.     It  may  be  that  if  the  speech  was  actually 
delivered  by  Socrates  it  does  not  contain  those  deeper 
convictions  which  he  reserved  for  his  friends.    There  is 
a  hint  at  the  beginning  of  the  Phaedo  that  Socrates  has 
'  more  convincing  arguments  '  than  those  which  he  used 
when  addressing  his  judges  ;  and  it  is  likely  enough  that 
he  would  not  make  confession  of  his  mystical  faith  to 
a  mixed  and  mainly  hostile  audience.    In  the  Meno,  an 
early  dialogue,  immortality  is  treated  as  a  beautiful  tale 
of  priests  and  poets ;  but  he  also  says  that  if  the  truth 
of  real  being  (ra  ovra)  is  in  the  Soul,  it  must  be  immortal. 
In  the  Phaedo  the  first  argument  calls  in  the  doctrine  of 
reminiscence,  which  is  used  to  establish  pre-exist ence. 
It  is  inferred  that  the  Soul  remains  unchanged  through 
successive  incarnations.     But  this  is  only  an  indication 
of  survival  for  a  time,  not  a  proof  of  immortality.   Then, 
finding  his  hearers  not  satisfied,  the  Platonic  Socrates 
argues  that  the  idea  of  Soul  is  the  idea  of  an  entity  un- 
changeable and  imperishable.    Or,  assuming  the  doctrine 
of  Ideas,  we  may  argue  that  since  the  Ideas  are  simple 
and  indiscerptible,  the  Soul  which  knows  them  must  be 
so  too.     Lastly,  after  disposing  of  the  notion  that  the 
Soul  is  a  harmony  of  the  body,  he  argues  that  the  Soul  is 
the  idea  of  life,  and  is  therefore  alien  to  death.    This 
seems  to  be  a  fallacy  ;2  the  proper  inference  would  only 
be  that  the  Soul,  as  far  as  it  exists,  is  alive  and  not  dead. 

1  Plato,  Phaedo,  76,  fcnj  Avdyirr)  ravrd  (SC.  ret  elS-rj}  re  eli/cu  Kal 

dj  irplv  Kal  T)fj.3.s  yeywtvai,  Kal  ei  ^  ravra  ovdt  rdde. 

a  It  is  the  familiar  fallacy  of  the  old  '  ontological  proof.' 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  9 

The  argument  ends  with  the  well-known  '  myth '  about 
the  condition  of  Souls  hereafter,  of  which  Socrates  feels 
sure  that  '  something  like  it  must  be  true/ 

In  the  Republic  and  Phaedrus  he  argues  no  longer  that 
the  Soul  is  immortal  because  it  partakes  in  the  idea  of 
life,  but  that  it  has  life,  indestructible  life,  in  its  own 
right.  '  It  is  not  difficult/  he  says  in  the  Republic,1  'to 
prove  immortality,  because  Soul  is  substance,  and  sub- 
stance is  indestructible.  Nothing  can  be  destroyed 
except  by  that  which  corrupts  its  own  nature  ;  and  Soul, 
which  cannot  be  destroyed  even  by  its  own  evil — in- 
justice or  ignorance  ('  a  murderer  is  very  much  alive  and 
wide  awake  ')  can  still  less  be  destroyed  by  any  physical 
agency.  This  argument,  he  adds,  applies  to  the  Soul  as 
it  really  is,  not  to  the  Soul  contaminated  by  its  associa- 
tion with  flesh  ;  this  latter  is  like  the  sea-god  Glaucus, 
who  is  so  encrusted  with  limpets  and  sea-weed  that  he 
is  hardly  recognisable.  In  the  Phaedrus  he  argues  that 
the  cause  of  life  is  a  self -moving  principle,  which  cannot 
perish.  Every  self-moving  principle  is  Soul.  By  '  move- 
ment '  he  means  any  form  of  activity.  '  Soul '  is  the 
self -deter  mining  principle  in  nature  ;  and  that  which 
is  self-determined  can  be  affected  by  external  things  only 
indirectly,  through  its  own  will.  If  it  is  in  a  fallen  state 
here,  that  must  be  because  it  has  chosen  to  make  for  itself 
an  unworthy  environment,  suited  to  its  own  disposition. 
'  God  is  not  in  fault  ;  the  fault  is  in  the  chooser/  '  It  is 
impossible  to  believe  that  the  union  of  the  immortal  Soul 
with  the  corruptible  body/  which  only  takes  place 
because  the  Soul  has  lost  its  wings,  '  is  immortal/  If 
Plato  had  stopped  here,  his  position  would  have  been  not 
unlike  that  of  some  modern  philosophers,  who  hold  that 
the  world  of  reality  is  constituted  by  a  plurality  of 
independent  spirits,  each  existing  in  its  own  right,  very 
much  as  he  at  one  time  thought  of  the  Ideas  as  distinct 
and  independent  spiritual  entities.  In  fact,  the  Ideas 
and  the  Souls  would  then  threaten  to  coalesce.  But  this 

1  Plato,  Republic,  pp.  608-61  r. 


to  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

kind  of  pluralism  could  never  satisfy  Plato  or  any  other 
Greek  thinker.  The  Ideas  are  not  the  Souls  of  individuals, 
but  half-hypostatised  Divine  attributes,  in  which  in- 
dividual Souls  '  participate/  a  word  which  signifies  a 
spiritual  and  non-quantitative  relation.  Moreover,  the 
Ideas,  as  Plato  came  to  see,  are  not  independent  of  each 
other.  They  are  brought  together  by  their  common  con- 
dition of  dependence  upon  '  the  Idea  of  the  Good.'  Just 
so  individual  Souls  derive  their  being  from  their  Creator, 
God.  Thus  a  new  argument  for  immortality  appears  in 
the  Timaeus.  The  higher  part  of  Souls,  at  any  rate,  is 
the  direct  work  of  the  Divine  intelligence  which  created 
them.  God  cannot  wish  to  destroy  His  own  work,  and 
nothing  else  can  destroy  it.  Individual  Souls,  then,  are 
not  immortal  in  their  own  right.  They  are  immortal 
because  they  are  made  by  God  in  His  own  image.  And 
it  is  only  the  higher  part  of  the  Soul  of  which  this  can  be 
said.  We  are  therefore  left  in  some  doubt  how  much  of 
what  we  consider  our  Souls  is  really  immortal.  There 
is  no  abstract  ego  about  which  the  blunt  question  '  to 
be  or  not  to  be  '  can  be  asked. 

Aristotle's  doctrine  of  immortality  depends  on  his 
characteristic  view  of  activity  (evepyeia).  Instead  of  the 
conception  of  substance  as  the  unchanging  substratum 
of  change,  he  holds  that  perfect  activity  transcends  change 
and  motion.  Activity  is  the  actual  functioning  of  a  sub- 
stance, the  nature  of  which  is  only  so  revealed.  So  far 
from  activity  being  a  kind  of  movement  (K/WJO-IS) ,  he 
says  that  movement  is  imperfect  activity.1  Activity 
does  not  necessarily  imply  motion  or  change  ;  in  the 
frictionless  activity  of  God,  which  constitutes  his  happi- 
ness, there  is  neither.  '  Change  is  sweet  to  us  because 
of  a  certain  defect/  The  happiness  of  God  is  derived 
from  an  activity  which  transcends  movement.  For  Time 
is  the  creature  of  movement  ;  it  is  the  '  number  of  move- 
ment '  (/aw/o-ew?  apiBjuLos).  The  perfecting  of  the  time- 
consciousness  carries  us  into  eternity,  where  there  is  no 

1  Cf.  Plotinus,  2.  5.  3. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  11 

time  and  no  movement.  '  God  is  an  eternal  perfect 
Being,  so  that  life,  and  continuous  and  eternal  duration, 
belong  to  God,  for  God  is  all  this/1  As  regards  the 
immortality  of  the  individual,  Aristotle  has  always 
been  considered  to  give  very  dubious  support  to  the 
hopes  of  mankind.  In  fact  his  treatment  of  the  subject 
in  the  De  Anima  makes  it  fairly  clear  that  it  is  only 
(what  we  should  call)  the  'impersonal'  Nous  which  is 
immortal. 

The  eschatology  of  the  Stoics  is  vague  and  uncertain. 
In  a  sense,  the  Soul  must  be  immortal,  because  nothing 
ever  really  perishes.  Forms  change,  but  the  substance 
persists.  The  destiny  of  the  Soul,  as  of  everything  else, 
is  to  be  reabsorbed  into  the  primal  essence,  which  the 
Stoics,  following  Heracleitus,  identified  with,  or  sym- 
bolised by,  fire.  But  they  were  not  agreed  whether  this 
absorption  takes  place  immediately  after  death ;  nor 
whether  the  individual  continues  to  keep  his  individuality 
till  the  great  conflagration  ;  nor  whether  he  falls  by 
degrees  into  the  Divine  essence,  through  a  course  of 
gradual  purification.2  Marcus  Aurelius  is  quite  agnostic 
on  the  subject.  '  Thou  hast  embarked  ;  thou  hast  made 
thy  voyage  ;  thou  hast  come  to  port  ;  leave  the  ship. 
If  there  is  another  life,  there  are  gods  there,  as  here.  If 
thou  passest  to  a  state  without  sensation,  thou  wilt 
be  delivered  from  the  bonds  of  pleasure  and  pain.'3 
Further,  Cleanthes  held  that  the  Souls  of  all  men  live 
on  till  the  conflagration,  Chrysippus  that  only  the  Souls 
of  the  wise  live  after  death.  In  a  new  cycle,  they  taught, 
Souls  return  to  earth,  and  the  successive  lives  of  Socrates 
the  First  and  Socrates  the  Second  will  resemble  each 
other,  though  (in  opposition  to  Plato)  there  is  no  reminis- 
cence of  former  lives.  But  in  some  of  the  later  Stoics,4 
when  the  prejudice  against  Platonism  had  disappeared, 

1  Aristotle,  Metaphysics,  n.  1072. 
8  Davidson,  The  Stoic  Creed,  p.  96. 
3  Marcus  Aurelius,  3.  3. 

*  Panaetius,  an  eclectic  and  independent  thinker,  stands  apart  as 
a  declared  disbeliever  in  individual  immortality. 


12  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

a  real  belief  in  personal  immortality  was  not  discouraged. 
Seneca  believes  in  a  heaven  very  like  that  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion.  He  is  able  to  say  of  death, '  That  day  which 
you  dread  as  your  last  is  your  birthday  into  eternity/1 
Seneca  is  known  to  have  been  influenced  by  Pythagorean 
doctrine  ;2  but  he  is  on  Stoical  ground  when  he 
adduces  '  common  consent '  as  an  argument  for  immor- 
tality. 

The  Epicureans,  as  is  well  known,  denied  a  future  life 
altogether  ;  but  the  influence  of  this  school  was  declining 
in  the  generations  before  Plotinus.  Educated  men 
probably  in  most  cases  believed  vaguely  in  some  sort  of 
survival,  and  sometimes  filled  in  their  pictures  of  a  future 
life  with  such  a  jumble  of  eschatologies  as  is  found  in 
the  sixth  ^Eneid  of  Virgil,  which  doubtless  affected 
Roman  beliefs  as  much  as  Paradise  Lost  has  affected 
those  of  Englishmen.  The  common  people,  and 
religiously-minded  conservatives,  continued  to  pay  re- 
spect to  the  Manes  of  the  dead,  and  believed  that  their 
spirits  haunt  the  neighbourhood  of  their  tombs.  Etruria 
had  contributed  a  less  pleasant  kind  of  spiritualism,  that 
which  maintained  the  old  festival  of  the  maleficent 
Lemures  in  May.3  Belief  in  survival  was  supported  by 
numerous  ghost -stories  of  the  familiar  type,  such  as  are 
ridiculed  by  Lucian  in  his  Philopseudes.  In  this  dia- 
logue all  the  chief  philosophical  schools,  except  the 
Epicureans,  are  represented  as  joining  in  the  tales  of 
apparitions.  The  younger  Pliny  believes  in  haunted 
houses.  For  the  age  of  the  Antonines  Galen  is  as  good 
a  witness  as  any.  He  believes  firmly  in  Providence,  but 
sees  difficulties  in  all  the  theories  of  a  future  life. 

The  Platonists  of  this  period,  with  Plutarch  and  Maxi- 

1  Seneca,  Ep.  102.    '  Dies  iste  quern  tamquam  extremum  reformidas 
aeterni  natalis  est.' 

2  Through  his  teacher  Sotion,  who  induced  him  to  be  a  vegetarian. 

3  Ovid  thinks  that  the  occurrence  of  this  festival  in  May  is  the 
reason  why  marriages  in  that  month  are  supposed  to  be  unlucky.     I 
found  this  precious  superstition  very  rife  in  my  fashionable  West  End 
parish,  but  those  who  held  it  had  not  read  Ovid,  and  did  not  observe 
the  Lemuralia. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  13 

mus  at  their  head,  were  the  great  champions  of  immor- 
tality.1 Plutarch  bases  his  belief,  as  so  many  do  in  our 
day,  mainly  on  the  justice  of  God  and  the  rationality  of 
the  world-order.  He  points  out  that  even  the  most 
sombre  beliefs  about  the  torments  of  the  damned  are 
more  welcome  to  the  majority  of  mankind  than  the 
prospect  of  annihilation.  The  Epicureans  deprive  man- 
kind of  their  highest  hopes,  while  seeking  to  rescue  them 
from  their  fears.  In  two  of  his  works2  Plutarch  recounts 
myths  like  those  of  the  Phaedo  and  Republic,  visions  of 
judgment  which,  he  would  have  us  believe,  are  probably 
not  very  far  from  the  truth.  But  the  two  pictures  of  the 
world  of  spirits  are  not  alike.  In  the  first,  Thespesius,  a 
bad  man,  who  had  apparently  been  killed  by  an  accident, 
revives  on  the  third  day,  and  tells  his  experiences.  He 
has  found  an  Inferno  and  a  Purgatorio,  and  a  third  form 
of  punishment,  unknown  to  Dante,  in  which  carnal  souls 
are  sent  to  inhabit  the  bodies  of  animals.  The  penalties 
are  rather  ingenious.  The  hypocrites  are  turned  inside 
out  ;  the  miser  is  plunged  into  a  lake  of  boiling  gold ; 
the  soul  of  the  cruel  man  is  blood-red,  that  of  the  envious 
is  blue.  In  the  other  myth,  Timarchus  descends  into 
the  cave  of  Trophonius  and  sees  a  revelation  of  the  spirit- 
world.  An  unseen  guide  explains  to  him  that  it  has  four 
divisions.  The  highest  sphere  is  that  of  the  invisible 
One.  Next  comes  the  region  of  pure  Spirit,  ruled  over  by 
the  sun.  The  moon  is  queen  of  the  third  kingdom,  that 
of  Soul.  Below,  on  the  other  side  of  Styx,  is  the  world 
of  Matter.  After  death— '  the  first  death '—the  Soul 
wanders  between  the  realms  of  the  moon  and  earth. 
'  The  second  death  '  finally  liberates  the  Spirit  from  its 
association  with  this  muddy  vesture  of  decay.  All  Souls 
have  a  spark  of  the  Divine  nature  in  them,  but  in  some 
it  is  clogged  and  swamped  by  the  baser  elements.  Some 
Souls,  when  released  from  the  body,  fly  straight  upwards, 
others  wander  through  the  middle  air,  others  fall  back 

1  Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  p.  520. 
8  Plutarch,  De  Sera  Numinis  Vindicta  and  De  Genio  Socratis. 


14  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

again  to  earth.  Even  the  daemons  may  incur  this  last 
fate.  These  and  similar  myths  express  in  poetical  and 
imaginative  form  the  kind  of  theodicy  which  the  religious 
mind  of  the  Greek  was  at  this  time  prepared  to  accept. 
They  have  an  obvious  resemblance  to  some  Christian 
pictures  of  judgment ;  but  it  was  not  till  theology  came 
under  the  rigid  discipline  of  the  Roman  Church  that 
these  visions  of  the  invisible  became  authoritative  maps 
of  the  undiscovered  country  and  prophecies  of  future 
events. 

Philo  believes  that  '  immortal  life  will  receive  the 
pious  dead,  but  eternal  death  the  impious  living.'1  The 
Soul  is  in  its  nature  immortal ;  it  cannot  perish  with 
the  decaying  body.  But  God,  who  '  renders  everything 
by  balance  and  weight/  ordains  that  every  Soul  shall 
reap  what  it  has  sown.  The  just  punishment  of  sin  is 
not  physical  torture,  but  the  inward  furies  of  passion  and 
guiltiness.  The  true  hell  is  the  life  of  the  wicked  man. 
This  doctrine  was  especially  taught  by  the  Epicureans, 
and  is  not  uncommon  in  classical  literature.  But  Philo 
holds  that  the  punishment  of  living  death — the  state  of 
uttermost  grief,  terror,  and  despair,  is  continued  and 
increased  after  death.  There  are  some  for  whom  there  is 
no  forgiveness.2  Philo  says  nothing  of  the  resurrection 
of  the  body,  nor  of  the  last  judgment,  nor  of  the  Messianic 
hopes  of  his  people. 

The  discussion  of  the  Christian  doctrine  or  doctrines 
of  immortality  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  book. 
But  the  writings  of  the  Alexandrian  school  of  Christian 
theology  throw  a  good  deal  of  light  on  Neoplatonism, 
and  they  are  perhaps  especially  useful  in  relation  to  the 
problems  of  human  immortality.  Clement  and  Origen 
represent  not  so  much  Christian  tradition  as  the  atmo- 
sphere of  learned  and  educated  thought  at  Alexandria 
in  the  half  century  before  Plotinus  migrated  to  Rome. 
They  were  loyal  and,  in  intention  at  least,  orthodox 

1  Philo,  Post.  Cain.  n. 

2  See  references  in  Drummond,  Philo  Judaeus,  Vol.  2,  322-324. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  15 

Christians  ;  but  there  was  at  Alexandria  none  of  that 
antipathy  to  secular  culture  which  at  other  times  and 
places  has  erected  a  barrier  between  sacred  and  profane 
studies.  Origen  in  particular  is  a  valuable  help  towards 
the  understanding  of  Plotinus,  both  when  they  agree 
and  when  they  differ. 

The  future  life  had  from  the  first  a  far  greater  im- 
portance in  Christian  teaching  than  it  has  in  Philo  or 
any  other  Jewish  writer.  The  destruction  of  the  world 
by  fire,  the  resurrection  of  the  dead  with  their  bodies,  the 
great  assize,  the  eternal  reward  of  the  good  and  the  eternal 
punishment  of  the  bad,  were  in  the  first  age  of  the  Church 
dogmas  accepted  without  being  subjected  to  philosophical 
analysis.  While  the  Messianic  hope  lasted,  the  '  end  of 
the  age  '  seemed  so  near  that  small  interest  was  taken 
in  the  questions  whether  the  Soul  is  essentially  immortal, 
and  what  will  be  its  condition  between  the  day  of  death 
and  the  general  resurrection.  It  was  only  when  educated 
Gentiles,  and  Jews  of  the  Dispersion,  who  had  never  been 
ardent  Messianists,  became  interested  in  Christianity, 
that  the  philosophical  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the 
Soul  had  to  be  set  by  the  side  of  the  religious  prophecy  of 
the  resurrection  of  the  body. 

Christian  teaching  was  unanimous  in  insisting  that 
in  some  way  or  other  the  whole  man,  and  not  merely  his 
ghost,  is  immortal.  The  doctrine  of  St.  Paul  had  been 
that  though  flesh  and  blood  cannot  inherit  the  kingdom 
of  God,  a  '  spiritual  body/  on  the  nature  of  which  he  does 
not  speculate,  is  prepared  for  everyone,  or  for  all  the 
redeemed.  The  bodies  of  those  who  happen  to  be  alive 
at  the  end  of  the  existing  order  will  be  '  changed '  into 
this  spiritual  essence.  Great  confusion  prevailed  in  the 
early  church  on  the  whole  subject.  Some  Christian 
thinkers  were  strangely  and  frankly  materialistic.  Ter- 
tullian  says  that  the  Soul  is  'nothing  if  it  is  not  body.'1 
Souls  are  '  kept  in  the  lower  regions  till  the  day  of  the 
Lord/  a  vague  phrase  which  is  meant  to  cover  his  real 
1  Tertullian,  De  Anima,  7  :  '  nihil  si  non  corpus.' 


16  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  PLOTINUS 

conviction  that  the  Soul  dies  with  the  body,  and  that 
both  are  raised  again  by  miracle  at  the  last  day.1  This, 
however,  he  could  not  openly  admit ;  and  so  he  speaks 
of  the  Soul  as  remaining  in  a  deep  slumber  till  the 
day  of  judgment.  Justin  condemns  as  unchristian  the 
doctrine  that  the  Soul  is  taken  to  heaven  at  the  death 
of  the  body  ;  such  a  view  does  away  with  the  necessity 
of  a  resurrection.  Theophilus  will  not  answer  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  Soul  is  mortal  or  immortal  by  nature  ; 
'  it  is  naturally  neither,  but  is  capable  of  becoming  either 
one  or  the  other.'2  A  common  view  seems  to  have  been 
that  Souls  are  by  nature  both  material  and  mortal,  but 
that  those  who  receive  the  Spirit  (Trvevjma)  live  for  ever. 
Athenagoras  has  the  curious  argument  that  it  would  be 
unjust  for  the  Soul  alone  to  suffer  for  sins  which  the  body 
incited  it  to  commit.  Theology  was  in  an  awkward 
dilemma,  especially  about  the  '  intermediate  state.' 
Either  the  souls  of  the  saints  and  martyrs  have  perished, 
and  must  wait  for  their  resuscitation  till  the  last  day, 
which  was  receding  into  a  very  dim  future,  or  the  Soul 
must  be  capable  of  living  apart  from  the  body,  as  a 
superior  and  deathless  principle  subsisting  in  its  own 
right,  which  was  precisely  the  point  at  issue  between 
Platonism  and  Christianity. 

Such  was  the  problem  which  the  Christian  school  of 
Alexandria  endeavoured  to  solve.  With  some  reserva- 
tions, they  adopt  the  Greek  conception  of  immortality, 
as  a  natural  endowment  of  the  Soul.  The  spirits  in  prison, 
to  whom  Christ  preached,  could  accept  His  message  more 
easily  because  they  were  delivered  from  the  burden  of  the 
flesh.  After  death,  souls  are  sent  to  purgatory,  where 
God,  who  hates  no  one  and  inflicts  no  vindictive  punish- 

1  What  other  conclusion  can  we  draw  from  such  words  as  the 
following  :  'Mors,  si  non  semel  tota  est,  non  est.  Si  quid  animae  re- 
manserit,  vita  est ;  non  vitae  magis  miscebitur  mors  quam  diei  nox. 
.  .  .  Anima  indivisibilis,  ut  immortalis,  etiam  indivisibilem  mortem 
exigit  credi,  non  quasi  mortali,  sed  quasi  indivisibili  animae  indivisibili- 
ter  accidentem.'  Z>£  Anima,  51. 

8  Theophilus,  Ad  Ant.  2.  24. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  17 

rnents,  chastises  them  till  they  repent.  The  Logos  is 
the  Saviour  of  all.  Our  life  in  time  is  essentially  an 
education,  and  our  education  does  not  cease  when  we 
die.  It  is  continued  till  we  are  fit  to  enjoy  the  beatific 
vision.  It  would  be  possible  to  quote  statements  of 
Clement  which  do  not  agree  with  these  views.  He  admits 
frankly  that  he  does  not  write  down  all  that  he  thinks  ; 
there  is  an  esoteric  Christianity  which  is  not  for  everybody. 
But  it  is  plain  that  he  leans  towards  the  doctrines  which 
Origen  develops  more  boldly.  The  resurrection  of  the 
body  is  an  otiose  dogma  in  his  creed.  The  body  of 
Christ,  all  Christians  were  bound  to  believe,  was  resusci- 
tated ;  but  the  Alexandrians  did  not  believe  that  His 
body  was  like  ours. 

Origen  takes  the  step  which  to  every  Greek  seemed 
the  logical  corollary  of  belief  in  immortality — he  taught 
the  pre-exist ence  of  Souls.  The  Soul  is  immaterial,  and 
therefore  has  neither  beginning  of  days  nor  end  of  life. 
Further,  it  must  be  immortal  because  it  can  think  Divine 
thoughts  and  contemplate  Divine  truths  ;  its  love  of 
God  and  desire  for  Him  are  also  signs  that  it  belongs  to 
the  eternal  world.  So  convincing  is  this  Platonic  faith 
to  him,  that  he  cannot  restrain  his  impatience  at  the 
crude  beliefs  of  traditionalists  about  the  last  day  and  the 
resurrection  of  the  dead.  The  predictions  in  the  Gospels 
cannot  have  been  intended  literally.  How  can  material 
bodies  be  recompounded,  every  particle  of  which  has 
passed  into  many  other  bodies  ?  To  which  body  do  these 
molecules  belong  ?  So,  he  says  scornfully,  men  fall  into 
the  lowest  depths  of  absurdity,  and  take  refuge  in  the 
pious  assurance  that  '  everything  is  possible  with  God.'1 
We  shall  not  need  teeth  to  masticate  food  in  the  next 
world,  and  we  need  not  suppose  that  God  will  provide 
the  wicked  with  new  teeth  *  to  gnash  with/2  The  Chris- 
tian doctrines  of  the  destruction  of  the  world^by  fire  and 

1  Origen,  in  Psalmos,  533,  rivos  o$v  &TTCU  <rwyua  iv  rrj  di/aarcura  ;  nai 
OUTOJS  et'j  fivQov  0\uap/ar  (rvpfiijcreTai  ^uTriTrreif,  /cat  ^tera  rairras  ras  diropiat  cirt 
76  iravra.  Sward.  eJVcu  rw  0ea3  KQ.TQ.<f)£vyo\)<n.  *  Id.  p.  535. 

II,— C 


i8  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

of  the  resurrection  of  the  dead  are  interpreted  on  the 
lines  not  of  Platonism  but  of  Stoicism.  The  Stoics 
taught  that  the  end  of  a  world-period  is  brought  about 
by  a  conflagration  (eKTrvpcocri?)  ;  and  that  creation  and 
renovation  are  the  work  of  the  '  seminal  Logoi.'  These 
Stoical  doctrines  in  truth  are  difficult  to  reconcile  either 
with  Platonism  or  Christianity  ;  but  Origen  had  a  difficult 
course  to  steer  between  the  Gnostics,  who  thought  that 
the  Soul  can  exist  without  a  body,  and  the  simple  be- 
lievers— really  the  inheritors  of  the  Jewish  Messianic 
tradition — who  hoped  for  such  a  resurrection  as  that 
which  Ezekiel  saw  in  the  valley  of  dry  bones,  in  prepara- 
tion for  a  new  life  under  quasi-terrestrial  conditions.  So 
he  adopted  the  Stoic  doctrine  of  the  '  conflagration  '  in 
a  manner  which  we  will  consider  presently,  and  main- 
tained that  in  each  body  there  is  a  '  seminal  Logos,' 
a  principle  of  individuation,  which  is  sown  in  the  earth  like 
a  seed,  and  finally  produces  another  body  true  to  type.1 
But  this  involves  him  in  great  difficulties.  Samuel  in  the 
Old  Testament  appears  to  Saul  in  the  form  of  an  old 
man ;  Moses  and  Elijah  were  seen  at  the  Transfiguration 
in  their  former  shapes.  It  is  plain,  then,  that  the  Spirit 
is  clothed  with  a  spiritual  body  before  the  resurrection, 
and  the  general  resurrection  is  tacitly  abandoned.  More- 
over, though  the  seminal  Logoi  are  '  forms,'  the  spiritual 
body  which  they  create  must  be  totally  unlike  the 
forms  which  we  know  here.  If  we  were  destined  to  live 
in  the  water,  we  should  have  to  be  changed  into  fish  ; 
since  we  are  to  live  in  the  spiritual  world,  we  must  have 
an  ethereal  body,  without  organs  or  limbs  which  will  be 
useless  in  that  state  of  existence.  Lastly,  what  part  ot 
our  personality  is  the  '  seminal  Logos  '  ?  It  cannot  be 
Spirit,  and  it  cannot  be  Body.  Is  it  then  the  Soul  ?  But 
if  it  is  buried  in  the  earth  like  a  grain  of  wheat,  we  are 

1  Jerome,  an  unfair  critic,  no  doubt,  says  that  Origen  taught 
'  corporales  substantias  penitus  dilapsuras,  aut  certe  in  fine  omnium 
hoc  esse  futura  corpora  quod  nunc  et  aether  et  caelum  et  si  quid  aliud 
corpus  sincerius  et  purius  intelligi  potest.' 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  19 

driven  back  to  Stoic  materialism.  The  inherent  contra- 
dictions of  traditional  eschatology  have  never  been 
more  forcibly  exhibited,  precisely  because  Origen  was 
not  the  man  to  glide  over  difficulties. 

As  for  the  '  conflagration  '  and  the  '  end  of  the  age,' 
Origen,  as  is  well  known,  follows  the  Stoics  in  teaching, 
quite  contrary  to  the  Christian  tradition,  that  there  will 
be  a  series  of  world-orders.  But  whereas  Greek  philosophy 
could  admit  no  prospect  except  a  perpetual  repetition 
of  the  same  alternate  evolution  and  involution,  a  never- 
ending  systole  and  diastole  of  the  cosmic  life,  Origen 
holds  that  there  is  a  constant  upward  progress.  Each 
world-order  is  better  than  the  last,  and  the  whole  process 
is  working  out  a  single  design  of  the  Creator.  The  con- 
flagration is  really  a  purifying  fire  ;  though,  Origen  adds, 
it  would  not  do  to  tell  this  to  everybody,  since  the  fear 
of  endless  perdition  exercises  a  salutary  restraint  on  many 
sinners.  But  the  truth  is,  that  as  all  Spirits  were  created 
blameless,  all  must  at  last  return  to  their  original  perfec- 
tion.1 The  education  of  Souls  is  continued  in  successive 
worlds. 

A  comparison  of  Origen  and  Plotinus,  who  resembled 
each  other  in  their  devotion  to  truth,  and  in  lovableness 
and  nobility  of  character,  cannot  fail  to  be  instructive. 
In  treating  of  the  all-important  subject  with  which  we 
are  now  concerned,  Origen  is  beset  by  difficulties  from 
which  Plotinus  is  free.  He  has  not  only  to  reconcile, 
if  he  can,  the  conflicting  opinions  of  the  great  Greek 
philosophers ;  he  has  to  solve,  if  possible,  the  most  for- 
midable problem  of  Christian  theology — how  to  make 
room  for  the  Jewish  philosophy  of  history  by  the  side 
of  the  Platonic  philosophy  of  eternal  life.  He  falls  into 
contradictions,  as  wre  have  seen  ;  but  it  is  while  strug- 
gling with  these  that  he  strikes  out  the  noble  theory  of 

1  Even  if  Origen  was  harassed  into  denying  the  logical  consequence 
of  his  doctrine  (Rufinus,  De  Adtilteratione  Libronim  Origenis),  that  the 
devil  himself  will  ultimately  be  saved,  it  is  plain  that  no  other  con- 
clusion can  be  drawn  from  his  arguments.  For  Origen 's  defence  against 
this  charge  see  Denis,  pp.  378-388, 


20  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

a  stairway  of  worlds,  superimposed  one  on  another  not 
in  space  but  in  time,  and  leading  up,  by  their  ascend- 
ing grades  of  perfection,  to  the  consummation  in  which 
'  God  shall  be  all  in  all.'  The  ascent  of  the  Soul,  which 
Plotinus  describes  as  an  inner  process  of  the  individual, 
is  in  Origen's  philosophy  writ  large  in  the  life-history  of 
the  universe  itself.  It  is  as  if  the  Universal  Soul  of  the 
Neoplatonic  system  were  travelling,  with  all  individual 
Souls,  towards  the  heavenly  city.  For  Plotinus,  the 
Universal  Soul  can  always  pray  and  aspire,  but  it  seems 
to  have  no  history.  Whether  Origen's  vision  of  cosmic 
progress  is  tenable  scientifically  is  another  question.  In 
the  history  of  philosophy  his  theory  holds  a  place  as  an 
interesting  attempt  to  give  the  world  a  real  history, 
within  the  Divine  scheme,  without  at  the  same  time  ad- 
mitting progress  or  development  in  God  Himself. 

The  main  passage  in  which  Plotinus  deals  with  the 
immortality  of  the  Soul  is  the  seventh  chapter  of  the 
Fourth  Ennead.  There  are,  he  says,  three  possible 
answers  to  the  question  whether  the  Souls  of  individuals 
are  immortal.  Either  the  individual,  as  such,  is  immortal  ; 
or  he  entirely  perishes,  or  part  of  him  perishes  and 
another  part  lives  for  ever.  Man  is  not  a  simple  being, 
but  is  compounded  of  Body  and  Soul.  That  the  body  is 
dissoluble  needs  no  proof.  If  then  the  body  is  an  integral 
part  of  us,  we  cannot  be  entirely  immortal.  But  it  is  a 
truer  view  that  the  relation  of  the  Soul  to  the  Body  is 
like  that  of  Form  to  Matter,  or  of  an  artificer  to  his 
instrument.  The  Soul  is  the  man  himself. 

The  Soul  exists  in  its  own  right  ;  it  neither  comes  into 
existence  nor  perishes.  It  is  itself  the  principle  of  life, 
the  '  one  and  simple  activity  in  living/1  and  as  such  it  is 
indestructible.  Can  anyone  doubt  this,  asks  Plotinus, 
who  considers  the  capacity  of  the  Soul  to  behold  and 
contemplate  pure  and  eternal  realities,  to  see  even  the 
world  that  is  illuminated  by  Spirit,  to  mount  up  to  God 


4.  7.  9—12,  upx^J  Kivrjireui,  luyv  r<$  ^u^i'^y  <rw,ua7C  diSowa.  -  <£i'<m  rty 
<7a  —  /u'a  Kal  «TT\^  cvepyeia  tv  T$  ^v. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  21 

and  gaze  on  His  likeness  within  itself  ?  Purification  and 
education  bring  us  to  the  knowledge  of  the  highest 
things  ;  and  all  these  spiritual  glories  are  beheld  by  Soul, 
not  as  things  outside  itself,  but  as  things  in  which  it 
shares,  as  its  own  inmost  nature.  The  Soul  has  life  and 
being  in  itself,  and  life  can  never  die.  Even  the  lower 
animals  and  plants,  since  they  are  sharers  in  Soul,  must 
have  an  immortal  principle  in  them. 

The  Soul,  when  separated  from  the  body,  no  longer 
exercises  its  lower  functions,  which  are  not  extinguished 
by  death,  but  survive  potentially  only.1  Such  faculties 
as  opinion,  reasoning,  and  memory  are  not  used  in  the 
spiritual  world,  not  because  they  need  bodily  organs, 
but  because  they  are  superfluous  under  the  conditions  of 
eternal  life.  Disembodied  Souls  may  still  act  on  the 
world,  benefiting  mankind  by  revealing  the  future  in 
oracles.2 

As  for  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  Greek  thought 
would  have  been  horrified  at  the  idea  that  the  Soul 
will  be  swathed  to  all  eternity  in  what  Empedocles 
called  the  '  alien  garment  of  flesh/  Resurrection,  says 
Plotinus  explicitly,  is  an  awakening  from  the  body,  not 
with  the  body.3  Flesh  and  blood  cannot  inherit  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  neither  can  corruption  inherit  in- 
corrupt ion.  But  Plotinus  does  not  need  the  hypothesis 
of  an  ethereal  '  spiritual  body/  He  does  not  help  out 
his  notion  of  the  spiritual  world  by  peopling  it  with 
creatures  in  a  semi-gaseous  condition — an  expedient 
which  had  been  tried  by  many  of  the  Stoics.  His  rejection 
of  a  bodily  resurrection  is  a  necessary  consequence  of 
the  very  doctrine  on  which  he  bases  the  immortality  of 
the  Soul.  Nothing  that  has  true  being  can  ever  perish,4 
nor  can  it  ever  come  into  existence.  There  are  no  new 

1  6.  4.  16.  Whittaker  shows  that  there  was  some  hesitation  among 
the  later  Neoplatonists  as  to  the  survival  of  the  '  irrational  soul.' 

8  4-  7-  15-  3  3-  6-  6- 

*  We  may  compare  Browning's  "All  that  is  at  all  Lasts  ever  past 
recall";  and  Goethe's  "  Kein  Wesen  kann  zu  nichts  zerf alien,  Das 
Ewge  regt  sich  fort  in  alien." 


22          THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Souls — all  have  existed  from  eternity.  But  there  are 
new  bodies ;  therefore  bodies  have  not  true  ova- la,  and 
bodies  must  die.  The  lower  Soul,  he  says  in  one  place,1 
when  it  has  been  illuminated  by  the  higher,  may  accom- 
pany it  after  it  leaves  the  body ;  but  the  fate  of  the 
lower  Soul  depends  on  our  manner  of  living. 

It  is  not  easy  to  answer  the  question  how  far 
individuality  is  maintained  Yonder.  For  Plotinus 
unity  is  the  source  and  highest  character  of  true  exist- 
ence, separation  the  very  sign  of  imperfection  and 
defect  of  reality.  Soul  Yonder,  he  says  explicitly,  is 
undifferentiated  and  undivided.2  Thus  individuality 
in  heaven  is  hardly  a  prize  to  be  striven  for.  And  yet 
Souls  are  Logoi  of  Spirits,  and  each  represents  a  distinct 
entity  in  the  spiritual  world.  This  distinctness  can 
never  be  destroyed.  But  the  distinctions  of  Souls, 
though  not  lost,  are  latent  in  the  world  of  Spirit.3  Dis- 
carnate  Souls  are  in  a  sense  absorbed  into  the  Universal 
Soul,  and  help  it  to  govern  the  world.4  Plotinus  believes 
in  and  describes  a  blessed  state  in  which  the  Souls  of 
just  men  made  perfect  live  in  joy  and  felicity ;  but  the 
condition  and  crown  of  this  felicity  is  precisely  their 
liberation  from  all  that  here  below  shuts  them  off  from 
the  most  complete  communion  with  each  other. 

The  question  is  not  whether  in  a  state  of  blessedness 
the  circumference  is  indefinitely  enlarged,  but  whether 
the  centre  remains.  These  centres  are  centres  of  con- 
sciousness ;  and  consciousness  belongs  to  the  world 
of  will ;  it  comes  into  being  for  the  purposes  of  will, 
when  the  will  has  to  grapple  with  new  conditions.  It  is 
not  conterminous  with  life  ;  there  is  a  life  below  con- 
sciousness, and  there  is  a  life  above  what  we  mean  by 
consciousness.  The  metaphor  of  a  centre  of  conscious- 
ness is  purely  spatial,  and  the  idea  of  a  continuing  state 

1  4.7.  14.    Contrast  the  medieval  dictum,  'Omnia  tcndunt  natural- 
iter  in  non  esse.' 

2  4.  I.  I,  if/v^r]  (K€i  aSiOiKpiTOS  /cat  d 

3  6.  4.  1 6,  OVK  tcm.v  evepyfiq.  oi>5'  aC 
«  4.  8.  4;    3.  2.  4. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  23 

of  consciousness  is  purely  temporal.  In  the  spiritual 
sphere  the  problem  may  be  actually  meaningless. 
Spiritual  existence  has  an  infinite  richness  of  content ; 
the  eternal  world  is  no  '  undifferentiated  jelly/  And  this 
rich  life  implies  reciprocal  action  among  Souls.  '  They 
see  themselves  in  each  other/  They  have  then  character- 
istics of  their  own  which  are  not  merged  in  the  unity  of 
all  spiritual  life.  We  may  further  assume  that  since  every 
life  in  this  world  represents  a  unique  purpose  in  the 
Divine  mind,  and  since  all  psychic  ends,  though  striven 
for  in  time,  have  their  source  and  consummation  in 
eternity,  this,  the  inner  meaning  and  reality  of  each 
individual  life,  remains  as  a  distinct  fact  in  the  world  of 
Spirit. 

y '  Mysticism/  says  Keyserling,  '  whether  it  likes  it 
or  not,  ends  in  an  impersonal  immortality/  But  imper- 
sonality is  a  negative  conception,  like  timelessness. 
What  is  negated  in  '  timelessness  '  is  not  the  reality  of 
the  present,  but  the  unreality  of  the  past  and  future. 
Time  is  only  forbidden  to  devour  itself.  So  impersonality, 
for  the  mystic,  means  simply  the  liberation  of  the  idea 
of  personality — it  is  allowed  to  expand  as  far  as  it  can. 
How  far  that  is,  we  admit  that  we  do  not  know  clearly  ; 
but  the  expansion  is  throughout  an  enrichment,  not  an 
impoverishment.  When  Keyserling  adds :  '  The  in- 
stinct of  immortality  really  affirms  that  the  individual 
is  not  ultimate/  we  entirely  agree  with  him.  If  this  were 
not  true,  how  could  men  die  for  an  idea  ? 

Souls  which  have  lived  unrighteously  are  sent  into  other 
bodies  as  a  punishment,  and  a  man's  daemon  or  guardian 
angel  may  chastise  his  Soul  when  it  is  out  of  the  body.1 
Punishments  are  proportioned  by  Divine  law  to  offences.2 
But  the  notion  that  virtue  is  hereafter  rewarded  by 
pleasure  and  comfort,  while  vice  is  chastised  by  torments, 
is  repugnant  to  the  later  Platonism.  Plotinus  says 
severely  that  if  any  man  desires  from  a  virtuous  life  any- 
thing beyond  itself,  it  is  not  a  virtuous  life  that  he 

1  3.  4  6;  I.  6.  6.  2  4.  3.  24. 


24  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

desires.  This  was  the  opinion  of  the  Alexandrian  school 
generally.  Origen  speaks  with  contempt  of  those  Chris- 
tians who  take  literally  the  temporal  promises  and  threats 
of  the  Old  Testament.  He  is  ashamed  to  think  that  the 
heathen,  whose  moral  sense  is  more  advanced  than  to 
accept  such  inducements  to  a  virtuous  life,  may  hear  of 
the  teaching  which  is  commonly  given  in  the  churches. 
Origen  will  never  believe  that  health,  power,  riches,  or 
other  advantages  of  the  same  kind,  are  the  end  of  virtue  ; 
to  say  this  would  be  to  admit  that  these  vulgar  rewards 
are  of  greater  worth  than  virtue  itself.1  The  bad  man, 
says  Plotinus,2  is  doomed  to  dwell  with  shadows  here  and 
hereafter  ;  he  is  punished  by  being  depraved  in  his  Soul 
and  degraded  into  a  lower  place  in  the  scale  of  being.3 
We  must,  however,  remember  that  for  Plotinus,  though 
not  for  Proclus,  it  is  only  the  lower  part  of  the  Soul  that 
can  sin  and  be  punished.4  This  inferior  part  he  some- 
times calls  'the  image  of  the  Soul.'5  The  higher  Soul  is 
sinless. 

How  far,  it  may  be  asked,  does  this  doctrine  of  the 
Soul's  destiny  affect  what  Christian  theology  calls  salva- 
tion ?  Can  the  Soul  be  lost  ?  The  answer  would  seem 
to  be  that  the  self  which  we  call '  I '  when  we  are  thinking 
of  our  future  prospects  in  time  or  eternity,  may  or  may 
not  be  identical  with  the  higher  Soul  which  has  its  place 
indefectibly  in  the  spiritual  world.  We  gain  our  Souls 
by  identifying  our  personal  interests,  our  thoughts  and 
actions,  our  affections  and  hopes,  with  this  pure  and 
eternal  essence,  which  is  ours  if  we  will.  The  Soul  of  the 
bad  man  may  be  lost,  but  not  the  Soul  which  he  would 
have  called  his  if  he  had  not  been  a  bad  man.  The  Soul 
which  cannot  be  lost  is  that  which  he  calls  '  Spirit  in 
Soul '  (vov$  cv  V^Xtf)-  So  in  Origen  the  Spirit  seems 
to  be  an  impersonal  power  which  is  and  is  not  part  of  the 
Soul.  '  If  the  Soul  is  disobedient  to  the  Spirit,  if  it 

1  Cf.  (e.g.)  his  Commentary  on  Psalm  4. 

8  i.  6.  8.  3  3.  2.  4,  8.  *  i.  i.  12. 

•  i.  i.  ii  ;   4.  3.  27,  32. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  25 

obstinately  rebels  against  it,  the  two  are  separated  after 
the  Soul  leaves  the  body.'  Similarly,  immortality  in  the 
vulgar  sense,  the  survival  of  the  empirical  ego,  is  in  a  sense 
a  goal  which  we  may  win  or  lose,  or  win  imperfectly.  So 
far  as  we  can  make  ourselves,  during  our  earthly  life, 
instruments  for  the  purposes  of  God  which  He  intends  to 
realise  through  our  means,  we  give  indestructible  value 
and  reality  to  our  life.  We  are  what  we  love  and  care 
ab©ut.  'All  souls,'  says  Plotinus,1  'are  potentially  all 
things.  Each  of  them  is  characterised  by  the  faculty 
which  it  chiefly  exercises.  One  is  united  to  the  spiritual 
world  by  activity,  another  by  thought,  another  by  desire. 
The  souls,  thus  contemplating  different  objects,  are  and 
become  that  which  they  contemplate.'  There  are  others, 
however,  which  contemplate  only  some  vain  phantom 
of  time,  soon  to  pass  into  nothingness.  Those  who  so 
live  are  not  living  the  life  of  Souls  in  any  true  sense.  For 
it  is  within  our  true  selves  that  the  world  and  we  as  in  it 
are  passing  away.  Otherwise  we  should  not  be  aware  of 
its  passing. 

The  supreme  importance  of  human  immortality,  not 
only  for  the  philosophy  which  is  the  subject  of  this  book, 
but  for  any  philosophy  of  religion,  must  be  my  justifica- 
tion for  offering  some  further  reflexions  upon  it  before 
ending  this  lecture. 

Immortality  may  be  understood  in  three  ways.  It 
may  mean  unending  continuance  in  time  ;  or  a  state 
which  is  absolutely  timeless  ;  or  a  state  which  transcends 
time,  but  for  which  the  time-series  has  a  meaning  and 
importance.  The  popular  notion  of  eternity  is  that  it  is 
a  series  of  moments  snipped  off  at  one  end  but  not  at  the 
other.  '  This  life  '  is  a  similar  series  snipped  off  at  both 
ends.  The  individual  comes  into  being  at  one  point  of 
time,  and  is  '  launched  into  eternity '  at  another.  His 
birth  is  commonly  regarded  as  a  quantitative  addition 
to  the  sum  of  existence.  This  belief  hardly  belongs  to 
philosophy.  It  is  part  of  the  naive  conception  of  human 

1  4-  3-  8. 


26  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

survival  under  conditions  of  time  and  place,  which  popu- 
lar Christian  teaching,  in  fear  of  losing  the  elements  of 
strength  contributed  by  the  concrete  and  positive  Jewish 
tradition,  has  not  discouraged.  It  is  well  known  how  long 
the  geographical  heaven  and  hell  held  their  own  in  popu- 
lar belief — indeed  they  have  not  yet  ceased  to  hold  it. 
There  are  parts  of  Christendom  in  which  it  is  unorthodox 
to  deny  the  existence  of  a  subterranean  torture-house, 
which  in  the  Middle  Ages  furnished  a  plausible  explanation 
of  volcanic  eruptions.  Modern  astronomy  has  destroyed 
the  popular  Christian  cosmology,  and  has  thereby  pro- 
foundly modified  religious  belief ;  but  the  parallel 
doctrine  of  a  temporal  eternity  still  survives,  though  the 
difficulties  attending  it  are  no  less  formidable.  This 
doctrine  postulates  the  ultimate  reality  of  time  as  an  un- 
ending series  of  moments,  but  destroys  it  again  by  giving 
no  permanent  value  to  each  moment  as  it  passes.  The 
series  is  never  summed  and  leads  to  nothing.  Further, 
the  popular  notion  of  eternity  destroys  all  essential  con- 
nexion between  our  present  lives  and  our  future  state. 
We  are  to  be  rewarded  or  punished  ;  but  these  rewards 
and  punishments  are  the  award  of  a  tribunal,  and  are 
only  externally  connected  with  the  acts  of  which  the 
tribunal  takes  cognizance.  Nevertheless,  Kant  admits 
the  idea  of  an  unending  process,  adding  that  in  the  mind 
of  God  this  process  takes  the  form  of  a  timeless  attain- 
ment. But  an  unending  process  can  surely  not  be  the 
symbol  of  any  attainment  whatsoever.  If  any  purpose 
is  involved  in  it,  that  purpose  must  be  eternally  frustrate. 
The  idea  of  eternity  as  timeless  existence  is  clearly 
stated  by  Plato.  He  says  in  the  Timaeus  that  while  the 
Father  was  ordering  the  universe,  He  made,  out  of 
eternity,  which  abides  in  unity,  an  eternal  image  moving 
according  to  number,  which  we  call  time.  Past  and  future 
are  relations  of  time,  which  we  wrongly  ascribe  to  the 
Divine  essence.  '  We  say  that  it  was  and  shall  be,  though 
we  can  rightly  say  only  that  it  is/1  How  this  teaching 

1  Plato,  Timaeus,  37. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  27 

was  developed  by  Plotinus  will  be  seen  in  the  next 
chapter. 

The  problem  is  how  to  maintain  this  view  of  eternity 
as  supratemporal  existence,  without  either  sundering 
the  higher  and  lower  worlds  entirely  from  each  other,  or 
reducing  the  world  of  time  and  change  to  a  vain  shadow. 
The  view  of  Plotinus  is,  as  we  shall  see,  that  eternity  is 
the  sphere  of  the  ultimately  real,  above  the  forms  of 
space  and  time,  in  which  all  meanings  and  values,  all  real 
distinctions,  are  preserved,  and  in  which  the  Divine 
attributes  of  beauty,  goodness,  and  truth  are  fully  realised 
and  fully  operative.  The  Soul  determines  its  own  rank 
in  the  scale  of  being,  for  it  is  what  it  loves  and  desires 
and  thinks  about.  It  is  its  nature  to  aspire  to  the  eternal 
world,  to  endeavour  to  know  the  things  of  time  under 
the  form  of  eternity.  *  Our  mind,  so  far  as  it  under- 
stands, is  an  eternal  mode  of  thought.'1  We  should  add 
that  so  far  as  it  loves  the  true,  and  wills  the  good,  and 
sees  the  beautiful,  it  is  an  eternal  mode  of  life.  '  Whatever 
can  be  known  under  the  form  of  eternity  is  to  that  extent 
eternal,'  as  Spinoza  says  again.  All  that  participates  in 
the  attributes  of  the  eternal  world,  as  they  are  known 
to  us — namely,  goodness,  truth,  and  beauty,  can  be 
known  under  the  form  of  eternity.  By  participation  in 
goodness  I  mean  a  certain  disposition  of  the  intellect, 
will,  and  feelings.  Intellectual  goodness  is  a  just  apprecia- 
tion of  values,  positive  and  negative.  Goodness  of  the 
will  is  a  steady  desire  and  purpose  to  make  the  positive 
values  actual  in  the  world  around  and  within  us,  and  to 
suppress  the  negative.  In  feeling,  goodness  is  an  emo- 
tional attraction  towards  all  that  is  pure  and  noble  and 
lovely  and  of  good  report.  By  truth  or  wisdom  I  mean 
the  correspondence  of  idea  with  fact.  Intellectual 
wisdom  is  the  knowledge  of  the  laws,  physical,  psychical, 
and  spiritual,  by  which  the  world  is  governed.  In  the 
will,  it  is  consent  to  and  active  co-operation  with  these 
laws,  which  are  its  own  laws,  not  imposed  from  outside, 

1  Spinoza. 


28  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

but  created  by  the  Divine  wisdom  itself.  This  consent 
and  co-operation  constitute  the  freedom  of  the  will.  In 
feeling,  it  is  the  love  of  God's  law.  By  beauty  I  mean 
the  expression  of  a  true  idea  under  an  appropriate  form. 
As  in  the  two  other  cases,  there  is  a  beauty  of  thought, 
of  action,  and  of  feeling. 

It  is  by  living  resolutely  (as  Goethe  said)  in  the  whole, 
the  good,  and  the  beautiful,  that  the  Soul  wins  its  eternal 
life.  As  we  rise  to  this  sphere,  we  apprehend  more  and 
more  significant  facts  about  existence.  The  lower  facts 
are  not  lost  or  forgotten,  but  they  fall  into  their  true 
place,  on  a  greatly  reduced  scale.  Mere  time-succession, 
as  well  as  local  position,  becomes  relatively  unimportant. 
The  date  and  duration  of  life  are  seen  to  be  very  insig- 
nificant facts.  Individuality,  as  determined  by  local 
separation  in  different  bodies,  and  not  on  distinctions  of 
character,  is  seen  to  be  a  very  small  matter.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  great  unselfish  interests,  such  as 
science  and  love  of  knowledge  of  all  kinds,  the  love  of 
art  and  beauty  in  all  its  forms,  and  above  all  goodness 
in  its  purest  form — unselfish  affection — are  seen  to  be 
the  true  life  of  the  Soul.  In  attaining  this  life  it  has  in 
a  sense  to  pass  out  of  the  normal  soul-life  into  a  higher 
sphere,  not  dominated  by  time  :  it  has  passed  from  death 
unto  life,  and  enjoys  eternal  life  though  in  the  midst  of 
time.  Christ  says  quite  explicitly  that  we  can  only  save 
our  Souls  by  losing  them ;  that  is  to  say,  the  Soul  must 
sacrifice  what  seem  at  the  time  to  be  its  own  interests, 
in  the  service  of  the  higher  life  which  it  will  one  day  call 
its  own.  The  Soul  thus  enters  heaven  by  '  ascending 
in  heart  and  mind  '  to  '  the  things  that  are  above  ' — 
above  itself. 

The  religious  faith  in  immortality  is  the  faith  that  all 
true  values  are  valid  always  and  everywhere  ;  that  the 
order  of  the  universe  is  just,  rational,  and  beautiful ;  and  ' 
that  those  principles  which  exalt  us  above  ourselves  and 
open  heaven  to  us  are  the  attributes  of  the  Creator  in 
whom  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  29 


Transmigration  of  Souls  (TraXtyyevecrta.) 

I  shall  not  follow  the  fashion  and  discuss  the  survivals 
of  totemism  in  civilised  religions.  -  Researches  into  the 
psychology  of  the  savage  are  interesting  to  the  anthro- 
pologist, and  would  have  some  importance  to  the  student 
of  comparative  religion,  if  we  could  have  any  confidence 
that  European  travellers  can  ever  really  understand  the 
mentality  of  primitive  races.  But  the  Platonist  and 
Aristotelian  can  have  no  sympathy  with  attempts  to 
poise  a  pyramid  on  its  apex.  For  us  the  nature  of  religion  I/ 
is  what  it  may  grow  into ;  and  our  starting-point,  if  we 
turn  to  history,  must  be  the  conceptions  of  early  civilised 
races.  In  this  case  we  begin  with  Egypt,  from  which, 
according  to  the  tradition  of  antiquity,  Pythagoras 
derived  his  doctrine.  In  Egypt  the  theory  of  transmigra- 
tion united  the  belief  in  retribution  after  death  with  the 
old  popular  notion  that  human  souls  can  enter  into  the 
bodies  of  lower  animals.  The  Egyptian  doctrine  differed 
from  the  Indian  in  three  ways  :  it  is  only  the  wicked 
who  are  doomed  by  the  Egyptian  theory  to  transmigra- 
tion ;  the  soul  ultimately  returns  into  human  form  ; 
and,  though  there  is  no  escape  from  the  cycle  when  once 
it  has  started,  the  Soul  may  gain  deliverance  after  return- 
ing to  human  form.1  In  India,  good  and  bad  alike  trans- 
migrate ;  and  there  is  no  deliverance  from  rebirths. 
Hence  the  Buddhist  revolt  against  the  doctrine.2  Em- 

1  Jevons,  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Religion,  p.  317. 

2  An  interesting  account   of   '  Modernist '    Buddhist  teaching  on 
Karma  will  be  found  in  David,  Le  Modernisme  Bouddhiste  (Paris,  1911). 
The  theory  of  Karma,  which  properly  means  '  action/  is  much  older 
than  Buddha.    In  Buddhism  its  basis  is  the  inexorable  law  of  psychical 
continuity.     Educated  Buddhists  do  not  believe  in  individual  retri- 
bution— e.g.  that  an  idiot  is  a  man  who  in  a  former  state  misused  his 
intellectual    faculties.      Buddhism    does    not    believe    in    permanent 
psychic  individuality.    Actions  and  their  consequences  are  indissolubly 
linked  together,  but  the  notion  of  individual  retribution  belongs  to  the 
'  illusion  of  the  ego/  which  this  philosophy  seeks  to  eradicate.    What 
we  call  a  person  is  only  the  transient  embodiment  of  past  activities. 
'  It  is  only  in  considering  the  whole  of  humanity  as  bound  together, 
like  the  parts  of  a  universal  whole,  that  we  can  seize  the  full  signifi- 


30  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

pedocles,  repeating  perhaps  the  teaching  of  Pythagoras 
himself,  says  that  the  cause  of  transmigration  is  sin,  that 
the  term  of  it  is  30,000  years,  and  that  finally  the  Soul 
will  become  a  god,  which  indeed  it  has  always  been. 
Pindar,  another  good  witness  to  early  Pythagorean 
teaching,  holds  that  only  the  bad  are  condemned  to 
transmigration,  the  good  being  admitted  to  a  state  of 
happiness  in  a  place  which  was  variously  described  as 
the  sky,  the  air,  Elysium,  or  Olympus. 

The  doctrine  of  transmigration  offers  us  '  chains  of 
personalities  linked  together  by  impersonal  transitions.'1 
Nothing  survives  except  the  bare  being  of  the  Soul,  and, 
we  may  add,  its  liabilities.  But  Plato  does  not  hold  the 
doctrine  in  an  uncompromising  form  :  Souls  do  not  all 
drink  enough  of  the  waters  of  Lethe  to  forget  every- 
thing ;  the  importance  of  '  recollection  '  in  his  writings 
is  well  known.  Leibnitz  thought  that  '  immortality 
without  recollection  is  ethically  quite  useless ' ;  and 
many  others  profess  that  such  an  immortality  would 
have  no  attractions  for  them.  But  others  would  be  satis- 
fied to  know  that  they  will  live  on  in  the  great  spiritual 
interests  with  which  they  identified  themselves  ;  they 
could  say  with  Browning,  '  Other  tasks  in  other  lives, 
God  willing.'  It  is  not  continuity  of  consciousness  which 
they  prize,  but  perpetuity  of  life  amid  the  eternal  ideas. 

The  doctrine  has  found  many  supporters  in  modern 
times.  The  philosophy  of  Krause  is  on  this  arid  some 
other  subjects  of  special  value  to  a  Neoplatonist.  Pflei- 

cance  of  the  doctrine  of  Karma  '  (quoted  from  Prof.  Narasu).  '  There 
are  no  creators  or  created,  and  men  are  not  real  beings  '  (Kuroda). 
Nevertheless,  liberation  from  the  bonds  of  the  past  is  possible.  '  If 
the  will  was  free,  it  would  be  impossible  to  change  our  character  by 
education.  Precisely  because  the  will  of  man  obeys  motives  and 
depends  on  causes,  he  can  transform  himself  by  changing  his  environ- 
ment and  regulating  the  motives  of  his  will '  (Narasu).  Karma,  so 
regarded,  is  impersonal  perpetuity,  modifiable  by  disinterested  volition. 
It  is  clear  that  Karma  and  Heaven-Hell  are  two  alternative  theodicies, 
which  cannot  be  blended  without  confusion.  If  we  adopt  the  former, 
punishment,  like  sin,  is  finite,  and  belief  in  eternal  life  is  quite  inde- 
pendent of  any  idea  of  compensation.  Attractive  as  the  belief  in 
reincarnation  is,  it  seems  to  have  no  intuitive  sanction. 
1  Bosanquet,  Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual,  p.  267. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  31 

derer,  who  writes  most  sympathetically  about  Krause, 
thus  sums  up  his  views  about  the  life  of  the  Soul.1  '  Man's 
whole  vocation  is  likeness  to  God  in  this  life,  or  the  un- 
folding of  his  godlike  essence  in  his  own  distinctive  way 
as  an  independent  active  being,  according  to  his  three 
faculties,  true  knowing,  blessed  feeling,  and  holy  willing 
and  doing.  That  man  may  know  himself  aright  it  is 
first  of  all  necessary  that  he  should  distinguish  aright 
what  he  is  as  spirit  and  what  he  is  as  body,  and  how 
these  two  are  related  to  each  other.  As  spirit,  man 
knows  himself  in  the  light  of  his  knowledge  of  God  to  be 
an  eternal,  unborn,  and  immortal  rational  being,  destined 
to  fulfil  in  infinite  time  his  divine  destiny  as  a  finite  spirit 
an  infinite  number  of  times  in  an  infinite  number  of  periods 
or  life-centres.  The  souls  of  men  upon  the  earth  are  the 
spirits  living  together  on  the  earth  with  individual  bodily 
natures  ;  they  form  a  part  of  the  infinite  spirit -realm 
of  the  universe,  which  suffers  neither  increase  nor  diminu- 
tion, but  lives  in  and  with  God  as  an  eternally  perfect 
organism  of  all  the  infinite  number  of  spirits.  Each 
separate  spirit  enters  by  union  with  a  body  upon  one  of 
its  infinite  number  of  life-periods,  develops  itself  to  its 
maturity,  and  then  declines  to  the  point  of  returning 
to  its  unity  in  God.  But  this  death  of  one  life-course  is 
at  the  same  time  a  beginning,  a  second  birth  into  a  new 
life-course/  The  doctrine  of  reincarnation  was  taught 
by  the  Manicheans  and  Cathari,  by  Giordano  Bruno  and 
the  theosophist  Van  Helmont.  Swendenborg  believed 
that  men  who  lead  bestial  lives  will  be  reincarnated  in 
the  forms  of  the  animals  which  they  resembled  in  charac- 
ter. Goethe  and  Lichtenberg  dallied  with  the  idea  of 
transmigration  more  or  less  seriously  ;  Hume  declared 
that  metempsychosis  is  the  only  doctrine  of  the  kind 
worthy  of  attention  by  a  philosopher  ;  Lessing  speaks 
respectfully  of  it,  without  being  himself  a  believer  ;  the 
friends  of  Lavater  at  Copenhagen  taught  the  doctrine, 
quite  in  the  manner  of  Pythagoras,  but  with  extra va- 

1  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Vol.  2, 


32  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

gancies  of  their  own.  Lavater  himself  had  been  King 
Josiah,  Joseph  of  Arimathaea,  and  Zwingli.  The  apostle 
Peter  had  come  to  life  again  as  Prince  Karl  of  Hesse. 
Schopenhauer  says  of  metempsychosis,  '  Never  will  a 
myth  be  more  closely  connected  with  philosophical 
truth.'  Ibsen  and  Maeterlinck  are  more  recent  sup- 
porters of  the  belief.1 

Plotinus,  as  we  have  seen,  says  that  the  true  awaken- 
ing of  the  Soul  is  the  awakening  from  the  body,  not  writh 
the  body.  Successive  reincarnations  are  like  one  dream 
after  another,  or  sleep  in  different  beds.2  It  is  a  univer- 
sal law  that  the  Soul  after  death  goes  where  it  has 
longed  to  be  ;3  it  '  goes  to  its  own  place/4  as  was  said 
of  Judas.  '  Particular  Souls  are  in  different  conditions. 
Soul,  as  Plato  says,  wanders  over  the  whole  heaven  in 
various  forms.  These  forms  are  the  sensitive,  the  rational, 
and  even  the  vegetative  (</>VTIKOI>)  .  The  dominating 
part  of  the  Soul  fills  the  function  which  belongs  to  it ; 
the  other  parts  remain  inactive  and  external.  In  man 
the  inferior  parts  do  not  rule,  but  they  are  present ; 
however,  it  is  not  always  the  highest  part  which  rules  ; 
the  lower  parts  also  have  their  place.  All  parts  work 
together,  but  it  is  the  best  part  which  determines  our 
Form  as  man.  When  the  Soul  leaves  the  body,  it  becomes 
that  faculty  which  it  has  developed  most.  That  is  why 
we  ought  to  flee  to  the  higher,  so  as  not  to  fall  into  the 
life  of  the  senses,  through  association  with  sense-images, 
nor  into  the  vegetative  life,  through  abandoning  our- 
selves to  the  pleasures  of  uncleanness  and  greediness  : 
we  must  rise  to  the  Universal  Soul,  to  Spirit,  to  God. 
Those  who  have  exercised  their  human  faculties  are  born 
again  as  men  ;  those  who  have  lived  only  the  life  of  the 
senses,  as  lower  animals.  The  choleric  become  wdld 
beasts,  with  bodies  suitable  to  their  character  ;  the  lust- 

1  Fourier  thought  that  the  souls  of  planets  will  be  reincarnated, 
like  those  of  individuals.  Leroux  is  another  Frenchman  who  has  held 
the  doctrine. 

*  3.  6.  6. 

*  ^.   3.   24,   etS  TOV  TrpOf'l]KOVTQ.  TOTTOJ'. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  33 

ful  and  greedy  become  lascivious  and  greedy  quadrupeds. 
The  merely  stupid  become  plants  ;  they  have  lived  like 
vegetables  in  this  life,  and  have  prepared  themselves 
only  to  be  turned  into  trees.  Those  who  have  been  too 
fond  of  music,  but  otherwise  have  lived  pure,  become 
singing  birds ;  unreasonable  tyrants,  if  they  have  no 
other  vice,  are  changed  into  eagles.  Dreamy  speculators 
who  occupy  themselves  with  high  things  above  their 
capacities  become  high-flying  birds.  The  man  who  has 
practised  the  civic  virtues  becomes  a  man  again ;  or  if 
he  has  been  indifferently  successful  in  this  pursuit,  he 
is  reborn  as  a  social  animal,  a  bee  for  instance.'1 

Plotinus  is  obviously  trying  his  hand  at  a  Platonic 
myth  in  this  passage,  and  he  seems,  for  once,  to  be  slightly 
amused  at  the  picture  which  he  is  drawing.  In  another 
passage2  he  shows  how  distributive  justice  may  be  exer- 
cised among  those  who  are  reincarnated  as  men.  Cruel 
masters  become  slaves ;  those  who  have  misused  their 
wealth  become  paupers.  The  murderer  is  murdered 
himself ;  the  ravisher  is  reborn  as  a  woman  and  suffers 
the  same  fate.  As  for  the  Souls  which  have  freed  them- 
selves from  the  contamination  of  the^flesh,  they  dwell 
'  where  is  reality  and  true  being  and  the  divine,  in  God  ; 
such  a  Soul  as  we  have  described  will  dwell  with  these 
and  in  God.  If  you  ask  where  they  will  be,  you  must 
ask  where  the  spirituarworld^is ;  and  you  will  not  find 
it  with  your  eyes.'3 

It  is  plain,  I  think,  that  Plotinus  does  not  take  the 
doctrine  of  reincarnation  very  seriously,  as  scientific 
truth.  He  is  inconsistent.  Sometimes  he  speaks  of  a 
purgatory  for  disembodied  Souls  ;4  sometimes  the  bad 
(as  we  have  seen)  are  reborn  as  lower  animals,  and  some- 
times retribution jn  kind  falls  upon  them  in  their  next  life 
as  human  beings?  Porphyry  and  lamblichus  both  refuse 
to  believe  that  human  Souls  are  ever  sent  to  inhabit  the 

,l  3-  4-  2.  2  3-  2.  13.  8  3-  4-  24. 

4  It  is  the  worst  Souls  which  are  punished  for  their  good  by  their 
daemon,  3.  4.  6  ;  4.  8.  5. 

II.— D 


34  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

bodies  of  beasts  and  birds  ;  and  these  two  do  not  con- 
tradict Plotinus  lightly.1  The  fact  is  that  Plotinus  is  not 
vitally  interested  either  in  the  question  of  individual 
survival  in  time,  or  in  that  of  rewards  and  punishments. 
As  Dr.  McTaggart  says2  of  Hegel,  '  he  never  attached 
much  importance  to  the  question  whether  Spirit  was 
eternally  manifested  in  the  same  persons,  or  in  a  succes- 
sion of  different  persons.1  Dr.  McTaggart  adds  that  '  no 
philosophy  can  be  justified  in  treating  this  question  as 
insignificant/  But  perhaps  Plotinus  and  Hegel  would 
agree  in  answering  that  it  is  not  so  much  insignificant  as 
meaningless. 

Dr.  McTaggart  is  a  strong  believer  in  reincarnation, 
and  his  chapter  on  '  Human  Immortality  '  is  very  instruc- 
tive. In  comparing  the  philosophy  of  Lotze  with  that  of 
Hegel,  he  blames  the  former  for  making  his  God  '  some- 
thing higher  than  the  world  of  plurality,  and  therefore 
something  more  than  the  unity  of  that  plurality.  .  .  . 
There  is  no  logical  equality  between  the  unity  which  is 
Lotze 's  God  and  the  plurality  which  is  his  world.  The 
plurality  is  dependent  on  the  unity,  but  not  the  unity  on 
the  plurality.  The  only  existence  of  the  world  is  in  God, 
but  God's  only  existence  is  not  in  the  world/  No  clearer 
statement  of  the  fundamental  difference  between  Hegel 
and  Plotinus  could  be  made.  The  view  of  Plotinus  is 
precisely  that  which  Dr.  McTaggart  blames  in  Lotze. 
Dr.  McTaggart  proceeds  to  say  that  on  this  theory  any 
demonstration  of  immortality  is  quite  impossible.  That 
is  to  say,  unless  I  am  as  necessary  to  God  as  God  is  to  me, 
there  can  be  no  guarantee  that  I  have  any  permanent 
place  in  the  scheme  of  existence.  We  have  already  seen 
how  Plotinus  would  answer  this.  Souls  have  ova-la — real 
being  ;  but  their  being  is  derived,  like  the  light  of  the 

1  Augustine,  De  Civ.  Dei,  10.  30.  Porphyrio  tamen  iure  displicuit. 
Stobaeus,  Eel.  I.  1068,  ol  d£  TrepL  Hoptfitipiov  &XP1  T&v  toftpuTtlviAv  piuv. 
Nemesius,  De  Nat.  Horn.  2  (about  lamblichus)  ;  and  ^Eneas  of  Gaza, 
Theophr.  p.  61.  Proclus  (in  Tim.  5.  329)  tries  to  prove  that  Plato 
never  meant  that  human  Souls  can  inhabit  the  bodies  of  beasts. 

8  Hegelian  Cosmology,  p.  6. 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  35 

moon.  They  are  not  constituent  factors  of  God,  or  of  the 
Absolute,  but  are  created  by  Him.  It  is  an  essential  attri- 
bute of  God  that  He  should  create,  but  His  creatures 
are  not  parts  of  His  being.  Souls  are  indestructible  and 
immortal  because  they  possess  ova-la  ;  there  is  a  qualita- 
tive difference  between  creatures  that  have  ova-la  and 
those  that  have  it  not.  But  the  empirical  self,  about 
whose  survival  we  are  unduly  anxious,  is  a  compound 
which  includes  perishable  elements.  And  this  composite 
character  is  found  all  through  nature  ;  even  trees  have 
a  share  in  Soul,  in  true  being,  and  in  immortality.  Our 
immortal  part  undoubtedly  pre-existed,  as  truly  as  it  will 
survive  ;  but  the  true  history  of  a  Soul  is  not  what 
Aristotle  calls  an  episodic  drama,  a  series  of  stories  dis- 
connected from  each  other,  or  only  united  by  '  Karma/ 
The  true  life  of  the  Soul  is  not  in  time  at  all.  Dr. 
McTaggart  says  that  '  the  relations  between  selves  are 
the  only  timeless  reality.'  Plotinus  would  certainly  not 
admit  that  relations  can  be  more  real  than  the  things 
which  they  relate  ;  and  he  would  also  deny  that  Souls 
find  themselves  only  in  the  interplay  with  other  Souls. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  only  in  self-transcendence  that  the 
individual  finds  himself  ;  and  he  is  united  to  his  fellows 
not  directly  but  through  their  common  relationship  to 
God.  Dr.  McTaggart  asks,  '  How  could  the  individual^, 
develop  in  time,  if  an  ultimate  element  of  his  nature  was 
destined  not  to  recur  in  time  ?  '  But  what  ground  have 
we  for  supposing  that  the  destiny  of  the  individual  is  to 
'  develop  in  time/  beyond  the  span  of  a  single  life  ?  It  is  V 
a  pure  assumption,  like  the  unscientific  belief  in  the 
perpetual  progress  of  the  race,  so  popular  in  the  last 
century. 

But  a  Neoplatonist  might  arrive  at  reincarnation  by 
another  road.  Since  the  nature  of  spiritual  beings  is 
always  to  create,  is  not  the  Orphic  aspiration  to  escape 
from  the  '  grievous  circle  '  after  all  a  little  impious  ? 
Must  not  work,  which  means  activity  in  time,  be  its 
eternal  destiny  ?  The  active  West,  on  the  whole,  sym- 


36  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

pathises  with  Tennyson's  '  Give  her  the  wages  of  going 
on  and  not  to  die/  Why  should  not  the  '  saved '  Soul 
'  go  forth  on  adventures  brave  and  new  ?  '  The  Orphic 
and  Indian  doctrine  of  release  seems  to  be  condemned  by 
the  Neoplatonic  philosophy,  when  it  has  the  courage  to 
follow  its  own  path.  The  beatified  Soul  has  its  citizen- 
ship in  heaven  ;  but  it  must  continue  always  to  produce 
its  like  on  the  stage  of  time.  In  what  sense  these  succes- 
sive products  of  its  activity  are  continuous  or  identical 
with  each  other  is  a  question  which  we  must  leave  to 
those  whom  it  interests.  To  us  their  only  unity  is  in  the 
source  from  which  they  flow,  and  in  the  end  to  which 
they  aspire. 


LECTURES  XIV-XVI 

THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD 
Nou? — votja-is — votjrd 

WE  have  already  noticed  the  peculiar  difficulty  of 
finding  equivalents  for  the  most  important 
terms  in  the  philosophy  of  Plotinus.  It  was  unfortunate 
that  we  could  find  no  word  except  '  Matter '  for  v\t], 
which  is  above  all  things  immaterial.  For  Xo'yo?  there 
is  no  single  English  word.  It  is  quite  different  from  the 
Logos  of  Christian  theology,  whom  the  Christian  Platon- 
ists  invested  with  the  attributes  of  the  Plotinian  Not/?.1 
'  Creative  activity '  comes  near  the  usual  meaning  of 
the  word  in  Plotinus.  ^vx*i  again  is  often  nearer  to 
'  Life  '  than  '  Soul/  Even  more  serious  is  the  difficulty 
of  finding  a  satisfactory  equivalent  for  Nou?.  Modern 
writers  on  Neoplatonism  have  chosen  '  intellect,'  '  intelli- 
gence/ '  thought/  '  reason/  '  mind/  '  das  Denke.n.'  All 
these  are  misleading.  Plotinus  was  neither  an  intel- 
lectualist  (in  the  sense  in  which  Hegel  has  been  called 
an  intellectualist  or  '  panlogist '),  nor,  in  the  modern 
sense,  an  idealist.  He  does  not  exalt  the  discursive 
reason  (Sidvoia  or  Xoy^r/xo?)  to  the  highest  place.  These 
are  the  activities  proper  to  Soul,  not  to  the  principle 
higher  than  Soul.2  The  discursive  reason  has  its  function 
in  separating,  distributing,  and  recombining  the  data  of 

1  Cf.  (e.g.)  Clement,  Strom.  7.  2.  8,  im-iv  rt>  ws  d\7?0ws  &p-%ov  re  /ecu 
riyeftovovv  6  0e?o?  \6yos  .   .   irpurovpyos  KIJ^O-CWS  SUPCI/US,  ctXT/Trros  al<rdri<rei. 
t.^*  Nemesius  (De  Nat,  Horn.  3.  59)  says  quite  correctly,  giving  the 
doctrine    of    Ammonius :    TJ   ^vxn  &  eavr?)   tvrlv  &TO.V  XoylfrTo.i,   tv   5£ 

T$  l>(j.   QTO.V  VOTI. 

37 


38  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

experience.  In  itself,  as  Aristotle  says,  it  moves  nothing. 
For  this  reason,  its  world  is  not  wholly  real.  But  Noi/? 
beholds  all  things  in  their  true  relations  without  the 
need  of  this  process.1  And  we  shall  see  in  the  course  of 
this  chapter  how  far  he  is  from  the  view  of  modern 
idealism,  that  things  are  real  when  and  because  they 
appear  to  a  mind  which  creates  and  contains  them. 

By  far  the  best  equivalent  is  Spirit.  It  need  not 
cause  any  confusion  with  Tn/evyua,  for  this  word  is  very 
little  used  by  Plotinus,  and  does  not  stand  for  anything 
important  in  his  system.  It  has  the  right  associations. 
We  think  of  Spirit  as  something  supremely  real,  but  in- 
corporeal, invisible,  and  timeless.  Our  familiarity  with 
the  Pauline  and  patristic  psychology  makes  us  ready 
to  accept  Spirit,  Soul,  and  Body  as  the  three  parts  of 
our  nature,  and  to  put  Spirit  in  the  highest  place.2 
St.  Paul  also  teaches  us  to  regard  Spirit  as  super- 
individual,  not  so  much  a  part  of  ourselves  as  a  Divine 
life  which  we  may  share.  In  all  these  ways,  Now?  and 
Spirit  correspond  closely.  Then,  if  we  call  Not/?  Spirit, 
TO  votjrov  (or  ra  vonra)  must  be  '  the  spiritual  world.' 
It  is  more  difficult  to  find  words  for  the  verb  voelv,  and 
the  substantive  i/oV"'?.  They  are  usually  translated 
'  to  think/  and  '  thought/  which  is  misleading.  '  To 
think1  is  Xoy/fecr&u,  and  'thought'  is  Sidvoia,  both  of 
which  belong  to  the  life  of  Soul.  We  must  be  content 
with  '  spiritual  perception  '  "or  '  intuition  '  for  ww/w,3 
and  '  perceive/  '  behold/  or  '  know/  for  the  verb.  It  will 
be  convenient  sometimes  to  retain  the  Greek  words  in  the 
text. 

In  these  three — Spirit,  Spiritual  Perception,  and  the 
Spiritual  World — we  have  the  trinity  in  unity  in  which 

1  This  does  not  mean  that  logic  is  superfluous  in  the  ascent  to  the 
noetic  view  of  things.    Thought  is  subsumed  in  the  activity  of  vow. 

2  Keyserling  says  that  this  psychology  is  still  familiar  to  all  students 
in  the  Eastern  Church. 

3  Cf.  5.  i.  5,  Zcrriv  TI  vorjtns  o/ocwts  bpCxra.    Origen  (Contra  Celsum, 
i.  48)  calls  it  ai'crflT/cm  oik  caV0??T77.     Nouy,  for  the  Christian  Platonists, 
is  almost  equivalent  to  \6yos  and  irvev^a,  which  tend  to  flow  together 
in  their  theology. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  39 

reality  consists.  It  is  true  that  Soul  also  is  real ;  but  it 
is  real  because  it  can  rise  into  the  world  of  Spirit,  and  be 
active  there,  without  ceasing  to  be  itself.  For  Plotinus, 

^/reality  is  the  spiritual  world  as  known  by  Spirit,  or  Spirit 
as  knowing  the  spiritual  world.  Here  only  we  find 
the  fully  real  and  the  completely  true.1  Most  commenta- 
tors on  Plotinus  have  not  emphasised  this  nearly  enough. 
They  have  made  either  the  Absolute,  or  Soul,  their 
starting-point,  and  have  taken  one  of  these  as  the  pivot 
of  the  whole  system  ;  or  they  have  opposed  the  spiritual 
and  sensible  worlds  to  each  other  as  if  Plotinus  meant 
them  to  be  two  real  worlds  set  over  against  each  other.1 
They  have  left-  untested  the  popular  errors  that  Platonism 
is  a  philosophy  of  dualism,  and  Neoplatonism  a  philosophy 

i/of  ecstasy,  and  have  neglected  the  numerous  passages 
which  should  have  taught  them  that  both  these  state- 
ments are  untrue.  We  shall  not  understand  Plotinus 
unless  we  realise  in  the  first  place  that  ova-la  corresponds 
nearly  to  what  in  Mr.  Bradley 's  philosophy  is  called 
reality  as  opposed  to  appearance,  and,  secondly,  that 
this  reality  is  neither  thought  nor  thing,  but  the  indis- 
soluble union  of  thought  and  thing,  which  reciprocally 

1  The  unity  of  vovs,  v6r)<ns,  and  vorjrd  is  well  brought  out  in  a 
passage  of  Maimonides,  quoted  in  a  French  translation  by  Bouillet. 
'  Tu  connais  cette  celebre  proposition  que  les  philosophes  ont  enoncee 
a  1'egard  de  Dieu,  savoir  qu'il  est  I'intellect,  Fintelligent,  et  I'intelligible, 
et  que  ces  trois  choses,  dans  Dieu,  ne  font  qu'une  seule  et  meme  chose, 
dans  laquelle  il  n'y  a  pas  multiplicite.  Comme  il  est  d6montre  que 
Dieu  (qu'il  soit  glorifie  !)  est  intellect  en  acte,  et  comme  il  n'y  a  en  lui 
absolument  rien  qui  soit  en  puissance,  de  sorte  qu'il  ne  se  peut  pas 
que  tantot  il  pergoive  et  tantot  il  ne  perceive  pas,  et  qu'au  contraire 
il  est  tou jours  intellecte  en  acte,  il  s'ensuit  que  lui  et  la  chose  percue 
sont  une  seule  et  meme  chose,  qui  est  son  essence  ;  et  que  cette  action 
de  percevoir,  pour  laquelle  il  est  appele  intelligent,  est  I'intellect  meme 
qui  est  son  essence.  Par  consequent,  il  est  perpetuellement  intellect, 
intelligent,  et  intelligible.  II  est  clair  aussi  que  si  Ton  dit  que  I'intellect, 
1'intelligent,  et  1'intelligible  ne  forment  qu'un  en  nombre,  cela  ne 
s 'applique  pas  seulement  au  Createur,  mais  a  tout  intellect.  Dans 
nous  aussi  I'intellect,  1'intelligent,  et  1'intelligible  sont  une  seule  et 
meme  chose,  toutes  les  fois  que  nous  possedons  I'intellect  en  acte  ; 
mais  ce  n'est  que  par  intervalles  que  nous  passons  de  la  puissance  a 
i'acte.' 

2  The  following  passages,  among  others,  throw  light  on  this  point : 
5.  4.  2,  vovt  STJ  Kal  dv  TCLvrbv  ;    id.  avrbs  6  vovs  TO.  IT  pay  par  a  ;  3«  8.  8,  Trcurci 


40  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

imply  each  other.  1  Ova-la  is  defined2  as  that  which  belongs 
to  itself,  or  is  an  essential  part  of  that  which  belongs  to 
itself.'  It  possesses  Mr.  Bradley  's  two  criteria  of  reality— 
that  is  to  say,  universality  and  inner  harmony.  It  needs 
neither  supplementing  nor  rearrangement  :  it  exists 
eternally  and  in  perfection.  Spiritual  perception  (VOYJO-L^) 
is  the  apprehension  of  incorporeals  ;3  it  is  a  seeing  of  the 
invisible.4  It  is  the  activity  of  Spirit  ;5  a  phrase  which 
might  suggest  to  a  modern  idealist  that  vov$  creates  the 
votird.  But  this  is  certainly  not  the  meaning  of  Plotinus. 
He  says,6  quoting  the  Timaeus  of  Plato,  that  '  Spirit  sees 
the  Ideas  which  dwell  in  real  being/  What  Plato  calls 
the  living  being  (faov)  is  not  you?  but  voyrov.  Spirit 
/sees  the  Ideas  which  dwell,  in  the  spiritual  world.  Are 
'  these  Ideas  external  to  the  Spirit  which  sees  them  ? 
If  they  were,  it  could  only  possess  the  images  of  them, 
not  the  Ideas  themselves  ;  there  would  be  no  direct 
contact  between  thought  and  thing.  But  we  cannot 
admit  this  ;  for  though  doubtless  Spirit  and  the  spiritual 
world  are  distinguishable  (erepoy  eKarepov),  they  are  not 
separate  or  separable.  Plato,  when  he  says  that  vov$  sees 
the  vorira,  means  that  it  possesses  them  in  itself.  The 
votjrov  is  vow,  but  vov$  in  a  state  of  unity  and  calm, 
while  the  vovs  which  perceives  this  vov?  abiding  in  itself 
is  an  energy  proceeding  from  it.  In  contemplating  it,  it 
becomes  like  it,  and  '  is  its  vow  because  it  perceives 
(voei)  it.'  It  is  in  one  aspect  vovs,  in  another  vonrov. 
The  Spiritual  World,  he  says  in  another  place,7  cannot 
be  outside  Spirit,  for  then  what  link  could  unite  them  ? 
How  then  could  we  distinguish  vdwis  from  alcr6ti<ri?} 
which  only  beholds  types  and  images  of  reality  ?  Can  we 
be  satisfied  to  say  that  justice,  beauty,  and  goodness,  the 
Ideas  which  Spirit  beholds,  are  strangers  to  itself  ?  On 
the  other  side,  the  Spiritual  World  (i/o^ra)  must  either 


1  6.  3.  4- 

2  C.  C.  Webb  (The  Relations  of  God  and  Man,  pp.  157-159)  has  some 


excellent 


.    .  ,      .        - 

ellent  remarks  on  true  knowledge  as  inherent  in  NoGs. 
'  d/j.eyeduv  avrfX^tj,  4.  7.  8.  4  5.  5.  I. 

6  5-4-2.  •  3.9.  i.  »  5>  5.  x< 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  41 

-be  deprived  of  life  and  intelligence,  or  it  must  have  Spirit. 
In  the  latter  case,  the  vorjra  make  up  one  thing  with 
Spirit,  and  this  thing  is  '  the  first  Spirit '  (6  TT/OWTO?  you?), 
'  Are  not  then  Spirit,  the  Spiritual  World,  and  Truth1  all 
one  P '  If  we  wish  to  preserve  the  reality  of  1/01/9,  votird, 
and  truth  and  to  make  true  knowledge  possible,  we  must 
concede  to  i/ou?  the  intimate  possession  of  reality. 
'  Therefore  Spirit,  the  whole  of  reality  (=ra  votjrd),  and 
truth,  are  one  nature.'2  Yet  the  relation  between  them 
is  not  bare  identity.  '  The  perceiving  Spirit  must  be  one 
and  two,  simple  and  not  simple.'3  That  is  to  say,  if  you? 
and  vorird  were  diverse,  they  could  not  come  together ; 
if  absolutely  one,  there  could  be  no  thought.  '  Each  of 
them  (of  the  vonrd)  is  Spirit  and  Being,  and  the  whole 
is  all  Spirit  and  all  Being.  Spirit  by  its  power  of  percep- 
tion posits  Being,  and  Being,  by  being  perceived,  gives 
to  Spirit  perception  and  existence.  The  cause,  both  of 
spiritual  perception  and  of  Being  is  another,'  i.e.  their 
common  principle,  the  One.4  The  relation  between  them 
is  one  of  essential  identity  actualised  under  the  form  of 
essential  reciprocity.  That  the  two  sides  of  reality  are 
of  equal  rank,  and  not  one  derived  from  the  other,  is 
plain  from  what  has  been  quoted,  and  from  several  other 
passages.5  '  Spirit,  in  beholding  reality  (TO,  ovra)  beheld 
itself,  and  in  beholding  entered  into  its  proper  activity, 
and  this  activity  is  itself.'6  '  Spirit  perceives,  not  as  one 

1  'AX?70eia   is  strictly  the    correspondence    between  9eupla  and  TO 
eeuprjTov.    Practically,  it  is  an  equivalent  of  vbqffis.     Afodiqffis,  he  says, 
conveys  not  dX^eta,  but  56£a,  because  it  is  passive  (5.  5.  i).    'Truth' 
requires  the  activity  of  the  perceiving  mind.    In  5.  5.  2  dX^^eia  is  denned 
as  self-consistency,  and  identified  with  voOs. 

2  3-  9-  3»  /*ia  roLvw  $6cris  vovs,  TOL  ovTa  iravTa  Kal  dXiJ0«a. 

3  5-  6.  I,  Tb  voovv  dec  £v  Kal  dvo  elvai.     dirXoO*'  /cat  ou%  airXovv  Set  elvai. 

*  5-  *•  4»  fxaffrov  d£  avrCjv  vous  /ecu  6v  £GT(.  Kal  rb  ffv^iro.v  Tras  vovs  Kal  TTOLV 
6v,  6  ^v  vous  /card  rb  votiv  i)0t(TTdj  TO  6V,  TO  5e  ov  rw  voeivdat  T+  v$  Sidbv  TO 
voelv  Kal  T&  flvai.  TOV  d£  voeiv  amov  ctXXo,  8  Kal  Tq>  OVTL. 

5  e.g.  5.  2.  I,  6/j.ou  vous  7iVerat  Kal  ov  (=vof]Tbv}.  Zeller  (p.  568), 
who  mistranslates  vovs  by  '  Denken,'  tries  to  prove  that  for 
Plotinus  '  Denken  '  is  prior  to  its  object.  On  this  Richter  (Neoplat. 
Stud.  3.  74,  75)  says  rightly:  '  Wenn  in  der  geistigen  Welt  der  Begriff 
und  das  gedachte  Ding  identisch  sind,  so  ist  das  nicht  so  zu  verstehen, 
als  ob  der  Begriff  des  Dinges  das  Ding  selbst  ist,  sondern  vielmehr  das 
Ding,  als  Gedanke  angefasst,  ist  BegrinV  6  5.  3,  5. 


42  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

that  seeks,  but  as  one  that  already  possesses.'1  '  The 
being  of  Spirit  is  this  beholding  '  of  itself  in  the  spiritual 
world.2  Because  this  activity  is  the  very  essence  of 
Spirit,  its  activity  and  actuality  are  identical.  New?  and 
are  one3;  and  votjvis  is  the  activity  of  vov$.  The 
a,  however,  are  the  product  not  of  i/ou?  but  of  the 
One.  The  whole  spiritual  nature  (vorjrtj  0wn?)  proceeds, 
like  the  rays  from  the  sun,  direct  from  the  One,  and  not 
through  the  medium  of  vov$.*  '  Reality  is  that  which  is 
seen,  not  the  act  of  seeing.'5  If  Plotinus  were  a  modern 
idealist,  there  would  be  no  need  of  a  super-essential  all- 
transcending  principle.  Monism  would  be  achieved,  or 
rather  aimed  at,  as  in  so  many  modern  systems,  by 
whittling  away  one  of  the  terms.  We  have  seen  how  far 
Plotinus  is  from  attempting  this  solution. 

These  quotations  are  perhaps  enough  to  show  that  the 
famous  dictum,  '  the  spiritual  world  is  not  outside 
Spirit  '  (OVK  e£u>  vov  TO.  votira),  does  not  bear  the  sense 
which  it  would  have  in  the  mouth  of  a  post-Kantian 
idealist.  But  the  problem  puzzled  Plotinus1  own  dis- 
ciples. Porphyry  wrote  an  essay  in  refutation  of  the 
doctrine  which  he  attributed  to  his  master,  hoping  in 
this  way  to  induce  Plotinus  to  explain  himself  more 
clearly.  But  Plotinus  only  smiled,  and  asked  Amelius 
to  '  remove  the  misunderstanding/  A  controversy  fol- 
lowed between  Amelius  and  Porphyry,  which  resulted  in 
the  submission  and  recantation  of  the  latter.  These 
essays  have  of  course  perished  ;  but  in  dealing  with  so 
important  najd  difficult  a  point  in  the  Neoplatonic  philos- 
ophy, it  may  be  worth  while  to  let  Plotinus  explain  his 
doctrine  more  at  length. 

'  We  must  not  regard  the  objects  of  spiritual  percep- 
tion as  things  exterior  to  Spirit,  nor  as  impressions 
stamped  upon  it,  thus  refusing  to  Spirit  the  immediate 
possession  of  truth  ;  to  do  so  would  be  to  condemn  the 


1  5.  I.  4,  i>oet  ov  frTuv  dXXa 

2  5-  3-  10.  3  5.  3.  5  *  5.  3.  12. 

5  6.  2.  8,  rb  p\€tr6iJ.cvov  TO  dv  oi>x 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  43 

Spirit  of  ignorance  in  spiritual  things,  and  to  destroy  the 
reality  of  Spirit  itself.  If  we  wish  to  maintain  the  possi- 
bility of  knowledge  and  of  truth,  and  the  reality  of 
existence,  and  knowledge  of  what  each  thing  is,  instead 
of  confining  ourselves  to  the  simple  notion  of  its  qualities, 
which  only  gives  us  an  image  of  the  object,  and  forbids 
us  to  possess  it,  to  unite  ourselves  with  it  and  become 
one  with  it,  we  must  allow  to  true  Spirit  the  possession 
of  everything.  So  only  can  it  know,  and  know  truly,  and 
never  forget  or  wander  in  search,  and  the  truth  will  be 
in  it,  and  reality  will  abide  with  it,  and  it  will  live  and 
know.  All  these  things  must  appertain  to  the  most 
blessed  life  ;  for  where  else  shall  we  find  the  worthy  and 
the  noble  ?  On  this  condition  only  will  Spirit  have  no 
need  of  demonstration  or  of  faith  ;  for  so  Spirit  is  itself, 
and  clear  to  itself  ;  so  Spirit  knows  that  its  own  principle 
[the  One]  is  above  itself,  and  that  that  which  comes  next 
after  the  One  is  itself ;  and  none  else  can  bring  it  any 
surer  knowledge  than  this  about  itself — it  knows  that 
it  exists  in  very  truth,  in  the  spiritual  world.  Absolute 
truth,  therefore,  agrees  not  with  any  other,  but  with 
itself ;  it  says  nothing  outside  itself  ;  it  is,  and  what  it  is, 
that  it  says/1 

The  same  argument  is  developed  in  the  ninth  book  of 
the  Fifth  Ennead,2  which  I  will  translate  in  a  slightly 
abbreviated  form.  '  Spirit  is  not  only  in  potentiality. 
It  does  not  become  knowing  after  being  ignorant ;  it  is 
always  active  and  always  Spirit.  It  exercises  its  power 
from  itself  and  out  of  itself,  which  implies  that  it  is  what  / 
it  knows.  We  must  not  separate  the  knowing  Spirit 
from  the  objects  of  its  knowledge ;  it  is  only  our  habit 
in  dealing  with  the  things  of  sense  that  makes  us  prone 
to  make  separations  in  the  world  of  Spirit.  What  then  is 
the  activity  of  Spirit,  in  virtue  of  which  we  may  say  that 
it  is  the  things  which  it  knows  ?  Plainly,  since  Spirit 
has  real  existence,  it  knows  and  posits  reality.  Spirit 
therefore  is  all  that  really  exists.  .  .  .  The  objects  of 

1  Sa-  2  5-  9-  5-8- 


44  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

spiritual  knowledge  cannot  be  in  the  world  of  sense,  for 
sensible  objects  are  only  derivative.  The  vorira  existed 
before  the  \vorld  ;  they  are  the  archetypes  of  sensible 
things,  and  they  constitute  the  true  being  or  reality  of 
Spirit.  .  .  .  Spirit  is  the  first  lawgiver,  or  rather  it  is 
itself  the  law  of  being.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  saying 
'  To  know  is  the  same  as  to  be  '  ;  and  the  knowledge  of 
immaterial  things  is  identical  with  the  things  known.  .  .  . 
Thus  Spirit  and  the  real  world  are  one.  Spirit  contains 
all  things  in  itself,  not  locally,  but  as  it  possesses  itself. 
Yonder  all  things  are  together  and  yet  remain  distinct, 
as  the  Soul  may  possess  many  sciences  without  con- 
fusion. .  .  . 

\J  '  The  sciences  (cTria-Twat)  which  exist  in  the  reasoning 
Soul  are  some  of  them  of  sensible  objects  (though  this 
kind  of  knowledge  ought  rather  to  be  called  opinion)  : 
these  are  posterior  to  the  facts,  being  images  of  them  ; 
others  are  of  spiritual  things  ;  and  these  are  true  sciences, 
coming  from  Spirit  into  the  reasoning  Soul,  and  not  con- 
cerned with  the  objects  of  sense.  In  so  far  as  they  are 
scientific  knowledge,  they  are  identical  with  their  objects, 
and  have  within  them  both  the  spiritual  object  and  the 
faculty  of  spiritual  vision.  For  the  Spirit  is  within  ;  it  is 
always  companying  with  itself,  and  always  active,  though 
not  needing  to  acquire  anything,  as  the  Soul  does  ;  but 
Spirit  stands  in  itself  and  is  all  things  together.  But  the 
objects  in  the  spiritual  world  were  not  brought  into  being 
by  Spirit  ;  God,  for  example,  and  movement,  did  not 
come  into  existence  because  Spirit  thought  them.  So 
when  it  is  said  that  the  Ideas  are  voSja-eis,  if  it  is  meant 
that  the  spiritual  world  only  exists  because  Spirit  thought 
it,  the  statement  is  untrue.  The  object  of  this  knowledge 
must  exist  before  knowledge  of  it.1 

'  Since  then  j/oV<?  is  knowledge  of  what  is  immanent 
in  Spirit,  that  which  is  immanent  is  the  Form 


1  True  knowledge  (e7ri<rr^7/,  vSyw)  implies  both  the  objective 
reality  of  the  thing  known  and  its  complete  possession  by  the 
knower. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  45 

and  vdtjvis  is  the  Idea  (ISea).1  What  is  this  ?  Spirit 
and  spiritual  being  (voepa  ova- la).  Each  idea  is  not 
different  from  Spirit,  but  each  idea  is  Spirit.  And  the 
whole  of  Spirit  is  all  the  forms,  and  each  form  is  each 
Spirit,  as  the  whole  of  science  is  the  sum  of  its  theories  ; 
each  theory  is  a  part  of  the  whole,  not  separated  locally 
but  having  its  power  in  the  whole.  This  Spirit  is  in  itself, 
and  possessing  itself  in  constancy  is  the  plenitude  of 
things.  If  Spirit  had  been  thought  of  (TrpoeTrevoeiro) 
as  prior  to  being  (i.e.  before  the  vonra  existed),  we  should 
have  had  to  say  that  the  activity  and  the  thought  of 
Spirit  produced  and  perfected  all  existences  ;  but  since 
we  are  obliged  to  think  of  being  as  prior  to  Spirit,  we 
must  insist  that  all  existences  are  in  the  preceding  Spirit, 
and  that  activity  and  voqa-i?  come  to  existences,  as  the 
activity  of  fire  joins  itself  to  the  essence  of  fire,  so  that 
the  existences,  being  immanent  in  Spirit,2  have  Spirit  as 
their  activity.  But  being  is  also  activity  ;  the  activity 
of  both  then  is  one,  or  rather  both  are  one.  Therefore 
Being  and  Spirit  are  one  nature,  and  so  are  all  existences 
and  the  activity  of  being  and  the  corresponding  Spirit ; 
in  this  sense,  voyareis  are  the  form  and  shape  of  being 
and  its  activity.  In  separating  by  our  thought  being  and 
Spirit,  we  conceive  of  one  of  them  as  prior  to  the  other. 
For  the  Spirit  which  separates  is  in  fact  another  ;  but 
the  unseparated  and  unseparating  Spirit  is  being  and  all 
things.' 

This  last  chapter  is  as  important  as  it  is  difficult.  Spirit 
as  it  is  in  itself  does  not  attempt  to  separate  itself  from 
the  spiritual  world  ;  we  go  wrong  as^soon  as  we  think  of 
the  two  as  subject  and  object,  still  more  if  we  think  of 
them  as  Form  and  Matter,  or  as  creator  and  created. 
But  '  our  Spirit/  which  is  Soul  exercising  its  highest 
faculties,  cannot  help  using  the  categories  of  subject  and 

1  I  am  not  sure  of  the  meaning  of  this  difficult  sentence.  Creuzer, 
Taylor,  and  Bouillet  read  £v  &VTOS  for  frbvros,  wrongly,  I  think. 

'  Volkmann  and  Muller  keep  £v  6vra.  But  I  have  no  doubt  that 
Ficinus  is  right  in  reading 


46  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

object.  We  cannot  help  thinking  of  an  eye  which  sees 
something  —  and  the  eye  '  cannot  behold  itself  '  ;  or  of  a 
mind  taking  knowledge  of  something  which  it  certainly 
did  not  create  by  thinking.  And  so  we  involuntarily 
'  conceive  of  one  as  prior  to  the  other  '  ;  we  either  think 
as  subjective  idealists,  or  we  affirm  that  '  the  spiritual 
world  is  outside.  Spirit.'  The  Spirit  that  '  neither  divides 
nor  is  divided  '  is  no  part  of  us  ;  we  pass  into  it  only 
when  we  '  awake  out  of  ourselves  '  and  find  ourselves  in 
the  presence  of  the  One  which  is  beyond  existence.  For 
Spirit,  when  it  is  absolutely  undivided  and  undividing, 
is  indistinguishable  from  the  Absolute. 

A  few  more  quotations  may  be  added,  though  my 
contention  has  already  been  fully  proved.  '  If  Spirit-in- 
itself  (avrovov?)  were  the  creator,  the  created  would 
have  to  be  inferior  to  Spirit,  but  close  to  Spirit  and  like 
Spirit  ;  but  since  the  creator  {the  Absolute]  is  beyond 
Spirit,  the  created  must  be  Spirit.  But  why  is  the 
creator  not  Spirit  ?  Because  vorja-is  is  the  activity  of 
Spirit.'1 

'  Thus  vovs  and  voyrov  and  Being  (TO  ov)  are  one 
and  the  same  thing,  and  this  is  the  First  Being: 
it  is  also  the  First  vov?  possessing  all  realities 
(ra  OVTO),  or  rather  identical  with  them.  2  But  if 
voip-is  and  votjrdv  are  one  and  the  same,  how  will 
TO  voovv  be  able  in  this  way  to  know  itself  ?  (^£9  vorj<r€i 
eavro).  For  votj(ri<f  will,  as  it  were,  embrace  TO  voyrov, 
or  it  will  be  identical  with  it,  but  one  does  not  yet  see  how 
vow  can  know  itself.  This  is  the  answer.  NOIJW  and 
voijrov  are  the  same,  because  voyrov  is  an  activity 
(evepyeia)  and  not  a  mere  potentiality  (Svvafjug)  ;  life  is 
not  a  stranger  to  it  nor  adventitious  ;  TO  voeiv  is  not  an 
accident  to  it  as  it  would  be  to  a  stone  or  lifeless  body  ; 
and  voiirov  is  the  First  Reality  (ova-la  y  Trpdrrtj).  Now 
if  voyrov  is  an  activity,  and  the  first  activity,  it  must  be 


1  5.  4.  2.  The  argument  is  that  since  j/^cm,  which  is  the  activity 
of  vow,  is  '  perfected  '  and  '  denned  '  by  its  object  (the  voyrdv),  vovs  can- 
not be  the  creator.  2  5.  3.  5. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  47 


the  noblest  yoV<?,  and  objectively  real  (owrMw  1/0170-19). 
And  as  this  v6ri<ris  is  completely  true,  and  the  first  i/oVr«9, 
it  must  be  the  first  1/01/9.  It  is  not  1/01/9  only  potentially, 
nor  can  it  be  distinguished  from  votjw,  otherwise  its 
essence  (or  reality,  TO  ova-Me?  avrov)  would  be  only 
potential.  If  then  it  is  an  activity  and  its  essence  (ova-la) 
is  activity,  it  must  be  one  and  the  same  with  this  activity. 
But  Being  and  vorjrov  are  also  one  and  the  same  with 
their  activity.  Therefore  vov$y  votjrov,  and  i/oVn?  are 
all  the  same  thing.  Since  the  vowu  of  vow  is  TO  votjrov 
and  TO  voyrov  is  vov$,  1/01/9  will  know  itself.  It  will  know, 
(vo}]<rei)  by  the  yoVn?  which  is  itself,  the  vorjrov  which 
is  also  itself.1  It  will  know  itself,  both  as  being  i/oVn? 
and  as  being  I/OJ/TO'I/  ;  and  the  i/oVn?  with  which  it 
knows  is  also  itself.' 

Plotinus,  it  will  be  seen,  is  not  content  with  making  \ 
Spirit  and  the  Spiritual  World  correlatives  implying  v 
each  other.  He  asserts  something  like  what  Christian 
theologians,  in  discussing  the  attributes  of  the  Trinity, 
and  the  two  natures  of  Christ,  called  Trepixvpytrt?  and 
communicatio  idiomatum.  Spirit  and  the  Spiritual  World 
flow  over  into  each  other.  In  another  chapter2  he  says  : 
is  the  activity  of  1/01/9.  But  voya-is  seeing  TO 
ov,  and  turning  towards  it  and  perfecting  itself,  as 
it  were,  from  it,  is  itself  indeterminate  (aoptrros)  like 
vision  (0^9),  but  is  determined  by  TO  vonrov.  For  which 
reason  it  has  been  said  that  forms  and  numbers  come 
from  the  indeterminate  Dyad  and  the  One  ;3  and  forms 
and  numbers  are  1/01/9.  Wherefore  it  is  not  simple,  but 
many,  and  exhibits  a  synthesis,  but  within  the  spiritual 
order,  and  it  sees  many  things  [i.e.  it  sees  things  as  dis- 
tinct from  each  other,  not  as  one].  It  is  itself  vorjrdv, 
and  also  vow  ;  so  that  it  is  two.  There  is  further  another 
vovrrov  after  it.  But  how  does  vov?  arise  from  TO'  vonrov  1 
Thus,  the  VOIJTOV  remaining  in  itself  and  needing 

1  aur6s  Am*  A  voei,  5.  g.  5;   vovt  forl  ra  6rra,  ibid.  z  5.  4.  2. 

8  This  appears  to  be  a  quotation,  but  I  cannot  trace  it.     A  doc- 
trine of  this  kind  is  attributed  to  Plato  in  the  Metaphysics  of  Aristotle. 


48  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

nothing,  differing  in  this  from  the  seeing  and  knowing 
faculty,  is  not  without  consciousness,  but  is  self-contained 
and  independent,  and  has  complete  power  of  self -discern- 
ment ;  it  has  life  in  itself  and  all  things  in  itself,  and  it 
knows  itself  by  a  kind  of  self-consciousness  in  an  eternal 
stability  and  intuition,  other  than  the  intuition  of  vov?.1 
If  then  anything  comes  into  being,  while  the  voyrdv 
remains  in  itself,  this  comes  from  voyrov  when  the 
votirov  is  most  itself.  So  then,  when  voyrov  remains  in 
its  proper  character,  that  which  comes  into  being  comes 
from  it,  without  any  change  in  the  vo^rov.  When  then 
it  remains  as  voyrov,  that  which  comes  into  being  comes 
as  voij<ri9 ;  and  this  being  i/oVn?  and  deriving  its  power 
of  thought  from  its  source  (voovva  atf  ov  eyeWo) — for  it 
has  none  other — becomes  vow,  another  yo^roV,  as  it  were, 
an  imitation  and  image  of  the  first/  In  this  difficult 
passage  the  order  of  priority  is  voyrov,  voya-is,  vov?.  But 
this  precedence  is  only  possible  because  Plotinus  begins 
by  making  votjrov  include  votja-is  and  vov$.  In  5.  9.  7 
he  says  that  the  ideas  (aStj)  are  not  strictly  vorja-eig ; 
'  or  if  they  are,  we  must  give  TO  voov^evov  a  priority 
before  this  votjo-is.' 

These  quotations  show  one  thing  very  clearly — that 
Plotinus  is  no  slave  to  his  own  technical  terms.  They  are 
not  rigid.  They  seem  to  throw  out  '  organic  filaments/ 
as  if  to  prove  the  doctrine  that  the  whole  is  implicit  in 
each  part.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  stiffen  classifications 
which  their  author  has  deliberately  left  fluid.  He  was 
well  aware  that  sharp  distinctions  and  hard  boundary- 
lines  belong  to  the  logical  faculty  (Sidvota),  not  to  vov?, 
and  that  these  methods  are  inappropriate  when  we  are 
considering  the  stage  above  the  discursive  intellect.  In 
the  relations  of  vow  and  voijrd  we  see  a  complete  recon- 
ciliation of  the  One  and  the  Many,  of  Sameness  and 
Otherness  ;  and  if  this  is  so,  it  is  manifestly  impossible 
to  give  distinct  characters  to  Spirit  on  the  one  side  and 

1  i]  KaTa,v6r)ffis  avrov  avrb  olovel  ffvvaio'dria'ei  of/era  £v  crrdfffi  at'Sitf  /cat  vofyra 
crfyws  T)  Kara  TTJV  vov  t>6r}<riv.  Mr.  Ross  suggests  avrov  for  avr6. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  49 

the  Spiritual  World  on  the  other.  Reality  is  not  to  be 
identified  either  with  Thought,  or  with  a  kind  of  transcen- 
dental physical  world  which  is  the  object  of  Thought ; 
nor  can  we  arrive  at  it  by  forming  clean-cut  ideas  of  these 
two,  and  saying  that  they  are  '  somehow  '  joined  together. 
Reality  is  eternal  life  ;  it  is  a  never-failing  spiritual 
activity ;  it  is  the  continual  self-expression  of  a  God 
who  '  speaks,  and  it  is  done,  who  commands,  and  it 
stands  fast/  The  dialectic  may,  as  Greek  philosophy 
claims,  lead  us  up  to  the  threshold  of  the  eternal  world 
and  beyond  it ;  but  within  that  world  a  principle  pre- 
vails, which  logic  is  powerless  to  analyse ;  for  the  Divine 
Ideas  penetrate  each  other,  and  defy  every  attempt  to 
treat  them  as  intellectual  counters.1 

The  Ideas 

The  usual  word  for  the  Ideas  is  e'lStj,  which  I  have 
frequently  translated  '  Forms/  In  one  place,  as  we  have 
just  seen,  Plotinus  says  that  the  voyrd  immanent  in  vov? 
are  the  eiS>j,  and  vorja-is  the  iSea.  It  is  easier  to  say 
what  the  Ideas  or  Forms  meant  to  Plotinus,  than  what 
they  meant  to  Plato.  Plato's  Ideas  are  explained  as 
self-existing  substances  by  Herbart,  Pater,  and  Zeller. 
Stallbaum,  Richter,  and  others  say  that  they  are  '  God's 
thoughts/  Others  again,  as  Kant,  Trendelenburg,  Lotze, 
Achelis,  and  many  recent  writers,  interpret  them  as  a 
kind  of  notions  of  the  human  mind.  It  can  hardly  be 
denied  that  Plato's  own  views  changed  considerably.  In 
the  Republic  the  theory  of  Ideas  is  no  longer  a  hypothesis, 
as  in  the  Phaedo,  but  an  ascertained  truth.  There  are 
Ideas  of  justice,  beauty,  and  the  good  ;  these  are  always 
the  same,  and  are  an  unity  of  particulars.  Our  knowledge 

1  Aristotle's  Psychology  illustrates  the  Plotinian  doctrine  of  vovs 
and  coijrcl  at  many  points.  Aristotle  anticipates  Plotinus  when  he 
says  4-rrl  TUV  &vtv  VXrjs  rb  avrb  tart  rb  voovv  Kal  rb  vooi>ii.tvov.  Wallace,  in 
his  fine  Introduction  to  this  treatise,  shows  that  Aristotle  is  nearer  to 
Plato  than  his  rather  carping  criticisms  of  his  master  seem  to  suggest. 
We  must  remember  that  they  are  criticisms  frcm  within;  Aristotle 
did  not  break  with  Platonism. 

II.— S 


50  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

of  the  Ideas  is  clearer  than  of  sensible  things  ;  they 
are  independent  of  the  senses  ;  they  are  known  by  a 
faculty  which  is  variously  called  yv(*>M,  yvuxris,  eTna-TiiM, 
vorja-ts,  vov<s,  TOV  StdXeyecrOai  Suva/mis.  The  verbs  used 
are  iSeiv,  aTrrea-Oai,  Oeaa-Oai,  all  expressing  immediate 
and  infallible  knowledge.  The  Idea  of  the  Good  is 
'  beyond  existence  '  ;  it  is  '  the  cause  of  science  and 
truth,  as  known.'  Students  of  the  lower  sciences  '  dream 
about  real  existence  (TO  6V),  but  cannot  see  it  in  their 
waking  moments.'  The  queen  of  the  sciences  is  dialectic 
(which  means  metaphysics),  because  it  deals  with  real' 
existence.  The  Idea  of  the  Good  is  the  final  cause  of  the 
universe  ;  it  enables  Plato  to  bridge  over  the  chasm 
between  the  One  and  the  Many.  Plato's  objective 
idealism  is  most  clearly  defined  in  the  Symposium  and 
Phaedo  ;  in  the  Republic  it  is  less  uncompromising.  In 
the  Theaetetus  the  categories  take  the  place  of  the  Ideas, 
which  means  that  the  Ideas  are  tending  to  become  forms 
of  thought.1  As  Plato  grew  older,  the  vision  faded  ;  he 
attached  more  importance  to  the  dialectic  and  less  to 
intuition.  He  seems  now  to  allow  movement  in  the  Ideas 
corresponding  to  progress  in  the  thinker's  mind.  In  the 
Sophist  it  is  suggested  that  true  being  is  that  which  has 
the  power  of  acting  and  being  acted  upon  (Troieiv  KGU 
TTcw-xefi').  But  the  definition  is  not  explicitly  accepted 
by  the  Eleatic  stranger,  who  seems  to  represent  Plato 
himself.  At  the  same  time,  the  value  of  outward  im- 
pressions is  increasingly  recognised,  and  the  notion  of 
being  is  extended  to  individual  things.  Being  is  some- 
times absolute,  sometimes  relative,  while  not-being  is 
always  relative,  since  it  arises  from  a  disharmony  of 
notions.  Thus  not  -being  is  not  one  of  the  categories 
(yevtj).  Error  is  a  mistake  as  to  how  the  Ideas  are 
related  to  each  other.  The  doctrine  at  this  stage  is 
that  the  sensible  world  is  built  up  according  to  the  Ideas 


1  The  change  from  ef5>;  to  ytvij  seems  to  point  in  this  direction; 
but  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  for  Plato  the  /xfyerra  7^77  were  ever 
only  subjective. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  51 

which  exist  in  the  mind  of  God,  and  which  pass  thence 
into  our  minds  by  the  observation  of  concrete  par- 
ticulars. In  the  Timaeus  the  Ideas  are  the  models 
according  to  which  the  Demiurge  brought  order  into 
the  world. 

But  how  can  an  individual  Soul  '  participate  '  in  an 
Idea  ?  The  difficulty  for  Plato  was  not  that  the  Idea  is 
a  concept,  and  the  Soul  a  self-contained  Person  ;  for 
neither  of  these  statements  is  true.  The  difficulty  arises 
from  the  residuum  of  materialism  in  the  notion  of  Soul ; 
and  this  Plato  is  trying  to  shake  off.  Is  the  Idea  divided 
among  the  Souls  who  participate  in  it  ?  This  is  im- 
possible ;  but  if  not,  we  must  cease  to  think  in  terms  of 
extension  and  quantity  ;  we  must  rise  to  the  conception 
of  a  spiritual  world,  which  has  its  own  laws.  The  doctrine  I/ 
of  Ideas  belongs  to  the  philosophy  of  mysticism  ;  and 
in  Plato,  as  he  grew  older,  the  logician  and  metaphysician 
gained  at  the  expense  of  the  mystic.  If  the  mystic  in 
him  had  been  slain,  he  might  have  turned  his  Ideas  into 
mere  concepts,  the  creations  of  the  human  mind,  as 
some  of  his  modern  interpreters  have  done  for  him ; 
but  as  soon  as  he  sees  his  argument  leading  him  in  that 
direction,  he  breaks  out  in  revolt  against  it.  'In  heaven's 
name,  are  we  to  believe  that  movement  and  life  and  soul 
and  intelligence  are  not  present  in  the  ultimately  real  ? 
Can  we  imagine  it  as  neither  alive  nor  intelligent,  but  that, 
grand  and  holy  as  we  hold  it  to  be,  it  is  senseless,  immov- 
able, and  inert  ?  >l  In  the  Parmenides  the  theory  of 
Mentalism2  is  explicitly  raised.  Socrates  suggests  that 
the  puzzle  about  the  unity  and  plurality  of  Forms 
may  be  solved  if  the  Forms  are  taken  to  be  only  '  thoughts 
in  Souls  ' — i.e.  as  merely  subjective,  as  we  say.  On  this 
theory,  the  common  nature  which  unites  the  particulars 
in  any  class,  and  the  relations  between  these  particulars, 
are  the  work  of  the  human  mind,  and  have  no  existence 

1  Plato,  Sophist,  249. 

1  A  useful  word  coined  by  Sidgwick,  instead  of  the  ambiguous 
1  Idealism.'    The  reference  to  the  Parmenides  is  p.  132, 


52  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

except  such  as  is  conferred  by  our  thought.  The  refuta- 
tion of  this  suggestion  is  so  concise  and  complete  that  it 
may  be  quoted.  '  Can  there  be  individual  thoughts  which 
are  thoughts  of  nothing  ?  '  '  Impossible/  '  Thought 
must  be  of  something  ?  '  '  Yes.'  '  Of  something  which 
is,  or  which  is  not  ?  '  '  Of  something  which  is.'  '  Must 
it  not  be  of  a  single  something,  which  thought  recognises 
as  attaching  to  all,  being  a  single  form  or  nature  ?  ' 
'  Yes.'  '  And  will  not  the  something  which  is  appre- 
hended as  one  and  the  same  in  all,  be  an  Idea  ?  '  '  From 
that  again  there  is  no  escape.'  '  Then  if  you  say  that 
everything  participates  in  the  Ideas,  must  you  not  say 
that  everything  is  made  up  of  thoughts,  and  that  all 
things  think ;  or  else  that  there  are  unthinking 
thoughts  ? '  '  The  latter  view  is  no  more  rational  than 
the  previous  one.'1  A  thought  musrt  always  be  a  thought 
of  something  ;  it  cannot  create  its  own  object  by  willing 
to  think  of  something  which  does  not  yet  exist.  An 
^Idea  is  not  the  process  of  thinking,  but  the  object  of 
thought.  There  was  never  a  time  when  Plato  did  not 
hold  this  view.  The  Eleatic  disputants  in  this  dialogue 
are  not  combating  the  existence  of  Forms  as  the  objects 
of  knowledge  ;  they  are  only  raising  a  doubt  whether 
Socrates  has  succeeded  in  establishing  a  connexion 
between  the  Ideas  and  the  objects  of  sense.  Parmenides 
and  Zeno  wish  to  discredit  sense-perceptions  (Kara/3d\\€iv 
ra?  ata-Ofocis) ,  and  they  maintain  that  Socrates  has  not 
succeeded  in  rehabilitating  them.  Plato's  object  in  this 
dialogue  seems  to  have  been  to  suggest  that  Socrates' 
theory  of  '  participation '  needed  more  clearing  up,  a 
view  which  he  certainly  held.2 

1  I  agree  with  Professor  Taylor,  who  has  sent  me  a  most  illuminat- 
ing essay  by  himself  on  this  subject,  that  '  unthought  thoughts  '  is 
quite  inadmissible  as  a  translation  of  av^ra  vo-q^ara. 

2  Prof.  Taylor  says :   '  Simplicius  says  in  a  scholium  on  Aristotle's 
Categories,  8. a. 31,  that  the  subjectivist  view  was  held  in  Plato's  time 
by  the  Eretrian  school  of  Menedemus.  ...  On  the  scanty  evidence 
we  possess,  Grote's  conjecture  that  Plato's  refutation  of  [subjective] 
idealism  is'meant  to  refer  to  the  views  of  Menedemus  seems  to  me  the 
best  that  can  be  made.' 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  53 

Critics  like  Natorp,  who  have  fathered  their  modern 
psychologism  on  Plato,  seem  to  me  to  have  introduced 
great  confusion  into  the  study  of  Platonism.  Plato  cer- 
tainly did  not  hold  that  VOY\TO.  depend  for  their  reality  on 
alvQriTa,  nor  that  Soul  alone  is  real.  The  statement  that 
the  Ideas  are  '  simply^force/  is  in  my  opinion  very  far 
from  Plato's  manner  of  conceiving  them,  at  any  period 
of  his  life. 

\1  If  the  Ideas  are  not  general  concepts,  and  not  the 
activity  of  our  own  Souls,  what  are  they  ?  Plato  more 
and  more  tends  to  identify  them  with  the  thought  of  God, 
which,  as  we  must  be  most  careful  to  remember,  is  also 
the  will  of  God.  Mr.  Cornford  thinks  that  in  Plato's 
later  thought  the  Ideas  are  withdrawn  from  the  world 
to  some  inaccessible  Olympus.  He  says,  '  The  world 
of  forms  is  the  characteristic  construction  of  the  Intellect, 
which  can  divide  and  analyse,  but  not  create.  At  the 
Apex  is  enthroned  that  very  Intellect  itself.  We  call  it 
Reason,  God,  the  Good  ;  but  it  is  idle  to  pretend  that  it 
can  create  the  world.'  But  we  have  already  seen  that 
Nou?  does  not  mean  the  Intellect,  and  that  Platonism  has 
other  words  to  express  the  operations  of  the  discursive 
reason.  If  it  is  idle  to  pretend  that  God  can  create  the 
world,  the  whole  of  Platonism,  and  most  of  the  higher 
religions,  must  go  by  the  board. 

Mr.  Cornford  thinks  it  '  an  unworthy  object '  for  the 
supreme  Will  to  desire  to  create  '  an  imperfect  copy  of 
perfection.'  But  the  imperfect  copy  exists,  and  must  be 
accounted  for.  And  perhaps  religious  philosophy  has 
not  been  entirely  unsuccessful  in  finding  an  explan- 
ation. 

Professor  Taylor,  from  a  different  point  of  view, 
objects  to  saying  that  the  Ideas  are  '  thoughts  of  God,' 
and  does  not  believe  that  Plato  ever  held  this  opinion. 
He  has  successfully  demolished  the  notion  that  subjective 
idealism  can  be  found  in  Plato  ;  and  he  argues  that  we 
cannot  escape  from  the  objections  which  have  proved 
fatal  to  this  philosophy  by  supposing  the  world  to  con- 


54  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

sist  of  Divine,  and  not  human  thoughts.1  He  quotes 
from  Bolzano  a  paragraph  which  expresses  his  own  view 
and,  as  he  thinks,  Plato's ;  '  It  follows  no  doubt  from 
the  omniscience  of  God  that  every  truth,  even  if  it  is 
neither  known  nor  thought  of  by  any  other  being,  is 
known  to  him  as  the  omniscient,  and  perpetually  present 
in  his  understanding.  Hence  there  is  not  in  fact  a  single 
truth  which  is  known  to  no  one.  But  this  does  not  pre- 
vent us  from  speaking  of  truths  in  themselves  as  truths 
in  the  notion  whereof  it  is  nowise  presupposed  that  they 
must  be  thought  by  some  one.  For  though  to  be  thought 
is  not  included  in  the  notion  of  such  truths,  it  may  still 
follow  from  a  different  ground,  i.e.  from  the  omniscience 
of  God,  that  they  must  at  least  be  known  by  God,  if  by 
no  one  else.  ...  A  thing  is  not  true  because  God  knows 
it  to  be  true  ;  on  the  contrary,  God  knows  it  to  be  true 
because  it  is  so.  Thus,  e.g.  God  does  not  exist  because 
God  thinks  that  He  exists  ;  it  is  because  there  is  a  God 
that  God  thinks  of  Himself  as  existing.'  Professor  Taylor 
illustrates  this  argument  by  the  example  of  the  discovery 
of  Neptune  by  Adams  and  Leverrier.  Neptune  of  course 
existed  long  before  there  were  any  human  astronomers, 
and  if  there  were  no  astronomers  on  other  planets  within 
sight  of  Neptune,  it  existed  none  the  less,  though  observed 
by  no  finite  intelligence.  He  proceeds,  '  And  though  it 
may  be  reasonable  to  believe  in  an  omniscient  God  who 
did  know  about  the  perturbations  [of  Uranus]  and  their 
cause  before  we  suspected  either,  it  is  pure  nonsense  to 
say  that  God's  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  Neptune 
is  what  we  mean  by  the  existence  of  Neptune.  For  we 
should  then  have  to  say  that  what  Adams  and  Leverrier 
discovered  was  not  Neptune  but  the  fact  that  God  knew 
j  about  Neptune/  Now  I  am  afraid  that  this  '  pure 
J  nonsense  '  is  exactly  what  the  Neoplatonic  Platonism 

1  I  believe  that  my  difference  from  Professor  Taylor  is  only  a  slight 
difference  of  emphasis.  I  should  say  that  God  cannot  '  think '  without 
ipso  facto  actualising  His  thought.  As  Proclus  says  (In  Parmen.  844) 
ws  vo€i  Troiet,  KCU  ws  TTotet  voet,  Kcu  del  eKarepov.  Proclus  defines  the  Ideas 
as  voepol  \6yoi. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  55 

believed  to  be  the  truth.  Bolzano,  in  his  polemic 
against  subjective  idealism,  seems  to  me  to  have  fallen 
into  precisely  the  error  which  Plotinus  requested  Amel- 
ius  to  explain  to  Porphyry,  the  error  of  placing  the 
votjra  '  outside  vov<s.'  God  does  not  know  of  Neptune 
because  He  has  observed  a  planet  revolving  round  the 
sun  in  an  outermost  ring  ;  He  knows  of  Neptune  because 
He  made  Neptune,  and  without  His  sustaining  will  ' 
Neptune  could  not  exist  for  an  instant.  Plotinus  would 
say  that  the  real  Neptune  is  neither  a  lump  of  gases  and 
minerals,  nor  a  notion  in  the  mind  of  God,  but  a  realised 
Idea,  in  which  it  is  quite  impossible  to  separate  the 
creative  will  from  the  thing  willed.  The  real  Neptune  is 
of  course  (to  the  Platonist)  immaterial.  The  Neptune 
of  science  is  not  an  independently  existing  congregation 
of  atoms,  but  an  imperfect  likeness,  constructed  and  per- 
ceived by  Soul,  of  the  real  Neptune.  Soul,  as  Proclus  says, 
is  the  living  world.  It  is  not  thought  as  opposed  to 
thing  ;  it  is  its  own  world,  as  Spirit  is  its  own  world.  It 
is  just  within  the  confines  of  real  existence  (ova-ia)  ; 
but  it  is  more  loosely  integrated  than  the  world  of  Spirit, 
and  therefore  the  particulars  which  compose  it  are  not, 
when  taken  apart,  what  they  seem  to  be.  The  world  of 
Soul — the  /coVyuo?  fwn/co'? — is  real ;  but  it  cannot  be 
pulled  to  pieces  without  admixture  of  error.  The  planet 
which  Leverrier  observed  is  part  of  the  /coV/Jo?  fam/co?. 
Science  finds  that  it  takes  its  place  in  an  ordered  universe, 
and  infers  that  God  knows  of  Neptune,  which  means  that 
Neptune  really  exists. 

In  the  quotation  from  the  Parmenides,  the  dilemma  is 
posed  :  '  If  everything  participates  in  the  Ideas,  must 
you  not  say  that  everything  is  made  up  of  thoughts,  • 
and  that  all  things  think  ;  or  else  that  there  are  unthink- 
ing thoughts  ?  '  Is  the  hypothesis  that  '  all  things 
think '  worth  considering  ?  Professor  Taylor  argues  that 
the  world  cannot  consist  exclusively  of  Souls,  because 
we  suppose  ourselves  to  know  of  many  things,  such  as 
stones  and  pens,  which  are  neither  Souls  nor  mental 


56  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

states.  Again,  the  gravitation  formula  expresses  a  rela- 
tion which  is  not  a  relation  between  minds  or  states  of 
mind.  Platonism  is  certainly  not  consonant  with  the 
fashionable  pluralism,  which  ^divides  the  world  into 
minds,  which  exist  for  themselves,  and  things,  which 
exist  only  for  minds.  Against  this  philosophy  it  is 
worth  insisting,  with  Eucken,  that  a  spiritual  world 
is  not  the  same  thing  as  a  world  of  spirits,  which 
these  thinkers  are  content  to  leave  in  a  non-spiritual 
environment.  The  difficulty  of  deciding  whether  (e.g.) 
a  lobster  has  an  objective  existence — or  wherever  else 
the  pluralist  chooses  to  draw  his  arbitrary  line — is 
enough  to  discredit  the  whole  theory.  Nature  knows  no 
sharp  dividing  line  between  conscious  and  unconscious 
life  ;  the  distinctions  between  animate  and  inanimate, 
organic  and  inorganic,  are  apparently  breaking  down 
under  modern  investigation.1  But  these  difficulties  do 
not  affect  Platonism  or  Neoplatonism.  No  Platonist 
-ever  supposed  that  there  is  a  separate  Soul  or  an  Idea  of 
a  pebble  or  a  pen.2  '  All  things  are  in  various  degrees 
endowed  with  Soul ' — so  Plotinus  says  with  Spinoza,  but 
\.  this  kind  of  panpsychism  is  very  different  from  pluralistic 
idealism,  which  is  often  disguised  materialism.  We  do 
not  get  rid  of  materialism  by  merely  banishing  the 
word.  Proclus,  instead  of  'all  things  think,'  says  'all 
things  pray.' 

The  doctrine  of  Plotinus  is  that  so  far  as  every  thought 
in  Spirit  is  also  an  eternal  Form  of  being,  all  the  thoughts 
of  Spirit  are  Ideas.  Spirit  embraces  all  the  Ideas,  as  the 
whole  its  parts.  Each  Idea  is  Spirit,  and  Spirit  is  the 
totality  of  the  Ideas.  The  Kingdom  of  the  Ideas  is  the 
true  reality,  the  true  beauty.  They  are  unity  in  divers- 
ity, and  diversity  in  unity.3  Their  number  cannot  be 

1  This  is  still  hotly  denied,  even  by  some  distinguished  scientists. 
But  the  study  of  colloids,  giant  molecules,  seems  to  indicate  a  bridge 
between  living  and  non-living  matter  (Moore,  Origin  and  Nature  of 
Life). 

8  Plotinus  holds  that  there  are  no  Ideas  of  artefacts. 

8  6.  5.  6. 


tHE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  57 

infinite,  though  it  is  immeasurably  great,  for  beauty  and 
order  are  inseparable  from  limitation,  and  the  number  of 
possible  Forms  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  infinite.1  There 
are  as  many  Ideas  Yonder  as  there  are  Forms  Here.  The 
only  objects  here  which  are  not  represented  Yonder  are 
such  as  are  '  contrary  to  nature/  There  is  no  Idea  of 
deformity,  or  of  any  vie  manquee. 

Chaignet2  thinks  that  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  Ideas 
is  '  not  organic  '  in  the  system  of  Plotinus,  and  that  it  is 
perhaps  only  retained  out  of  respect  for  Plato.  It  is 
certainly  not  easy  to  distinguish  the  Ideas  from  Spirits, 
and  from  the  creative  Logoi.  Zeller  says  that  in  the 
Enneads,  as  in  Philo,  the  Ideas  '  verdichten  sich '  into 
Spirits,  which  are  not  merely  thoughts  in  the  great 
Spirit,  but  '  spiritual  Powers,  thinking  Spirits.'  The 
relation  between  the  Ideas  and  Nou?  cannot,  he  adds, 
be  more  closely  defined  '  without  bringing  to  light  the 
contradiction  which  vitiates  Philo 's  doctrine  of  Powers — 
namely,  that  of  ranging  substances  under  each  other, 
sometimes  in  the  relation  of  logical  subordination,  some- 
times in  that  of  parts  to  a  whole/  Kirchner  blames 
Zeller  for  identifying  the  Ideas  with  Spirits,  and  the 
two  words  are  certainly  not  interchangeable.  Perhaps 
the  most  important  thing  that  can  be  said  about  the  ei'cfy 
of  Plotinus  is  that  he  has  found  in  the  creative  Reason 
which  is  at  once  in  our  minds  and  immanent  in  the 
world,  the  bridge  between  thought  and  thing.  Spirit  |/ 
does  not  create  the  spiritual  world  ;  but  it  does  create 
the  ordered  universe  as  known  by  the  discursive  reason, 
and  the  reason  which  knows  it. 

Categories  (yevrj)  of  the  Spiritual  World 

In  Plato's  later  dialogues  the  Categories,  as  has  been 
said,  tend  to  displace  the  Ideas.    The  first  table  of  Cate- 
gories is  in  the  Theaetetus,  repeated  and  enlarged  in  the 
Sophist  and  Parmenides.    The  first  place  in  all  enumera- 
1  5«  7-  1-3;  6.  6.  18.  »  Vol.  4,  p,  298. 

i 


58  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

tions  is  given  to  ova-la  (TO  eivai,  ov)  and  its  opposite  TO 
M  elvai.  The  Same  and  the  Other,  Similarity  and 
Dissimilarity,  are  also  common  to  the  three.  The  One 
and  the  Many  are  dropped  in  the  Sophist  ;  Permanence 
and  Change  (Stability  and  Movement)  are  omitted  in  the 
Theaetetus.  '  Not  -Being  '  is  to  be  dropped,  as  it  turns 
out  to  be  only  another  word  for  '  Otherness/  These 
ywn  are  not  identical  with  the  Ideas.  There  is  no  place 
among  them  for  Truth,  Beauty,  or  the  Good.  The  older 
intuitive  vision  gives  way  to  an  analytic  investigation 
of  a  given  universe.  Lastly  in  the  Timaeus  we  have 
almost  the  Aristotelian  list.1 

Aristotle's  Categories  have  been  very  severely  criticised 
by  modern  philosophers  ;2  and  Plotinus  subjects  them  to 
an  acute  and  hostile  examination  in  the  first  book  of  the 
Sixth  Ennead.  It  is  the  more  remarkable  that  the  later 
Neoplatonists,  except  Syrianus,  passed  over  Plotinus' 
work,  and  preferred  the  Aristotelian  treatment.  The 
fact  is,  I  think,  that,  as  Ravaisson  says,  '  Les  genres  de 
Plot  in  sont  des  attributs  inseparables  de  I'toe  ;  c'est  ce 
qu'il  nomme,  par  une  fausse  analogic  avec  les  categories 
d'Aristote,  les  premiers  genres  de  I'toe.'3  I  am  much 
more  disposed  to  agree  with  Zeller,  who  minimises  the 
importance  of  the  Kategorienlehre  in  Plotinus,  than  with 
Steinhart  and  Richter,  who  find  in  it  the  key  to  the 
whole  system.  The  long  discussion  of  the  Categories  in 
the  Sixth  Ennead  seems  to  me  the  least  interesting  part 
of  the  whole  book. 

There  are,  according  to  Plotinus,  three  parrs  of  cate- 
gories, each  pair  consisting  of  opposites,  which  are  recon- 
ciled in/rftie  spiritual  world.  These  are,  Spirit  and  Being, 
or  Thought  and  Thing  (vovs  and  ov)  ;  Difference  and 
Identity  (erepo'rj;?  and  TOVTOTW]  ;  Stability  and  Move- 
ment, or  Permanence  and  Change  (a-rceo-^  and 


1  The  references  are  —  Theaetetus,  p.  185  ;   Sophist,  p.254  ;  Parmen- 
ides,  p.  136;  Timaeus,  p.  37.  2  Cf.  Vol.  i,  p.  191. 

3  Ravaisson,  Essai  sur  la  Metaphysique  d'Aristote,  Vol.  2,  p.  412. 
*  5.  I.  4,  ylvercu  o$v  rot  Trpura   vovst    dv,  erepdr^s,  TavTbrys,    del  d£  Kal 
XajSea'  KCU  0T<x<riv. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  59 

But  he  is  not  quite  consistent  about  this  classification. 
Sometimes  he  omits  the  first  pair  and  makes  four  cate- 
gories ;  l  sometimes,  as  in  the  important  passage  which 
follows,2  he  enumerates  five,  leaving  out  1/01/9.  '  We 
must  lay  down  these  three  categories,  since  Spirit  knows 
each  of  them  separately— Being,  Movement,  and  Stability. 
In  knowing  them,  it  posits  them,  and  in  being  thus  seen, 
they  exist.  Those  things  the  existence  of  which  is  bound 
up  with  Matter,  have  not  their  existence  in  Spirit ;  but  we 
are  now  speaking  of  the  non-material,  and  of  non-material 
things  we  say  that  their  existence  consists  in  being  known 
by  Spirit.  Behold  then  pure  Spirit  and  look  at  it  earnestly, 
not  with  your  bodily  eyes.  You  behold  the  hearth  of 
Reality  (overlap  ea-riav)  and  a  sleepless  light  shining  in 
it ;  you  see  how  it  stands  in  itself,  united  and  yet  divided  ; 
you  see  in  it  permanent  life  and  spiritual  vision  which  is 
directed  not  on  the  future  but  on  the  present,  or  rather 
on  the  eternal  Now  and  the  always  present,  and  on 
itself,  not  on  anything  external.  In  this  spiritual  vision 
or  knowledge  reside  activity  and  movement  ;  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  directed  on  itself  reside  reality  and  being 
(v  over  la  KOI  TO  ov)  ;  for  in  this  self-knowledge  both  sub- 
ject and  object  are  known  as  truly  existing,  and  that  on 
which  it  rests  is  known  as  truly  existent.3  For  activity 
directed  on  itself  is  not  Reality  (ova-la),  but  the  source 
and  object  of  the  activity  is  being  (TO  ov)  ;  for  being  is 
that  which  is  seen,  not  the  act  of  seeing  ;4  but  the  act  of 
seeing  also  possesses  being,  because  its  source  and  object 
is  being.  Now  since  being  is  in  act  and  not  in  potentiality 
(evepyeta,  ov  Swa/mei),  it5  connects  the  two  terms 
again  and  does  not  separate  them,  but  makes  itself  being, 
and  makes  being  itself.  Being  is  the  most  stable  of  all 
things,  and  the  foundation  of  stability  in  all  other  things, 
and  possesses  nothing  that  is  not  absolutely  its  own.  It 

1  6.  2.  15,  19.  2  6.  2.  8. 

8  Viz.  the  voyrbv,  which  calls  vovs  into  activity. 

4  rb  yap  /SXeT^ej/ov  rb  6v,  o$x  "h  jSXtyis,  an  important  statement. 

6  vovs  connects  subject  and  object. 


6o  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

is  also  the^  goal  of  ^spiritual  knowledge,  as  a  stability  that 
had  no  beginning,  and  the  starting-point  of  it,  as  a 
stability  which  never  began  to  move  ;  for  movement 
cannot  arise  from  movement  nor  end  in  movement.  The 
Idea  (idea)  further  belongs  to  the  category  of  stability 
as  being  the  term  of  Spirit,  but  Spirit  is  its  movement ; 
so  that  all  things  are  one,  movement  and  stability,  and 
are  categories  which  exist  in  all  beings.  Each  of  the 
beings  posterior  to  these  is  a  definite  being,  a  definite 
stability,  and  a  definite  movement/  He  goes  on  to  say 
that  if  we  analyse  these  three  categories,  Being-,  Stability, 
and  Movement,  we  shall  find  that  they  are  both  identical 
and  different ;  so  that  we  must  add  Identity  and  Differ- 
ence, making  up  five  categories  in  all.  In  this  chapter 
Plotinus  follows  Plato's  Sophist,  without  introducing 
clearness  into  a  very  obscure  argument. 

Plotinus  elsewhere  distinguishes  carefully  between 
Being  (6V)  and  Reality  (ova-la).  '  Being  and  Reality  are 
different.  Beifig  is  iouricTby "abstraction  from  the  others 
(i.e.  the  other  two  pairs  of  categories)  ;  but  Reality  is 
Being  together  with  Movement,  Stability,  Identity,  and 
Difference.'  We  have  seen  that  Being  (ov)  is  identical 
with  vorirov  in  abstraction  from  vovs.  Therefore  it  has 
the  same  relation  to  vov$  as  a-ravis  to  Klv>ia-i$.  But  it 
is  surely  an  error  to  make  vow  and  voyrov  a  pair  of 
categories  by  the  side  of  the  other  two  pairs.  For  the 
antithesis  of  Stability  and  Movement,  and  of  Identity  and 
Difference,  belongs  to  the  sphere  of  discursive  reason,  the 
Soul-world.  They  only  become  categories  of  Spirit  when 
their  contradictions  are  harmonised  by  being  taken  up  into 
a  higher  sphere.  But  when  they  thus  cease  to  be  contra- 
dictories, they  cease  to  be  themselves.  That  which  is 
always  in  motion  and  yet  always  at  rest,  is  neither  in 
motion  nor  at  rest,  in  the  common  sense  of  the  words. 
It  is  true  that  motion  and  rest  are  ideas  which  imply  each 
other  ;  but  the  very  fact  of  their  real  inter-dependence, 
combined  with  their  apparent  mutual  exclusiveness, 
stamps  them  as  imperfect  ideas,  which  are  transcended 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  61 

rather  than  reconciled  in  the  life  of  Spirit.  Change  and 
Permanence  are  ideas  which  belong  obviously  to  that 
range  of  thought  of  which  time  and  place  are  necessary 
forms.  Identity  and  Difference  are  contradictory  rela- 
tions which,  if  they  can  both  be  asserted  of  the  same 
terms,  prove  that  the  terms  have  been  imperfectly  under- 
stood, or  wrongly  divided.  But  the  unity  in  duality  of 
vov?  and  vorirov  belongs  to  the  sphere  of  real  existence. 
It  is  only  transcended  in  the  Absolute,  which  is  '  beyond 
existence.'  The  third  pair  of  categories,  we  may  venture 
to  say,  ought  to  be  Thought  (Sidvota)  and  its  Object, 
which  present  the  same  kind  of  difficulties  as  the  other 
two  pairs.  And  all  three  pairs  are  not  strictly  yevrj  rov 
WTO?,  but  forms  of  thought  in  the  Soul-world.1 

The  Same  and  the  Other  (TCLVTOV — erepov) 

External  nature  appears  to  us  as  a  collection  of  objects 
in  juxtaposition,  with  no  inner  connexion.  The  main 
task  of  Soul,  and  above  that,  of  Spirit,  is  to  systematise 
and  unify.  In  a  sense  Identity  and  Difference  are  not 
so  much  categories  by  the  side  of  the  other  pairs,  as 
(taken  together)  the  relation  in  which  each  member  in 
the  other  pairs  stands  to  its  correlative.  Or  we  might  say 
that  the  antithesis  between  Identity  and  Difference  is  the 
most  fundamental,  and  that  until  we  understand  how  it 

1  Aliotta,  whose  Idealistic  Reaction  against  Science  (1912)  is  one  of 
the  ablest  of  recent  philosophical  books,  defends  the  Platonic  cate- 
gories. '  Certain  categories  are  presupposed  in  our  ideal  reconstruc- 
tion, but  they  do  not  include  cause,  substance,  quantity,  time,  or 
mathematical  space,  but  rather  other  categories  which  are  really  primi- 
tive and  fundamental,  and  are  conditions  essential  to  the  thinkableness 
of  any  form  of  experience.  Such  are  Identity  and  Diversity.  .  .  .  And 
we  have  presupposed  the  category  of  Being,  that  is  to  say,  the  affirma- 
tion of  facts  as  existing.'  Plotinus  (6.  2.18)  refuses  to  place  vovs  among 
the  ytvt),  because  it  is  '  made  up  of  all  the  others  '  (adv derov  £K  TTO.VTUV)  . 
'  True  vovs  is  Being  with  all  the  others  and  already  the  whole  of 
existence,  but  &v  taken  alone  and  isolated  (^bvov  KO.I  \f/i\bv  \a/j.pavb- 
fjifvov)  is  an  element  (o-rocxetoz/)  of  Spirit.'  This  is  as  much  as 
to  say  that  ov  when  used  as  a  category  is  not  the  same  as  vorirbv.  If 
so,  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  it  is,  or  what  room  there  is  for  it  in  Plotinus' 
system.  For  a  short  summary'of  controversies  about  Being  in  scholastic 
theology  see  Rickaby,  General  Metaphysics,  Book  I. 


62  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

can  be  transcended,  we  cannot  hope  to  understand  how 
Change  and  Permanence,  Thought  and  its  Object,  can 
be  unified  in  the  world  of  Spirit. 

The  great  doctrine  which  Plotinus  expresses  as  the 
reconciliation  of  '  the  same  '  and  the  '  other/  is  that  all 
the  barriers  which  break  up  experience  into  fragmentary 
and  opposing  elements  must  be  thrown  down,  not  in 
order  to  reduce  life  to  a  featureless  mass  of  undifferen- 
tiated  experience,  but  in  order  that  each  element  in 
experience  may  be  realised  in  its  true  relations,  which 
are  potentially  without  limit.  Otherness  and  sameness 
help  to  define  and  emphasise  each  other.  The  whole,  as 
Plotinus  tells  us  repeatedly,  is  in  each  part.  Individual 
Spirits  are  not  parts  of  the  one  Spirit.  They  exist  '  in  ' 
each  other  ;  each  is  the  whole  under  a  particular  form. 
The  universal  is  implicit  in  the  particular.  The  vo^ra  are 
'  many  in  one  and  one  in  many  and  all  together.'1  They 
are  not  separated  in  the  slightest  degree  from  each  other  ; 
the  whole  Spirit  lives  in  each  centre  of  life.2  There  must 
be  differentiation  ;  otherwise  no  communion  of  Spirits, 
no  interaction  on  the  spiritual  plane,  would  be  possible. 
It  would  not  be  enough  that  distinctions  exist  on  the 
plane  of  Soul ;  for  then  Spirit  would  need  Soul  in  order 
to  come  to  life.  '  Spirit  itself  is  not  simple/3  any  more 
than  the  Soul. 

Aliotta4  says,  '  The  perception  of  differences  by  the 
Soul  is  not  ethical  valuation,  or  aesthetic,  or  any  kind  of 
preference,  but  qualitative  as  opposed  to  quantitative 
difference.  Without  qualitative  difference  all  individu- 
ality is  illusory.'  The  question  here  arises  whether  there 
can  be  a  recognition  of  qualitative  differences  without 
ethical  or  aesthetic  valuation,  or  any  kind  of  preference. 
I  am  inclined  to  think  that  there  cannot.  I  believe  that 
judgments  of  value  enter  necessarily  into  every  cognitive 
process  by  the  Soul.  It  seems,  however,  to  be  true  that 
in  contemplating  the  eternal  or  spiritual  world  we  are 

1  6.  5.  6.  2  3.  2.  i  ;   and  cf.  5.  8.  4.  3  6.  7.  13. 

*  Aliotta..  The  Idealistic  Reaction  against  Science   p.  10. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  63 

able  to  recognise  different  aspects  of  perfection,  without 
assigning  comparative  values  to  them.  No  kind  of  pre- 
ference need  be  felt.  In  the  spiritual  world  the  different 
aspects  of  perfection  illuminate  and  do  not  interfere 
with  each  other.  In  that  world,  as  Plotinus  says,  '  all 
is  each,  and  each  is  all,  and  infinite  the  glory/  '  It  is 
necessary  to  recognise  that  there  must  be  diversity  as 
well  as  unity  in  the  intelligible  world.  In  the  same 
way  Christian  theology,  which  is  just  Platonism  applied 
to  the  interpretation  of  the  beliefs  of  the  first  Christians, 
came  to  recognise  that  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world 
and  to  man  cannot  be  thought  out,  unless  in  the  Divine 
nature  itself  there  is  diversity  and  not  merely  abstract 
unity/1  Spirit  is  simple  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  dis- 
cerptible  ;  but  for  that  very  reason  it  has  everywhere 
a  rich  content,  which  becomes  explicit  and  differentiated 
in  the  Soul  which  proceeds  from  it.  It  is  only  when  the 
creative  power  reaches  the  limit  of  its  activity  that  we 
find  simplicity,  in  the  sense  of  poverty  of  content  ;2  in 
Spirit  the  principles  of  all  differentiation  are  contained. 
It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  trace  back  the  sources  of 
plurality,  on  the  lower  planes  of  being,  to  the  inner 
nature  of  Spirit  itself.  Spirit  not  only  engenders  all 
things;  it  is  all  things.3  Though  it  does  not  become 
anything  that  it  was  not,  Spirit  is  in  a  state  of  constant 
inner  activity ;  it  '  wanders  among  realities  (eV  ova-lais 
TrXavarai),  on  the  field  of  truth,  remaining  always  itself.' 
This  '  field  of  truth '  (TreSiov  aXtjOeias)  is  everywhere 
complex  and  diversified  ;  it  is  also  subject  to  incessant 
movements.  There  is  no  standing  still ;  for  where  there 
is  standing  still,  there  is  no  thought  (or  spiritual  percep- 
tion) ;  and  where  there  is  no  thought,  there  is  no  being. 
Reality  and  vorjvis  are  identical;  the  journeys  (jropelai) 
which  Spirit  makes  in  '  the  field  of  truth  '  are  all '  through 

1  Ritchie,  Philosophical  Studies,  p.  202. 

*  6.  7.  13,  TOV  (j.tv  7&p  tffxdrov  ij  tvtpyeia  us  &v  Xr/yovffa  air\rj,  rov  S£ 
irpurov  waffai. 

3  76. ,  ouros  TCI  irdvra  tytvva.,  juaXXov  3£  TO.  TTO.VTO.  fy. 


64  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

life  and  living  things/  and  all  within  its  own  domain. 
Plotinus  deals  with  the  same  subject  in  the  Fifth  Ennead.1 
'  The  being  of  Spirit  is  seeing.'2  But  seeing  involves 
duality  ;  and  if  the  seeing  is  also  an  activity,  it  involves 
plurality  and  movement  as  well.  Thus  Spirit  is  one  in 
many,  and  many  in  one.  We  cannot  even  say  '  I  am  this  ' 
without  acknowledging  at  the  same  time  identity  and 
difference.  If  the  relation  is  one  of  absolute  identity, 
we  no  longer  have  voijo-is,  but  that  immediate  and  un- 
thinkable union  which  belongs  to  the  Absolute.  The 
element  of  plurality  belongs  not  only  to  the  voyrd,  but 
to  vovs  which  perceives  them.  We  may  speak  of  voeg  as 
well  as  of 


Movement  and  Stability  (Kiwjtris  and  o-rao-/?) 


This  antinomy  is  another  form  of  the  last.  That  which 
changes  and  yet  remains  the  same,  that  which  moves 
and  yet  abides  unshaken,  is  at  once  '  the  same  '  and 
'  another  '  in  its  relation  to  itself.  Greek  philosophy  had 
recognised  long  before  Plotinus  that  Movement  and 
Stability  are  complementary  ideas,  which  imply  each 
other.3  As  Kant  says,4  '  Only  the  permanent  and  sub- 
stantial can  change.'  It  is  only  in  a  being  which  '  par- 
ticipates '  in  eternity  that  change  has  any  meaning. 

1  5.  3.  IO.  2  rrji>  oixrlav  avrov  8pa<riv  elvat. 

3  I  entirely  agree  with  Aliotta,  who  expresses  his  astonishment  that 
Bergson  should  think  it  possible  to  return  to  the  crudest  belief  in  move- 
ment pure  and  simple,  as  the  nature  of  reality.     '  Bergson's  fantastic 
mysticism  reduces  the  world  to  a  perennial  stream  of  forms  flowing 
in  no  definite  direction,  a  shoreless  river  whose  source  and  mouth  are 
alike  unknown,  deriving  the  strength  for  its  perpetual  renewal  from 
some  mysterious,  blind,  and  unintelligent  impulse  of  nature,  akin  to 
the  obscure  will  of  Schopenhauer  '  (Op.  cit.  p.  128). 

4  '  To  arise  and  pass  away  are  not  changes  of  that  which  arises 
and  passes  away.    Change  is  a  way  of  existing  that  follows  on  another 
way  of  existing  of  the  very  same  object.    Hence  whatever  changes  is 
permanent  and  only  its  state  alters  '  (Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Miiller's 
transl.  p.  164).    Plotinus  expresses  this  by  saying  forty  eis  8  XiJ-yet  ??  voriais 
OVK   dp^a^vij    <rrd<rts,   /ecu  d0'   o3  &p/j,r)Tai  oi>x    opfiifiaaaa  orders,     ov  yap 


Kbnjffts,  ovd'  eis  Ktvyffiv.  In  opposition  to  Miiller  and  Bouillet,  I 
think  that  Aptafdrq  and  6pfj.rj<raaa  agree  with  v6?7<r(s,  not  with  o-rdc-ts. 
Plotinus  wishes  us  to  remember  that  po^o-ets  are  not,  properly  speak- 
ing, in  time  (6.  2.  8). 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  65 

Recent  writers  of  the  activist  school  have  ignorantly 
represented  Plato  as  the  prophet  of  pure  staticism.  This 
is  very  far  from  the  truth.  In  the  Theaetetus  and  Parmen- 
ides  first  appears  the  notion  of  Kivtjaris  as  change,  as  well 
as  movement  in  space.  The  distinction  of  these  two  kinds 
of  movement  is  introduced  as  a  discovery  of  Socrates. 
The  starting-point  of  this  theory  was  the  recognition  of 
Kivrja-i?  as  a  principle  of  being,  justified  in  the  Phaedrus, 
mentioned  as  known  in  the  Theaetetus,  and  reconciled 
with  the  opposing  principle  of  arrdcrig  in  the  Sophist.  The 
inclusion  of  these  two  under  one  primary  kind  is  (says 
Lutoslawski) *  one  of  Plato's  most  wonderful  anticipa- 
tions of  modern  philosophy.  In  the  Sophist2  he  repudiates 
staticism  with  something  like  indignation. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  for  Plotinus  Spirit  is  perfect 
activity.  Activity  is  defined  by  Bradley3  as  self -caused 
change.  He  proceeds  to  argue  that  nothing  can  be  active 
without  an  occasion  or  cause,  which  makes  it,  so  far, 
passive,  not  active  ;  that  activity  implies  finitude,  and 
a  variety  of  elements  changing  in  time.  His  conclusion 
is  that  activity  is  only  appearance.  Plotinus  would  admit 
that  the  activity  which  consists  in  changes  in  time  is  only 
appearance  ;  but  he  would  differ  from  Bradley  by  saying 
that  the  idea  of  non-temporal  activity  is  not  meaningless. 
That  this  idea  is  wholly  intelligible  he  would  perhaps 
not  venture  to  assert ;  the  activity  which  we  can  under- 
stand is  an  imperfect  likeness  of  spiritual  activity,  and 
it  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  harmonising  the  idea  of 
Stability  with  that  of  Movement.  Plotinus  does  not  like 
Aristotle's  statement  that  '  Movement  is  imperfect 
activity '  (areXi?  ei/epyeia)  ;4  because  there  is  Move- 
ment in  the  world  of  Spirit.5  '  If  no  diversity  awakened 
Spirit  into  life,  Spirit  would  not  be  activity.'6  It  does 
not  follow  that  there  is  Time  in  the  spiritual  world  ;  for 

1  Lutoslawski,  Plato's  Logic,  p.  364  sq. 
8  p.  248,  quoted  above. 

3  Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  64. 

4  6.  i.  16.  6  6.  7.  13.  fl  6.   7.   13 

II.— F 


66  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

'  Movement  does  not  need  Time,  which  only  measures 
the  quantity  of  Movement/1  Movement,  in  the  spiritual 
as  in  the  phenomenal  world,  implies  the  operation  of 
will  ;  not,  however,  in  order  to  become  activity,  but  in 
order  to  accomplish  something  from  which  it  is  quite 
distinct.  It  is  not  itself  made  perfect,  but  the  object  at 
which  it  aimed.'2  Movement  in  the  spiritual  world  is 
not  antithetic  to  stability  ;  its  activity  is  not  a  develop- 
ment of  itself  into  something  that  it  was  not  before. 
The  purposes  of  Spirit  are  realised,  by  its  creative  power, 
as  processes  involving  temporal  succession.  In  these 
processes,  subject  as  they  are  to  time  and  place,  Move- 
ment is  of  course  opposed  to  Stability,  though  the  two 
are  necessary  counterparts  of  each  other.  But  this 
movement,  which  might  truly  be  called  imperfect  activity 
(areXt]?  evepycta),  is  also  imperfect  movement,  if  we 
compare  it  with  the  movement  of  Spirit,  which  does  not 
need  Time  (ov  Seirai  xpovov). 

Plotinus  recognises3  that  continuous  and  regular  move- 
ment is  a  form  of  stability.  The  real  change  would  be 
for  the  machine  to  stop.  Are  we  then  denying  the  truth 
of  the  kinetic  aspect  of  reality  when  we  postulate  un- 
varying laws  of  nature  ?  This  thought  is  the  starting- 
point  of  the  vitalistic  philosophies  of  the  present  day, 
such  as  that  of  Bergson.  It  is  said  that  if  reality  consists 
of  unvarying  general  laws,  illustrated  by  transient  mani- 
festations which  in  no  way  affect  the  eternal  steadfastness 
of  the  laws,  the  time-process  is  without  significance,  and 
the  universe  has  no  history.  Our  answer  is  that  history 
is  always  a  description  of  the  changes  within  some  one 
finite  unitary  whole,  and  that  these  changes  have  a 
meaning  only  when  regarded  as  states  of  some  abiding 
reality  which  persists  through  and  in  them  all.  They 
are  the  expression  of  the  life  and  purpose  which  consti- 
tute the  unity  of  the  whole  in  which  they  are  embraced. 

»  6.  I.  16. 

8  6.  i.  16  and  6.  3.  22.   Kivyffis  is  defined  as  ^  £K  SwA/mcus  odbs  els 


4,  32  and  cf.  5.  i.  4. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  67 

In  the  life  of  Soul  there  is  no  standing  still,1  but  continual 
movement,  and  movement  with  a  meaning.  Within  any 
unitary  whole  there  may  be  developments  of  what  we 
call  laws  as  well  as  in  the  processes  which  exhibit  their 
working  ;  for  the  laws  are  only  the  methods  of  operation 
adopted  by  the  Universal  Soul,  and  are  uncontrolled  by 
any  necessity.  Whether,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  laws 
of  nature  are  uniform,  is  to  be  decided  by  observation. 
But  when  we  consider  "the  subordination  of  the  individual 
to  the  larger  processes  of  the  world-order,  it  is  most 
improbable  that  our  private  volition  should  be  able  so 
to  modify  the  course  of  events  as  to  give  the  world  the 
appearance  of  a  '  wild  '  system,  which  by  its  unaccount- 
able behaviour  administers  shocks  even  to  its  Creator,  as 
William  James  would  have  us  believe. 

In  spiritual  things,  Plotinus  says,  persistence  (OTCKTI?) 
is  their  form  (/xo/>0?/)  and  determination  (0/3*07x09).  2  When 
we  remember  the  superiority  of  Form  to  Matter  in  his 
system,  we  seem  here  to  find  an  assertion  of  the  superiority 
of  persistence  to  change,  though  Movement  is  a  property 
of  Reality  no  less  than  Stability  ;  and  this,  as  has  been 
said,  has  been  regarded  by  many  as  a  characteristic  of 
Platonism.  So  Eucken  says,  '  The  ultimate  basis  of  life 
is  here  always  taken  for  granted  ;  in  the  full  develop- 
ment of  this,  human  activity  has  an  important  task 
assigned  to  it,  but  at  the  same  time  an  impassable  goal. 
When  this  goal  is  reached,  activity  ceases  to  be  a  mere 
striving,  and  is  transformed  into  a  state  of  rest  in  itself, 
into  an  activity  fully  satisfied  by  its  own  exertion  and 
self-expression.  .  .  .  Hence  the  chief  problem  of  life  is 
life  itself,  as  the  complete  unfolding  and  effective  co- 
ordination of  its  own  nature  ;  as  the  poet  says,3  the 
important  thing  is  to  become  what  one  is.'4  He  con- 
trasts this  conception  of  life,  as  something  which  we 


1  There  is  no  o-rderis  here  below,  but  only  ijpe.ufe,  '  the  negation  of 
local  movement,'  6.  3.  27.  a  5  .  i.  7. 

8  The  reference  is  no  doubt  to  Pindar's  remarkable  maxim, 
oToj  wet  HO.BUV.     Pyth.  2.  131. 

«  Eucken,  Life  of  the  Spirit  (Engl.  Tr.),  p.  113, 


68  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

should  see  as  perfect,  if  we  knew  all  that  it  contains,  with 
what  he  considers  the  Christian  view  of  life  as  in  need  of 
redemption  and  radical  change.  In  Christianity,  he  says, 
eternity  enters  into  time,  and  '  temporal  happenings  thus 
gain  a  value  for  the  deepest  ground  and  the  ultimate  fate 
of  reality.'  But  the  Plotinian  view  is  nearer  to  Chris- 
tianity than  the  pseudo-scientific  doctrine  of  perpetual 
progress  which  often  passes  for  Christian.  In  the  Chris- 
tian scheme  a  term  is  set,  not  only  to  the  activities  of 
each  individual,  but  to  the  world-order  itself.  '  Heaven 
and  earth  shall  pass  away,'  not  into  nothingness,  but  into 
a  state  in  which  no  further  development  and  change 
can  be  asserted.  Both  individual  souls  and  any  larger 
scheme  which  has  a  unitary  value  in  God's  sight,  have 
their  places  in  the  eternal  order,  when  their  task  is  done 
here  on  earth.  Nor  is  it  the  Christian  doctrine  that 
'  temporal  happenings  have  a  value  for  the  ultimate  fate 
of  reality.'  The  ultimate  fate  of  reality  never  hangs  in 
the  balance  ;  God  does  not  evolve,  and  suffers  no  loss, 
though  He  may  feel  sorrow,  in  the  failures  of  His  crea- 
tures. Temporal  events  determine  the  ultimate  fate  of 
the  souls  that  animate  bodies,  but  they  do  so  not  as 
external  happenings,  but  as  the  outward  expression  of 
that  upward  or  downward  movement  of  the  Soul  which 
conducts  it  to  its  own  place.  A  man  is  not  -damned  for 
what  he  does,  but  for  what  he  is.  Modern  critics  of 
Platonism  seem  to  assume  that  if  progress  has  its  pre- 
ordained limit,  it  must  be  illusory.  This  is  the  result  of 
forcing  eternity  into  the  category  of  time,  and  envisaging 
it  as  an  endless  series.  This  is,  no  doubt,  the  kind  of 
immortality  that  many  look  for — '  the  wages  of  going  on, 
and  not  to  die.'  But  this  is  not  eternal  life  either  in  the 
Platonic  or  in  the  Christian  sense ;  nor  is  it  the  destiny 
which  science  allows  us  to  anticipate  for  the  individual,  or 
the  race,  or  the  planet  itself.  We  are  not  in  a  position  to 
assert  or  deny  that  there  may  be  other  tasks  for  the  Soul 
in  other  lives.  But  if  there  are,  that  is  not  eternal  life, 
but  at  best  a  kind  of  image  of  it,  a  mode  of  appearance. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  69 

The  problem  of  change  and  permanence  is  so  impor- 
tant, and  is  so  vitally  connected  with  the  debates  of 
modern  philosophy,  that  a  few  more  reflections  may  be 
offered  upon  it.  Plato,  like  Spinoza,  was  deeply  im- 
pressed by  the  timeless  immutability  of  mathematical 
truth,  which  therefore  became  for  him  the  type  of  the 
unchangeable  eternal  Ideas.  The  Soul  which  is  in  com- 
munion with  the  unchangeable  must  have  itself  an  un- 
changeable element.  So  Kant  postulated  an  extra- 
temporal  '  noumenal '  self  as  a  background  for  our 
knowledge  of  the  temporal,  and  T.  H.  Green  argued 
that  knowledge  of  succession  in  time  can  only  arise  for 
a  mind  which  is  not  itself  involved  in  the  time-series.1 
It  is  because  the  Soul  is  in  its  deeper  self  outside  the  time- 
series  that  it  regards  the  fleeting  shows  of  phenomenal 
life  as  either  vain  or  tragic,  and  identifies  itself  willingly 
with  those  parts  of  experience  which  can  defy  '  the 
wreckful  siege  of  battering  days.'  But  I  believe  that 
what  the  Soul  values  in  these  objects  of  experience  is  not 
their  extreme  longevity,  but  their  quality  of  everlasting- 
ness.  Hegel  bids  us  '  banish  from  our  minds  the  preju- 
dice in  favour  of  duration,  as  if  it  had  any  advantage  as 
compared  with  transience/ 2  a  counsel  which  perhaps  goes 
too  far,  since  ability  to  go  on  at  the  highest  level  is  surely 
a  mark  of  superiority  ;  but  it  brings  out  the  main  point, 
that  there  may  be  more  of  the  eternal  in  fifty  years  of 
Europe  than  in  a  cycle  of  Cathay,  in  a  life  of  thirty  years 
greatly  lived  than  in  a  selfish  or  vacuous  existence  pro- 
longed to  extreme  old  age. 

'  A  lily  of  a  day 
Is  fairer  far  in  May, 
Although  it  fall  and  die  that  night — 
It  was  the  plant  and  flower  of  light. 
In  small  proportions  we  just  beauties  see  ; 
And  in  short  measures  life  may  perfect  be.'8 

1  In  this  paragraph  I  am  indebted  to  G.  F.  Barbour  in  Hibberi 
Journal,  Oct.,  1907. 

2  Philosophy  of  History  (Engl.  Tr.),  p.  231. 

3  Ben  Jonson. 


70  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Belief  in  the  persistence  of  effort  through  unending 
aeons  does  not  console  us  for  the  perishing  of  the  finest 
flowers  which  that  effort  produces  ;  nor  does  it  justify 
the  ambition  to  produce  new  values,  which  will  be  equally 
transient.  Faith  can  be  satisfied  with  nothing  short  of 
Plotinus'  confidence  that  '  nothing  that  truly  is  can  ever 
perish  '  j1  and  this  belief  compels  us  to  assert  the  exist- 
ence of  an  eternal,  unchangeable  background,  of  which 
an  unending  temporal  series  would  be  at  best  only  a 
symbol.  Even  the  most  definitely  historical  and  ethical 
religions,  such  as  Judaism,  are  rooted  in  faith  in  an 
Eternal  Being,  who  is  '  God  from  everlasting,  and  world 
without  end,  before  the  mountains  were  brought  forth  or 
ever  the  earth  and  the  world  were  made.' 

Bradley  has  shown  very  clearly  that  progress  and 
evolution  can  only  be  movements  within  a  unitary 
whole.  '  There  is  of  course  progress  in  the  world,  and 
there  is  also  retrogression  ;  but  we  cannot  think  that 
the  Whole  moves  either  on  or  backwards.  The  improve- 
ment or  decay  of  the  universe  seems  nonsense,  unmean- 
ing or  blasphemous.'2 

The  difficulty  is  to  prevent  the  two  aspects  of  reality, 
Change  and  Permanence,  from  falling  apart  again  after 
we  think  that  we  have  reconciled  them.  Plato  himself, 
in  the  Parmcnides,  anticipates  one  of  the  criticisms  which 
have  been  most  often  made  against  his  philosophy.  '  If 
God  has  this  perfect  authority,  and  perfect  knowledge, 
his  authority  cannot  rule  us,  nor  his  knowledge  know  us, 
nor  any  human  thing.'3  This  is  an  objection  of  Parmen- 
ides,  the  Eleatic,  to  the  doctrine  of  Ideas  as  expounded 
by  the  young  Socrates.  If  the  Ideas  are  objective  exist- 
ences independent  of  phenomena,  the  two  systems  must 
be  cut  off  from  each  other.  Plotinus,  as  we  have  seen, 

1  So  Paul  Sabatier  says;  '  Ce  qui  a  vraiment  vecu,  une  fois  revivra.' 

8  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  499. 

8  Parmemdes,  134.  The  best  answer  to  the  question,  '  If  like  can 
only  be  known  by  like,  how  can  God  know  his  creatures  ?  '  is  perhaps 
that  given  in  6.  7.  10.  XoOs  can  perceive  the  lower  things  because 
they  are  owd/m  spiritual,  though  not 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  71 

holds  that  the  world  of  the  Ideas  is  by  no  means  one  of 
stationary  immobility,  though  there  are,  strictly,  no 
inner  changes  in  spirits.  In  the  world  of  Soul  the  Ideas 
are  polarised,  not  only  into  a  multiplicity  of  forms,  but 
into  a  series  of  successive  states  within  unitary  processes. 
It  is,  in  fact,  only  by  understanding  this  soul-world,  the 
world  of  the  One  and  Many,  that  we  can  rise  to  under- 
stand the  world  of  the  One-Many,  the  world  of  Spirit.  In 
making  this  ascent,  we  by  no  means  exchange  the  kinetic 
for  the  static  view  of  reality ;  but  we  are  strengthened 
in  our  conviction  that  the  whole  meaning  of  movement 
and  change  is  to  be  sought  in  the  direction  taken  by  the 
movement,  and  in  the  values  which  the  movement, 
taken  as  a  whole,  succeeds  in  realising.  These  values  are 
themselves  above  the  antithesis  of  rest  and  motion  ; 
they  belong  to  the  eternal  world.  To  us,  who  are  ex- 
posed to  the  stress  of  conflict,  they  abide  in  a  haven  of 
peace  and  calm  beyond  our  reach,  and  it  is  no  small  part 
of  the  longing  which  we  have  to  enter  into  that  haven, 
that  in  it  each  particular  task  is  in  turn  finished  and 
then  kept  safe  for  ever.  For  the  Soul,  it  may  be,  there  is 
no  doffing  of  its  armour,  but  only  a  temporary  repose. 
But  a  life's  battle,  if  won,  is  won  for  ever.  Its  unitary 
purpose,  if  achieved,  has  its  home  secure  in  the  world  of 
real  being.  Thus  our  attitude  towards  life  should  be 
that  of  Browning's  Rabbi  ben  Ezra. 

'  Therefore  I  summon  age 

To  grant  youth's  heritage, 
Life's  struggle  having  so  far  reached  its  term  ; 

Thence  shall  I  pass,  approved 

A  man,  for  aye  removed 
From  the  developed  brute  ;   a  god  though  in  the  germ. 

And  I  shall  thereupon 

Take  rest,  ere  I  be  gone 
Once  more  on  my  adventure  brave  and  new ; 

Fearless  and  unperplexed 

When  I  wage  battle  next, 
What  weapons  to  select,  what  armour  to  endue.' 


72  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

The  moods  of  the  religious  mind  vary.  Sometimes  we 
say  with  Faber  : — 

'  O  Lord,  my  heart  is  sick, 
Sick  of  this  everlasting  Change  ; 
And  life  runs  tediously  quick 
Through  its  unresting  race  and  varied  range. 
Change  finds  no  likeness  of  itself  in  Thee, 
And  makes  no  echo  in  thy  mute  eternity.' 

Sometimes  we  agree  with  George  Macdonald  : — 

'  Blame  not  life ;   it  is  scarce  begun  ; 
Blame  not  mankind  ;   thyself  art  one  ; 
And  Change  is  holy,  O  blame  it  never ; 
Thy  soul  shall  live  by  its  changing  ever  ; 
Not  the  bubbling  change  of  a  stagnant  pool, 
But  the  change  of  a  river,  flowing  and  full ; 
Where  all  that  is  noble  and  good  will  grow 
Mightier  still  as  the  full  tides  flow, 
Till  it  join  the  hidden,  the  boundless  sea 
Rolling  through  depths  of  eternity.' 

But  on  the  whole  surely  Keyserling  is  right  when  he  says 
that  if  life  had  no  temporal  end  it  would  not  be  '  tin 
ewiges  Sein,  but  ein  perpetuelles  Werden.'  And  this  would 
mean  that  we  must  live  for  ever  in  the  consciousness  of  an 
unfulfilled  purpose,  doomed  never  to  attain  our  heart's 
desire. 

'  The  whole  system  of  Eckhart  '  (says  Delacroix)  '  is 
a  long  and  passionate  effort  to  place  life  and  movement 
in  Being  itself,  and  to  spread  the  Supreme  Being  over  the 
multiplicity  of  the  acts  the  synthesis  of  which  can  alone 
constitute  it.  Hardly  has  he  affirmed  the  absolute 
reality  of  Being,  when  he  occupies  himself  in  penetrating 
its  depth  and  discerning  its  richness.  His  God  is  not  an 
immobile  God,  but  the  living  God ;  not  abstract  Being, 
but  the  Being  of  Being.  The  reality  of  God  is  his  work, 
and  his  work  is,  before  the  birth  of  things,  his  own 
birth/  .  .  .  '  So  in  developing  created  things  in  the 
world  of  becoming,  Spirit  makes  them  enter  into  eternity. 
In  God  progress  and  regress,  coming  and  returning,  are 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  73 

closely  united  ;  they  are  at  bottom  one  and  the  same  act, 
the  act  by  which  God  penetrates  himself  and  finds  him- 
self wholly  in  himself.  Thus  divine  movement  is  at 
bottom  repose.  Becoming  is  eternal ;  that  is  to  say,  its 
change  alters  nothing  in  eternity.  God  is  immobile  in 
himself  and  so  abides.'1 

Ruysbroek  thus  unites  and  distinguishes  Work  and 
Rest  in  God.  '  The  Divine  Persons  who  form  one  God 
are  in  the  fecundity  of  their  nature  ever  active  ;  and  in 
the  simplicity  of  their  essence  they  form  the  Godhead  and 
eternal  blessedness.  Thus  God  according  to  the  Persons 
is  eternal  Work  ;  but  according  to  His  essence  and  per- 
petual stillness,  He  is  eternal  Rest.  Now  love  and 
fruition  lie  between  this  activity  and  this  rest.  Love 
would  work  without  ceasing,  for  its  nature  is  eternal 
work  with  God.  Fruition  is  ever  at  rest,  for  it  dwells 
higher  than  the  will  and  the  longing  for  the  well-beloved, 
in  the  well-beloved,  in  the  divine  nescience  and  simple 
love  .  .  .  above  the  fecundity  of  nature.'2 

If,  before  leaving  this  subject,  we  turn  for  a  moment 
to  the  aesthetic  aspects  of  Change  and  Permanence,  we 
observe  the  curious  fact  that  the  beauty  perceived  by 
sight  is  mainly  stationary,  while  that  perceived  by  hear- 
ing requires  change.  The  most  exquisite  note  of  a  prima 
donna,  if  prolonged  for  two  or  three  minutes,  would 
compel  us  to  stop  our  ears  ;  but  there  is  no  satiety  in 
gazing  at  a  fine  landscape  or  a  noble  picture,  until  the 
optic  nerves  become  fatigued.  The  Greeks,  though  they 
did  not  undervalue  music,  were  on  the  whole  more 
impressed  by  the  beauties  of  visible  form  ;  their  greatest 
triumphs  were  in  sculpture,  an  art  in  which  they  remain 
unapproachable.  It  may  not  be  an  accident  that  in  this 
race  of  sculptors  we  find  also  our  pioneers  in  the  cult  of 

1  *  Gotlich  nature  is  ruowe.'  '  Esse  ipsum  dat  quietem  et  facit  in 
seipso  et  solo  ipso  quiescere  omnia  quae  citra  ipsum  sunt.  Igitur  deus 
in  se  quiescit  et  in  se  quiescere  facit  omnia.'  '  Ipsum  esse  est  quies 
et  quietans  omnia  et  ipsum  solum.'  Delacroix,  Le  Mysticisme  en  Alle- 
magne,  pp.  192,  176. 

a  De  Septem  Gradibus  A  moris,  Chap.  xiv.  Underbill,  Mysticism,  p. 521 . 


74  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

'  eternal  form,  the  universal  mould.'  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Jews,  in  whom  the  sense  of  visible  form  is  singularly  blunt, 
have  been  great  musicians,  and  also  strong  upholders  of 
the  belief  that  it  is  in  history  that  God  reveals  Himself. 

The  Spiritual  World  as  a  Kingdom  of  Values 

The  whole  discussion  of  the  Categories  of  the  Spiritual 
world  in  the  Enneads  leaves  me  dissatisfied.  It  seems 
to  me  that  when  we  reach  the  plane  of  the  eternal  verities, 
the  Koo-juios  vor]T09,  we  should  leave  these  dialectical 
puzzles  behind,  and  recognise  that  what  we  now  have  to 
deal  with  is  a  kingdom  of  absolute  values.  The  whole 
philosophy  of  Plotinus  is  an  ontology  of  moral,  intellec- 
tual, and  aesthetic  values.  These  values  are  not  merely 
ideals  ;  they  are  the  constituents  of  Reality,  the  attributes 
under  which  God  is  known  to  man.  Whether  they  should 
be  called  categories  is  a  question  which  does  not  matter 
much  ;  they  are  the  qualities  which  all  spiritual  things 
possess,  and  in  virtue  of  which  they  hold  their  rank  as 
perfect  being. 

The  highest  forms  in  which  Reality  can  be  known  by 
Spirits,  who  are  themselves  the  roof  and  crown  of  things, 
are  Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty,  manifesting  themselves 
in  the  myriad  products  of  creative  activity.  Things  truly 
arc,  in  proportion  as  they  '  participate  '  in  Goodness, 
Truth,  and  Beauty.  These  attributes  of  Reality,  which, 
so  far  as  can  be  known,  constitute  its  entire  essence,  are 
spiritual ;  that  is  to  say,  they  belong  to  a  sphere  ot 
supra-temporal  and  supra-spatial  existence,  which  obeys 
laws  of  its  own,  and  of  which  the  world  of  common 
experience  is  a  pale  copy. 

I  venture  to  think,  audacious  as  the  suggestion  un- 
doubtedly is,  that  Plotinus  ought,  when  dealing  with 
the  spiritual  world,  to  have  made  a  clean  sweep  of  the 
Platonic  and  Aristotelian  categories,1  and  to  have  said 

1  Bradley,  as  is  well  known,  takes  most  of  the  Aristotelian  categories 
in  detail  and  convicts  them  of  being  mere  Appearance.  That  is  to  say, 
they  are  not  categories  of  the  Kooyios  voyrfc. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  75 

that  the  three  attributes  of  oucr/a  are  Goodness,  Truth, 
and  Beauty — ayaOorw,  uX^Oeia,  and  Ka'XXo?.  Let  us 
examine  his  reasons  for  refusing  to  do  this  ;  for  he  does 
not  leave  the  question  unconsidered.  '  Why  do  we  not 
include  among  the  first  categories  the  Beautiful,  the  Good, 
the  Virtues,  Science  (true  knowledge),  and  Spirit  P1  If 
by  the  Good  we  mean  the  First  Principle,  that  of  which 
we  can  affirm  nothing,  but  which  we  call  the  Good 
because  we  have  nothing  else  to  call  it,  it  cannot  be  a 
category  ;  for  we  cannot  affirm  it  of  anything  else.  .  .  . 
Besides,  the  Good  is  not  in  existence,  but  beyond  existence. 
But  if  by  the  Good  we  mean  the  quality  of  goodness, 
we  have  shown  that  quality  is  not  one  of  our  categories. 
The  nature  of  Reality  is  good,  no  doubt ;  but  not  as 
the  First  Principle  is  good  ;  its  goodness  is  not  a  quality, 
but  an  attribute.2  But,  it  will  be  said,  you  have  told  us 
that  the  One  has  all  the  other  categories  in  it,  and  that 
each  of  these  is  a  category  because  it  is  common  and  is 
seen  in  many  things.  If  then  the  Good  is  seen  in  every 
part  of  Reality  or  Being,  or  in  most  of  them,  why  is  it 
not  included  in  the  first  categories  ?  The  reason  is  that 
it  is  present  in  different  degrees  ;  there  is  a  hierarchy  of 
goods  all  depending  on  the  First  Good.  .  .  .  But  if  by 
the  Good  which  is  in  Being  we  mean  the  natural  activity 
which  draws  it  towards  the  One,  and  say  that  this  is  its 
Good,  to  gain  the  form  of  Good  from  the  One,  then  the 
Good  in  this  sense  will  be  activity  directed  towards  the 
Good,  and  this  is  its  life.  But  this  activity  is  Movement ; 
and  Movement  has  been  named  as  one  of  the  categories/3 
The  answer  to  these  various  objections  is  that  in  the 
first  place  when  we  call  Goodness  an  attribute  of  vow 
and  povjrd,  we  certainly  do  not  mean  the  Absolute, 
'  which  we  only  call  the  Good  because  we  have  nothing 
else  to  call  it/  but  Goodness  in  its  proper  sense ;  in  the 

1  This  is  a  direct  contradiction  of  5.  i.  4,  in  which  foCs  appears  as 
one  of  the  categories.  He  is  certainly  right  in  excluding  »/ouj,  but 
the  same  arguments  are  fatal  to  its  correlative  fly,  which  he  retains 
among  them. 

*  iov,  d\\'  iv  aitT$.  *  6.  2.  17. 


76          THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

second  place  that  this  Goodness  is  not  a  quality,  but  a 
constitutive  attribute  of  Reality  as  such  ;  in  the  third 
place  that  the  hierarchy  of  degrees  in  Goodness  is  also 
a  hierarchy  in  degrees  of  Reality,  the  two  being  in- 
separable ;  and  lastly  that  though  the  striving  towards 
the  Good  is  itself  a  good  for  the  Soul,  the  good  of  the 
Spirit  is  not  a  KWIJO-IS,  but  a  form  of  activity  '  within 
the  field  of  truth/  in  which  movement  and  stability  are 
reconciled.  The  whole  argument  is  hardly  worthy  of 
Plotinus. 

Proceeding  to  the  Beautiful,  he  uses  the  same  argu- 
ments with  no  better  effect.  Of  cV«rn;/A»/,  which  nearly 
corresponds  to  the  attribute  which  we  have  called  Truth, 
he  says,  '  Knowledge  is  Movement -in-itself  (avroKivijvis), 
as  being  a  vision  of  Reality  and  activity,  but  not  its 
possession  ;  it  may  be  subsumed  under  Movement,  or 
Stability,  or  both.'  It  is  contrary  to  Plotinus'  own 
doctrine  to  say  that  in  the  spiritual  world  there  can  be 
o\fr/9  without  £$9. 

We  have  seen  already  that  the  disciples  of  Plotinus 
were  dissatisfied  with  his  spiritual  categories.  It  was 
satisfactory  to  me  to  find  that  the  view  which  had  already 
occurred  to  me  has  the  powerful  support  of  Proclus,  the 
ablest  thinker  of  the  school  next  to  Plotinus  himself. 
'  There  are  three  attributes  (he  says)  which  make  up  the 
essence  of  Divine  things,  and  are  constitutive  of  all  the 
higher  categories — Goodness,  Wisdom,  Beauty  (ayaOorw, 
(ro</>ia,  icccXXo?)  ;  and  there  are  three  auxiliary  principles, 
second  in  importance  to  these,  but  extending  through 
all  the  divine  orders — Faith,  Truth,  and  Love'  (-TnVn?, 
aXijOeta,  cpw).1  In  another  place2  he  explains  the 
relationship  between  these  two  triads.  Goodness,  Wis- 
dom, and  Beauty  are  not  only  the  constitutive  attributes 
of  the  Divine  nature  as  such ;  they  are  also  active  causes. 
When  they  are  exerting  their  activity,  they  take  respec- 
tively the  forms  of  Faith,  Truth,  and  Love.  '  Faith  gives 

1  Proclus,  Theol.  Plat.  i.  i. 
1  Proclus,  In  Alcib.  2.,  p.  141. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  77 

all  things  a  solid  foundation  in  the  Good.1  Truth  reveals 
knowledge  in  all  real  existences.  Love  leads  all  things 
to  the  nature  of  the  Beautiful.' 

The  ultimate  attributes  of  Reality  are  values.  And 
it  is  an  unmixed  advantage,  in  considering  them,  to  get 
rid  of  the  quantitative  categories  which  are  only  valid 
of  temporal  and  spatial  relations.  The  intellectual 
puzzles  about  sameness  and  otherness,  movement  and 
stability,  do  not  help  us  at  all  to  understand  the  spiritual 
world.  They  only  convince  us  of  the  inadequacy  of  the 
discursive  reason  to  comprehend  the  things  of  the  Spirit . 
The  attributes  of  Reality  are  values.  But  values  are 
nothing  unless  they  are  values  of  Reality.  Truth,  for 
example,  is,  subjectively,  a  complete  understanding  of 
the  laws  and  conditions  of  actual  existence.2  It  is 
the  true  interpretation  of  the  world  of  sense,  as  know- 
able  by  Soul  when  illuminated  by  Spirit.  Objectively, 
it  is  an  ordered  harmony  or  system  of  cosmic  life,  inter- 
preted in  terms  of  vital  law,  and  nowhere  contradicted 
by  experience.  If,  as  is  notoriously  the  case,  perfect 
law  and  order  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  world  of  ordinary 
experience  ;  if  perfect  Beauty  and  Goodness  are  not 
to  be  discerned  by  the  Soul  except  when  it  turns  to 
Spirit,  we  have  to  suppose  that  these  imperfections  are 
partly  due  to  our  faulty  apprehension,  and  partly 
to  the  essential  conditions  of  a  process  which  is  doubly 
split  up  by  Space  and  Time,  and  which  is  so  disintegrated 
precisely  in  order  that  spiritual  values  may  be  realised 
through  conflict  with  evil. 

The  great  difficulty  in  this  scheme  is  one  which  is  by 
no  means  created  by  the  scheme  itself.  It  is  rather  a 
fundamental  problem  of  all  philosophy  ;  and  a  system 

1  Cf.  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  u.  i.  But  Proclus  tends  to  identify 
Faith  with  the  mystical  vision. 

8  Neoplatonism  throughout  assumes  that  Truth  is  '  the  conformity 
of  Thought  to  Thing.'  In  spite  of  the  heavy  guns  that  have  been 
brought  to  bear  on  this  first  principle  of  scholastic  epistemology,  I  see 
no  reason  to  abandon  it.  It  is  what  we  all  mean  by  Truth ;  and  I 
agree  with  Fechner  that  in  philosophy  '  there  comes  a  point  where  a  man 
must  trust  himself.' 


78  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

which  brings  it  out  clearly  is  so  far  superior  to  a  system 
which  ignores  or  conceals  it.  The  difficulty  is  that  judg- 
ments of  value  give  us  an  essentially  graduated  world  ; 
while  judgments  of  existence  are  riot  so  easily  graduated. 
In  judgments  of  value  every  object  is  what  it  is  only  in 
a  relation  of  better  or  worse  as  compared  with  other 
objects,  or  of  estimated  defect  in  relation  to  an  absolute 
standard.  But  judgments  of  existence  are  not  naturally 
arranged  in  an  ascending  or  descending  series.  An 
object  either  is  or  is  not.  The  quantitative  measure- 
ments with  which  science  is  occupied  establish  no  generic 
difference  between  the  smaller  and  the  greater.  The 
scientific  intellect  would  be  satisfied  with  a  single  realm 
of  objective  reality,  all  on  the  same  plane,  as  distinguished 
from  a  shadow- world  of  false  opinions  (\fsevSels  S6£ai), 
to  be  suppressed  wherever  recognised.  Science  has  no 
business  with  the  categories  '  good  '  and  '  bad,'  '  beauti- 
ful '  and  '  ugly/  and  has  no  absolute  standard  whereby 
to  approve  or  condemn  any  phenomenon.  It  is  true 
that,  as  its  enemies  are  now  beginning  to  point  out,  it 
has  frequently  set  up  an  absolute  standard,  that  of  univer- 
sal continuity  or  invariable  sequence,  often  erroneously 
called  causation,  and  has  treated  as  a  scandal  or  an 
enigma  the  deviations  from  .complete  regularity  which 
the  investigation  of  nature  brings  to  light.  This,  how- 
ever, is  only  one  of  many  instances  in  which  judgments 
of  value  intrude  unnoticed  into  an  abstract  method  of 
inquiry  when  it  attempts  to  deal  with  the  concrete 
actual.  The  unconscious  assumption  is  that  the  order 
of  nature  must  be  perfect,  and  that  the  perfect  is  the 
absolutely  regular.  This  assumption  obliges  the  scientist 
to  distinguish  between  normal  and  abnormal  phenomena, 
and  to  recognise  degrees  of  abnormality.  But  these 'are 
value- judgments  :  the  abnormal  phenomenon  is,  so  to 
speak,  convicted  as  a  law-breaker,  although  its  existence 
is  in  truth  not  a  breach  of  the  law  but  a  confutation  of  it. 
However,  a  severer  dependence  upon  observed  facts,  and 
a  distrust  of  generalisation,  are  now  characteristic  of 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  79 

scientific  research.  Speaking  generally,  the  scientist 
aims  at  a  valuation  which  shall  nowhere  be  contradicted 
by  experience  j1  while  the  metaphysician  endeavours 
so  to  interpret  experience  that  it  shall  nowhere  contra- 
dict his  valuation.  But  this  latter  can  only  be  achieved 
if  the  contents  of  experience  are  arranged  on  a  graduated 
scale,  according  to  their  relative  approximation  to  an 
absolute  standard  not  realised  in  finite  experience. 
Morality  and  Art  can  face  the  possibility  that  their  ideals 
are  not  fully  realised  anywhere  or  at  any  time,  though  in 
admitting  this  possibility  they  confess  their  faith  in  a 
supra-spatial  and  supra-temporal  kingdom  of  spiritual 
existence.  The  Platonist  believes  that  he  has  the  wit- 
ness of  the  Spirit  to  the  eternal  reality  as  well  as  to  the 
validity  of  his  ideals,  and  he  resolutely  rejects  the  ex- 
pedient of  throwing  them  into  the  future,  as  if  there  were 
a  natural  tendency  in  the  universe  to  improve  itself. 
His  ontology  therefore  compels  him  to  identify  Reality 
with  achieved  perfection  ;  and  this  involves  the  diffi- 
culty of  postulating  degrees  of  existence  corresponding 
with  degrees  of  value.  No  one  will  pretend  that  he  has 
succeeded  in  clearing  this  conception  of  its  inherent 
difficulties.  It  is  tempting  to  say,  with  Bradley,  that 
graduation  belongs  only  to  Appearance  ;  but  are  we  not 
then  in  danger  of  breaking  the  link  which  connects  the 
world  of  phenomena  with  the  world  of  Spirit  ?  There  is, 
in  point  of  fact,  no  graduation  given  to  us  in  the  physical 
world ;  graduation  is  entirely  the  work  of  our  value- 
judgments  interpreting  phenomena.  But  these  value- 
judgments  claim  to  be  also  judgments  of  existence  ;  for 
that  which  has  no  existence  has  no  value.  If  then  gradua- 
tion is  only  Appearance,  we  are  left,  it  seems  to  me,  with 
a  perfect  world  of  the  Ideas  over  against  an  undifferen- 
tiated  world  of  Matter.  The  former,  it  would  seem,  has 
no  existence,  and  the  latter  no  value  ;  nor  is  it  possible 
to  bring  them  together. 

The  solution  offered  by  a  spiritual  philosophy,  such  as 

1  This  clause  is  from  Miinsterberg. 


8o  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

that  of  Plotinus,  is  that  existence  is  most  adequately 
conceived  under  the  form  of  spiritual  values,  rather  than 
under  the  form  of  substance.  It  is  only  when  we  think 
of  substances — a  term  which  suggests  ponderable  quanti- 
ties— that  the  dilemma  '  to  be  or  not  to  be  '  leaves  no 
escape.  Science  is  in  truth  occupied  with  certain  values 
— those  which  Plotinus  calls  order  and  limit  (jcoV/xo?  or 
rd£t<;  and  Tre/oa?),  and  looks  for  them  in  the  objects 
which  it  examines.  From  this  point  of  view,  all  real 
irregularity  is  a  problem,  and  the  only  solution  of  the 
problem  is  to  show  that  the  irregularity  is  only  apparent. 
Similarly  the  apparent  '  failures  of  purpose/  as  Aris- 
totle calls  them,  in  soul-life,  are  problems  for  the  philo- 
sopher. But  the  notion  of  '  imperfect  existence/  taken 
in  itself,  does  not  seem  to  me  to  involve  any  contradiction 
when  applied  to  immaterial  things. 

It  is  also  a  principle  of  the  philosophy  of  Spirit  that 
since  all  the  world  of  becoming  is  radically  teleological, 
it  can  only  be  understood  by  the  method  of  valuation. 
As  Lotze  says  in  a  very  fine  passage  :  '  All  the  increase 
of  knowledge  which  we  may  hope  to  attain,  we  must  look 
for,  not  from  the  contemplation  of  our  intelligent  nature 
in  general,  but  from  a  concentration  of  consciousness 
upon  our  destiny.  Insight  into  what  ought  to  be  will 
alone  open  our  eyes  to  discern  what  is  ;  for  there  can  be 
no  body  of  facts,  no  course  of  destiny,  apart  from  the  end 
and  meaning  of  the  whole,  from  which  each  part  has 
received  not  only  existence  but  also  the  active  nature  in 
which  it  glories/1 

The  three  attributes  of  the  divine  nature,  Goodness, 
Truth  (or  Wisdom),  and  Beauty,  are  ultimates,  in  our 
experience.  They  cannot  be  fused,  or  wholly  harmonised. 
There  is  a  noetic  parallelism  between  them,  with  that 
character  of  mutual  inclusion  which  belongs  to  spiritual 
existences.2  Popular  theology  quite  justifiably  fuses 

1  Lotze,  Microcosmus,  Bk.  3,  Chap.  5. 

8  A  very  clear  and  thoughtful  treatment  of  this  theme  may  be 
found  in  Mr.  Glutton  Brock's  little  book,  The  Ultimate  Belief  (1916). 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  81 

them,  with  the  help  of  a  quasi-sensuous  imagery,  into  a 
kind  of  unity,  in  which  all  three  suffer  equal  violence. 
The  aim  of  popular  religion  is  practical ;  it  gives  us  a 
working  hypothesis  and  a  rule  of  conduct  ;  but  its 
science,  ethics,  and  aesthetics  are  all  demonstrably 
faulty.  The  philosophy  of  Plotinus  does  not  permit  us 
to  acquiesce  in  such  accommodations.  It  shows  us  why 
we  must  expect  to  find  some  difficulties  insuperable,  by 
insisting  that  there  is  a  stage,  which  we  have  not  yet 
reached,  where  they  will  disappear.  '  Now  we  see 
through  a  glass  darkly,  but  then  face  to  face/  Meanwhile 
we  have  our  revelation,  imperfect  though  it  is,  of  these 
three  attributes  of  God,  a  threefold  cord  not  quickly 
broken. 

It  follows  from  this  conception  of  the  spiritual  world 
as  a  kingdom  of  values,  that  it  is  the  goal  of  the  will  and 
of  the  intellect  together.  We  need  not  try  to  separate 
these  two  faculties,  which  work  together.  The  '  ought 
to  be  '  is  an  element  of  spiritual  perception  ;  but  the 
ethical  ideal  which  is  here  realised  is  of  no  private  inter- 
pretation. It  is  not  my  will,  but  the  will  of  God,  which 
is  done  Yonder. 

In  concluding  this  section,  we  may  mention  that  Eucken 
and  Miinsterberg  both  regard  a  self-contained  system  of 
pure  values  as  one  of  the  desiderata  of  modern  philosophy. 
Would  it  not  be  true  to  say  that  if  Life  is  the  supreme 
category  of  the  world  as  constituted  by  and  known  to 
Spirit,  harmony  must  have  the  form  of  teleology,  unity 
of  love,  joy  of  creation,  and  goodness  of  virtue  ? 

See  especially  p.  20.  '  The  philosophy  of  the  spirit  tells  us  that  the 
spirit  desires  three  things  and  desires  these  for  their  own  sake  and  not 
for  any  further  aim  beyond  them.  It  desires  to  do  what  is  right  for 
the  sake  of  doing  what  is  right ;  to  know  the  truth  for  the  sake  of 
knowing  the  truth ;  and  it  has  a  third  desire  which  is  not  so  easily 
stated,  but  which  I  will  now  call  the  desire  for  beauty  without  giving 
any  further  explanation  of  it.  These  three  desires  and  these  alone  are 
the  desires  of  the  spirit ;  and  they  differ  from  all  our  other  desires  in 
that  they  are  to  be  pursued  for  their  own  sake,  and  can  indeed  only 
be  pursued  for  their  own  sake.' 


H.— Q 


82  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 


The   Great  Spirit   and   Individual   Spirits 

We  have  followed  the  explanations  of  Plotinus  with 
regard  to  the  Universal  Soul  and  its  relations  to  individual 
Souls.1  We  shall  not  be  surprised  to  find  Universal  Spirit 
holding  much  the  same  position  in  relation  to  particular 
Spirits.  The  chief  passage  in  which  he  deals  with  '  the 
Great  Spirit '  is  in  the  second  chapter  of  the  Sixth  En- 
nead.2  Let  us  suppose,  he  says,  that  Spirit  is  not  yet 
attached  to  any  particular  being.  We  may  find  an 
analogy  in  generalised  Science,  which  is  potentially  all  the 
sciences,  but  actually  none  of  them.  So  Universal  Spirit, 
enthroned  above  particular  Spirits,  contains  them  all 
potentially,  and  gives  them  all  that  they  possess.  The 
Great  Spirit  exists  in  itself,  and  the  particular  Spirits 
exist  equally  in  themselves  ;  they  are  implied  in  the 
Universal  Spirit,  and  it  in  them.  Each  particular  Spirit 
exists  both  in  itself  and  in  the  Great  Spirit,  and  the  Great 
Spirit  exists  in  each  of  them  as  well  as  in  itself.  The 
Great  Spirit  is  the  totality  of  Spirits  in  actuality  (eW/>- 
ye/a),  and  each  of  them  potentially  (Swa.fj.ei).  They  are 
particular  Spirits  evepyela,  and  the  Great  Spirit  Swa^ei. 
As  to  the  source  of  particular  Spirits,  he  says  that  when 
the  Great  Spirit  energises  within  itself,  the  result  of  its 
activity  is  the  other  Spirits,  but  when  outside  itself,  Soul. 
Thus  the  Great  Spirit. is  exactly  analogous  to  the  Univer- 
sal Soul  on  the  next  rung  of  the  ladder. 

The  Great  Spirit,  as  the  manifestation  of  the  ineffable 
Godhead  in  all  its  attributes,  is  the  God  of  Neoplatonism.3 
This  fact  is  obscured  both  by  the  completeness  with 
which  it  is  divested  of  all  anthropomorphic  attributes, 
and  by  the  mystical  craving  for  union  with  the  Godhead 
itself,  which  has  been  commonly  supposed  to  be  the 
starting-point  and  the  goal  of  this  philosophy.  But  it  is 

1  See  especially  4.  3.  4.  2  6.  2.  20,  21,  22. 

3  Plotinus  occasionally  calls  the  One  0c6s,  e.g.  in  i.  i.  8  ;  but  those 
modern  critics  who  habitually  speak  of  the  Neoplatonic  Absolute  as 
'  God  '  only  mislead  their  readers. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  83 

only  as  Spirit  that  the  Godhead  is  known  to  us  as  a 
factor  in  our  lives.  We  have  the  power  of  rising  above 
our  psychic  selves  to  share  in  the  life  of  Spirit  ;  and  this 
communion,  which  may  be  the  directing  principle  of  our 
inner  and  outer  life,  is,  except  in  rare  moments  of  ecstasy, 
the  highest  degree  of  worship  and  spiritual  joy  to  which 
a  human  being  can  attain.  The  life  of  religion  consists 
in  communion  with  the  Father  of  Spirits  ;  and  it  is  here 
that  philosophy  also  reaches  her  goal.  Those  Christian 
philosophers  who,  following  the  deepest  doctrine  of  the 
Fourth  Gospel,  have  placed  salvation  in  communion 
with  the  Logos-Christ,  are  in  a  position  to  understand 
the  Plotinian  doctrine  of  Spirit.  Such  similes  as  that  of 
the  vine  and  its  branches,  and  such  sayings  as  '  Abide  in 
me,  and  I  in  you/  illustrate  the  relation  of  the  Great 
Spirit  to  other  Spirits  in  Neoplatonism. 

In  ascending  to  Spirit,  the  Soul  loses  itself  in  order  to 
find  itself  again.  We  present  ourselves  a  living  sacrifice, 
not  to  death  but  to  life  ;  and  this  is  possible  because  our 
highest  life -principle  is  super-personal.  The  ideal  unity 
is  truer  than  the  concrete  individuality.  Love  joins  the 
discontinuity  of  living  beings  to  the  continuity  of  life, 
and  mirrors  in  the  subjective  sphere  the  objective  unity 
of  individuals.  Love  is  the  psychical  expression  of  the 
natural  unity  of  living  creatures,  and  of  their  union  with 
God.  This  doctrine  is  common  to  Neoplatonism  and 
Christianity. 

The  consciousness  of  eternal  values,  and  love  for  them, 
are  primary  and  instinctive  affections  of  the  Soul.  And 
since  these  values  are  not  coincident  with  individual 
advantage,  this  fact  is  inexplicable  unless  the  ultimate 
reality  is  super-personal.  We  do  not,  in  our  conscious- 
ness, begin  with  the  individual  and  then  pass  by  abstrac- 
tion to  the  general,  but  the  general  works  in  us  as  such 
immediately.  We  see  resemblances  before  we  see  the 
objects  which  resemble  each  other.  The  primitive  law  is  not 
association,  but  rather  dissociation.  The  objective  inter- 
connexion of  life  is  a  fact,  and  the  highest  expression  of 


84  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

each  individual  life  is  not  itself  but  the  totality  of  life. 
The  physiology  of  birth  and  infancy  indicate  how  little 
independent  the  individual  is.  We  are  drawn  into  supra- 
personal  life  whenever  we  find  it  impossible  to  rest  in 
the  present  moment,  which  alone  belongs  to  us  ;  whenever 
we  rise  above  the  mere  animal  plane,  we  in  truth  forget 
ourselves  and  enter  into  a  larger  life.  The  fact  that 
our  psycho-physical  ego  is  for  all  of  us  object  not  subject 
(this  is  indisputably  true)  is  itself  a  sufficient  proof  that 
we,  in  our  deepest  ground,  are  far  more  than  it.1 

And  yet  the  individual  is  not  a  link  in  the  chain. 
He  is  the  chain  itself.  The  whole  is  not  '  the  race,'  as 
known  to  the  historian  or  anthropologist.  The  race,  so 
studied,  is  an  organism  more  loosely  integrated,  and 
therefore  of  a  lower  type,  than  the  personal  life.  But  in 
the  spiritual  world  the  race  is  one  ;  '  each  is  all,'  as 
Plotinus  says  in  the  passage  quoted  below. 

The  differences  which  keep  spiritual  things  from  fusing 
completely  arc  qualitative  differentiations ;  but,  as 
Plotinus  says  in  an  interesting  passage,  they  are  evepyeiai 
and  \6yoi  rather  than  qualities.2  These  distinctions, 
which  do  not  involve  separation,  are  a  good  thing,3  be- 
cause they  add  to  the  richness  of  the  real  world,  which 
includes  not  only  the  diverse  (§ia<j>opa),  but  opposites 
(ei/di/rm).4  It  is  not  easy  to  answer  the  question 
whether  there  are  differences  of  value  among  the  votjra.5 
Their  common  life  is  so  much  more  than  their  individual 
life  that  the  question  has  not  much  meaning.  The 
inferior  values,  if  such  there  be,  are  raised  to  the  level  of 
perfection  by  their  intimate  unity  with  the  whole  spiritual 
world.  On  the  lower  levels  real  inferiority  exists,  because 

1  So  Eckhart  says,  '  Men  differ  according  to  flesh  and  according 
to  birth;  but  according  to  Thought  (=vovs)  they  are  one  man,  and 
this  one  man  is  Christ,'  Delacroix,  p.  203. 

8  6.  i.  10.  3  6.  7.  8-10,  otiru  ptKrlov.  *  3.  2.  16. 

6  Plotinus  says  that  beings  in  the  eternal  world  are  unequal,  but 
not  imperfect  (6.  7.  9).  Each  has  realised  the  '  nature  '  which  it  was 
intended  to  attain  ;  but  there  is  a  natural  hierarchy  there,  as  here. 
And  see  2.  9.  13,  KCU  ^/cet  \//VXTI  xeWov  v°v  '>  an^  2-  6.  I,  for  qualitative 
differences  ^e? 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  85 

the  avenues  of  intercourse  with  things  Yonder  are 
obstructed. 

It  is  plain  that  the  individual  i/oy?  is  the  same  life 
as  the  individual  V^XV*  only  transformed  into  the  Divine 
image  and  liberated  from  all  baser  elements.1  In- 
dividuality is  maintained  by  the  '  something  unique  '  in 
each  Spirit  ;2  but  it  is  no  longer  any  bar  to  complete 
communion  with  all  that  is  good,  true,  and  beautiful  in 
others.  And  this  state,  so  far  from  being  a  mere  ideal, 
is  the  one  true  reality,  eternal  and  objectively  true 
existence,  the  home  of  the  Soul,  which  has  its  citizenship 
in  heaven. 

Mr.  Bosanquet  says,3  '  In  every  true  part — hence  in 
every  member — of  an  infinite  whole  there  is  something 
corresponding  to  every  feature  of  such  a  whole,  though 
not  repeating  it.  ...  It  would  certainly  be  true  of  a 
genuine  infinite  that  if  we  speak  of  whole  and  parts  at  all, 
the  whole  represents  itself  within  every  part/  This  is 
exactly  the  doctrine  of  Plotinus  with  regard  to  vonra. 
Their  characteristic  in  relation  to  each  other  is  '  mutual 
inclusion/  which  is  another  way  of  saying  that  '  the 
relations  between  psychical  states  cannot  be  expressed 
quantitatively/4  '  Each  part  of  the  whole  is  infinite/5 
'  Each  vonrov  is  intrinsically  multifold/6  '  Each  is  a 
whole,  and  all  everywhere,  without  confusion  and  with- 
out separation/7  In  a  fine  passage,8  one  of  the  noblest 
in  Plotinus,  the  condition  of  beatified  spirits  is  thus 
described.  '  A  pleasant  life  is  theirs  in  heaven  ;  they 
have  the  Truth  for  mother,  nurse,  real  being,  and  nutri- 
ment ;  they  see  all  things,  not  the  things  that  are  born 

1  In  4.  3.  5  he  says  that  individual  souls  are  the  \6yoi  of  particular 
voes  within  vovs,  '  made  more  explicit.' 

2  4-  3-  5»  aTroXemu  ot-5^  TUV  &VTWV,  £ir<l  KaKet  ol  voej  OVK  aTrdXouJ'rcu,  6'n 
HT)  ciVt  (Tto/AaTiKws  /xc^tep«r/A^i'ot,  ciXXd  /j.£vei  %KO.ffTov  tv  tTfp^rrjTt  %xov  T^-ai/rd 
8  <?<mv  flvai. 

3  The  Value  and  Destiny  o/  the  Individual,  p.  298. 

4  Lindsay,  The  Philosophy  o/  Bergson,  p.  50. 

6  6.  7.  13.  •  5.  3.  10. 

7  I.  8.  2,  S\ov  €<rrlv  (KaffTov  /ecu  TravraxT}  TT&V.     /cat  01)  rvytt&*nu  dXXd  01) 
xwph.    The  editors  follow  the  MSS.  in  reading  a5  xupl*i  ^>u^  surely  ov 
must  be  right.  »  5.  8.  4. 


86  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

and  die,  but  those  which  have  real  being  ;  and  they  see 
themselves  in  others.  For  them  all  things  are  transparent, 
and  there  is  nothing  dark  or  impenetrable,  but  everyone 
is  manifest  to  everyone  internally,  and  all  things  are 
manifest ;  for  light  is  manifest  to  light.  For  everyone 
has  all  things  in  himself  and  sees  all  things  in  another  ;  so 
that  all  things  are  everywhere  and  all  is  all  and  each  is 
all,  and  the  glory  is  infinite.  Each  of  them  is  great,  since 
the  small  also  is  great.  In  heaven  the  sun  is  all  the  stars, 
and  again  each  and  all  are  the  sun.  One  thing  in  each  is 
prominent  above  the  rest ;  but  it  also  shows  forth  all. 
There  a  pure  movement  reigns  ;  for  that  which  produces 
the  movement,  not  being  a  stranger  to  it,  does  not  trouble 
it.  Rest  is  also  perfect  there,  because  no  principle  of 
agitation  mingles  with  it/ 

William  Penn,  the  Quaker,  shows  how  Love  can  antici- 
pate the  state  of  beatified  Spirits  here  on  earth.  '  They 
that  love  beyond  the  world  cannot  be  separated  by  it. 
Death  cannot  kill  what  never  dies.  Nor  can  Spirits  ever 
be  divided  that  love  and  live  in  the  same  Divine  Principle, 
the  root  and  record  of  their  friendship.  Death  is  but 
crossing  the  world,  as  friends  do  the  seas  ;  they  live  in  one 
another  still.  For  they  must  needs  be  present,  that  love 
and  live  in  that  which  is  omnipresent.  In  this  Divine 
glass  they  see  face  to  face  ;  and  their  converse  is  free  as 
well  as  pure.  This  is  the  comfort  of  friends,  that  though 
they  may  be  said  to  die,  yet  their  friendship  and  society 
are  in  the  best  sense  ever  present,  because  immortal/ 

Life  in  the  Spiritual  World 

The  most  attractive  description  of  the  state  of  beatified 
Spirits  is  that  quoted  above,  from  the  eighth  book  of  the 
Fifth  Ennead.  Another  brief  passage  may  be  added.1 
'  After  having  admired  the  world  of  sense,  its  grandeur, 
and  beauty,  the  eternal  regularity  of  its  movement,  the 
gods,  visible  or  invisible,  the  daemons,  the  animals  and 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  87 

plants  which  it  contains,  we  may  rise  to  the  archetype 
of  this  world,  a  world  more  real  than  ours  is  ;  we  may 
there  contemplate  all  the  spiritual  objects  which  are  of 
their  own  nature  eternal,  and  which  exist  in  their  own 
knowledge  and  life,  and  the  pure  Spirit  which  presides 
over  them,  and  infinite  wisdom,  and  the  true  kingdom 
of  Kronos,  the  God  who  is  KO/OO?  and  1/01/9-  For  it 
embraces  in  itself  all  that  is  immortal,  all  Spirit,  all  that 
is  God,  all  Soul,  eternally  unchanging.  For  why  should 
it  seek  to  change,  seeing  that  all  is  well  with  it  ?  And 
whither  should  it  move,  when  it  has  all  things  in  itself  ? 
Being  perfect,  it  can  seek  for  no  increase.'  It  is  much 
the  same  as  Plato's  description  in  the  Phaedo  :  '  When  the 
Soul  returns  into  itself  and  reflects,  it  passes  into  another 
region,  the  region  of  that  which  is  pure  and  everlasting, 
immortal  and  unchangeable  ;  and  feeling  itself  kindred 
thereto,  it  dwells  there  under  its  own  control,  and  has 
rest  from  its  wanderings,  and  is  constant  and  one  with 
itself  as  are  the  objects  with  which  it  deals/1  Aristotle 
is  really  not  far  from  the  same  conception  of  spiritual 
life.  '  We  ought  not  to  pay  regard  to  those  who  exhort 
us  that  as  we  are  men  we  ought  to  think  human  things 
and  to  keep  our  eyes  upon  mortality.  Rather,  as  far 
as  we  can,  we  should  endeavour  to  rise  to  that  in  us  which 
is  immortal,  and  to  do  everything  in  conformity  with 
what  is  best  for  us  ;  for  if  in  bulk  it  is  small,  yet  in  power 
and  dignity  it  far  exceeds  all  else  that  we  possess.  Nay, 
we  may  even  think  of  it  as  our  true  self,  for  it  is  the 
supreme  element  and  the  best  that  is  in  us.  If  so,  it  would 

1  We  may  quote  a  parallel  from  a  modern  Platonist,  who  by  an 
early  and  glorious  death  has  passed  into  the  better  world  which  was 
often  in  his  thoughts. 

[We  will]  there 

Spend  in  pure  converse  our  eternal  day  ; 
Think  each  in  each,  immediately  wise ; 
Learn  all  we  lacked  before  ;   hear,  know,  and  say 

What  this  tumultuous  body  now  denies ; 
And  feel,  who  have  laid  our  groping  hands  away  ; 
And  see,  no  longer  blinded  by  our  eyes. 

(Rupert  Brooke). 


88  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

be  absurd  for  us  to  choose  any  life  but  that  which  is 
properly  our  own.'1 

In  the  spiritual  world  finite  beings  exist  as  pulse-beats 
of  the  whole  system ;  finite  relations  are  superseded  by 
complete  communion.  All  the  faculties  of  the  Soul  must 
be  transmuted  to  suit  these  eternal  conditions.  There 
can  be  no  reasoning  (Xoyio-juios)  Yonder ;  a  constant 
activity  (evepyeia  ea-Tuxra)  takes  the  place  of  dubitative 
reasoning.2  Nor  can  there  be  any  memory  ;  for  all  v6tj(ri? 
is  timeless.3  In  the  spiritual  world  all  is  reason  (Xo'yo?) 
and  wisdom  ;4  Spirits  pass  their  existence  in  '  living 
contemplation '  (Oewpia  fwora).5  '  The  calm  of  the 
Spirit  is  not  an  ecstatic  condition,  but  a  state  of  activity/6 
Its  rest  is  unimpeded  energy. 

This  raises  a  question,  which  affects  the  roots  of  the 
Neoplatonic  philosophy,  whether  even  in  heaven  there 
can  be  satisfaction  without  tension.  For  if  there  be  no 
such  thing  as  unimpeded  activity,  the  only  escape  from 
this  troublesome  world  of  change  and  chance  would  be 
into  the  formless  Absolute  and  the  dreamless  sleep  of 
Nirvana.  We  should  lose  the  /coo-yuo?  i/o^ro?,  and  with 
it  almost  all  that  makes  Plotinus  an  inspiring  guide. 
The  world  would  be  cut  into  two  halves,  both  of  which 
could  be  proved  by  analysis  to  be  unreal.  The  answer, 
I  think,  is  that  in  the  spiritual  world  the  opposition 
between  tension  and  free  action,  like  that  between  rest 
and  motion,  is  transcended.  Of  course  the  Spirit  cannot 
energise  in  vacuo  ;  but  the  condition  which  calls  out  the 
expenditure  of  its  energy  is  willed  and  accepted,  so  that 
if  there  is  tension,  there  is  no  strife.  We  must  not  forget 
that  there  is  a  close  parallelism  between  the  world 
Yonder  and  that  which  we  know  Here  below.  '  All  that 
is  there  is  here/  as  Plotinus  says.  The  difference  is  that 
what  we  see  here  in  a  state  of  partial  disintegration, 

1  Aristotle,  Ethics,  Bk.  x.  2  4.  3.  18. 

3  See  the  long  discussion  in  4.  4.        4  3.  3.  5.  &  3.  8.  8. 

•  5. 3.  7.  This  is  one  of  many  passages  which  show  how  far  Plotinus 
was  from  the  Schwarmerei  of  the  extreme  mystics. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  89 

amid  a  war  of  jarring  elements,  is  there  known  as  vigorous 
and  harmonious  life.  The  forces  which  '  here  '  seem  to 
thwart  the  operations  of  the  Universal  Soul  are  not 
destroyed  '  there/  but  minister  to  the  triumphant  and 
healthful  activity  of  Spirit. 

Plotinus  raises  the  curious  question,  what  room,  if 
any,  there  is  for  the  arts  and  sciences  in  heaven.1  His 
answer  is,  that  in  so  far  as  these  aim  at  symmetry  and 
harmony,  they  are  rooted  in  spiritual  reality,  and  have 
their  place  in  the  higher  sphere.  Greek  aesthetics  always 
overvalued  the  importance  of  symmetry  and  proportion 
in  art.  A  modern  Platonist  would  be  right  in  enlarging 
this  answer,  and  saying  that  all  art  which  expresses  an 
eternal  or  spiritual  meaning  has  its  place  in  the  eternal 
world  of  Beauty,  while  all  science  which  succeeds  in  the 
discovery  of  nature's  laws  belongs  to  the  eternal  world 
of  Truth. 

In  heaven  'the  Soul  is  the  Matter  of  Spirit/2  which 
means  that  the  self -transcendence  of  the  Soul  is  achieved 
by  making  itself  the  passive  instrument  of  Spirit,  turning 
its  gaze  steadily  towards  God  and  heaven,  and  trying, 
as  a  medieval  mystic  says,  '  to  be  to  God  what  a  man's 
hand  is  to  a  man/  When  it  thus  turns  to  God,  it  finds 
that  'there  is  nothing  between/3  It  comes  to  Spirit,  is 
moulded  by  Spirit,  and  united  to  Spirit.  Nor  does  it 
lose  its  individuality,  or  its  self -consciousness,  though  it 
is  one  and  the  same  with  the  world  of  Spirit ;  and  from 
this  blessed  state  it  will  not  change.4 

'  In  knowing  God,  the  Spirit  knows  also  itself ;  for  it 
will  know  what  it  receives  from  God,  what  God  has  given 
to  it,  and  can  give.  In  knowing  this,  it  will  know  itself  ; 

1  5.  9.  ii.  'In  heaven  '=&«.  Plotinus  uses  ovpavbs=b  /c6<r/xos,  TO 
S\ov  &ov,  rb  irw,  rb  6'Xo»>.  See  Bouillet,  Vol.  i,  p.  243.  But  he  also 
uses  ovpavbs  of  an  intermediate  sphere  between  ^ct  and  tvravda,  in  which 
memory  first  appears,  4.  4.  5.  I  have  sometimes  translated  ^te?  '  in 
heaven/  because  I  wish  to  emphasise  that  it  is  the  home  of  beatified 
Souls.  2  3.  9.  3. 

3  4.  4.  2,  ffTpa,<pfiaa  ovdtv  /uera£i>  ?xa-    Cf.  a^so  5-  I-  6* 
*  4.  4.  2,  oi/Tws  oPc  Hxov<ra  OVK  &v  /zera/SdXXoi,  dXXa  ?xot  &v  dr/^Trrws  irpbs 
6/J.ov  J-\QVffa  TTJV  crvvalcrdijffiv  avrijs,  u>$  £v  fi/wa  ra3  VOIJTI^  rainrbv 


go  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

for  it  is  itself  one  of  God's  gifts,  or  rather  the  sum-total 
of  them.  If  then  the  Spirit  will  know  him  and  his  powers, 
it  will  know  itself  as  having  come  from  him  and  derived 
from  him  all  that  it  can  do.  If  it  cannot  see  him  clearly, 
it  is  because  seer  and  seen  are  the  same.  For  this  reason 
Spirit  will  know  and  see  itself,  because  to  see  is  to  become 
oneself  the  thing  seen.'1 

Thus  the  Soul  can  pass  without  any  abrupt  change 
into  the  eternal  world,  and  find  itself  at  home  there. 
'  There  is  nothing  between/  as  Plotinus  says  again  and 
again.  It  is  only  a  question  of  words  whether  we  call '  the 
pure  Spirit  in  the  Soul '  '  our  Spirit,'  or  whether  we  still 
call  it  Soul.2  '  We  are  kings  when  we  are  in  the  Spirit.'3 
Nay,  we  are  no  longer  mere  men,  when  we  ascend  to  that 
height,  '  taking  with  us  the  best  part  of  the  Soul/  The 
discursive  reason  (Stavota)  can  discern  the  handwriting, 
as  it  were,  of  Spirit.  It  judges  things  by  its  own  canons, 
which  are  given  to  it  by  Spirit,  and  testify  that  there  is 
a  higher  region  than  its  own.  It  knows  that  it  is  an 
image  of  Spirit,  and  that  the  handwriting  which  it  de- 
ciphers in  itself  is  the  work  of  a  writer  who  is  Yonder. 
Will  it  then  be  content  not  to  go  higher  ?  No.  It  will 
proceed  to  the  region  where  alone  complete  self-conscious- 
ness and  self-knowledge  exist — the  realm  of  Spirit.4  So 
'  the  Siavota  of  the  true  Soul  is  Spirit  in  Soul/5 

It  is  difficult  to  picture  to  ourselves  a  state  of  existence 
in  which  we  shall  no  longer  reason,  because  we  know 
intuitively  ;  in  which  we  shall  not  talk,  because  we  shall 
know  each  other's  thoughts  ;  a  state  in  which  we  shall 
be  '  all  eye/6  St.  Augustine  uses  the  same  language  and 
applies  it  to  the  angels  and  beatified  Spirits.7  Origen  has 
much  the  same  doctrine  about  the  relation  of  Soul  to 
Spirit  that  we  find  in  Plotinus  ;  but,  like  almost  all 

1  5-  3.  7- 

2  In  i.  6.  6.  he  says  that   the    Soul  is   &>rwy  pbvov  \l/vxn  when  it 
becomes  vovs.  3  5.  3.  4.  *  5.  3.  4. 

6  He  also  uses  vovt  tv  TJHIV,  vovs  \oyiftnevos,  vovs  cV  Stcurrctaet  /ou 
vov*  /ic0eK76s.  *  4.  3.  1 8. 

7  Augustine,  De  Civitate  Dei,  10.  29  ;   22.  29. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  91 

Christian  philosophers,  he  follows  St.  Paul  in  calling  the 
higher  principle  7rm//xa,  not  vovs.  '  When  the  Soul  is 
lifted  up  and  follows  the  Spirit,  and  is  separated  from  the 
body,  and  not  only  follows  the  Spirit  but  becomes  in  the 
Spirit,  must  we  not  say  that  it  puts  off  its  soul-nature, 
and  becomes  spiritual  ?  >l  But  Plotinus  will  not  let  us 
forget  that  Soul  is  the  child  of  Spirit ;  and  that  the  higher 
principle  never  is,  or  can  be,  barren.  The  felicity  of 
Spirit  always  flows  over  into  Soul,  which  is  the  Logos  and 
activity  of  Spirit.2  As  Shakespeare  says  : — 

'  Heaven  doth  with  us  as  we  with  torches  do  ; 
Not  light  them  for  themselves  :   for  if  our  virtues 
Did  not  go  forth  of  us,  'twere  all  alike 
As  if  we  had  them  not.   Spirits  are  not  finely  touched 
But  to  fine  issues  :   nor  Nature  never  lends 
The  smallest  scruple  of  her  excellence, 
But,  like  a  thrifty  goddess,  she  determines 
Herself  the  glory  of  a  creditor, 
Both  thanks  and  use.'3 

It  is  necessary  for  us  to  be  carefully  on  our  guard 
against  interpreting  the  Neoplatonic  '  Yonder  '  as  merely 
the  future  life.  It  is  intimately  bound  up  with  present 
experience.  Every  worthy  object  of  human  activity, 
including  the  mechanical  arts,  belongs  at  least  in  part  to 
the  eternal  world.4  Spirit  is  the  universal  element  in 
all  worthy  occupations.  Spirituality  means  a  persistent 
attitude  of  mind,  which  will  never  be  immersed  in  the 
particular  instance.  The  Soul  is  able  to  recognise  spiritual 
law  in  the  natural  world,  and  in  recognising  it,  Soul  itself 
becomes  more  spiritual.  Escape  from  the  thraldom  of 
change  and  chance  is  always  open ;  and  the  return  jour- 
ney, which  is  the  magnetic  attraction  of  Spirit,  is  always 
open  too. 

1  Origen,  De  Oratione,  10.  2  5.  i.  3. 

3  Shakespeare,  Measure  for  Measure,  Act  i,  Sc.  i. 
*  5.  9.  ii.     And  cf.  5.  5.  2,  where  it  is  stated  explicitly  that  Spirit 
knows  the  life  of  Soul. 


92  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 


Eternity  (atw 


1  Spirit  possesses  all  things  at  all  times  simultaneously. 
It  possesses  all  things  unchanged  in  identity.  It  is  ;  it 
knows  no  past  or  future  ;x  all  things  in  the  spiritual  world 
co-exist  in  an  eternal  Now.  Each  of  them  is  Spirit  and 
Being  ;  taken  together,  they  are  universal  Spirit,  univer- 
sal Being.'2 

'  In  virtue  of  what  attributes  do  we  call  the  spiritual 
world  immortal  and  perpetual  ?  In  what  does  per- 
petuity (aiSiorw)  consist  ?  Are  perpetuity  and  eternity 
identical,  or  is  a  thing  eternal  by  being  perpetual  ?  3  In 
any  case  eternity  must  depend  on  one  common  character, 
but  it  is  an  idea  composed  of  many  elements,  or  a  nature 
either  derived  from  the  things  Yonder  or  united  to  them, 
or  seen  in  them,  so  that  all  spiritual  objects  taken  to- 
gether make  one  eternity,  which  nevertheless  is  complex 
in  its  powers  and  in  its  essence.  When  we  look  at  its 
complex  powers,  we  may  call  it  Being  or  Reality,  as  the 
substratum  of  spiritual  objects  ;  we  may  call  it  Move- 
ment, as  their  life  ;  Rest,  as  their  permanence  ;  as  the 
plurality  of  these  principles,  we  may  call  it  Difference  ;  as 
their  unity,  Identity.4  A  synthesis  of  these  principles 
brings  them  back  to  life  alone,  suppressing  their  differ- 
ences, and  considering  their  inexhaustible  activity,  the 
identity  and  immutability  of  their  action,  their  life,  and 
their  thought,  in  which  there  is  no  change  or  break.  In 
contemplating  all  things  thus,  we  contemplate  eternity  ; 
we  see  a  life  which  is  permanent  in  its  identity,  which 
possesses  all  things  at  all  times  present  to  it,  which  is 
not  first  one  thing  and  then  another,  but  all  things  at 

1  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell  (Mysticism  and  Logic,  p.  21)  quotes  as 
typical  of  the  mystical  attitude  towards  time  the  following  from  a 
Persian  Sufi  :  '  Past  and  future  are  what  veil  God  from  our  sight. 
Burn  up  both  of  them  with  fire.  How  long  wilt  thou  be  partitioned 
by  these  segments  as  a  reed  ?  ' 

*  5-  I-  4- 

3  In  i.  5.  7  he  says  we  must  not  confound  T&  x/>oj/t/c6»>  del  T$ 

*  Plotinus  thus  finds  in  eternity  all  the 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  93 

once  ;  which  is  perfect  and  indivisible.1  It  contains  all 
things  together,'  as  in  a  single  point,  without  anything 
passing  from  it  ;  it  remains  identical  and  suffers  no 
change.  Being  alvrays  in  the  present,  because  it  has  never 
lost  anything  nor  will  acquire  anything,  it  is  always  what 
it  is.  Eternity  is  not  the  substratum  ;2  it  is  the  light  which 
proceeds  from  it.  Its  identity  admits  of  no  futurity  ;  it 
is  always  now,  always  the  same.  .  .  .  That  of  which  we 
cannot  say,  '  It  was,'  or  '  it  will  be/  but  only,  'it  is  '  ; 
that,  the  existence  of  which  is  immovable,  because  the 
past  has  taken  nothing  from  it  and  the  future  can  bring 
nothing  to  it,  that  is  eternity.  Therefore  the  life  of  the 
real  in  reality,  in  its  full,  unbroken,  and  absolutely  un- 
changing totality,  is  the  eternity  which  we  are  seeking. 
'  Eternity  is  not  an  extraneous  accident  of  spiritual 
reality ;  it  is  with  it  and  of  it.  It  is  closely  bound  up 
with  reality,  because  we  see  that  all  the  other  things 
which  we  affirm  to  exist  Yonder  are  from  and  with  reality. 
For  the  things  which  hold  the  first  rank  in  being  must 
be  in  and  with  the  highest  existences.  This  is  to  be  said 
of  the  Beautiful,  and  also  of  Truth.  Some  of  these 
qualities  are  as  it  were  in  a  part  of  the  whole  of  Being, 
while  others  are  in  the  whole  ;  because  this  whole,  being 
a  true  whole,  is  not  composed  of  parts,  but  engenders  the 
parts.  Further,  in  this  whole,  Truth  does  not  consist  in 
the  agreement  of  one  thing  with  another,  but  with  that 
of  which  it  is  the  Truth.  The  true  whole  must  be  a  whole 
not  only  in  the  sense  that  it  is  all  things,  but  in  the  sense 
that  nothing  is  wanting  to  it.  If  so,  it  can  have  no 
future  ;  for  to  say  that  anything  will  be  for  it  is  to  imply 

1  Augustine  expounds  the  doctrine  of  Plotinus  in  his  own  words. 
'  Ad  quam  [Sapientiam]  pertinent  ea  quae  nee  fuerunt  nee  futura  sunt 
sed  sunt;  et  propter  aeternitatem  in  qua  sunt.et  fuisse  et  esse  et  futura 
esse  dicuntur  sine  ulla  mutabilitate  temporum.  Non  enim  sic  fuerunt 
ut  esse  desinerent,  aut  sic  futura  sunt  quasi  nunc  non  sint,  sed  id  ipsum 
esse  semper  habuerunt  semperque  habitura  sunt.  Manent  autem  non 
tamquam  in  spatiis  locorum  fixa  veluti  corpora,  sed  in  natura  incor- 
porali  sic  intelligibilia  praesto  sunt  mentis  aspectibus,  sicut  ita  in  locis 
visibilia  vel  contrectabilia  corporis  sensibus.'  De  Trinitate,  12,  14. 

a  Plotinus  uses  this  Aristotelian  term  (inroKeifj.fvot')  both  of  Matter  as 
the  receptacle  of  Forms,  2.  4.  i,  and,  as  here,  of  voTjrd.  Cf.  6.  3.  4. 


94  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

that  something  is  wanting,  that  it  is  not  yet  the  whole. 
Again,  nothing  contrary  to  its  nature  can  happen  to  it ; 
for  it  is  impassible.  And  if  nothing  can  happen  to  it,  it 
has  no  future  and  no  past. 

'  In  the  case  of  created  things,  if  you  take  away  their 
future  you  take  away  their  existence,  which  consists 
in  continual  growth  ;  but  in  things  that  are  not  created 
you  cannot  apply  the  idea  of  futurity  without  ousting 
them  from  their  position  in  Reality.  For  they  could  not 
belong  originally  to  the  world  of  real  being,  if  their  life 
were  in  a  becoming  and  in  the  future.  .  .  .  The  blessed 
beings  which  are  in  the  highest  rank  have  not  even  any 
desire  for  the  future  ;  for  they  are  already  all  that  it  is 
their  nature  to  be  ;  they  possess  all  that  they  ought  to 
possess  ;  they  have  nothing  to  seek  for,  since  there  is 
no  future  for  them,  nor  can  they  receive  anything  for 
which  there  is  a  future.  .  .  .  The  world  of  Spirit  can 
admit  nothing  which  belongs  to  not-being.  This  con- 
dition and  nature  of  Reality  is  what  wre  mean  by  eternity  ; 
the  word  aiwv  is  derived  from  TO  ael  ovt  that  which  exists 
for  ever.  .  .  .x 

'  What  then  if  we  do  not  cease  to  contemplate  the 
eternal  world,  if  we  remain  united  to  it,  adoring  its 
nature  ;  if  we  do  not  weary  in  so  doing,  if  we  run  to  it 
and  take  our  stand  in  eternity,  not  swerving  to  right  or 
left,  that  we  may  be  eternal  like  it,  contemplating  eternity 
and  the  eternal  by  that  which  is  eternal  in  ourselves  ?  If 
that  which  exists  in  this  manner  is  eternal  and  ever- 
existing,  it  follows  that  that  which  never  sinks  to  a 
lower  nature,  and  which  possesses  the  fullness  of  life  .  .  . 
must  be  perpetual.  .  .  .  Eternity  then  is  a  sublime 
thing  ;  it  is  identical  with  God.  Eternity  is  God  mani- 
festing his  own  nature  ;  it  is  Being  in  its  calmness,  its 
self-identity,  its  permanent  life.  We  must  not  be  sur- 
prised to  find  plurality  in  God ;  for  everything  Yonder 
is  multiple  on  account  of  its  infinite  power.  That  is 

1  This  etymology  was  generally  accepted.  It  appears  in  the  pseudo- 
Aristotelian  De  Mundo,  i.  9. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  95 

infinite  which  lacks  nothing  ;  and  that  of  which  we 
speak  is  essentially  infinite,  because  it  loses  nothing. 
Eternity  then  may  be  defined  as  life  which  is  infinite 
because  it  is  universal  and  loses  nothing  of  itself,  having 
no  past  and  no  future.  .  .  . 

'  Since  this  nature,  so  all-beautiful  and  eternal,  exists 
around  the  One,  from  the  One,  and  to  the  One,  never 
leaving  it,  but  abiding  around  it  and  in  it  and  living  like 
it,  Plato  speaks  with  profound  wisdom  when  he  says 
that "  eternity  abides  in  One."1  In  these  words  he  implies 
that  Eternity  not  only  reduces  itself  to  unity  with  itself, 
but  that  it  is  the  life  of  Reality  around  the  One.  This 
is  what  we  seek,  and  that  which  so  abides  is  eternity. 
That  which  abides  in  this  manner,  and  which  remains 
the  same,  that  is  to  say,  the  activity  of  this  life  which 
remains  of  itself  turned  towards  the  One  and  united  to 
it,  and  which  has  no  illusory  life  or  existence,  must  be 
eternity.  For  true  being  consists  in  never  not  being  and 
never  being  different ;  that  is  to  say,  in  being  always 
the  same  without  distinctions.  True  being  knows  no 
gaps,  no  developments,  no  progress,  no  extension,  no 
before  or  after.  If  it  has  no  before  or  after  ;  if  the  truest 
thing  that  we  can  say  about  it  is  that  it  is  ;  if  it  is  in  such 
a  way  as  to  be  Reality  and  life,  we  are  again  brought  to 
the  notion  of  eternity.  We  must  add,  however,  that  when 
we  say  that  "  Being  is  for  ever,"  that  there  is  not  onetime 
when  it  is  and  another  when  it  is  not,  we  are  speaking 
with  a  view  to  clearness;  "for  ever"  is  not  used  quite 
correctly.  If  we  use  it  to  express  that  Reality  is  in- 
destructible, we  may  mislead  ourselves  by  using  words 
applicable  only  to  the  many,  and  to  persistence  in  time.2 
It  might  be  better  to  call  eternity  "that  which  is," 
simply.  But  as  "  that  which  is  "  is  an  adequate  equiva- 
lent of  "  Reality,"  and  as  some  writers  have  called 

1  Plato,  Timaeus,  37. 

*  irXavy  $LV  rr\v  tyv\T]V  els  HKftaffiv  TOV  TrXet'ovo?  nai  $TI  Cts  /-IT?  €Jiri,\etyovT6s 
iroTf.  A  very  obscure  sentence  ;  I  am  not  sure  that  I  have  given  the 
meaning  rightly. 


96  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Becoming  "  Reality,"  the  addition  of  "  for  ever  "  seemed 
necessary.'1 

It  is  plain  from  this  passage,  and  from  all  that  Plotinus 
says  about  the  eternal  world,  that  his  conception  of 
eternity  is  widely  different  from  the  hope  of  continued 
existence  in  time,  to  which  many  persons,  though  by  no 
means  so  many  as  is  often  assumed,  cling  with  passionate 
desire.  Ghost -stories  have  no  attraction  for  the  Platonist. 
He  does  not  believe  them,  and  would  be  very  sorry  to 
have  to  believe  them.  The  kind  of  immortality  which 
'  psychical  research '  endeavours  to  establish  would  be 
for  him  a  negation  of  the  only  immortality  which  he 
desires  and  believes  in.  The  difference  between  the  two 
hopes  is  fundamental.  Some  men  are  so  much  in  love 
with  what  Plotinus  would  call  the  lower  soul-life,  the 
surface-consciousness  and  surface-experience  which  make 
up  the  content  of  our  sojourn  here  as  known  to  ourselves, 
that  they  wish,  if  possible,  to  continue  it  after  their  bodies 
are  mouldering  in  the  grave.  Others  recognise  that  this 
lower  soul-life  is  a  banishment  from  the  true  home  of  the 
Soul,  which  is  in  a  supra-temporal  world,  and  they  have 
no  wish  to  prolong  the  conditions  of  their  probation  after 
the  probation  itself  is  ended,  and  we  are  quit  of  our 
'  body  of  humiliation.'  Nor  does  Neoplatonism  encour- 
age the  belief  that  the  blessed  life  is  a  state  which  will 
only  begin  for  the  individual  when  the  earthly  course  of 
the  whole  human  race  has  reached  its  term.  This  theory 
of  the  '  intermediate  state  '  as  a  dreamless  sleep  finds 
a  beautiful  expression  in  Christina  Rossetti : — 

'  O  Earth,  lie  heavily  upon  her  eyes  ; 

Seal  her  sweet  eyes  weary  of  watching,  Earth  ; 

Lie  close  around  her  ;   leave  no  room  for  mirth 
With  its  harsh  laughter,  nor  for  sound  of  sighs. 
She  hath  no  questions,  she  hath  no  replies. 

Hushed  in  and  curtained  with  a  blessed  dearth 

Of  all  that  irked  her  from  the  hour  of  birth  ; 
With  stillness  that  is  almost  Paradise. 
Darkness  more  clear  than  noonday  holdeth  her, 

1  3-  7-  3-6. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  97 

Silence  more  musical  than  any  song  ; 
Even  her  very  heart  has  ceased  to  stir  : 
Until  the  morning  of  Eternity 
Her  rest  shall  not  begin  nor  end,  but  be  ; 

And  when  she  wakes  she  will  not  think  it  long.' 

'  The  morning  of  Eternity/  it  appears,  is  the  beginning 
of  a  new  series,  snipped  off  at  one  end  but  not  at  the 
other.  And  the  waiting  time  before  that  hour  arrives 
must  be  a  period  of  unconsciousness,  in  which  the  Soul 
is  neither  dead  nor  alive.  This  unphilosophical  concep- 
tion is  very  unlike  the  doctrine  of  Plotinus.  For  him, 
to  win  admittance  into  the  eternal  world,  which  lives  in 
an  everlasting  Now,  is  to  awake  out  of  sleep.  But  the 
sleep  is  the  surface  life  of  common  consciousness.  And, 
as  he  says,  we  can  take  nothing  with  us  which  belongs 
to  the  dream-world  of  mortality.  The  Soul  which  lives 
Yonder  in  blessed  intercourse  with  God  is  not  the  '  com- 
pound '  (rvvOerov)  which  began  its  existence  when  we 
were  born.  Nothing  which  can  never  die  was  ever  born. 
Our  true  self  is  a  denizen  of  the  eternal  world.  Its  home 
is  in  the  sphere  of  eternal  and  unchanging  activity 
Yonder,  even  while  it  energises  in  the  execution  of  finite 
but  Divine  purposes  here  below. 

Eternity  is  an  experience  and  a  conception  partly 
latent  and  partly  patent  in  all  human  life.  It  is  in  part 
denned  to  our  consciousness  negatively.  Of  things  in 
place  and  time  we  say  :  This  thing  is  outside  that.  They 
cannot  coincide  or  amalgamate  ;  hence  they  are  different. 
And  again  we  say,  This  thing  comes  after  that.  The 
former  must  disappear  before  the  latter  can  arrive ; 
hence  they  are  different.  But  our  minds  tell  us  that  there 
is  a  large  class  of  things  of  which  these  statements  are 
untrue.  These  things  do  not  interfere  with  each  other  or 
displace  each  other.  They  are  alive  and  active,  but  they 
are  neither  born  nor  die.  They  are  constant  without 
inertia  ;  they  are  active  but  they  do  not  move.1  Our 

1  See  Dr.  Schiller's  excellent  essay  on  the  Mpyeia  &Kivr)<rias  in  Aris- 
totle ;  in  the  volume  called  Humanism. 

II.— H 


98  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

knowledge  of  the  eternal  order  is  as  direct  as  our  know- 
ledge of  the  temporal  order  ;  but  our  customary  habits 
of  thought  and  modes  of  speech  confuse  us.  To  be  honest, 
we  can  think  most  clearly  of  eternal  life  when  we  divest 
the  conception  of  its  ethical  associations  ;  but  this  is  to 
cut  the  nerve  which  links  the  temporal  and  the  eternal. 
It  will  lead  us  to  acosmism,  for  this  world  will  then 
have  no  meaning  ;  or,  since  '  outraged  nature  has  her 
occasional  revenges/  we  may  swing  round  into  material- 
ism. And  the  interpenetration  of  time  and  eternity  in 
our  consciousness,  though  it  may  spoil  or  confound  the 
symmetry  of  our  metaphysics,  is,  after  all,  a  fact  of  the 
soul-nature,  in  which  we  live  and  move.  Reason  seeks 
to  divide  them,  assigning  to  Caesar  and  to  God  what 
belongs  to  each  ;  but  in  the  true  spiritual  experience  they 
are  not  divided.  Time  is  a  child  of  eternity,  and  '  re- 
sembles its  parent  as  much  as  it  can.!1  The  most  illum- 
inating of  all  prophetic  writings  are  those  in  which  the 
temporal  is  set  in  a  framework  of  eternity,  such  as  the 
Johannine  presentation  of  the  life  of  Christ,  or  Words- 
worth's interpretations  of  wild  nature.  And  the  sense 
of  contrast  between  the  temporal  and  the  eternal  exist- 
ence, which  are  both  ours,  has  produced  some  of  the 
noblest  utterances  of  religious  meditation.  Such  is  the 
thought  which  inspired  the  goth  Psalm,  or  the  following 
words  of  Augustine,  '  Thou,  O  God,  precedest  all  past 
times  by  the  height  of  thine  ever-present  eternity  ;  and 
thou  exceedest  all  future  times,  since  they  are  future,  and 
when  they  have  come  and  gone  will  be  past  time.  .  .  . 
Thy  years  neither  come  nor  go  ;  but  these  years  of  ours 
both  come  and  go,  that  so  they  may  all  come.  All  thy 
years  abide  together,  because  they  abide  .  .  .  but  these 
our  years  will  all  be  only  when  they  will  all  have  ceased 
to  be.  Thy  years  are  but  one  day ;  and  this  thy  day  is 
not  every  day  but  to-day.  This  thy  to-day  is  eternity.'2 

1  Schopenhauer  has  the  remarkable  thought  that  '  Time  is  the 
form  in  which  the  variety  of  things  appears  as  their  perishableness.' 

2  Augustine,    Confessions,   11.13.      See    also    Confessions,  11.24; 
De  Trin.  12.  14  ;   In  Psalmos,  101. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  99 

The  very  transiency  of  time  becomes  a  stately  procession 
of  images  across  a  background  of  eternal  truth.  '  This 
day  of  ours  does  not  pass  within  thee,  and  yet  it  does 
pass  within  thee,  since  all  these  things  have  no  means  of 
passing,  unless  somehow  thou  dost  contain  them  all.'1 

The  natures  of  Time  and  Eternity  are  so  diverse  that 
it  is  very  difficult  to  bring  them  into  vital  relation  with 
each  other.  We  might  have  expected  that  Plotinus 
would  have  resorted  to  his  favourite  expedient  of  intro- 
ducing an  intermediate  category  which  should  '  partake 
of  the  nature  of  both/  I  do  not  find  that  he  has  done  so.2 
But  the  Christian  schoolmen  of  the  Middle  Ages,  who 
on  this  subject  are  in  direct  descent  from  the  Neoplatonists 
through  the  highly  respected  Boethius,  did  make  this 
attempt.  The  analysis  of  the  concept  aevum,  which 
stands  between  Eternity  and  Time,  is  of  great  interest 
to  the  student  of  Neoplatonism.  The  following  summary 
is  taken  mainly  from  the  work  of  the  very  able  and 
learned  Jesuit,  Bernard  Boedder.3 

In  the  strict  sense,  he  says,  Eternity  implies  an  exist- 
ence which  is  essentially  without  beginning  and  without 
end.  But  no  creature  can  be  essentially  without  be- 
ginning and  end  and  internal  succession.  If  such  a  crea- 
ture exists,  it  owes  its  eternity  to  the  will  of  God.  But 
God  is  essentially  eternal.  As  the  First  Cause,  He  can 
have  had  no  beginning.  Absolute  necessity  of  existence 
must  be  identical  with  His  essence  ;  He  can  therefore 
never  cease  to  be.  And  His  existence  is  unchangeable  ; 
therefore  it  cannot  contain  any  different  successive 
phases  or  modes  of  being.  Boethius  defines  Eternity  as 

1  Id.   10.  27.     We  miss  in  Plotinus  what  Augustine  (Confessions, 
7.  20,  21)  also  missed  in  him,  the  lesson  of  Divine  love  and  human 
humility  which  the  descent  of  the  Eternal  into  time  suggests  to  the 
Christian. 

2  Proclus  does  draw  distinctions  in  his  treatment  of  eternity.    The 
One  is  r/ooatwi'toj  (as  it  is  irpo — everything  else)  ;    and   rb   aidiov  (per- 
petuity) is  a  lower  form  of  rb  aMviov  (eternity).     There  is  an  aiSifrrrjs 
which  is  /card,  xp^ov.    There  are  6vra  which  are  not  in  the  full  sense 
atwj/ta.    This  doctrine  may  have  been  one  of  the  foundations  of   the 
scholastic  doctrine  of  aevum. 

3  Natural  Theology,  p.  243  sq. 


loo         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

'  a  simultaneously  full  and  perfect  possession  of  intermin- 
able life.'  Eternity,  thus  defined,  is  identical  with  the 
highest  life  conceivable,  the  self-activity  of  infinite  intel- 
lectual will.  This  life  is  '  interminable/  because  it  endures 
of  absolute  necessity.  It  is  '  simultaneously  possessed  ' 
because  it  is  neither  capable  of  development  nor  liable 
to  defect.  In  God  is  neither  past  nor  present  nor  future. 
As  Boethius  expresses  it,  '  the  passing  Now  makes  time, 
the  standing  Now  makes  eternity.'  The  duration  of 
God  is  one  everlasting  state,  the  duration  of  temporal 
being  is  liable  to  a  succession  of  states  really  distinct  from 
each  other. 

The  duration  of  created  Spirits  is  called  aevum.  In 
aevum  there  is  no  succession,  as  regards  the  substantial 
perfection  of  a  created  Spirit.  Nevertheless,  Spirits  are 
not  quite  above  time  or  succession  ;  for  though  the  specific 
perfection  of  their  substantial  being  is  unalterable,  they 
can  pass  from  one  thought  and  volition  to  another,  and 
the  Creator  may  cause  in  them  now  one  and  now  another 
accidental  perfection.  Their  essential  being  is  above 
time,  but  they  are  liable  to  accidental  modification  of 
temporal  duration.  The  duration  called  time  belongs 
properly  to  Matter.  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  says  :  '  Time 
has  an  earlier  and  a  later  ;  aevum  has  no  earlier  and 
later  in  itself,  but  both  can  be  connected  with  it ;  eternity 
has  neither  an  earlier  nor  a  later,  nor  can  they  be  con- 
nected with  it.'  '  Spiritual  creatures,'  says  Aquinas 
again,  '  as  regards  their  affections  and  intellections,  are 
measured  by  time  ;  as  regards  their  natural  being,  they 
are  measured  by  aevum  ;  as  regards  their  vision  of  glory, 
they  participate  in  eternity.' 

Baron  von  Hugel1  has  yielded  to  the  temptation  to 
find  in  the  notion  of  aevum  an  anticipation  of  Bergson's 
duree.  But  as  Bergson  is  far  from  holding  the  doctrines 
about  Time  and  Eternity  which  are  common  to  Neo- 
platonism  and  to  the  Catholic  Schoolmen,  it  is  not  likely 
that  he  should  need  or  acknowledge  a  conception  which 

1  Eternal  Life,  p.  106. 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  101 

was  expressly  designed  to  mediate  between  them.  The 
scholastic  aevum  is  something  which  '  participates '  (in 
the  Platonic  sense)  in  Time  and  Eternity,  as  these 
words  are  understood  by  St.  Thomas.  It  is,  in  fact,  the 
form  which  belongs  to  Soul-life,  as  Time  belongs  to  the 
changes  of  Matter,  and  Eternity  to  the  life  of  Spirit. 
A  modern  Neoplatonist  may  find  the  conception  useful 
in  explaining  the  relations  of  the  Soul  to  Time  and 
Eternity,  though  it  is  of  little  or  no  value  in  bridging  the 
chasm  between  temporal  succession  and  the  totum  simul. 
'  We  prefer  to  confess/  says  another  modern  interpreter 
of  the  Schoolmen,1  '  that  we  do  not  know  how  to  effect 
the  translation  of  Eternity  into  Time/  Eternity  is  above 
and  beyond  us,  though  in  it  we  live  and  move  and  have 
our  being.  If  we  understood  it,  we  should  understand 
Time  also,  and  the  relation  between  them.  But  this  can- 
not be,  without  transcending  the  conditions  of  our 
finite  existence. 

Eternity  is,  on  one  side,  an  ethical  postulate.  Without 
it,  the  whole  life  of  will  and  purpose  would  be  stultified.2 
All  purpose  looks  towards  some  end  to  be  realised.  But 
if  time  in  its  course  hurls  all  its  own  products  into  nothing- 
ness— if  there  is  no  eternal  background  against  which  all 
happenings  in  time  are  defined,  and  by  which  they  are 
judged,  the  notion  of  purpose  is  destroyed.  The  existence 
of  human  will  and  reason  becomes  incomprehensible. 
Our  minds  travel  quite  freely  over  time  and  space  ;  they 
are  not  confined  to  the  present ;  whether  we  realise  it 
or  not,  in  every  thought  we  imply  that  Reality  is  supra- 
temporalJ  Both  Time  and  Eternity  are  involved  in 
every  act  of  our  moral  and  rational  life.  And  it  is  through 
our  experience  "of  Time  that  we  come  to  know  Eternity. 
As  Baron  von  Hugel  says,3  '  Time  is  the  very  stuff  and 

1  John  Rickaby,  General  Metaphysics,  p.  214. 

*  Cf.  Rothe,  Stille  Stunden,  p.  219.  '  He  who  believes  in  a  God, 
must  also  believe  in  the  continuance  of  life  after  death.  Wit  out  this, 
there  would  be  no  world  which  would  be  thinkable  as  an  object  (Zweck) 
for  God.'  ? 

8  Eternal  Life,  p.  38*  sq. 


102         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

means  in  and  by  which  we  vitally  experience  and  appre- 
hend eternal  life.  ...  A  real  succession,  real  efforts, 
and  the  continuous  sense  of  limitation  and  inadequacy 
are  the  very  means  in  and  through  which  man  apprehends 
increasingly  (if  only  he  thus  loves  and  wills)  the  contrast- 
ing yet  sustaining  simultaneity,  spontaneity,  infinity, 
and  pure  action  of  the  eternal  life  of  God/  Duration  is 
not  eternal  life,  though  in  its  entirety  and  meaning  it  is 
very  near  to  it.  It  may  be  called  the  eternity  of  the 
phenomenal  world.  This  thought  has  been  very  nobly 
expressed  in  a  fine  sonnet  by  Sidney  Lanier  :— 

'  Now  at  thy  soft  recalling  voice  I  rise 
Where  thought  is  lord  o'er  Time's  complete  estate, 
Like  as  a  dove  from  out  the  grey  sedge  flies 
To  tree-tops  green  where  coos  his  heavenly  mate. 
From  these  clear  coverts  high  and  cool  I  see 
How  every  time  with  every  time  is  knit, 
And  each  to  all  is  mortised  cunningly, 
And  none  is  sole  or  whole,  yet  all  are  fit. 
Thus,  if  this  age  but  as  a  comma  show 
Twixt  weightier  clauses  of  large-worded  years, 
My  calmer  soul  scorns  not  the  mark  :    I  know 
This  crooked  point  Time's  complex  sentence  clears. 
Yet  more  I  learn  while,  friend,  I  sit  by  thee : 
Who  sees  all  time,  sees  all  eternity.' 

Eternity  is  that  of  which  duration  is  the  symbol  and  sacra- 
ment. It  is  more  than  the  totality  of  that  which  strives 
to  express  and  '  imitate  '  it.  But  Time  '  resembles  it  as 
far  as  it  can/  All  that  we  find  in  Time  exists,  '  in  an 
eminent  sense/  in  eternity.  We  must  therefore  beware, 
when  we  tread  the  mystic's  negative  road,  lest  we  cut 
ourselves  off  from  knowledge  of  God.  When  we  say  that 
God,  or  eternity,  is  '  not  like  this/  we  mean  that  Reality 
is  glimmering  through  its  appearances  as  something 
higher  than  they,  but  not  as  something  wholly  alien  to 
them.  Therefore  we  need  not  discard  those  modes  of 
envisaging  eternity  which  clearly  depend  on  temporal 
and  spatial  imagery.  Such  imagery  cannot  be  dispensed 
with  ;  for  the  symbols  of  substance  and  shadow  equally 


THE  SPIRITUAL  WORLD  103 

belong  to  this  world,  and  do  not  take  us  much  further 
than  those  of  co-existence  and  succession. 

Nevertheless  it  cannot  be  denied  that  popular  religion, 
by  insisting  on  its  local  and  temporal  imagery,  has  not 
only  impeded  the  progress  of  natural  science,  but  has 
sadly  impoverished  the  idea  of  eternal  life,  and  in  the 
minds  of  very  many  has  substituted  a  material  fairyland 
for  the  true  home  of  the  Spirit.  The  Jewish  tendency  to 
throw  the  golden  age  into  the  future  has  its  dangers,  no 
less  than  the  early  Greek  tendency  to  throw  it  into  the 
past. 


LECTURES  XVII,  XVIII,  XIX 

THE  ABSOLUTE 
(TO  ev,  TO  irpwTov,  TO  ayaQov) 

goal  of  the  Intellect  is  the  One.    The  goal  of 
1     the  Will  is  the  Good.    The  goal  of  the  Affections— 
of  Love  and  Admiration — is  the  Beautiful. 

These  three  words  will  all  require  close  analysis.  We 
shall  find  that  the  One  is  something  other  than  a  numeral ; 
that  the  Good  is  not  merely  that  which  satisfies  the  moral 
sense  ;  and  that  the  Beautiful  is  not  merely  that  which 
causes  aesthetic  pleasure. 

We  have  seen  that  Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty  are 
the  attributes  of  Spirit  and  the  Spiritual  world.  They  are 
the  three  objects  of  the  Soul's  quest.  They  may  be  repre- 
sented as  the  three  converging  pathways  which  lead  up 
the  hill  of  the  Lord  ;  and  they  furnish  three  lines  of 
proof.1  The  spiritual  world  must  be — this  is  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  dialectic,  which  convinces  us  that  the  idea  of 
plurality  implies  that  of  unity,  that  of  imperfection  a 
perfect.  It  ought  to  be — this  is  the  claim  of  the  ethical 

1  Bradley  is  here  again  a  valuable  guide  to  understanding  Plotinus. 
'  The  relational  form  implies  a  substantial  totality  beyond  relations 
and  above  them,  a  whole  endeavouring  without  success  to  realise  itself 
in  their  detail.'  [This  is  the  apex  of  the  dialectical  pyramid.  But  the 
disciple  of  Plotinus  must  not  take  '  realise  itself  '  in  the  Hegelian 
sense.]  '  Further,  the  ideas  of  goodness,  and  of  the  beautiful,  suggest 
in  different  ways  the  same  result.  .  .  .  We  gain  from  them  the  know- 
ledge of  a  unity  which  transcends  and  yet  contains  every  manifold 
appearance.  .  .  .  And  the  mode  of  union,  in  the  abstract,  is  actually 
given  '  (Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  160).  We  must,  however,  remember 
that  for  Plotinus  '  the  relational  form,'  though  it  points  beyond  itself, 
is  an  essential  character  of  ofola.  '  We  cannot  get  above  vovs  with- 
out falling  outside  it,'  as  Plotinus  tells  us. 

104 


THE  ABSOLUTE  105 

sense.  It  is — this  is  the  discovery  of  direct  experience 
or  intuition,  made  by  the  Soul  yearning  in  love  for^its 
heavenly  home. 

The  Path  of  Dialectic 

The  word  '  dialectic/  like  many  other  technical  terms 
of  Platonism,  has  helped  to  confuse  modern  critics.  It 
means  literally  the  art  of  discussion,  but  it  has  travelled 
far  from  its  original  meaning.  Diogenes  Laertius1  quotes 
Aristotle  as  saying  that  the  method  was  invented  by 
Zeno,  the  Eleatic,  from  whom  it  was  no  doubt  borrowed 
by  Socrates.  In  the  Dialogues  of  Plato  it  means  the  art 
of  giving  a  rational  account  (\6yov)  of  things,  and  more 
especially  the  discovery  of  the  general  truths  and  prin- 
ciples which  underlie  the  discoveries  of  particular  sciences. 
For  instance,  the  results  of  mathematical  and  astronomi- 
cal science  need  to  be  examined  by  the  dialectician.2 
In  the  Republic3  Socrates  claims  that  dialectic  alone  '  can 
comprehend  by  regular  process  all  true  existence,  and 
what  each  thing  is  in  its  true  nature  ;  for  the  arts  in 
general  are  concerned  with  the  desires  or  opinions  of 
men,  or  are  cultivated  with  a  view  to  production  and 
construction,  or  for  the  preservation  of  such  productions 
and  constructions  ;  and  as  to  the  mathematical  sciences, 
which  have  some  apprehension  of  true  being,  they  only 
dream  about  being,  but  never  behold  the  waking  reality  so 
long  as  they  leave  their  hypotheses  unexamined  and 
are  unable  to  give  an  account  of  them.  .  .  .  Dialectic 
does  away  with  hypothesis,  in  order  to  make  her  own 
ground  secure  ;  the  eye  of  the  soul,  which  is  literally 
buried  in  an  outlandish  slough,  is  by  her  gentle  aid  lifted 
upwards  ;  and  she  uses  as  helpers  and  handmaids  in  the 
work  of  conversion  the  sciences  which  we  have  been 
discussing/  We  reach  true  science  only  when  we  '  do 

1  Diogenes  Laertius,  9.  25. 
a  Plato,  Euthydemus,  290. 
8  Plato,  Republic,  533, 


106         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

away  with  the  hypotheses  '  which  belong  to  some  sciences 
and  not  to  others.  Such  particular  hypotheses  are  only 
postulates,  and  we  desire  to  find  the  non-hypothetical 
first  principle.  Dialectic,  thus  understood,  is  the  art 
of  discovering  the  affinities  of  forms  or  ideas  (etSrj),  and 
kinds  or  categories  (ywri),  with  each  other.  This  is  why 
dialectic  is  specially  concerned  with  the  relations  of 
Being,  Change,  and  Permanence.  Plotinus  follows  Plato 
closely  in  his  treatment  of  dialectic.  'It  is  a  science 
which  enables  us  to  reason  about  each  thing,  to  say  what 
it  is  and  how  it  differs  from  others,  what  it  has  in  common 
with  them,  where  it  is,  whether  it  really  exists,  to  deter- 
mine how  many  real  beings  there  are,  and  where  not-being 
is  to  be  found  instead  of  true  being.  It  treats  also  of 
good  and  evil,  of  all  that  is  subordinated  to  the  Good 
and  to  its  contrary,  of  the  nature  of  that  which  is  eternal 
and  of  that  which  is  not.  It  speaks  of  all  things  scientifi- 
cally and  not  according  to  simple  opinion.  ...  It 
traverses  the  whole  domain  of  the  spiritual,  and  then  by 
analysis  returns  to  its  starting-point/  Then  it  rests,  in 
contemplation  of  the  One,  and  hands  over  logical  dis- 
quisitions to  another  art,  subordinate  to  itself.  Dialectic 
receives  its  clear  principles  from  Spirit,  which  furnishes 
Soul  with  what  it  can  receive.  In  possession  of  these 
principles,  it  combines  and  distinguishes  its  material,  till 
it  comes  to  pure  spiritual  knowledge.  Dialectic  is  the 
most  precious  part  of  philosophy  ;  all  existing  things 
are  '  Matter  '  for  it  ;  'it  approaches  them  methodically, 
possessing  things  and  thoughts  in  combination.'1  False- 
hood and  sophisms  it  recognises  only  to  reject  them  as 
alien  to  itself.  The  lower  kinds  of  knowledge  it  leaves 
to  the  special  sciences,  seizing  the  general  truth  about 
them  by  a  kind  of  intuition.  Philosophy  includes  these 
studies,  such  as  the  detailed  application  of  ethical  prin- 
ciples :  dialectic,  which  is  the  same  as  wisdom  (a-o(f>la),  is 
concerned  with  the  principles  themselves,  on  which  con- 


1  Afjia  rots  #ew/577/xacri   ri  irpdy/Jiara  £xovffa"     ^n  true  tiriffTtj /AIJ  the  cor* 
respondence  between  thought  and  thing  is  perfect. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  107 

duct  depends.     But  one  cannot  reach  wisdom  without 
traversing  first  the  lower  stages.1 

/  Dialectic,  then,  is  the  study  of  first  principles  which 
leads  up  to  intuitive  wisdom.  It  passes  through  logic, 
and  at  last  rises  above  it.  Plotinus  is  at  no  pains  to 
separate  the  intellectual  ascent  from  the  moral  and  the 
mystical ;  in  fact  he  refuses  to  do  so.  They  begin  to 
join  long  before  our  journey's  end.  This  view,  so  discon- 
certing both  to  '  intellectualists  '  (if  there  are  any  such 
people)  and  to  those  who  try  to  find  intellectualism  in  the 
school  of  Plato,  is  the  outcome  of  the  conception  of  logic 
which  is  common  to  Plato  and  Hegel.  '  Logic  is  the 
supreme  law  or  nature  of  experience,  the  impulse  towards 
unity  or  coherence  by  which  every  fragment  yearns 
towards  the  whole  to  which  it  belongs/2  The  birth  of 
logic  is  an  experience  which  clamours  for  completion.  & 
Dialectic,  says  Plotinus,  rests,  and  worries  itself  no 
more  (ovSev  en  TroAfTr/oay^o^)  when  it  has  traversed 
the  whole  domain  of  Spirit.  But  it  does  not  permit  us 
to  stop  at  the  attributes  of  the  spiritual  world.  Just 
as  Eckhart,  the  most  Plotinian  of  all  Christian  philos- 
ophers, distinguishes  between  God  and -the  Godhead,  so 
Plotinus  must  follow  his  quest  of  unity  to  the  utmost 
limit.  The  God  whom  we  commonly  worship  is  the 
revelation,  not  the  revealer.  The  source  and  ground  of 
revelation  cannot  be  revealed  ;  the  ground  of  knowledge 
cannot  be  known.  So  the  common  source  and  ground 
of  Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty  must  be  beyond  existence 
and  beyond  knowledge. 

The  Absolute  as  the  One 

If  the  Greeks  had  had  a  symbol  for  zero,  and  especially 
if  that  symbol  had  been  the  mystic  circle,  it  may  well  be 
that  the  Pythagoreans  and  Plotinus  would^have  antici- 
pated John  Scotus  Erigena,  who  called  the  Absolute 

1  i.  3.  4-6. 

2  Bosanquet,  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value,  p.  340. 


io8         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

nihil.  Plotinus  does  call  '  the  One  '  the  negation  of  all 
number.1  The  earlier  Pythagoreans  had  not  learnt  to 
distinguish  between  numbers  and  the  things  counted. 
For  this  reason  they  affirmed  that  numbers  are  realities. 
Plato  agreed  that  numbers  are  realities,  but  this  is  part 
of  his  affirmation  that  there  are  other  kinds  of  reality 
besides  that  of  sensible  objects.2  The  Monad  in  Pytha- 
gorean arithmetic  was  not  itself  a  number,  but  the  source 
in  which  the  whole  nature  of  all  numbers  is  implicit. 
They  thought  of  the  Monad  as  the  undifferentiated  whole, 
out  of  which  particulars  branched  off.  The  true  whole, 
as  Plotinus  said,  is  that  which  gives  birth  to  the  parts, 
not  a  mere  collection  of  the  parts.3  Thus  we  must  be 
careful  not  to  give  '  the  One  '  a  merely  numerical  sense. 
In  this,  the  numerical  sense,  unity  and  plurality  are 
correlatives,  so  that  we  cannot  have  the  one  without 
the  other.  In  this  sense,  the  Absolute  One  would  be  an 
impossible  abstraction.  But  for  Plotinus  the  Onejs  the 
source  from  which  the  differentiation  of  unity  and 
plurality  proceeds  ;  it  is  the  transcendence  of  'separability 
rather  than  the  negation  of  plurality.  In  the  Fifth 
Ennead  he  says  that  'the  One  is  not  one  of  the  units 
which  make  up  the  number  Two/  When  we  call  the 
Absolute  the  One,  we  intend  thereby  only  to  exclude  the 
notion  of  discerptibility.4 

?7.  The  unity  in  duality^of  Spirit  and  the  Spiritual  World 
points  decisively  to  a  deeper  unity  lying  behind  them. 
This  is  the  coping-stone  of  the  dialectic.  '  Spirit/  he 
says,5  '  cannot  hold  the  first  place.^  There  must  be  a 
principle  above  it,  such  as  we  have  been  endeavouring 
to  find.  Spirit  is  at  once  vovs  and  voyrov,  that  is  to  say, 
two  things  at  once.  If  they  are  two,  we  must  find  that 
which  is  before  this  duality.  What  is  this  ?  Is  it  Spirit 
alone  ?  No  ;  for  there  can  be  no  1/01/9  without  a  vorjrov  ; 
separate  TO  vorjrov,  and  you  will  no  longer  have  vov$. 
If  the  principle  we  are  seeking  is  not  vov$,  it  must,  if 

1  5.  5.  6.  2  Burnet,  Early  Greek  Philosophers,  p.  308. 

3  3-  7-  4-  '  5>  5-  4  6  3-  8.  9. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  109 


it  is  to  escape  the  dualism,  be  something  above 
Why  then  should  it  not  be  TO  vo^rov  ?  Because  TO 
is  as  closely  joined  to  vovs  as  vow  to  it.  If  then  it  is 
neither  vovs  nor  vorjTov,  what  can  it  be  ?  We  shall 
answer,  the  source  from  which  both  vov?  and  votrrdv 
proceed.'  The  Absolute  is  therefore  inferred  from  the 
impossibility  of  reducing  either  vovs  or  voryrov  to  depen- 
dence ;  the  two  are  inseparable,  and  the  Absolute  can 
be  neither  of  them.  Another  reason,  for  Plotinus,  why 
neither  vovg  nor  vorjrov  can  be  the  Absolute  is  that  they 
are  themselves  multiple.  '  The  vornMara  are  not  one  but 
many/  and  vovs  also  is  many  in  one.  The  name  '  The 
One  '  is  not  adequate  to  express  the  nature  of  the  Abso- 
lute, which  cannot  be  apprehended  by  any  of  our  senses. 
If  any  sense  could  perceive  it,  it  would  be  sight  ;  but  how 
can  we  see  that  which  has  no  form  ?  We  say  that  the 
Absolute  is  One  as  being  indivisible  ;  but  this  is  to  intro- 
duce a  quantitative  measurement,  which  is  quite  out  of 
place.1  Without  attempting  to  picture  to  ourselves  the 
nature  of  the  One,  we  can  understand  that  as  all  things 
participate  in  unity,  in  different  degrees,  and  as  the  path 
to  reality  is  a  progress  from  lower  unities  to  higher 
unities,  there  must  be,  at  the  top  of  the  ascent,  an  abso- 
lute unity,  a  perfect  simplicity,  above  all  differentiation. 
It  is  not  the  weakest  and  poorest  of  all  numbers,  but  the 
plenitude  of  all,  and  the  source  of  all. 

The  One  as  Beyond  Existence 

In  considering  the  train  of  reasoning  which  led  the 
Neoplatonists  to  place  the  Absolute  '  beyond  existence,'  , 
we  must  remember  three  things.  (i)pThe  nature  of  the 
Godhead  is  certainly  unknown  to  us  ;|Twe  are  unable 
to  form  any  idea  of  the  absolute  and  ^unconditioned. 
(2)  It  is  a  principle  of  this  philosophy  that  we  are  not 
cut  off  from  the  highest  form  of  life  —  the  eternal  and 
universal  life  of  Spirit.  (3)  We  have,  in  the  mystical 

1  6.  9.  5,  6. 


no         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

state,  an  experience  of  intuition  which  is  formless  and 
indescribable,  and  which  is  therefore  above  the  spiritual 
world  of  Forms  or  Ideas. 

The  doctrine  goes  back  to  Plato,  and  a  little  further 
still,  for  Eucleides  of  Megara  was  the  first  to  identify  the 
Good  and  the  One,  who  is  also  called  God  and  Wisdom.1 
He  seems  to  have  argued  that  all  the  Forms  may  be  re- 
duced to  One,  which  alone  exists.  This  line  of  thought 
leads  straight  to  the  nihilism  of  some  Indian  philosophy, 
for  an  all-embracing,  undifferentiated,  solely  existing 
unity  has  no  distinguishable  content  whatever.  Plato, 
in  the  Republic,2  seeks  to  escape  this  conclusion  by  rele- 
gating the  Good,  or  the  One,  '  beyond  Reality  '  (eTn^i/a 
T??  ova-id?).  The  passage,  which  is  isolated  in  Plato, 
and  is  never  referred  to  by  Aristotle,  had  yet  an 
enormous  importance  for  subsequent  philosophy. 
'  The  God  is  not  only  the  author  of  knowledge 
to  all  things  known,  but  of  their  Being  and  Reality, 
though  the  Good  is  not  Reality,  but  beyond  it,  and 
superior  to  it  in  dignity  and  power.'  This  remarkable 
sentence  is  followed  by  the  famous  allegory  of  the  cave, 
in  which  the  prisoners,  when  their  heads  are  turned 
towards  the  light,  see  the  realities  which  cast  their 
shadows  upon  the  walls  of  their  den.  '  In  this  world  of 
true  knowledge  the  Idea  of  the  Good  appears  last  of  all, 
and  is  seen  only  with  an  effort ;  and  when  seen  is  inferred 
to  be  the  universal  author  of  all  things  beautiful  and 
right,  parent  of  light  and  of  the  lord  of  light  in  this 
visible  world,  and  the  immediate  source  of  reason  and 
truth  in  the  spiritual  world  ;  and  this  is  the  power  upon 
which  he  who  would  act  rationally  in  public  or  private 
life  must  fix  his  gaze/  This  position  is  half-way  between 
that  attributed  to  Eucleides  and  the  doctrine  of  Plotinus. 
The  '  Idea  of  the  Good  '  still  belongs  to  the  world  of  Real 
Being,  and  still,  it  would  seem,  subsumes  the  other  Forms 
under  itself ;  but  the  Good  itself  is  '  beyond  Reality.' 

1  See  Burnet,  Greek  Philosophy,  Vol.  i,  230  sq. 
8  P.  5<>9  sq. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  m 

It  is  not  clear  that  Plato  sanctions  any  goal  of  aspiration 
beyond  this  noblest  of  the  Forms. 

Alexandrian  philosophy  before  Plotinus  had  pondered 
much  upon  the  unknowable  Godhead.  To  Philo,  as  a 
Jew,  it  was  a  dogma  that  no  man  may  see  God  face  to 
face,  and  live.  The  created  cannot  behold  the  uncreated. 
'  One  must  first  become  God — which  is  impossible — in 
order  to  be  able  to  comprehend  God/  Even  Moses, 
though  he  '  entered  into  the  thick  darkness  '  where  God 
dwells,  could  perceive  nothing,  and  his  prayer  was 
answered  only  by  a  vision  of  the  '  hinder  parts  '  of  the 
Eternal.  God  exists  ;  it  is  folly  to  say  more  about  Him 
than  this.  He  has  properties  (tSioTtjreg)  t  but  no  quali- 
ties (iroioTnres).'*-  We  may  call  Him  eternal,  self -existent, 
omnipotent,  for  these  predicates  belong  to  Him  alone. 
But  God  is '  better  than  the  Good  itself  and  the  Beautiful 
itself :  He  can.be  apprehended  by  Himself  alone.'  Philo's 
God  is  above  space  and  time ;  but  not  '  beyond  Reality.' 

Clement  of  Alexandria,  as  a  Christian,  feels  the  same 
objection  to  saying  that  God  is  *  beyond  Reality.'  Accord- 
ingly, he  declares  that  God  is  or  has  ova-la,  but  outdoes 
the  Neoplatonists  by  saying  that  He  is  '  beyond  the  One 
and  above  the  Monad,'2  a  phrase  which  seems  to  have 
no  meaning.  '  He  is  formless  and  nameless,  though  we 
sometimes  give  Him  names.'  Origen  attaches  less  value 
than  Clement  to  the  '  negative  road  '  as  the  way  to  under- 
stand God's  nature  ;  but  he  insists  that  a  certain  divine 
inspiration  (evQova-uxTfwy  TIS)  is  necessary  for  the  know- 
ledge of  Him. 

The  doctrine  has  had  a  long  history  in  later  Christian 
theology.  Augustine,  whose  earlier  works  are  steeped 
in  Plotinus,  says  that  God  is  essentia,  not  substantia  ; 
perhaps  God  alone  should  be  called  essentia.3  '  We  can 
know  what  God  is  not,  but  not  what  He  is.'4  Dionysius 

1  <*7roios  properly  means  sui  generis,  not  belonging  to  any  class. 

2  Clement,  Pad.,  1.8.71.    But  lamblichus  and  Proclus  also  speak  of 
a  Tr&.vT'r)  Appyros  apx^i  above  the  One. 

8  Augustine,  Dg  Trinitate,  7.  5. 
4  De  Trinitate,  8.  2. 


112         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

the  Areopagite  describes  God  the  Father  as  '  super- 
essential  indetermination/  '  the  unity  which  unifies  every 
unity/  '  the  absolute  no-thing  which  is  above  all  reality.' 
'  No  monad  or  triad/  he  exclaims  in  a  queer  ebullition 
of  jargon,  '  can  express  the  all-transcending  hiddenness 
of  the  all-transcending  superessentially  superexisting 
super-Deity/  Erigena  is  not  afraid  to  follow  Plotinus  in 
denying  Being  to  God.  Being,  he  says,  is  a  defect,  since 
it  separates  from  the  superessential  Good.  '  The  things 
that  are  not  are  far  better  than  those  that  are.'  God, 
therefore, '  per  excellentiam  non  immeriio  Nihilum  vocatur.' 
God  is  above  the  category  of  relation  ;  and  therefore  in 
the  Godhead  the  Three  Persons  of  the  Trinity  are  fused. 
Eckhart,  as  we  have  seen,  distinguishes  between  the 
Godhead  and  God.  The  Godhead  is  not  Being,  but  the 
eternal  potentiality  of  Being,  containing  within  Himself 
all  distinctions,  as  yet  undeveloped.  '  All  things  in  God 
are  one  thing.'  But  Eckhart  is  determined  not  to  deprive 
God  of  Being  and  Life.  '  If  I  have  said  that  God  is  not 
a  Being  and  is  above  Being,  I  do  not  mean  to  deprive  Him 
of  Being,  but  to  honour  Being  in  Him.'1  But  elsewhere 
he  uses  the  familiar  language  of  mysticism,  calling  the 
Godhead  the  silence,  the  darkness,  or  the  desert.  His 
theory  of  creation  resembles  that  of  Plotinus.  '  We  were 
in  God  eternally,  like  a  work  of  art  in  the  mind  of  a 
master.'  His  distinction  between  God  and  the  Godhead 
enables  him  to  insist  firmly  on  the  immanence  of  God  in 
the  world.  Without  the  creatures,  God  '  would  not  be 
God.' 

We  shall  find  that  Plotinus  makes  the  same  distinction, 
though  he  is  more  careful  than  Eckhart  to  maintain  that 
the  creation  of  the  lower  orders  of  Being  is  '  necessary ' 
because  the  higher  order  is  what  it  is,  not  at  all  in  order 
that  it  may  become  what  it  ought  to  be.  He  is  quite 
clear  that  the  One  must  be  independent  of  the  world  of 
Forms. 

The  One  is  '  beyond  ova-la,  beyond  activity,  beyond 

1  Cf.  Delacroix,  Le  Mysticisme  en  Allemagne,  p.  174. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  113 

and  v6>j<ri9.1  It  is  'an  activity  beyond  vow  and 
sense  and  life.'2  We  may  call  it  First  Activity,3  or  First 
Potency  ;4  since  in  the  One  there  is  no  difference  be- 
tween Svvafjiis  and  evepyeia  ;5  but  strictly  $vva/j.t?  and 
evepyeia  belong  to  over  la,  and  cannot  properly  be  pre- 
dicated of  the  Absolute.  It  has  no  limit  or  boundary,6 
but  is  fundamentally  infinite.7  It  is,  in  short,  ineffable.8 
We  can  say  what  it  is  not,  but  not  what  it  is.  After 
ascribing  to  it  the  highest  attributes  that  we  can  conceive, 
we  must  add,  (  yet  not  these,  but  something  better/ 

We  must  not  ascribe  Will  to  the  Absolute,  if  Will 
implies  the  desire  for  something  not  yet  present.9  But 
we  may  say,  '  It  is  what  it  willed  to  be/  for  it  is  its  own 
author.10  In  a  more  detailed  discussion,  he  says  that 
the  One  is  '  all  Will/  and  that  '  there  is  nothing  in  him 
that  is  prior  to  his  Will/  There  is  no  real  resemblance 
between  this  doctrine  and  the  blind  unconscious  Will  of 
German  pessimism.  The  One  in  Plotinus  is  not  uncon- 
scious, but  superconscious.  It  possesses  a  higher  form 
of  consciousness  than  the  discursive  reason,  or  even  than 
the  intuitive  perception  of  Spirit.  Plotinus  calls  it  im- 
mediate comprehension  (aOpoa  €7ri/3o\ri).11  He  is  careful 
to  explain  that  when  we  speak  of  Will  in  the  Absolute, 
we  are  using  words  incorrectly.  What  we  mean  to  assert 
is  that  the  One  posits  himself  (ixpia-rqcriv  eavrov),  that 
there  is  no  chance  or  contingency  in  him,  and  that  he 
could  never  wish  to  be  other  than  he  is.  In  one  curious 
passage  he  says  that  '  he  is  what  he  wishes  (OeXet,  not 
/3ov\€Tai)  to  be,  or  rather  he  projects  (airopplTrrei)  what 
he  wishes  into  the  world  of  Reality/  The  Absolute  is 
essentially  Will  only  as  being  his  own  cause  :  he  is  all 

1  5.  4.  2  ;   i.  7.  i.  »  6.  8.  16. 

8  5.  6.  6.     It  is  tvtpyeia  tiirtp  vovv,  6.  8.   16  ;   tvtpyeia  ^  Trpwr?;  Avev 
ovalas,  6.  8.  2O  ;    £vtpyr}fj.a  lavrov  ctur6s,  6.  8.  16. 

4  5-  4-  i.  5  2.  9-  i.  6  4.  3.  8;    6.  7.  17.^ 

7  6.  5.  9,  J3v<r<r60€v  &irei.pov.  8  2.  3.  13,  &pprjTOv  rfi  oiXrjBeigi. 

9  5-  3-  12.  "  6.  8.  13. 

1  Aliotta  (p.  32)  says  truly  enough  that  Hartmann  endows  his 
'  Unconscious  '  with  the  same  faculty.  But  in  him  this  is  a  patent 
inconsistency. 

II.— 1 


H4         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Will,  because  there  can  be  nothing  outside  him.  He  is 
also  all  necessity,  because  there  can  be  no  contingency  in 
his  life.  Plotinus  would  have  agreed  with  Mr.  Bosan- 
quet,1  that  '  for  the  Absohite  to  be  a  Will,  or  purpose, 
would  be  a  meaningless  pursuit  of  nothing  in  particular/ 
The  Absolute  is  all  necessity,  as  being  subject  to  no 
necessity.  Being  absolutely  free,  He  is  the  cause  of 
freedom  in  the  world  of  Spirit.  We  may  rightly  call  the 
One  'the  giver  of  freedom'  (eXevOepoTroiov).  All 
teleology  belongs  to  the  finite  world  of  becoming,  in 
which  the  thoughts  of  God  are  transmuted  into  vital  law. 
Nevertheless,  the  purposes  which  constitute  the  reality  of 
psychical  life,  and  which  live  as  achievement  in  the 
spiritual  world,  flow  directly  from  the  One,  who  '  is  what 
he  willed  to  be.'  Plotinus  does  not  bind  us  to  the  fatalism 
of  Angelus  Silesius  : — 

'  Wir  beten :  es  gescheh,  mein  Herr  und  Gott,  dein  \Ville ; 
Und  sieh,  er  hat  nicht  Will',  er  1st  ein  ewge  Stille/ 

Eckhart  is  nearer  Plotinus  when  he  says,  '  He  is  God 
naturally,  but  not  from  nature  ;  willingly,  but  not  from 
will/ 

Plotinus  also  answers  in  the  negative  the  question 
whether  the  One  thinks  (voei).2  But  he  certainly  does  not 
mean  that  his  Absolute  is  wrapped  in  eternal  slumber.  It 
has  a  '  true  vo^a-is,'  different  from  that  of  vou?.3  He  has 
'  self-discernment  '  (SiaKpiriKov  eavrov),  which  implies 
a  sort  of  self -consciousness.4  It  differs  from  vorjo-ig  as 
being  more  instantaneous,  the  subject-object  relation 
being  quite  .  transcended.  The  only  reason  why  1/01/079, 
and  ordinary  self  -  consciousness  ((rwoupQwis),  are 
denied  to  the  Absolute  is  that  these  actions  imply  a  sort 
of  duality.  '  That  which  is  absolutely  self -sufficing  does 

1  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value,  p.  391  ;    and  cf.  Bradley, 
Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  483  sq. 

2  6.  9-  6  ;    6.  7.  37. 

3  3.  8.  10  ;    5.  4.  2. 

*  6.  7.  1 6  and  5.  I.  7.     He  has  olov  ffvvaiffdrjffiv  rrjs  Svvdfieus,  tin  Sfoarai 
He   even    says   that   rrj   ^-mcrTpo^y   7r/>6s   avrb   eu>/>a,  77    8£   Spaais 
vovs. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  115 

not  even  need  itself.'1  The  One  abides  in  a  state  of  '  wake- 
fulness  (eypriyoparis}  beyond  Being/ 

The  criticism  will  certainly  be  made,  that  Plotinus, 
after  protesting  that  nothing  can  be  said  of  the  Absolute, 
tells  ns  a  good  deal  about  it  or  him,  investing  him  in  fact 
with  the  attributes  of  a  personal  God.  The  faculties  of 
Spirit  are,  after  all,  ascribed  to  the  First  Principle,  only 
per  eminentiam,  and  with  apologies  for  the  weakness  of 
human  thought.  We  must  not  say  that  the  Absolute 
wills,  and  yet  he  is  all  Will.  We  must  not  say  that  he 
thinks,  and  yet  he  comprehends  everything.  We  must  not 
say  that  he  is  conscious,  and  yet  he  is  more  awake  than 
we  can  ever  be.  Such  a  Being,  it  may  be  objected,  is 
not  the  Absolute  to  whom  the  dialectic  conducts  ;  he  is 
not  '  beyond  Reality/  but  the  reigning  monarch  of  the 
real  world. 

I  do  not  see  how  this  criticism  is  to  be  met,  any  more 
than  I  can  justify  the  various  characteristics  which 
Herbert  Spencer  gives  to  the  Unknowable,  and  Hartmann 
to  the  Unconscious.  The  real  question  for  the  student  of 
Neoplatonism  is  not  whether  the  dialectic  really  leads  to 
an  Absolute  '  beyond  existence/  It  does.  The  question 
is  whether  this  Absolute  can  be  the  object  of  worship, 
or  of  contemplation,  without  at  once  descending  into  the 
sphere  of  vov?.  The  mystical  vision  of  the  One  will  be 
dealt  with  presently.  Here  we  are  concerned  with  a 
number  of  statements  about  the  One,  which  are  intended 
to  make  us  understand  what  he  is,  though  we  know  that 
strictly  he  is  not.  Plotinus  was  well  aware  that  omnis 
deter minatio  est  negatio  ;2  but  one  cannot  worship  the 
a  privative.  He  would  probably  not  have  been  seriously 
troubled  by  the  above  criticism,  for  he  has  no  desire  at  all 
to  separate  his  three  Divine  Principles  sharply  from  each 
other.  He  might  perhaps  have  accepted  our  suggestion 
that  the  God  of  practical  religion  is  the  universal  Soul, 
the  God  of  devout  and  thankful  contemplation  the  Great 

1  5-  3- 13- 

&(f>a.lpevi.v  /cai  tXXei^iv  Trout,  3.  9.  3. 


n6         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Spirit,  the  God  of  our  most  inspired  moments  the  Abso- 
lute. '  And  these  three  are  one.'  This  is  not  so  for  the 
dialectic,  if  we  treat  the  dialectic  as  a  logical  structure 
leading  to  a  climax  ;  but  we  have  seen  that  for  the  Platon- 
ist,  dialectic  is  the  method  of  acquiring  knowledge  of  the 
eternal  verities  ;  and  scholastic  logic,  which  does  not 
recognise  the  fluidity  and  interpenetration  of  concepts  in 
the  spiritual  world,  gains  lucidity  and  cogency  at  the 
price  of  truth.  However,  I  will  not  conceal  my  opinion 
that  Plotinus  tells  us  too  much  about  '  the  One.'  The 
inevitable  result  is  that  his  successors  postulate  some  still 
more  mysterious  principle  behind  the  Monad. 

The  One  as  Infinite 

The  One  is  '  fundamentally  infinite.'  When  we  re- 
member that  Matter  was  also  defined  as  'the  infinite/ 
we  may  think  that  there  is  a  danger  of  a  '  meeting  of 
extremes,'  such  as,  I  think,  really  exists  in  the  philosophy 
of  Herbert  Spencer.  The  abstract  idea  of  absolute  full- 
ness has  no  determinations  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
abtract  idea  of  absolute  emptiness.  If  they  are  different, 
it  may  be  argued,  that  is  only  because  in  the  philosophy 
of  Plotinus  '  the  One  '  has  already  begun  to  differentiate 
himself,  and  '  Matter  '  to  receive  forms.  We  are  con- 
fessedly in  a  region  where  discursive  thought  is  no  longer 
adequate,  and  we  cannot  leap  off  our  shadows.  To  mount 
above  vow,  Plotinus  himself  warns  us,  is  to  fall  outside 
it.  There  is  a  profound  truth  in  the  N observation  of 
Proclus,  already  quoted,  that  the  extremes  (at  the  top 
and  bottom  of  the  scale)  are  simple,  but  the  intermediate 
are  complex.  But  the  extremes  are  no  more  identical 
than  the  '  religion '  to  which,  in  Bacon's  aphorism,  depth 
in  philosophy  recalls  us,  is  identical  with  the  religion 
from  which  a  little  philosophy  estranges  us.  With  re- 
gard to  the  conception  of  the  Infinite,  it  is  perhaps  true 
to  say  that  immeasurableness  is  revealed  in  the  act  of 
measuring.  The  fact  of  limit  (Tre/Da?)  only  implies  the 


THE  ABSOLUTE  117 

indefinite ;  the  act  of  limiting  implies  the  infinite.  To 
know  the  infinite  is  a  contradiction ;  for  to  know  is  to 
limit ;  but  we  know  the  fact  of  the  infinite,  for  it  is 
implied  in  the  act  of  knowing. 

It  is  a  common  criticism,  brought  against  mysticism 
of  the  Indian  type,  that  it  ends  in  metaphysical  nihilism. 
The  mystic  who  tries  to  apprehend  the  infinite  grasps  only 
zero.1  As  applied  to  the  actual  teaching  of  Indian 
thinkers,  this  criticism  is  based  largely  on  Western  mis- 
understanding of  Eastern  thought.  Nirvana  is  not  what 
Europeans  have  agreed  to  paint  it.2  But  the  danger 
certainly  exists — and  the  best  writers  on  mysticism  have 
fully  admitted  it — that  we  may  grasp  at  a  premature 
synthesis  and  simplification  of  experience,  and  so  lose 
the  rich  content  of  spiritual  life.  The  vacuity,  passing 
almost  into  idiocy,  of  many  cpntemplatives  is  an  object- 
lesson  in  the  consequences  of  this  error.  But  no  disciple 
of  Plotinus  is  likely  to  fall  into  it.  He  teaches  us  that 
we  must  gain  our  soul  first,  and  surrender  it  afterwards  ; 
there  are  no  short  cuts  to  the  beatific  vision.  And  the 
highest  experience,  if  it  comes  to  us,  will  be  light,  not 
darkness. 

The  question  whether  we  ought  to  speak  of  God  as 
infinite  has  often  been  raised.  To  the  Platonist,  infinity 
suggests  the  absence  of  Form,  which  in  all  objects  of 
thought  is  an  evil ;  to  others  it  asserts  freedom  from  all 
limitations,  and  is  therefore  a  proper  term  to  apply  to 
God.  Rothe3  says,  '  Absoluteness  and  infinitude  are  in 
no  way  identical  conceptions.  Infinitude  is  merely 
eternity  with  the  idea  of  self -negation  added.  It  cannot, 
therefore,  in  any  sense  be  predicated  of  God.  There  is 
no  worse,  no  poorer  definition  of  the  Absolute  than  the 
word  infinite.  God  in  his  immanent  being  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  entirely  outside  space  and  time,  and  therefore 

1  On  the  different  senses  in  which  the  One  and  Matter  may  be  called 
afjus  TrdvTwv  see  5.  3.  15. 

2  See  A.  David,  Le  Modernisms  Bouddhiste  and  Poussin,  The  Way 
to  Nirvana. 

3  Still JHours,  p.  98. 


n8         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

is  just  as  little  infinite  as  finite.'  The  root  of  this  objection 
is  that  infinitude  is  an  idea  which  belongs  to  space  ;  to 
ascribe  it  to  God  is  the  same  blunder  as  to  explain  eternity 
as  endless  existence  in  time.  But  there  is  no  harm  in 
adopting  the  frankly  metaphorical  expression  of  the 
Schoolmen  (following  Augustine)  that  God  has  his  centre 
everywhere,  and  his  circumference  nowhere. 


The  One  as  First  Cause  and  Final  Cause 

The  Absolute  as  the  One  is  the  first  cause  ;  as  the  Good 
it  is  the  final  cause  of  all  that  is.  Plotinus  is  quite  explicit 
in  asserting  the  causality  of  the  Absolute.1  But  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  spiritual  and  phenomenal  worlds 
are  coeternal  with  the  One,  so  that  causality  means  little 
more  than  the  assertion  of  a  hierarchy  in  Reality,  leading 
up  to  an  all-embracing  Absolute  in  which  everything  is 
contained,  and  which  in  the  world  of  becoming  is  the 
primary  source  and  final  consummation  of  every  process. 
The  following  quotation2  will  show  in  what  relation  the 
One  stands  to  the  world  of  votjrd.  '  Whatever  is  en- 
gendered by  another  resides  either  in  the  principle  which 
made  it,  or  in  another  being,  if  there  is  one  between  it 
and  its  source  ;  for  that  which  springs  from  another,  and 
needs  another  to  come  into  existence,  needs  another 
everywhere,  and  therefore  resides  in  another.  The  lowest 
things  are  in  the  next  lowest,  the  higher  in  the  next 
highest,  and  so  on  up  to  the  first  principle.  This  first 
principle,  having  nothing  above  it,  cannot  be  in  another  ; 
but  it  contains  all  the  others,  embracing  them  without 
dividing  itself  among  them,  and  possessing  them  without 
being  possessed  by  them.'  The  One,  he  goes  on,  is  every- 
where and  nowhere  ;  all  things  depend  on  it,  and  differ  in 
value  according  as  the  dependence  is  closer  or  more 
remote. 

1  The    One  is  cipx7?,  6.  9.  6  ;    atrtov   ruv  TTOLVTUV,  5.  5.  13  ;    frjyrj   xal 
Suvafjus  yevvuva  TO,  6vra  ;   an  tvtpyet.a  which  is  re\et6repoj'  TTJJ  o&rtas, 
&>ra>s  TroirjTiK^,  6.  8.  18.     And  cf.  3.  8.  9,  10.  *  5.  5.  9. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  119 

Plotinus  was  well  aware  that  it  is  not  easy  to  show 
how  plurality  can  emanate  from  unity,  Being  from  the 
super-essential.  Physical  science  is  equally  unable  to 
account  for  differentiation,  and  professes  ignorance  as  to 
whether  ether,  homogeneous  electrons,  atoms  only 
quantitatively  different,  and  elements  with  very  different 
properties,  are  all  modifications  of  some  Trpw-n;  v\*j.  The 
difficulty  is  the  same  whether  we  begin  at  the  top  or  the 
bottom  of  the  scale.  To  regard  this  problem  as  an  incon- 
sistency specially  characteristic  of  Neoplatonism  seems 
to  me  unintelligent  criticism.  The  solution  offered  by 
Plotinus  is  that  of  creation.  The  Absolute  does  not  cease 
to  be  the  Absolute  by  creating  a  world  wholly  dependent 
on  itself,  nor  does  Spirit  lose  anything  by  creating  the 
Soul-world.  To  say  that  the  Absolute  must  be  God  plus 
the  world  seems  to  me  like  saying  that  the  real  Shake- 
speare is  the  poet  plus  the  folio  edition  of  his  works.  As 
to  the  motive  and  manner  of  creation,  it  is  obvious  that 
we  cannot  be  expected  to  know  much.  '  How  God 
creates  the  world  we  can  never  understand/  says  Prof. 
Ward  ;  and  many  other  philosophers  have  urged  that 
we  cannot  expect  to  know.  But  if,  with  Heracleitus,  we 
assume  that  the  '  road  up  '  and  the  '  road  down '  must 
be  the  same,  and  if  we  can  show,  as  Plotinus  has  shown, 
that  there  is  nowhere  any  salto  mortale  in  the  ascent  of  the 
Soul  to  God,  it  seems  reasonable  to  infer  that  there  are 
no  unbridged  chasms  in  the  creation  of  the  various  orders 
of  Being  by  the  Absolute,  though  we  cannot  understand 
the  first  stages,  because  we  are  not  God.  We  have  not 
even  any  secure  footing  in  the  Spiritual  World,  the 
'  second  nature  '  ;  we  do  not  even  know  our  own  highest 
selves.  As  Malebranche  says  very  well :  '  My  inner  self 
reveals  only  that  I  am,  that  I  think,  that  I  desire,  that 
I  feel,  that  I  suffer,  etc. ;  but  it  does  not  reveal  to  me 
what  I  am,  the  nature  of  my  feelings,  of  my  passions,  of 
my  pain,  nor  the  relations  of  all  these  to  one  another, 
because,  having  no  idea  of  my  soul,  not  beholding  its 
archetype  in  God,  I  am  not  able  to  discover  either  what 


120         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

it  is,  or  the  modes  of  which  it  is  capable.'1  If  this  is  true, 
any  theory  which  seemed  to  explain  to  us  the  origin  of 
the  Spiritual  World  would  be  justly  suspect.  Neverthe- 
less, Plotinus  throws  out  some  suggestions  for  countering 
objections.  The  existence  of  the  world  is  due  to  the 
necessity  of  there ,  being  '  a  second  nature  '  (Sevrepa 
<f>v(Ti$).2  If  there  were  no  necessity  for  each  principle 
'  to  give  of  its  own  to  another/  the  Good  would  not  be 
the  Good,  Spirit  would  not  be  Spirit,  and  Soul  would  not 
be  Soul.3  Without  Spirit,  the  One  would  have  no  object 
for  its  activities  ;  it  would  be  alone  and  deserted,  at  a 
standstill.  For  activity  is  not  possible  in  a  being  which 
has  no  inner  multiplicity,  unless  it  acts  on  another.  4 
'  The  One  could  not  be  alone  ;  if  it  were,  all  things  would 
remain  hidden,  having  no  form  in  the  One.'5  There  is 
a  '  mysterious  power '  (a<j>aro?  Svvajuus)  which  impels 
each  nature  to  create,  and  go  on  creating  down  to  the 
lowest  limit  of  existence.  Thus  only  can  its  latent  quali- 
ties be  unfurled  (egeXiTreo-Qai).  Why  should  we  sup- 
pose that  the  One  would  remain  standing  still  in  itself  ? 
prom  envy  ?  Or  from  want  of  power,  though  it  is  the 
Fower  of  all  things  ?6  The  creation  is  a  kind  of  overflow 
(otov  vTrepeppvrj)  of  the  One.7  It  is  like  the  efflux  of  light 
and  heat  from  the  sun,  which  loses  nothing  in  imparting 
itself.8  Another  favourite  word  is  '  dependence  '  (egap- 
raa-Oai),*  which  comes  from  Aristotle.  There  is  an  un- 
broken chain  from  the  One  to  Matter  and  back.  The 
One  is  present  to  all  grades,  since  it  penetrates  all  things 
with  power.  The  chain  is  so  continuous  that  '  wherever 
the  third  rank  is  present,  there  is  also  the  second,  and  the 
first.'10 

The  passages  just  quoted  have  a  Hegelian  sound.  They 
suggest  that  the  world  is  as  necessary  to  the  Absolute  as 
the  Absolute  is  to  the  world.  Whether  this  view  is  right 

1  Malebranche,  Entvetien  3.  23.2.2.  32.9.3. 

4  5.  3.  10.  •  4.  3.  6.  6  5.  4.  i.  '  5.  2.  i. 

8  5.1.  6.    This  unfortunate  illustration  is  now  employed  by  critics 
to  discredit  the  theistic  doctrine  of  creation. 

9  E.g.  i.  7.  i;    5.  5.  9;    i.  6.  7.  "  6.  5.  4. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  121 

or  wrong,  it  is  not  the  philosophy  of  Plotinus.  He  insists 
upon  the  complete  independence  of  the  One  in  many 
places  ;  the  following  sentence  may  serve  as  a  sample.1 
'  The  Good  is  the  principle  on  which  all  depends,  to  which 
all  aspires,  from  which  all  proceeds,  and  which  all  need. 
In  itself  it  is  "in  need  of  nothing  (avevSee?),  sufficient  for 
itself,  wanting  nothing,  the  measure  and  term  of  all  things, 
giving  out  of  itself  Spirit  and  Reality.'  The  '  necessity  ' 
which  causes  the  real  world  to  proceed  from  the  First 
Principle  is  akin  to  the  necessity  for  self-expression  on  the 
part  of  an  artist ;  it  is  not  a  vital  necessity  of  growth 
or  self-preservation.  The  Hegelian  view,  it  need  hardly 
be  said,  takes  the  world  into  the  Absolute  ;  for  otherwise 
the  Absolute  would  need  something  outside  itself,  which 
is  a  contradiction.  Further,  it  seems  to  make  the  time- 
process  an  essential  factor  in  the  life  of  the  Absolute; 
for  according  to  this  philosophy,  as  stated  by  its  founder, 
God  only  comes  to  Himself  in  human  history.  It  is  no 
doubt  difficult  to  say  whether  Hegel  really  means  that 
God  becomes,  through  history,  something  that  He  was 
not  before,  for  he  oscillates  continually  between  two 
different  kinds  of  development,  the  dialectical  and  the 
historical.  Some  Hegelians  repudiate  the  notion  of  real 
progress  in  the  Divine  life,  and  speak  instead  of  self- 
communication.  This  brings  them  much  nearer  to 
Plotinus,  who  himself  is  found  saying  that  the  One 
'  would  have  been  hidden '  without  a  world.  But  the 
Hegelians,  if  I  understand  them,  would  say  that  without 
a  world  the  Godhead  would  have  been  hidden  from  itself. 
This  Plotinus  would  not  admit.  In  Biblical  language 
God  made  the  world  '  to  make  His  glory  to  be  known/ 
But  such  an  expression  has  no  meaning  as  applied  to  the 
inner  life  of  the  One.  The  activity  of  the  Absolute  is 
purely  one-sided  ;  there  is  no  reaction  upon  it. 

I  can  imagine  a  critic  saying  :  '  The  One  of  Plotinus 
seems  to  me  to  be  only  an  objectification  of  the  categories 
of  Cause  and  Substance,  which  analysis  has  driven  out 

*  i.  8.  2. 


122         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

of  the  real  world.  The  infinite  regress  has  led  him  to 
take  refuge  in  a  citadel  beyond  the  limits  of  thought, 
where  he  is  unassailable  because  he  has  cut  his  com- 
munications with  Reality/ 

But  for  Plotinus  there  is  no  infinite  regress,  because 
things  in  time  are  not  causes.  Nor  is  it  true  that  Sub- 
stance, if  by  this  is  meant  ova-la,  has  been  driven  out  of 
the  real  world.  It  is  not  the  infinite  regress  of  causation, 
but  the  infinite  progress  of  aspiration,  which  leads  us  to 
the  furthest  confines  of  Reality,  and  beyond  them  to  the 
fountain-head  of  all  that  is.  We  cannot  ever  say  :  '  Now 
I  have  reached  the  top,  and  may  stop  climbing/  '  Un 
Dieu  defini  est  un  Dieufini.'  But  Plotinus  is  as  well  aware 
as  any  of  his  critics  that  his  titles  for  the  One  are 
attempts  to  name  the  Nameless. 

The  Path  of  Beauty 

Plotinus  calls  the  Absolute  indifferently  the  One  and 
the  Good  ;  he  does  not  call  it  the  Beautiful.  In  one 
passage1  he  seems  to  put  the  Beautiful  in  a  slightly  lower 
place  than  the  One  or  the  Good  ;  but  he  half  withdraws 
this  judgment.  '  A  man  will  first  ascend  to  Spirit  and 
will  there  behold  all  beautiful  forms,  and  will  say  that 
this  (namely,  the  world  of  Forms)  is  beauty ;  for  all 
things  in  them  are  beautiful,  being  the  offspring  and 
essence  of  Spirit.  Beyond  this,  as  we  affirm,  is  the  nature 
of  the  Good,  which  lies  as  it  were  behind  the  Beautiful 
(Trpo/3e/3\tiiuL€vov  TO  KaXov  TT/OO  avrw  e'xovo-av).  So  that, 
speaking  shortly,  the  Good  is  the  First-Beautiful.  If  we 
wish  to  make  distinctions  within  the  spiritual  world,  we 
shall  say  that  the  Beautiful  in  the  spiritual  world  is  the 
place  of  the  ideas,  but  that  the  Good  is  beyond  this,  as 
the  source  and  beginning  of  the  Beautiful.  Or  we  may 
put  the  Good  and  the  First-Beautiful  on  the  same  level. 
In  any  case  the  Beautiful  is  Yonder/2  Other  passages 

1  i.  6.  9. 

•    *  ir\T]v  teei  TO  fca\6i>.    I  see  no  reason  to  change  ^et  into  e£??5,  with 
Wyttenbach,  Creuzer,  Chaignet,  and  Bouillet. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  123 

seem  to  show  that  he  does  not  wish  to  put  the  Beautiful 
on  a  lower  plane,  especially  that  in  which  he  says,  '  he 
who  has  not  yet  seen  him  [God]  desires  him  as  the  Good, 
but  he  who  has,  admires  him  as  the  Beautiful/1  It  is 
true  that  the  One  '  does  not  wish  to  be  beautiful '  ;2  but 
the  One  does  not  '  wish  '  to  be  anything,  having  in  itself 
the  potency  of  all  things.  The  One  is  '  the  flower  of  all 
that  is  beautiful,'  '  beauty  above  beauty/3  It  may,  as 
we  have  seen,  be  identified  with  the  '  First-Beautiful/ 
Perhaps  the  clearest  passage  about  the  relations  of  the 
One  and  the  Beautiful  is  5.  5.  12.  We  do  not  begin  to 
perceive  and  know  the  Beautiful  until  we  '  know  and 
are  awake  ' ;  but  '  the  Good  is  inborn,  and  present  to 
us  even  when  we  are  asleep  '  ;4  and  '  it  does  not  amaze 
its  beholders,  because  it  is  always  with  them/  The 
'  unconscious  desire  '  (avalo-Orjro?  etyeo-f?)  for  the  Good 
proves  it  to  be  '  more  original '  (apxaiorepov)  than  the 
Beautiful.  Further,  all  are  satisfied  with  the  Good  ;  but 
not  all  with  the  Beautiful,  which  some  think  is  '  advan- 
tageous for  itself,  not  for  them/  Beauty,  too,  is  more 
superficial  and  subjective ;  people  are  satisfied  to  be 
thought  beautiful,  but  not  to  be  thought  good.  Again, 
the  enjoyment  of  Beauty  is  exciting  and  mixed  with 
pain  ;  that  of  the  Good  is  a  calm  delight.  Even  Yonder, 
the  Beautiful  needs  the  Good,  not  the  Good  the  Beautiful. 
These  reflections  are  rather  surprising,  at  any  rate  till 
we  remember  that  '  the  Good  '  is  not  to  be  identified  with 
'  the  morally  good/  On  this  more  must  be  said  presently. 
The  curious  opinion  that  the  enjoyment  of  Beauty  is 
'  mixed  with  pain  '  seems  to  come  from  Plato,5  for  whom 
sex-love,  epw  yXwcvVf/e/oo?,  is  the  type  of  spiritual  love. 
The  position  of  inferiority  here  ascribed  to  the  Beautiful 
is  revoked  in  i.  6.  6.  '  When  the  Soul  is  raised  to  Spirit, 
it  becomes  more  beautiful.  Spirit,  and  the  gifts  that 

1  i.  6.  7.  2  5.  8.  10.  3  6.  7.  8. 

4  We  may  compare  Psalm  127.  3,  '  Even  in  sleep  God  gives  his  gifts 
to  his  beloved.' 

6  Phaedrus,  251  ;  and  cf.  Philebus,  48,  where  he  says  that  great 
works  of  art  bring  tears  to  the  eyes. 


124         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

flow  from  Spirit,  are  its  proper  Beauty,  for  only  when  it 
becomes  Spirit  is  Soul  truly  Soul.  Wherefore  it  is  rightly 
said,  that  for  the  Soul,  to  become  good  and  beautiful  is 
to  be  made  like  God,  because  from  Him  comes  the  beauti- 
ful and  the  other  part  of  reality.1  Or  rather  we  should 
say  that  Reality  is  Beauty,  and  "the  other  nature"  is 
the  Ugly.  The  Ugly  and  the  First-Evil  are  the  same, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  Good  and  Beautiful  are  the  same, 
or  the  Good  and  Beauty.  We  may  therefore  study 
Beautiful  and  Good  together,  and  Ugly  and  Bad  together. 
We  must  give  the  primacy  to  Beauty,  which  is  also  the  Good. 
Then  follows  Spirit,  which  is  identical  with  the  Beautiful. 
Soul  is  beautiful  through  Spirit ;  other  things  that  are 
beautiful  are  so  through  the  Soul  which  forms  them, 
including  beautiful  actions  and  practices.  Even  bodies, 
which  are  reckoned  beautiful,  are  the  creation  of  Soul ; 
for  being  a  Divine  thing,  and  as  it  were  a  part  of  the 
Beautiful,  it  makes  all  that  it  touches  and  controls 
beautiful,  so  far  as  they  are  able  to  receive  it.'  Thus  he 
distinguishes  Beauty  (/caXXoi/*;),  which  he  identifies  with 
t*he  One,  from  the  Beautiful  (TO  /caXoV),  which  is  Spirit. 
The  One,  being  formless  (a/mop^ov  KOI  avei&eov)  could 
hardly  be  TO  /caXoV.  '  Beauty  is  not  embodied  in  forms  ' 
(TO  AcaXXo?  ov  /mefioptpwrai),2  but  TO  /caXoV  is.  '  The  First- 
Beautiful,  and  Beauty,  are  formless,  and  Beauty  Yonder 
is  the  nature  of  spiritual  Good.'3  The  One  is  '  the  be- 
ginning and  end  of  Beauty/ 

When  we  take  these  passages  together,  we  find  that 
Plotinus  has  three  names  for  his  Absolute — the  One,  the 
Good,  and  Beauty.  These  are  the  three  attributes  of 
Spirit,  carried  up  to  their  primary  source,  above  the 
place  where  the  streams  divide  and  assume  those  deter- 
minations which,  as  Spinoza  says,  are  always  negations. 
There  is  a  certain  awkwardness  in  correlating  '  the  One  ' 
and  '  the  Good/  not  with  '  the  Beautiful/  but  with 
'  Beauty  ' ;  but  the  reasons  for  it  will  now  be  apparent. 

1  i.e.  the  higher  part;  but  see  the  next  sentence. 
1  6.  7.  32.  »  6.  7.  33. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  125 

A  more  serious  criticism  is  that  the  One,  thus  character- 
ised, is  a  Triad  of  Platonic  Ideas,  and  not  the  hidden 
source  from  which  all  the  Ideas  flow.  Plotinus  is,  I 
think,  well  aware  of  this:  Strictly,  though,  the  three 
attributes  of  Spirit,  however  exalted  to  their  ideal  per- 
fection, are  the  first  determinations  of  the  Absolute,  and 
not  the  Absolute  itself.  The  '  Spirit  in  love  '  worships  the 
One  as  the  fountain  of  these  Divine  ideals,  which  are 
the  highest  things  that  we  can  know.  Plotinus  might,  no 
doubt,  have  given  more  consideration  to  the  relations  of 
Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty  to  each  other,  especially 
as  the  rival  claims  of  these  three  ideals  give  rise  to  some 
serious  practical  and  moral  problems.  He  has  not  thought 
it  necessary,  because  it  has  never  occurred  to  him  to 
isolate  the  intellect,  or  the  artistic  sense,  or  the  moral 
consciousness,  in  the  way  that  some  modern  thinkers 
have  done. 

The  Path  of  Perfection 

'  It  is  essential  to  the  understanding  not  only  of  Plato 
but  of  Greek  philosophy  generally,  to  realise  the^  place 
held  by  "  the  Good."  a  Three  ideas  are  here  inseparable  : 
(i)  the  Good  is  the  supreme  object  of  all  desire  and 
aspiration.  (2)  The  Good  is  the  condition  of  knowledge  ; 
it  is  that  which  makes  the  world  intelligible.  (3)  The 
Good  is  the  creative  and  sustaining  cause  of  the  world. 
'  The  Good  '  did  not  in  the  first  instance  involve  any 
moral  qualities.  It  meant  the  object  of  desire — that 
which  we  most  want.  Our  Good  is  that  for  which  we 
would  give  up  everything  else.  Man  is  always  a  creature 
of  means  and  ends  ;  he  is  a  rational  being,  who  lives  for 
something.  This  explains  the  connexion  between  reason 
and  the  Good.  Greek  thought  is  intensely  teleological, 
not  in  the  sense  that  the  world  was  made  for  men,  for 
'  the  universe  contains  many  beings  more  divine  than 
man/  but  '  the  nature  of  a  thing  is  its  end/  the  object  or 

1  R.  L.  Nettleship,  Lectures  on  Plato's  Republic,  p.  218. 


126         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

ideal  which  it  strives  to  realise.  The  good  life  is  directed 
towards  the  most  worthy  end,  and  the  pursuit  of  this  end 
is  the  immanent  principle  which  gives  life  its  meaning  and 
character.  '  Virtue  '  (apery)  is  not  necessarily  a  moral 
quality  ;  it  is  that  which  makes  anything  good  of  its 
kind.  Thirdly,  the  Good  makes  things  what  they  are. 
The  reality  of  things  is  what  they  mean,  what  they  are 
'  good  for  ' ;  and  it  is  the  Good  which  gives  them  their 
place,  and  assigns  them  their  proper  task  (epyov). 

It  has  been  said  that  Plotinus  alters  Plato's  doctrine 
of  the  Good,  inasmuch  as  for  Plato  the  Good  is  within  the 
circle  of  the  Ideas,  while  for  Plotinus  it  is  above  them. 
But  this  overstates  the  difference.  For  Plato  the  Good 
is  the  supreme  source  of  light,  of  which  everything  good, 
true,  and  beautiful  in  the  world  is  the  reflexion.1  In  the 
Republic2  he  says  that  we  must  look  at  all  other  Forms  in 
the  light  of  the  Form  of  the  Good,  which  is  the  starting- 
point  of  knowledge.  It  is  beyond  knowledge  and  being, 
or  at  least  beyond  our  knowledge  of  being.  Beauty  and 
Truth  are  the  Good  under  certain  forms.  The  question 
has  often  been  raised  whether  in  Plato  the  Form  (or 
Idea)  of  the  Good  is  the  same  as  God.  The  discussion 
is  not  a  very  profitable  one,  for  9c6s  is  by  no  means  an 
equivalent  of  the  God  of  the  modern  theist.  But  the 
identification  is  impossible,  because  for  Plato  God  is  a 
Soul,  not  a  Form.  The  Form  of  the  Good  is  rather  the 
pattern  which  the  Creator  copies  in  making  the  world. 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  Plotinus  exalts  '  the 
Good '  to  a  more  inaccessible  altitude  than  Plato  has 
done.  It  is  not  for  us  only,  but  for  the  highest  intelligence, 
that  the  Good  is  '  beyond  being/  But  if  the  Good  is  the 
Absolute,  the  question  at  once  arises  whether  we  can 
rightly  use  such  a  name  for  it  as  '  the  Good/  Plotinus 
insists  that  the  Absolute  cannot  be  '  the  Beautiful/  but 
Beauty,  or  the  source  of  the  Beautiful.  Why  does  he 
not  say  that  it  cannot  be  the  Good,  but  Goodness,  or  the 

1  Nettleship,  p.  8r. 

*  Plato,  Republic,  p.  505-509.    Cf.  Burnet,  Greek  Philosophy,  p.  169. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  127 

source  of  the  Good?1  In  fact,  this  is  his  view;  but  in 
loyalty  to  Plato  he  retains  the  name,  and  explains  that 
in  reference  to  us  the  One  is  the  Good,  and  so  may  be 
called  by  this  name,  though  it  is  not  strictly  accurate. 

Plotinus  dissociates  '  the  Good  '  from  the  idea  of  mere 
moral  excellence.  '  Virtue  is  not  the  Good,  but  a  Good.'2 
It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  morality,  as  such,  must  be 
transcended  in  the  Absolute.  Morality  lives  in  a  radical 
antithesis  ;  it  is  what  it  is  only  in  contrast  with  its  op- 
posite. So  Rothe3  says  that  the  good  in  God  is  not 
moral  good.  Moral  good  is  becoming  and  is  destined  to 
become  real  good,  but  it  has  not  yet  attained  perfection. 
In  attaining  this  perfection  it  ceases  to  be  moral  good. 
But  that  which  only  exists  as  one  side  of  an  antithesis 
cannot  be  the  Absolute,  or  even  fully  real.  We  must 
therefore  be  careful  not  to  give  a  strictly  ethical  sense 
to  the  Good  as  a  name  of  the  One.  The  Good,  for  Plotinus, 
is  unity  as  the  goal  of  desire.*  This  desire,  he  says,  is 
universal.5  The  Good  is  the  fulfilment  of  the  natural 
desire  (o/oe£e)  for  self -completion  and  self -transcendence, 
which  every  finite  centre  of  consciousness  feels.  Our  life 
indeed  is  that  desire  ;  all  life  is  a  nisus  towards  its  proper 
goal.  This  unity  which  is  the  Good  of  all  finite  life  is  also 
the  source  of  .all  individual  being.  All  being  begins  and 
ends  in  the  Good.  Spirit  flows  over  into  Soul,  uncon- 
sciously. Soul  returns  to  Spirit,  consciously ;  and 
Spirit  is  rooted  in  the  One.  '  From  the  great  deep  to  the 
great  deep  he  goes.' 

Perhaps  we  should  understand  Plotinus'  supreme  cate- 
gory better  if  we  called  it  '  the  Perfect '  instead  of  the 
Good.  It  is  valor  valor um,  as  Nicholas  of  Cusa  says  of 

1  Origen  prefers  o.yaBbr^  to  rb  ayaObv.     Denis,  p.  87. 

2  i.  8.  6.  3  Still  Hours,  p.  97. 

4  6.  8.  7,  TJ  TOV  ayadov  0uo-ts  avrb  T&  tycrfo.  Proclus  (Dubner,  Ivi.) 
says  clearly  :  ccmv  r/  ayadbr-rfs  tvuffis  Kal  TJ  gvuffts  ayadbr^.  What  Plotinus 
means  by  the  Good  is  clear  from  5.  5.  9,  8ib  Kal  ratTy  ayadbv  TWV  TT&VTUV, 
STL  Kal  fort  Kal  dv/fprijTai  iravra  e/s  avrb  &\\o  AXXws.  Sib  Kal  dyadurepa  $repa 
eTtpuv,  &TI  Kal  /iSXAov  6vra  trepa  brtpuv  ('  one  thing  is  better  than  another, 
in  proportion  as  it  is — possesses  oixrla — in  higher  degree  than  another'). 

*  6.  2.  ii. 


128         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

God.  Its  characteristic  is  that '  it  needs  nothing.'1  It  is 
quite  in  accordance  with  his  usual  method  when  Plotinus 
reminds  us  that  '  the  Good  '  which  we  recognise  as  such 
is  not  the  Absolute  Good,  but  is  relative  to  the  stage 
which  we  have  reached  ourselves.2  '  The  Good  of  Matter 
is  Form  ;  for  Matter,  if  it  were  conscious,  would  receive 
it  with  pleasure.  The  Good  of  the  Body  is  Soul ;  for 
without  it,  it  could  neither  exist  nor  persist.  The  Good 
of  the  Soul  is  virtue  ;  then,  rising  higher,  it  is  Spirit.  The 
Good  of  Spirit  is  that  which  we  call  the  First  Principle. 
Each  of  these  Goods  produces  something  in  the  object 
of  which  it  is  the  Good  ;  it  gives  it  either  order  and 
beauty,  or  life,  or  wisdom  and  happiness.  Finally,  the 
Good  gives  to  Spirit  an  activity,  which  emanates  from 
the  Good,  and  spreads  over  it  what  we  call  its  light.'3  In 
the  same  chapter  he  tries  to  explain  how  Plato  in  the 
Philebus  came  to  '  mix  pleasure  with  the  end  [of  life], 
thereby  making  the  Good  not  simple,  nor  in  Spirit  only.' 
'  Plato  was  not  trying  to  determine  what  is  the  Good 
absolutely,  but  the  Good  for  man  ' ;  the  two  are  not  the 
same.  He  is  anxious  to  prove  that  Plato's  view  was 
really  the  same  as  his  own.  '  Plato/  he  says,4 '  establishes 
three  degrees  in  the  hierarchy  of  beings.  Everything  is 
ranged  round  the  king  of  all.  He  speaks  here  of  things 
of  the  first  rank.  He  adds  :  That  which  is  of  the  second 
rank  is  ranged  round  the  Second  Principle,  and  that 
which  is  of  the  third  rank  round  the  Third  Principle.  He 
also  says  that  the  First  Principle  is  the  father  of  cause — 
meaning  Spirit  by  "cause";  for  he  makes  Spirit  the 
Demiurge  ;5  and  also  that  Spirit  creates  Soul  in  the 
"  bowl  "  of  which  he  speaks.  The  cause  being  Now,  its 
' '  father  "  must  be  the  Absolute  Good,  the  Principle  above 
Spirit  and  above  existence/  He  is  on  safer  ground  when 
he  says  that  the  '  pure  and  unmingled  Spirit '  of  Anaxa- 
goras  is  by  definition  detached  from  all  sensible  things, 

1  3.  8.  II,  ovd&os  Setrcu.  *  6.  7.  25.  3  6.  7.  25. 

4  5.  i.  8.    The  reference  is  to  the  Timaeus,  pp.  34,  43, 
6  Plotinus  also  calls  Spirit  the  Demiurge,  2.  3.  18. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  129 

and  that  the  '  perpetual  flux  '  of  Heracleitus  is  meaning- 
less unless  there  is  also  an  eternal  and  spiritual  One. 
Aristotle,  he  says  truly,  by  making  his  highest  Principle 
'  think  itself/  places  it  below  the  absolute  One.  The 
Pythagoreans,  as  he  sees,  are  nearest  to  his  own  theory. 
'  Good,'  in  relation  to  finite  experience,  is  the  perfection 
to  which  each  grade  in  the  hierarchy  aspires,  and  having 
attained  which  it  passes  into  the  next  stage  above.  '  All 
things  strive  after  life,  after  immortality,  and  after 
activity.'1  True  life  and  true  Spirit  are  identical,  and 
both  come  from  the  Good.  The  Ideas — the  spiritual 
world  and  its  contents — are  good  ;  but  not  the  Good. 
We  cannot  stop  at  the  world  of  Spirit,  as  if  the  First 
Principle  was  to  be  found  there.  '  The  Soul  does  not 
aspire  to  Spirit  alone.  Spirit  is  not  our  supreme  end, 
and  all  does  not  aspire  to  Spirit,  while  all  aspires  to  the 
Good  ;  beings  which  do  not  possess  vov$  do  not  all  seek 
to  possess  it,  while  those  which  do  possess  it  are  not  con- 
tent to  stop  there.  Nou?  is  sought  as  the  result  of  reason- 
ing ;  but  the  Good  is  desired  before  argument.  If  the 
object  of  desire  is  to  live,  to  live  always,  and  to  act,  this 
is  desired  not  as  Spirit,  but  as  good,  as  coming  from  good 
and  leading  to  good  ;  for  it  is  only  thus  that  we  desire 
life.'  It  is  then  natural  for  the  Soul,  and  still  more  for 
Spirit,  to  aspire  to  the  absolutely  perfect.  Nothing  else 
contents  us.  '  When  a  man  sees  this  light,  he  moves 
towards  it,  and  rejoices  in  the  light  which  plays  over  the 
spiritual  world.  Even  here,  we  love  bodies  not  for  them- 
selves, but  for  the  beauty  which  shines  in  them.  For  each 
vorrrov  is  what  it  is  in  itself ;  but  it  only  becomes  an 
object  of  desire  when  the  Good  gives  it  colour,  bestowing 
grace  upon  the  object  and  love  upon  the  subject.  As 
soon  as  the  Soul  receives  into  itself  the  effluence  from 
above,  it  is  moved,  it  is  filled  with  holy  ecstasy,  and 
becomes  love.  Before  that,  it  is  not  moved  by  the  sight 
of  Spirit,  for  all  its  beauty  ;  its  beauty  is  inactive,  till  it 
receives  the  light  of  the  Good  ;  and  the  Soul  lies  supine 

1  6.  7.  20. 

II.—  K 


130         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

before  it  and  wholly  inactive,  cold  and  stupid  even  in 
the  presence  of  Spirit.  But  when  warmth  from  the 
Good  enters  into  it,  it  becomes  strong  and  wide  awake, 
and  though  troubled  by  what  lies  near  at  hand,  it  ascends 
more  lightly  to  that  which  a  kind  of  memory  tells  it  to  be 
greater.  And  as  long  as  there  is  anything  higher  than 
what  is  present  to  it,  it  rises,  lifted  up  naturally  by  that 
which  implanted  the  love.  Beyond  the  spiritual  world 
it  rises,  but  it  cannot  pass  beyond  the  Good,  because 
there  is  nothing  beyond.  If  it.  abides  in  the  region  of 
Spirit,  it  beholds  indeed  beautiful  and  noble  things,  but 
is  not  completely  in  possession  of  all  that  it  seeks.  For 
the  world  of  Spirit  is  like  a  face  which  does  not  attract 
us  in  spite  of  its  beauty,  because  no  grace  plays  upon  its 
beauty.  Even  here  we  are  charmed  not  by  symmetry 
as  such,  but  by  the  beauty  which  shines  upon  it.  A  living 
face  is  more  beautiful  than  a  dead  one  ;  a  statue  which  is 
full  of  life,  as  we  say,  is  more  beautiful  than  one  which 
appears  lifeless,  though  the  latter  be  more  symmetrical ; 
a  living  animal  is  more  beautiful  than  a  picture  of  one. 
This  is  because  the  living  appears  to  us  more  desirable  ; 
it  has  a  soul ;  it  is  more  like  the  Good  ;  it  is  so  because 
it  is  coloured  by  the  light  of  the  Good,  and  enlightened  by 
it  is  more  wide  awake  and  lighter  ;  and  in  its  turn  it 
lightens  its  own  environment  [the  body],  and  as  far  as 
possible  makes  it  good  and  awakens  it/1 

This  very  remarkable  passage  shows  that  Plotinus  was 
not  insensible  to  the  feeling  of  chill  which  repels  many 
moderns  from  Platonism.  The  world  of  ideas,  of  perfect 
forms,  of  stable  beauty  and  perfection — is  it  not  after  all 
'  faultily  faultless,  icily  regular,  splendidly  null '  ?  Is  it 
not  too  much  like  the  beautiful  but  cold  and  motionless 
marble  statues  in  which  the  Greek  spirit  expressed  itself 
so  perfectly  ? 2  We  have  seen  that  Plotinus  by  no  means 
intended  his  spiritual  world  to  have  this  character.  It 

1  6.  7.  22. 

2  Whether  this  was  the  effect  of  Greek  statuary  when  it  was  new  is 
another  question. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  131 

is  to  be  a  world  of  life,  activity,  and  ceaseless  creativeness. 
But  as  the  apex  of  a  dialectical  pyramid  it  may  even  seem 
almost  forbidding.  If  the  Soul,  on  getting  there,  were  to 
say,  I  see  all  to  admire,  but  nothing  to  love,  what  answer 
should  be  made  ?  Some  later  philosophers  have  shrunk 
from  the  cold  white  light  of  the  eternal  and  unchanging, 
and  have  willingly  embraced  the  warm  colours  and  rapid 
changes  of  the  world  of  appearance — a  lower  sphere, 
doubtless,  but  better  fitted  for  such  beings  as  we  are 
to  live  in.  So  Schiller  invokes  Colour  rather  than  Light 
to  be  his  companion. 

'  Wohne,  du  ewiglich  Eines,  dort  bei  dem  ewiglich  Einen ! 
Farbe,  du  wechselnde,  komm'  freundlich  zum  Menschen  herab.' 

Plotinus  could  not  have  made  this  invocation  without 
being  false  to  the  first  principle  of  his  philosophy.  The 
Soul  is  forbidden  to  acquiesce  in  any  downward  move- 
ment. The  only  escape  from  difficulties  is  to  press  ever 
upward,  in  the  confidence  that  all  disharmonies  will  be 
resolved,  all  obstacles  left  behind,  as  we  resolutely  turn 
our  backs  upon  change  and  strife,  and  follow  the  gleam 
of  the  pure  and  undivided  Unity.  Even  in  heaven  the 
Soul  is  not  content  with  itself.  It  must  still  aspire,  and 
its  aspiration  is  purest  and  keenest  when  it  is  in  full  view 
of  the  very  highest.1  '  It  is  then  that  the  Soul  takes  fire, 
and  is  carried  away  by  love.  The  fullest  life  is  the  fullest 
love  ;  and  the  love  comes  from  the  celestial  light  which 
streams  forth  from  the  Absolute  One,  the  Absolute  Good, 
that  supreme  Principle  which  made  life,  and  made 
Spirit,  the  source  and  beginning,  which  gave  Spirit  to 
all  spiritual  things  and  life  to  all  living  things.'2  But, 
we  may  ask,  what  is  there  in  the  idea  of  absolute  perfec- 
tion, raised  above  all  forms  and  all  existence,  to  kindle 
this  passionate  love  and  adoration  in  the  Soul  ?  If  we 

1  Cf.  Leo,  Ninth  Sermon  on  the  Nativity.  '  None  draws  nearer  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  truth  than  he  who  understands  that  however  far  he 
advances  in  divine  things  there  is  always  a  beyond  for  him  to  seek. 
He  who  thinks  that  he  has  reached  his  goal  has  not  found  what  he 
sought.'  2  6.  7.  23. 


132         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

have  not  loved  our  brother  whom  we  have  seen,  and  this 
warm  world  of  adventure  and  change,  which  claims  us 
as  its  own,  how  can  we  love  the  Godhead  whom  no  man 
hath  seen  or  can  see,  who  dwelleth  in  the  light  that  no 
man  can  approach  unto  ?  The  best  answer  to  these 
questions  is  to  consider  what  Plotinus  has  to  tell  us  about 
the  vision  of  the  One.  For  it  is  unquestionably  a  genuine 
experience  of  his  own — this  ecstatic  love  of  the  Absolute. 
Moreover,  the  great  army  of  mystics,  Christian,  Pagan, 
Mohammedan,  corroborate  all  that  the  great  Neoplatonist 
describes  to  us.  The  '  Spirit  in  love  '  (vow  cpw)1  is  the 
culmination  of  personal  religion  ;  and  the  object  of  this 
adoration  is  not  the  limited  half-human  God  of  popular 
religion,  but  the  ineffable  mysterious  Power  to  whom  we 
shrink  from  ascribing  any  human  attributes  whatever. 
But  we  will  let  Plotinus  expound  his  doctrine  and  give 
us  (so  far  as  that  is  possible)  his  experience,  in  his  own 
words. 

'  What  then  is  there  better  than  this  wisest  life,  exempt 
from  fault  and  error  ?  What  is  better  than  Spirit  which 
embraces  all  ?  What  is  better  than  universal  life  and 
universal  Spirit  ?  If  we  answer,  That  which  made  these 
things,  we  must  go  on  to  ask  how  it  made  them  ;  and  if 
no  higher  principle  manifests  itself,  the  argument  will 
proceed  no  further,  but  will  stop  at  this  point.  But  we 
must  go  higher,  for  many  other  reasons  and  especially 
because  the  principle  which  we  seek  is  the  Absolute  which 
is  independent  of  all  things  ;  for  things  are  incapable  of 
sufficing  for  themselves,  and  each  of  them  has  a  share  in 
the  One,  from  which  it  follows  that  none  of  them  is  the 
One.  .  .  .  That  which  makes  being  and  independence 
is  not  itself  being  and  independence,  but  above  both.  Is 
it  enough  to  say  this  and  pass  on  ?  Or  is  the  Soul  in 
labour  with  something  more  ?  Perhaps  it  must  bring 
forth,  filled  as  it  is  with  travail-pangs,  after  hastening 
eagerly  towards  the  Absolute.  Nay,  we  must  try  rather 
to  charm  her,  if  we  can  find  any  magic  spell  against  her 

1  6.    7-    35- 


THE  ABSOLUTE  133 

pains.  Perhaps  something  of  what  we  have  already 
said,  if  it  were  often  repeated,  might  act  as  a  charm. 
Or  where  shall  we  find  another,  a  new  charm  ?  For 
although  it  permeates  all  Truth,  and  therefore  the  Truth 
of  which  we  participate,  nevertheless  it  escapes  us  when 
we  try  to  speak  of  it  or  even  to  think  of  it.  For  the  dis- 
cursive reason,  if  it  wishes  to  say  anything,  must  seize 
first  one  element  of  the  Truth  and  then  another  ;  such 
are  the  conditions  of  discursive  thought.  But  how  can 
discursive  thought  apprehend  the  absolutely  simple  ? 
It  is  enough  to  apprehend  it  by  a  kind  of  spiritual  intuition 
(voepws  etyd^aa-Oat).  But  in  this  act  of  apprehension  we 
have  neither  the  power  nor  the  time  to  say  anything 
about  it  ;  afterwards  we  can  reason  about  it.  We  may 
believe  that  we  have  really  seen,  when  a  sudden  light 
illumines  the  Soul ;  for  this  light  comes  from  the  One 
and  is  the  One.  And  we  may  think  that  the  One  is 
present,  when,  like  another  god,1  he  illumines  the  house 
of  him  who  calls  upon  him  ;  for  there  would  be  no  light 
without  his  presence.  Even  so  the  Soul  is  dark  that  does 
not  behold  him  ;  but  when  illumined  by  him,  it  has 
what  it  desired,  and  this  is  the  true  end  and  aim  of  the 
Soul,  to  apprehend  that  light,  and  to  behold  it  by  that 
light  itself,  which  is  no  other  than  the  light  by  which 
it  sees.  For  that  which  we  seek  to  behold  is  the  light 
which  gives  us  light,  even  as  we  can  only  see  the  sun  by 
the  light  of  the  sun.  How  then  can  this  come  to  us  ? 
Strip  thyself  of  everything.'2 

'  We  must  not  be  surprised  that  that  which  excites 
the  keenest  of  longings  is  without  any  form,  even  spiritual 
form,  since  the  Soul  itself,  when  inflamed  with  love  for  it, 
puts  off  all  the  form  which  it  had,  even  that  which 
belongs  to  the  spiritual  world.  For  it  is  not  possible  to 

1  Like  one  of  the  gods  of  the  popular  mythology.  Commentators 
suggest  that  Plotinus  has  in  mind  either  Homer,  Od.  19.  33,  irdpoi6c  5t 
IIa\Ads'A077»>77,  xpfocov  \i>xvov  txovffa,  0dos  irepiKa\\ts  tirolci,  or  the  Hymn 
to  Denieter,  279,  rrjf\€  8t  0£yyos  dirk  XP°^  dOavAroio  \d/j.irc  {teas  .  .  .  auyT/s 
5'  4ir\T)ff0Tj  irv 

*  5-  3-  17- 


134         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

see  it,  or  to  be  in  harmony  with  it,  while  one  is  occupied 
with  anything  else.  The  Soul  must  remove  from  itself 
good  and  evil  and  everything  else,  that  it  may  receive  the 
One  alone,  as  the  One  is  alone.  When  the  Soul  is  so 
blessed,  and  is  come  to  it,  or  rather  when  it  manifests  its 
presence,  when  the  Soul  turns  away  from  visible  things 
and  makes  itself  as  beautiful  as  possible  and  becomes  like 
the  One  ;  (the  manner  of  preparation  and  adornment  is 
known  to  those  who  practise  it  ;)  and  seeing  the  One 
suddenly  appearing  in  itself,  for  there  is  nothing  between, 
nor  are  they  any  longer  two,  but  one  ;  for  you  cannot 
distinguish  between  them,  while  the  vision  lasts  ;  it  is 
that  union  of  which  the  union  of  earthly  lovers,  who  wish 
to  blend  their  being  with  each  other,  is  a  copy.  The  Soul 
is  no  longer  conscious  of  the  body,  and  cannot  tell  whether 
it  is  a  man  or  a  living  being  or  anything  real  at  all ;  for 
the  contemplation  of  such  things  would  seem  unworthy, 
and  it  has  no  leisure  for  them  ;  but  when,  after  having 
sought  the  One,  it  finds  itself  in  its  presence,  it  goes  to 
meet  it  and  contemplates  it  instead  of  itself.  What  itself 
is  when  it  gazes,  it  has  no  leisure  to  see.  When  in  this 
state  the  Soul  would  exchange  its  present  condition  for 
nothing,  no,  not  for  the  very  heaven  of  heavens  ;  for 
there  is  nothing  better,  nothing  more  blessed  than  this. 
For  it  can  mount  no  higher  ;  all  other  things  are  below  it, 
however  exalted  they  be.  It  is  then  that  it  judges  rightly 
and  knows  that  it  has  what  it  desired,  and  that  there  is 
nothing  higher.  For  there  is  no  deception  there  ;  where 
could  one  find  anything  truer  than  the  True  ?  What  it 
says,  that  it  is,  and  it  speaks  afterwards,  and  speaks  in 
silence,  and  is  happy,  and  is  not  deceived  in  its  happi- 
ness. Its  happiness  is  no  titillation  of  the  bodily  senses  ; 
it  is  that  the  Soul  has  become  again  what  it  was  formerly, 
when  it  was  blessed.  All  the  things  which  once  pleased 
it,  power,  wealth,  beauty,  science,  it  declares  that  it 
despises  ;  it  could  not  say  this  if  it  had  not  met  with 
something  better  than  these.  It  fears  no  evil,  while  it 
is  with  the  One,  or  even  while  it  sees  him  ;  though  all 


THE  ABSOLUTE  135 

else  perish  around  it,  it  is  content,  if  it  can  only  be  with 
him  ;  so  happy  is  it.'1 

'  The  Soul  is  so  exalted  that  it  thinks  lightly  even  of 
that  spiritual  intuition  which  it  formerly  treasured. 
For  spiritual  perception  involves  movement,  and  the  Soul 
now  does  not  wish  to  move.  It  does  not  call  the  object 
of  its  vision  Spirit,  although  it  has  itself  been  trans- 
formed into  Spirit  before  the  vision  and  lifted  up  into  the 
abode  of  Spirits.  When  the  Soul  arrives  at  the  intuition 
of  the  One,  it  leaves  the  mode  of  spiritual  perception. 
Even  so  a  traveller,  entering  into  a  palace,  admires  at 
first  the  various  beauties  which  adorn  it ;  but  when  the 
Master  appears,  he  alone  is  the  object  of  attention.  By 
continually  contemplating  the  object  before  him,  the 
spectator  sees  it  no  more.  The  vision  is  confounded  with 
the  object  seen,  and  that  which  was  before  object  becomes 
to  him  the  state  of  seeing,  and  he  forgets  all  else.  The 
Spirit  has  two  powers.  By  one  of  them  it  has  a  spiritual 
perception  of  what  is  within  itself,  the  other  is  the  recep- 
tive intuition  by  which  it  perceives  what  is  above  itself. 
The  former  is  the  vision  of  the  thinking  Spirit,  the  latter 
is  the  Spirit  in  love.  For  when  the  Spirit  is  inebriated 
with  the  nectar,  it  falls  in  love,  in  simple  contentment 
and  satisfaction  ;  and  it  is  better  for  it  to  be  so  intoxi- 
cated than  to  be  too  proud  for  such  intoxication/ 

'  If  you  are  perplexed2  because  the  One  is  none  of  those 
things  which  you  know,  apply  yourself  to  them  first,  and 
look  forth  out  of  them  ;  but  so  look,  as  not  to  direct  your 
intellect  to  externals.  For  it  does  not  lie  in  one  place 
and  not  in  another,  but  it  is  present  everywhere  to  him 
who  can  touch  it,  and  not  to  him  who  cannot.  As  in 
other  matters  one  cannot  think  of  two  things  at  once, 
and  must  add  nothing  extraneous  to  the  object  of  thought, 
if  one  wishes  to  identify  oneself  with  it,  so  here  we  may 
be  sure  that  it  is  impossible  for  one  who  has  in  his  soul 
any  extraneous  image  to  conceive  of  the  One  while  that 

1  6.  7.  34.    The  next  paragraph  is  abridged  from  6.  7.  35. 
3  6.  9.  7,  to  end. 


136         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

image  distracts  his  attention.  Just  as  we  said  that 
Matter  must  be  without  qualities  of  its  own,  if  it  is  to 
receive  the  forms  of  all  things,  so  a  fortiori  must  the  Soul 
be  formless  if  it  is  to  receive  the  fullness  and  illumination 
of  the  First  Principle.  If  so,  the  Soul  must  forsake  all 
that  is  external,  and  turn  itself  wholly  to  that  which  is 
within  ;  it  will  not  allow  itself  to  be  distracted  by  any- 
thing external,  but  will  ignore  them  all,  as  at  first  by  not 
attending  to  them,  so  now  last  by  not  seeing  them  ;l  it 
will  not  even  know  itself ;  and  so  it  will  come  to  the 
vision  of  the  One  and  will  be  united  with  it  ;  and  then, 
after  a  sufficient  converse  with  it,  it  will  return  and 
bring  word,  if  it  be  possible,  to  others  of  its  heavenly 
intercourse.  Such  probably  was  the  converse  which 
Minos  was  fabled  to  have  had  with  Zeus,  remembering 
which  he  made  the  laws  which  were  the  image  of  that 
converse,  being  inspired  to  be  a  lawgiver  by  the  divine 
touch.  Perhaps,  however,  a  Soul  which  has  seen  much 
of  the  heavenly  world  may  think  politics  unworthy  of 
itself  and  may  prefer  to  remain  above.  God,  as  Plato 
says,  is  not  far  from  every  one  of  us  ;  he  is  present  with 
all,  though  they  know  him  not.  Men  flee  away  from  him, 
or  rather  from  themselves.  They  cannot  grasp  him  from 
whom  they  have  fled,  nor  when  they  have  lost  them- 
selves can  they  find  another,  any  more  than  a  child  who 
is  mad  and  out  of  his  mind  can  know  his  lather.  But 
he  who  has  learnt  to  know  himself  will  know  also  whence 
he  is. 

'  If  a  Soul  has  known  itself  throughout  its  course,  it  is 
aware  that  its  natural  motion  has  not  been  in  a  straight 
line  (except  during  some  deflection  from  the  normal)  but 
rather  in  a  circle  round  a  centre  ;  and  that  this  centre 
is  itself  in  motion  round  that  from  which  it  proceeds.  On 
this  centre  the  Soul  depends,  and  attaches  itself  thereto, 
as  all  Souls  ought  to  do,  but  only  the  Souls  of  gods  do 
so  always.  It  is  this  that  makes  them  gods.  For  a  god 

1  This  I  take  to  be  approximately  the  meaning  of  the  obscure  phrase: 
ir/>6  TOV  /J.ti>  rri  Siadfoci,  rbre  5£  KO.I  T 


THE  ABSOLUTE  137 

is  closely  attached  to  this  centre  ;  those  further  from  it 
are  average  men,  and  animals.  Is  then  this  centre  of  the 
Soul  the  object  of  our  search  ?  Or  must  we  think  of 
something  else,  some  point  at  which  all  centres  as  it  were 
coincide.  We  must  remember  that  our  "  circles  "  and 
"  centres  "  are  only  metaphors.  The  Soul  is  no  "  circle  " 
like  the  geometrical  figure  ;  we  call  it  a  circle  because 
the  archetypal  nature  is  in  it  and  around  it,  and  because 
it  is  derived  from  this  first  principle,  and  all  the  more 
because  the  Souls  as  wholes  are  separated  from  the  body.1 
But  now,  since  part  of  us  is  held  down  by  the  body  (as 
if  a  man  were  to  have  his  feet  under  water),  we  touch  the 
centre  of  all  things  with  our  own  centre  —  that  part  which 
is  not  submerged  —  as  the  centres  of  the  greatest  circles 
coincide  with  the  centre  of  the  enveloping  sphere,  and 
then  rest.  If  these  circles  were  corporeal  and  not  psychic, 
the  coincidence  of  their  centres  would  be  spatial,  and  they 
would  lie  around  a  centre  somewhere  in  space  ;  but  since 
the  Souls  belong  to  the  spiritual  world,  and  the  One  is 
above  even  Spirit,  we  must  consider  that  their  contact 
is  through  other  powers  —  those  which  connect  subject 
and  object  in  the  world  of  Spirit,  and  further,  that  the 
perceiving  Spirit  is  present  in  virtue  of  its  likeness  and 
identity,  and  unites  with  its  like  without  hindrance.  For 
bodies  cannot  have  this  close  association  with  each  other, 
but  incorporeal  things  are  not  kept  apart  by  bodies  ;  they 
are  separated  from  each  other  not  by  distance,  but  by 
unlikeness  and  difference.  Where  there  is  no  unlikeness, 
they  are  united  with  each  other.  The  One,  which  has 
no  unlikeness,  is  always  present  ;  we  are  so  only  when 
we  have  no  unlikeness.  The  One  does  not  strive  to  en- 
circle us,  but  we  strive  to  encircle  it.  We  always  move 
round  the  One,  but  we  do  not  always  fix  our  gaze  upon 
it  :  we  are  like  a  choir  of  singers  who  stand  round  the 
conductor,  but  do  not  always  sing  in  time  because  their 
attention  is  diverted  to  some  external  object  ;  when  they 


1  K&1  6ri  dird  TOiotrov  /cat  tri  jja\\ov  #ri  xuPtcr^^ffai  ^eu-     I  am  n°t  sure 
whether  this  is  the  meaning  of  this  obscure  and  elliptical  sentence. 


138          THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

look  at  the  conductor  they  sing  well  and  are  really  with 
him.  So  we  always  move  round  the  One  ;  if  we  did  not, 
we  should  be  dissolved  and  no  longer  exist ;  but  we  do 
not  always  look  towards  the  One.  When  we  do,  we 
attain  the  end  of  our  existence,  and  our  repose,  and  we 
no  longer  sing  out  of  tune,  but  form  in  very  truth  a  divine 
chorus  round  the  One. 

'  In  this  choral  dance  the  Soul  sees  the  fountain  of  life 
and  the  fountain  of  Spirit,  the  source  of  Being,  the  cause 
of  Good,  the  root  of  Soul.  These  do  not  flow  out  of  the 
One  in  such  a  way  as  to  diminish  it ;  for  we  are  not 
dealing  with  material  quantities,  else  the  products  of  the 
One  would  be  perishable,  whereas  they  are  eternal, 
because  their  source  remains  not  divided  among  them,  but 
constant.  Therefore  the  products  too  are  permanent,  as 
the  light  remains  while  the  sun  remains.  For  we  are  not 
cut  off  from  our  source  nor  separated  from  it,  even  though 
the  bodily  nature  intervenes  and  draws  us  towards  itself, 
but  we  breathe  and  maintain  our  being  in  our  source, 
which  does  not  first  give  itself  and  then  withdraw,  but 
is  always  supplying  us,  as  long  as  it  is  what  it  is.  But 
we  are  more  truly  alive  when  we  turn  towards  it,  and 
in  this  lies  our  well-being.  To  be  far  from  it  is  isolation 
and  diminution.  In  it  our  Soul  rests,  out  of  reach  of 
evil ;  it  has  ascended  to  a  region  which  is  pure  from  all 
evil ;  there  it  has  spiritual  vision,  and  is  exempt  from 
passion  and  suffering ;  there  it  truly  lives.  For  our 
present  life,  without  God,  is  a  mere  shadow  and  mimicry 
of  the  true  life.  But  life  yonder  is  an  activity  of  the 
Spirit,  and  by  its  peaceful  activity  it  engenders  gods  also, 
through  its  contact  with  the  One,  and  Beauty,  and 
Righteousness,  and  Virtue.  For  these  are  the  offspring 
of  a  Soul  which  is  filled  with  God,  and  this  is  its  beginning 
and  end— its  beginning  because  from  this  it  had  its  origin, 
its  end  because  the  Good  is  there,  and  when  it  comes  there 
it  becomes  what  it  was.  For  our  life  in  this  world  is  but 
a  falling  away,  an  exile,  and  a  loss  of  the  Soul's  wings. 
The  natural  love  which  the  Soul  feels  proves  that  the 


THE  ABSOLUTE  139 

Good  is  there  ;  this  is  why  paintings  and  myths  make 
Psyche  the  bride  of  Cupid.  Because  the  Soul  is  different 
from  God,  and  yet  springs  from  him,  she  loves  him  of 
necessity  ;  when  she  is  yonder  she  has  the  heavenly 
love,  when  she  is  here  below,  the  vulgar.  For  yonder 
dwells  the  heavenly  Aphrodite,  but  here  she  is  vulgarised 
and  corrupted,  and  every  Soul  is  Aphrodite.  This  is 
figured  in  the  allegory  of  the  birthday  of  Aphrodite,  and 
Love  who  was  born  with  her.1  Hence  it  is  natural  for 
the  Soul  to  love  God  and  to  desire  union  with  Him,  as 
the  daughter  of  a  noble  father  feels  a  noble  love.  But 
when,  descending  to  generation,2  the  Soul,  deceived  by 
the  false  promises  of  a  lover,  exchanges  its  divine  love  for 
a  mortal  love,  it  is  separated  from  its  father  and  submits 
to  indignities  ;  but  afterwards  it  is  ashamed  of  these 
disorders  and  purifies  itself  and  returns  to  its  father  and 
is  happy.  Let  him  who  has  not  had  this  experience  con- 
sider how  blessed  a  thing  it  is  in  earthly  love  to  obtain  that 
which  one  most  desires,  although  the  objects  of  earthly 
loves  are  mortal  and  injurious  and  loves  of  shadows, 
which  change  and  pass  ;  since  these  are  not  the  things 
which  we  truly  love,  nor  are  they  our  good,  nor  what 
we  seek.  But  yonder  is  the  true  object  of  our  love,  which 
it  is  possible  to  grasp  and  to  live  with  and  truly  to  possess, 
since  no  envelope  of  flesh  separates  us  from  it.  He  who 
has  seen  it  knows  what  I  say,  that  the  Soul  then  has 
another  life,  when  it  comes  to  God  and  having  come 
possesses  him,  and  knows,  when  in  that  state,  that  it  is  in 
the  presence  of  the  dispenser  of  the  true  life,  and  that 
it  needs  nothing  further.  On  the  contrary,  it  must  put 
off  all  else,  and  stand  in  God  alone,  which  can  only  be 
when  we  have  pruned  away  all  else  that  surrounds  us. 
We  must  then  hasten  to  depart  hence,  to  detach  ourselves 
as  much  as  we  can  from  the  body  to  which  we  are  un- 

1  Greek  mythology  had  no  authoritative  doctrine  about  the  parent- 
age of  Eros.  According  to  the  version  here  referred  to,  he  was  '  be- 
gotten on  the  birthday  of  Aphrodite,'  but  Plato  (Symposium,  178) 
makes  him  '  the  eldest  of  the  gods,  of  whose  birth  nothing  is  said.' 

*  I.e.  to  the  fleeting  world  of  births  and  deaths. 


140         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

happily  bound,  to  endeavour  to  embrace  God  with  all  our 
being,  and  to  leave  no  part  of  ourselves  which  is  not 
in  contact  with  him.  Then  we  can  see  God  and  ourselves, 
as  far  as  is  permitted  :  we  see  ourselves  glorified,  full  of 
spiritual  light,  or  rather  we  see  ourselves  as  pure,  subtle, 
ethereal,  light ;  we  become  divine,  or  rather  \ve  know 
ourselves  to  be  divine.  Then  indeed  is  the  flame  of  life 
kindled,  that  flame  which,  when  we  sink  back  to  earth, 
sinks  with  us. 

'  Why  then  does  not  the  Soul  abide  yonder  ?  Because 
it  has  not  yet  wholly  left  its  earthly  abode.  But  the 
time  will  come  when  it  will  enjoy  the  vision  without 
interruption,  no  longer  troubled  with  the  hindrances  of 
the  body.  The  part  of  the  Soul  which  is  troubled  is  not 
the  part  which  sees  God,  but  the  other  part,  when  the 
part  which  sees  God  is  idle,  though  it  ceases  not  from  that 
knowledge  which  comes  of  demonstrations,  conjectures, 
and  the  dialectic.  But  in  the  vision  of  God  that  which 
sees  is  not  reason  (Xo'yo?),  but  something  greater  than 
and  prior  to  reason,  something  presupposed  by  reason,1 
as  is  the  object  of  vision.  He  who  then  sees  himself,  when 
he  sees  will  see  himself  as  a  simple  being,  will  be  united  to 
himself  as  such,  will  feel  himself  become  such.  We  ought 
not  even  to  say  that  he  will  see,  but  he  will  be  that  which 
he  sees,  if  indeed  it  is  possible  any  longer  to  distinguish 
seer  and  seen,  and  not  boldly  to  affirm  that  the  two  are 
one.  In  this  state  the  seer  does  not  see  or  distinguish  or 
imagine  two  things  ;  he  becomes  another,  he  ceases  to 
be  himself  and  to  belong  to  himself.  He  belongs  to  God 
and  is  one  with  Him,  like  two  concentric  circles ;  they  are 
one  when  they  coincide,  and  two  only  when  they  are 
separated.  It  is  only  in  this  sense  that  the  Soul  is  other 
than  God.  Therefore  this  vision  is  hard  to  describe.  For 
how  can  one  describe,  as  other  than  oneself,  that  which, 
when  one  saw  it,  seemed  to  be  one  with  oneself  ? 

'  This  is  no  doubt  why  in  the  mysteries  we  are  forbidden 
to  reveal  them  to  the  uninitiated.  That  which  is  divine 

1  eVi  r$  \byy.    I  am  not  quite  sure  of  the  meaning  of  this  phrase. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  141 

is  ineffable,  and  cannot  be  shown  to  those  who  have 
not  had  the  happiness  to  see  it.  Since  in  the  vision  there 
were  not  two  things,  but  seer  and  seen  were  one,  if  a 
man  could  preserve  the  memory  of  what  he  was  when  he 
was  mingled  with  the  divine,  he  would  have  in  himself  an 
image  of  God.  For  he  was  then  one  with  God,  and 
retained  no  difference,  either  in  relation  to  himself  or  to 
others.  Nothing  stirred  within  him,  neither  anger  nor 
concupiscence  nor  even  reason  or  spiritual  perception  or 
his  own  personality,  if  we  may  say  so.  Caught  up  in  an 
ecstasy,  tranquil  and  alone  with  God,  he  enjoyed  an 
imperturbable  calm  ;  shut  up  in  his  proper  essence  he 
declined  not  to  cither  side,  he  turned  not  even  to  him- 
self ;  he  was  in  a  state  of  perfect  stability ;  he  had 
become  stability  itself.  The  Soul  then  occupies  itself  no 
more  even  with  beautiful  things  ;  it  is  exalted  above  the 
Beautiful,  it  passes  the  choir  of  the  virtues.  Even  as 
when  a  man  who  enters  the  sanctuary  of  a  temple  leaves 
behind  him  the  statues  in  the  temple,  they  are  the 
objects  which  he  will  see  first  when  he  leaves  the  sanctuary 
after  he  has  seen  what  is  within,  and  entered  there  into 
communion,  not  with  statues  and  images,  but  with  the 
Deity  itself.  Perhaps  we  ought  not  to  speak  of  vision 
(Oeajuia)  ;  it  is  rather  another  mode  of  seeing,  an  ecstasy 
and  simplification,  an  abandonment  of  oneself,  a  desire 
for  immediate  contact,  a  stability,  a  deep  intention 
(Treptvdrjo-is)  to  unite  oneself  with  what  is  to  be  seen  in  the 
sanctuary.  He  who  seeks  to  see  God  in  any  other  manner, 
will  find  nothing.  These  are  but  figures,  by  which  the 
wise  prophets  indicate  how  we  may  see  God.  But  the 
wise  priest,  understanding  the  symbol,  may  enter  the 
sanctuary  and  make  the  vision  real.  If  he  has  not  yet 
got  so  far,  he  at  least  conceives  that  what  is  within  the 
sanctuary  is  something  invisible  to  mortal  eyes,  that  it  is 
the  Source  and  Principle  of  all ;  he  knows  that  it  is  by 
the  first  Principle  that  we  see  the  first  Principle,  and 
unites  himself  with  it  and  perceives  like  by  like,  leaving 
behind  nothing  that  is  Divine,  so  far  as  the  Soul  can  reach. 


142          THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

And  before  the  vision,  the  Soul  desires  that  which  re- 
mains for  it  to  see.  But  for  him  who  has  ascended  above 
all  things,  that  which  remains  to  see  is  that  which  is 
before  all  things.  For  the  nature  of  the  Soul  will  never 
pass  to  absolute  not-being  :  when  it  falls,  it  will  come 
to  evil,  and  so  to  not-being,  but  not  to  absolute  not- 
being.  But  if  it  moves  in  the  opposite  direction,  it  will 
arrive  not  at  something  else,  but  at  itself,  and  so,  being 
in  nothing  else,  it  is  only  in  itself  alone  ;  but  that  which 
is  in  itself  alone  and  not  in  the  world  of  Being  is  in  the 
Absolute.  It  ceases  to  be  Being  ;  it  is  above  Being,  while 
in  communion  with  the  One.  If  then  a  man  sees  himself 
become  one  with  the  One,  he  has  in  himself  a  likeness  of 
the  One,  and  if  he  passes  out  of  himself,  as  an  image  to 
its  archetype,  he  has  reached  the  end  of  his  journey.  And 
when  he  comes  down  from  his  vision,  he  can  again 
awaken  the  virtue  that  is  in  him,  and  seeing  himself  fitly 
adorned  in  every  part  he  can  again  mount  upward 
through  virtue  to  Spirit,  and  through  wisdom  to  God. 
Such  is  the  life  of  gods  and  of  godlike  and  blessed  men  ; 
a  liberation  from  all  earthly  bonds,  a  life  that  takes  no 
pleasure  in  earthly  things,  a  flight  of  the  alone  to  the 
Alone/ 

These  extracts  will  be  enough  to  illustrate  the  character 
of  the  Plotinian  mysticism.  As  a  description  of  a  direct 
psychical  experience,  it  closely  resembles  the  records  of 
the  Christian  mystics,  and  indeed  of  all  mystics,  what- 
ever their  creed,  date,  or  nationality.  The  mystical 
trance  or  ecstasy  is  a  not  very  uncommon  phenomenon, 
wherever  men  and  women  lead  the  contemplative  life. 
Even  when  the  possibility  of  literary  dependence  is 
excluded,  the  witness  of  the  mystics  is  wonderfully 
unanimous. 

i~The  psychology  of  religious  ecstasy  has  lately  been 
studied  with  a  thoroughness  which  has  nearly  exhausted 
the  subject.  I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  it  here.  The 
influence  of  the  psychological  school  on  the  philosophy  of 
religion  seems  to  me  to  be  on  the  whole  mischievous. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  143 

Psychology  treats  mental  states  as  the  data  of  a  science. 
But  intuition  changes  its  character  completely  when 
treated  in  this  way.  This  is  why  a  chilling  and  depressing 
atmosphere  seems  to  surround  the  psychology  of  religion. 
Many  persons  are  pleased  to  find  that  on  purely  scientific 
grounds  the  intuitions  of  faith  and  devotion  are  allowed 
a  place  among  incontrovertible  facts,  and  treated  with 
sympathetic  respect.  They  do  not  reflect  that  the  whole 
method  is  external ;  that  it  is  a  science  not  of  validity  but 
of  origins  ;  and  that  in  limiting  itself  to  the  investigation 
of  mystical  vision  as  a  state  of  consciousness,  it  excludes 
all  consideration  of  the  relation  which  the  vision  may 
bear  to  objective  truth.  There  are  some,  no  doubt,  who 
regard  this  last  question  as  either  meaningless  or  unan- 
swerable ;  but  such  are  not  likely  to  trouble  themselves 
about  the  philosophy  of  Plotinus.  Nor  would  an  examina- 
tion of  pathological  symptoms,  such  as  fill  the  now  popu- 
lar books  on  '  religious  experience/  be  of  any  help  towards 
understanding  the  passages  which  I  have  just  quoted. 
The  vision  of  Plotinus  is  unusual,  but  in  no  sense  ab- 
normal. To  see  God  is  the  goal  of  the  religious  life,  and 
the  vision  of  the  One  is  only  the  highest  and  deepest  kind 
of  prayer,  which  is  the  mystical  act  par  excellence.  There 
is  nothing  strange  in  the  mentality  of  Plotinus  except  his 
intense  concentration  on  the  Soul's  supreme  quest.  Those 
who  will  live  as  he  lived  will  see  what  he  saw. 

Mr.  Cutten1  rightly  says  that  '  there  are  two  forms  of 
ecstasy.  The  one  is  characterised  by  wild  excitement,  loss 
of  self-control,  and  temporary  madness.  It  is  a  sort  of 
religious  intoxication,  indulged  in  largely  for  its  delightful 
effects.  This  usually  originates  in  dancing  and  other 
physical  manifestations.  The  other  type  is  intense,  but 
quiet  and  calm  ;  it  is  usually  spontaneous  in  origin,  or 
else  comes  through  mental  rather  than  physical  causes.' 
The  author  adds,  again  very  justly,  that  not  only  auto- 
suggestion but  crowd-contagion  plays  a  large  part  in 
the  production  of  religious  excitement,  while  the  calm 

1  Cutten,  The  Psychological  Phenomena  of  Christianity,  p.  45. 


144         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

type  of  ecstasy  is  experienced  in  solitude.  The  latter  type, 
to  which,  it  is  needless  to  say,  Plotinus  belongs,  is  also 
represented  by  many  other  scholarly  contemplatives, 
such  as  the  Frenchman,  Maine  de  Biron,1  who  describes  its 
manifestations  from  his  own  experience.  It  is  also 
characteristic  of  the  poets  who  have  drawn  spiritual 
sustenance  from  the  manifestations  of  cosmic  life  in 
nature.  The  following  reflections  may  help  us  to  under- 
stand some  of  the  chief  features  of  Plotinian  mysticism, 
and  the  points  in  which  it  differs  from  other  branches  of 
the  great  mystical  tradition. 

Plotinus  is  not  content  to  give  us  his  own  experience 
of  the  beatific  vision,  nor  does  he  wish  us  to  accept  it  on 
his  authority.  He  prefers  to  appeal  to  the  experience  of 
his  readers.  He  has  followed,  he  says,  the  guidance  of 
a  faculty  '  which  all  have,  but  few  use  '  ;2  a  faculty 
which,  as  we  shall  see,  is  not  anything  distinct  from  the 
normal  operations  of  the  mind,  but  arises  from  the 
concentration  of  these  on  the  return  of  the  Soul  to  its 
'  Father.'  He  assumes  that  his  readers  are  made  like 
himself,  and  that  many  of  them  have  followed  the 
same  path.  '  He  who  has  seen  it  knows  what  I  mean,' 
is  his  excuse  for  not  attempting  to  describe  the  indescrib- 
able. But  he  does  claim  to  have  given  us  a  real  meta- 
physic  of  mysticism.  He  has  put  the  vision  of  the  One 
in  its  right  place  at  the  apex  of  a  pyramid  which  ascends, 
as  the  dialectic  guides  us,  from  the  many  and  discordant 
to  the  One  in  whom  is  no  variableness.  He  explains 
clearly  why  thought  cannot  reach  the  Absolute.  Thought 
must  have  a  Thing  ;  and  Thought  and  Thing  can  never 
be  wholly  one.  This  argument  we  have  considered  ; 
here  I  wish  to  emphasise  that  the  truth  which  he  claims 

1  Anthropologie,  p.  550.  '  C'est  au  moment  ou  le  moi  triomphe,  ou 
la  passion  est  vaincue,  oil  le  devoir  est  accompli  centre  toutes  les 
resistances  affectives,  enfin  ou  le  sacrifice  est  consomme^  que,  tout  effort 
cessant,  1'ame  est  remplie  d'un  sentiment  ineffable,  ou  le  moi  se  trouve 
absorbe.  Un  calme  pur  succede  aux  tempetes.' 

8  So  John  Wesley  said  :  '  I  pretend  to  no  extraordinary  revelations 
or  gifts  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  none  but  what  every  Christian  may  receive, 
and  ought  to  expect  and  pray  for.' 


THE  ABSOLUTE  145 

for  the  vision  of  the  One  is  absolute,  universal,  and 
necessary  truth. 

The  end  of  the  Soul's  pilgrimage  is  the  source  from 
which  it  flowed.  As  Proclus  was  afterwards  to  teach 
in  more  precise  language,  all  life  consists  in  a  home- 
stopping,  a  journey  forth,  and  a  return  (novy,  irpooSos, 
ciri(rrpo<fnj) .  If  the  outward  journey  were  considered 
in  isolation,  we  should  have  to  say  that  it  was  not  willed, 
but  necessary.  If,  however,  we  take  the  whole  course 
together,  as  we  should  do,  we  may  say  that  Creation  was 
the  first  act  in  the  drama  of  Redemption.  For  the  Soul 
only  realises  itself  in  the  desire  (efyeo-t?),  the  travail- 
pangs  (co&'y),  which  draw  it  back  towards  the  source  of 
its  being. 

The  process  of  simplification  (aVXoxn?)  by  which  we 
approach  the  One  seems  at  first  sight  to  be  a  kind  of  self- 
denudation — a  figure  which  indeed  Plotinus  uses.  Just 
as  we  are  forbidden  to  affirm  anything  positive  about  the 
One,  because  we  cannot  affirm  anything  without  excluding 
its  opposite,  and  nothing  must  be  excluded  from  the 
Absolute,  so  the  Soul  must  strip  itself  of  all  that  does  not 
belong  to  the  spiritual  world,  and  finally  must,  for  the 
time  at  least,  shut  its  eyes  to  the  manifold  riches  of  the 
spiritual  world  itself,  in  order  to  enter  naked  and  alone 
into  the  Holy  of  Holies.  This  '  negative  road  '  (via 
negativa)  is  the  well-trodden  mystic  way,  and  it  is  the 
chief  stumbling-block  of  those  who  dislike  mysticism. 

Plotinus  describes  the  method  in  language  familiar  to 
all  mystics.  It  consists  in  removing  everything  extraneous 
to  the  reality  which  we  seek  to  win  and  to  be.  First  the 
body  is  to  be  detached  as  not  belonging  to  the  true 
nature  of  the  Soul ;  then  the  Soul  which  forms  body  ; 
then  sense-perception.  What  remains  is  the  image  of 
Spirit.  When  the  Soul  becomes  Spirit  by  contemplating 
Spirit  as  its  own  principle,  the  source  of  all  being  still 
remains  unexplored.  To  reach  this,  '  take  away  all ' 
Trai/ra).1  The  language  used  makes  it  clear  that 

1  5-  3.  17- 
u.— L 


146         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

this  '  abstraction  '  consists  of  intense  concentration  of  the 
mind  and  will  on  what  are  believed  to  be  the  essentials 
of  the  quest.  But  the  method  is  based  on  the  conviction 
that  'all  truth  is  shadow  except  the  last.'  All  soul- 
experience  half  reveals  and  half  conceals  reality.  So  the 
ascent  of  the  Soul  involves  a  continual  rejection  of  out- 
ward shows,  and  continual  self-denial.  '  Ideas  are 
always  given  through  something  ' ;  but  what  is  behind 
the  Ideas  is  given  through  nothing  ;  if  it  is  given  at  all, 
it  is  given  in  a  manner  which  is  too  immediate  to  be 
described. 

The  critics  have  treated  the  '  negative  road  '  as  if  it  were 
a  mere  '  peeling  the  onion,'  a  progressive  impoverishment 
of  experience  until  nothing  is  left.  Royce,  who  is  not 
unsympathetic  towards  mysticism,  condemns  it  for 
'  ignoring  the  sum  of  the  series,  and  craving  only  for  the 
final  term.'  This  is  not  true  of  Plotinian  mysticism,  and 
theoretically  it  is  not  true  of  Catholic  mysticism  either  ; 
though  there  is  a  practical  danger  that  the  cloistered 
contemplative  may  live  in  dreams  and  lose  touch  with 
the  external  world.  We  must  remember  that  for  Plotinus 
reality  consists  in  the  rich  and  glorious  life  of  Spirit,  in 
which  whatever  we  renounce  in  the  world  of  sense  is 
given  back  to  us  transmuted  and  ennobled.  It  is  quite 
a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  Neoplatonist  desires  to 
get  rid  of  his  Soul.  He  agrees  with  the  author  of  the 
Cloud  of  Unknowing.*  '  In  all  this  sorrow  he  desireth 
not  to  unbe  ;2  for  that  were  devil's  madness  and  despite 
unto  God.  But  him  listeth  right  well  to  be  ;  and  he 
intendeth  full  heartily  thanking  to  God,  for  the  worthiness 
and  gift  of  his  being,  for  all  that  he  desire  unceasingly  to 
lack  the  witting  and  the  feeling  of  his  being.'  This  last 
clause  does  not  mean  that  the  ideal  state  is  a  sort  of 
somnambulism  ;  we  have  seen,  on  the  contrary,  that 
Plotinus  describes  the  highest  experience  as  a  sort  of 

1  Chapter  44. 

*  Some  of  the  medieval  German  mystics  have  used  phrases  like 
'  Ich  bin  entworden.' 


THE  ABSOLUTE  147 

awaking.  A  living  realisation  has  taken  the  place  of 
abstract  conceptions.  But  he  does  mean  that  the  refer- 
ence of  every  experience  to  a  self-conscious  psychic  self 
is  necessarily  an  impoverishment  of  that  experience.  The 
less  of  subjectivity  that  there  is  in  our  experience,  the 
wider  and  truer  it  will  be.  Thus  it  is  not  so  much  the 
object  as  the  perceiving  subject  that  is  constantly 
reproved  and  silenced  in  the  *  negative  way  '  as  practised 
by  Plotinus.  It  is  our  image  of  the  object  which  is  not 
good  enough  to  be  true.  He  is  no  Gnostic,  despising  this 
beautiful  world  ;  he  wants  to  see  it  as  it  really  is,  and 
not  through  the  distorting  medium  of  his  lower  faculties. 
He  knows  that  the  Soul  is  perpetually  constructing  a 
synthesis  out  of  what  it  has  seen  and  apprehended  ;  it  is 
these  premature  syntheses  which  frequently  have  to  be 
destroyed,  or  they  will  detain  us  in  a  world  of  shadows. 
So  the  words  of  Goethe  are  true  : — 

'  Denn  alles  muss  in  nichts  zerfallen, 
Wenn  es  in  Sein  beharren  will.' 

Some  critics1  have  been  content  to  find  a  patent 
contradiction  in  the  philosophy  of  Plotinus,  which  they 
attribute  to  a  conflict  between  his  personal  piety  and  his 
speculative  thought.  '  In  Plotinus'  philosophy  God  is 
exiled  from  his  world  and  his  world  from  him,  whilst 
Plotinus'  experiences  and  intuitions  find  God  to  be  the 
very  atmosphere  and  home  of  all  souls.'  To  the  '  abstrac- 
tiveness of  his  method  '  are  traced  '  his  profoundly 
unsocial  conception  of  man's  relation  to  God,  and  of  the 
moments  when  this  relation  is  at  its  deepest — alone  with 
the  Alone — and  the  exclusion  from  the  Soul's  deepest 
ultimate  life  of  all  multiplicity  and  discursiveness  of 
thought,  and  of  all  distinct  acts  and  productiveness  of  the 
will.'  These  strictures  on  Neoplatonic  ethics  will  be  con- 
sidered in  the  next  chapter.  As  for  the  alleged  contra- 

1  e.g.  Eucken,  in  his  Lebensanschauungen  Grosser  Denker,  and 
Baron  Von  Hiigel,  who  seems  to  be  influenced  by  him.  The  quotations 
are  from  the  latter  writer's  Eternal  Life.  See  below,  p.  205. 


148         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

diction  between  his  personal  religion  and  his  speculative 
thought,  Plotinus  is  the  last  writer  in  whom  we  should 
expect  to  find  such  an  inconsistency  ;  his  metaphysics 
were  no  intellectual  pastime,  as  Hume's  seem  in  part 
to  have  been,  but  an  earnest  attempt  to  think  out  his 
deepest  convictions.  Nor  does  the  criticism  seem  to  me 
to  be  in  any  way  justified.  The  '  exile  of  God  from  the 
world  '  is  part  of  the  '  extreme  dualism  '  which  Caird 
supposes  in  Plotinus,  but  which,  I  venture  to  think,  no 
careful  student  of  the  Enneads  will  find  there.  There  are 
certainly  two  movements — a  systole  and  diastole,  in 
which  the  life  of  the  Soul  consists.  Spiritual  progress  is 
on  one  side  an  expansion,  on  the  other  an  intensification 
or  concentration.  But  it  is  not  true  that  one  is  the  core 
of  Plotinus'  philosophy,  the  other  of  his  religion. 

One  aspect  of  the  Plotinian  mysticism,  which  must  be 
strongly  emphasised,  is  that  there  is  no  occultism  in  it. 
There  is  no  '  mystical  faculty,'  but  only  the  spiritual 
sense  '  which  all  possess  but  few  use/  There  is  con- 
tinuity of  development  from  sense-perception  up  to  the 
vision  of  the  One.  The  whole  lore  of  miraculous  Divine 
favours,  which  fills  the  records  of  cloistered  mystics,  is 
entirely  absent  from  Plotinus.1  The  psychology  of  these 
delusions  is  still  rather  obscure  ;  happily  they  do  not 
concern  us  here.  Suggestion  has  no  doubt  much  to  do 
with  them  ;  sometimes  auto-suggestion,  sometimes  the 
contagion  of  a  crowd.  During  some  revivals,  the  patients 
swoon  ;  in  other  cases  they  dance  or  jerk  convulsively. 
There  is,  as  Mr.  Granger  well  says,  a  physical  hypocrisy 
as  well  as  a  moral  one.  The  best  guides  in  the  mystical 
life  warn  their  disciples  against  these  '  monkey-tricks  of 
the  soul,'  as  the  Cloud  of  Unknowing  calls  them.  Some 
persons,  says  this  wise  and  quaint  writer,  '  turn  their 
bodily  wits  inwards  to  their  bodies  against  the  course  of 

1  lamblichus,  however,  was  asked  by  his  disciples  whether  it  was 
true  that  he  sometimes  floated  in  the  air  when  he  said  his  prayers  !  It 
is  melancholy  to  find  that  so  sane  a  writer  as  Granger  (The  Soul  of  a 
Christian,  p.' no)  can  still  believe  these  absurdities. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  149 

nature  ;  and  strain  them,  as  they  would  see  inwards  with 
their  bodily  eyes,  and  hear  inwards  with  their  ears,  and 
so  forth  of  all  their  wits,  smelling,  tasting,  and  feeling 
inwards  .  .  .  and  then  as  fast  the  devil  hath  power  for 
to  feign  some  false  light  or  sounds,  sweet  smells  in  their 
noses,  wonderful  tastes  in  their  mouths,  and  many 
quaint  heats  and  burnings  in  their  members.'  Eckhart 
says  distinctly  that  ecstatic  auditions  are  not  the  voice 
of  God,  who  '  speaks  but  one  word,  in  which  are  contained 
all  truths.'  It  is  the  subject  of  the  vision  who  acts  and 
speaks,  and  is  under  an  illusion  about  his  own  words  and 
acts.  In  ecstasy  the  soul  feels  a  new  vigour  ;  and  as  it 
has  before  itself  no  object  which  it  can  know,  it  makes 
an  object  of  itself  and  answers  itself,  and  creates  what  it 
desires,  like  the  sparks  which  are  seen  after  a  blow  on 
the  eye.1  St.  John  of  the  Cross  bids  us  '  fly  from  such 
experiences  without  even  examining  whether  they  be 
good  or  evil.  For  inasmuch  as  they  are  exterior  and  in 
the  body,  there  is  the  less  certainty  of  their  being  from 
God.  It  is  more  natural  that  God  should  communicate 
himself  through  the  Spirit  than  through  the  sense, 
wherein  there  is  usually  much  danger  and  delusion  ; 
because  the  bodily  sense  decides  upon  and  judges  spiritual 
things,  thinking  them  to  be  what  itself  feels  them  to  be, 
when  in  reality  they  are  as  different  as  body  and  soul, 
sensuality  and  reason.'2  Plotinus  would  have  distrusted 
'  bodily  showings  '  for  the  same  reason.  When  the  mind 
is  engaged  in  contemplating  the  things  of  God,  strange 
quasi-sensual  delights  or  pains  could  be  only  a  distrac- 
tion, and  to  provoke  or  welcome  them,  and  describe  them 
afterwards  with  luscious  recollection,  would  be  folly.  To 
suppose  that  divine  knowledge  could  be  so  communicated 
would  contradict  his  epistemology  completely.3 

This  repudiation  of  occultism  does  not  forbid  the  per- 

1  Delacroix,  Le  Mysticism*  en  Allemagne,  p.  212. 

2  Quoted  by  Herman,  Meaning  and  Value  of  Mysticism,  p.  53. 

3  Origen  condemns  irrational  ecstasy  even  more  strongly,  imputing 
it  to  evil  spirits.    See  Denis,  La  Philosophic  d'Origtne,  p.  246. 


150         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTlNUS 

ception  of  analogies  in  nature — that  vision  of  spiritual 
law  in  nature  which  inspires  such  poets  as  Wordsworth, 
and  gives  some  encouragement  to  magic.  So  Sir  Thomas 
Browne  says  :  '  The  severe  schools  shall  never  laugh  me 
out  of  the  philosophy  of  Hermes,  that  this  visible  world 
is  but  a  picture  of  the  invisible,  wherein,  as  in  a  portrait, 
things  are  not  truly  but  in  equivocal  shapes,  and  as  they 
counterfeit  some  real  substance  in  that  invisible  frame- 
work.' On  the  subject  of  magic,  some  further  reflections 
will  be  found  in  the  next  chapter. 

It  will  also  be  noticed  that  there  is  not  a  trace  in 
Plotinus  of  the  '  dark  night  of  the  Soul,'  the  experience 
of  dereliction.  This  tragic  experience  has  received  much 
attention  from  modern  psychology.  Many  writers  have 
regarded  it  as  merely  pathological,  as  a  violent  reaction 
from  nervous  overstrain.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
unnatural  life  led  by  the  contemplative  ascetic,  cut  off 
from  almost  every  healthy  relaxation,  must  often  produce 
morbid  conditions.  Intense  introspection  is  sure  to  cause 
fits  of  melancholy  ;  and  some  mystics,  like  Madame 
Guyon,  cannot  be  entirely  acquitted  of  a  sort  of  spiritual 
self-importance  which  makes  them  enjoy  retailing  their 
inner  joys  and  miseries.  Those  who  fancy,  with  Miss 
Underbill,  that  these  sufferings  are  the  privilege  of  the 
higher  order  of  mystics,  the  'great  and  strong  spirits/  will 
probably  experience,  or  think  they  have  experienced,  some- 
thing like  what  they  have  read  of.  I  think  this  writer  ex- 
aggerates the  emotional  side  of  religion.  But  I  agree  with 
her  that  the  '  dark  night  of  the  Soul '  is  not  to  be  disposed 
of  as  a  phenomenon  of  morbid  psychology.  As  a  rule,  one 
may  rather  distrust  the  ecstatic  who  has  had  no  experience 
of  it.  As  Delacroix  says,  '  the  dark  night  condenses  the 
whole  vision  of  things  into  a  negative  intuition,  as  ecstasy 
into  a  positive.'  The  Christian  struggle  for  spiritual 
victory  is  more  intense  than  the  Platonic,  because  the 
contrasted  blackness  of  evil  is  felt  far  more  vividly. 
Plotinus  knows  of  no  devil,  and  no  active  malignancy  in 
the  nature  of  things.  There  is  no  sense  of  horror  in  his 


THE  ABSOLUTE  151 

philosophy  from  first  to  last.  The  temper  of  the  Neo- 
platonic  saint  is  to  be  serene  and  cheerful,  confident  that 
the  ultimate  truth  of  the  world  is  on  his  side,  and  that  only 
'  earth-born  clouds  '  can  come  between  him  and  the  sun. 
It  is  a  manly  spirit,  which  craves  for  no  divine  caresses 
and  fears  no  enmity  from  '  the  world-rulers  of  this  dark- 
ness/ The  Christian  may  be  reminded  that  the  words 
of  the  Johannine  Christ, '  Let  not  your  heart  be  troubled/ 
reflect  the  whole  tone  of  Christ's  teaching  better  than 
the  more  sombre  outlook  of  many  Christian  saints.  But 
the  dark  night  of  the  Soul  means  repentance  and  remorse  ; 
and  are  these  feelings  to  be  sanctioned  or  discouraged  ? 
For  the  Jew,  the  call  to  repent  means  '  Turn/  not 
'  Grieve  ' ;  and  Spinoza  explicitly  forbids  remorse,  as 
partaking  in  the  cardinal  fin  of  tristitia.  '  One  might 
perhaps  expect  gna wings  of  conscience  and  repentance  to 
help  to  bring  men  on  the  right  path,  and  might  thereupon 
conclude  (as  everyone  does  conclude)  that  these  affections 
are  good  things.  Yet  when  we  look  at  the  matter  closely, 
we  shall  find  that  not  only  are  they  not  good,  but  on  the 
contrary  deleterious  and  evil  passions.  For  it  is  manifest 
that  we  can  always  get  along  better  by  reason  and  love 
of  truth  than  by  worry  of  conscience  and  remorse.  These 
are  harmful  and  evil,  inasmuch  as  they  form  a  particular 
kind  of  sadness ;  and  the  disadvantages  of  sadness  I 
have  already  proved,  and  shown  that  we  should  strive  to 
keep  it  from  our  life.  Just  so  we  should  endeavour, 
since  uneasiness  of  conscience  and  remorse  are  of  this 
kind  of  complexion,  to  flee  and  shun  these  states  of 
mind/1  Some  of  the  Christian  mystics  are  here  in  accord 
with  Spinoza  and  Plotinus.  It  was  one  of  the  accusations 
against  Molinos  that  he  discouraged  contrition.  '  When 
thou  fallest  into  a  fault/  he  says,  '  do  not  trouble  or 
afflict  thyself  for  it.  Faults  are  effects  of  our  frail  nature, 
stained  by  original  sin.  Would  not  he  be  a  fool  who 
during  a  tournament,  if  he  had  a  fall,  should  lie  weeping 
on  the  ground  and  afflict  himself  with  discourses  upon  his 
1  Spinoza,  On  God,  Man,  and  Happiness,  ii.  10. 


152         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

misadventure  ?  '  Those  who  believe  in  what  William 
James  calls  the  religion  of  healthy-mindedness  will  fight 
against  every  attack  of  spiritual  misery  as  if  it  were  a 
disease.  But  I  cannot  disregard  the  testimony  of  some 
of  the  sanest  and  best  mystics  that  it  is  often  '  speedful ' 
for  a  man  to  fall  into  this  state  of  depression.1  I  find, 
after  all,  something  acaderoia  and  unreal  in  those  whose 
,  visions  and  thoughts  always  affirm  an  optimism.  John 
Pulstord  says  wisely  :  "Satan  can  convert  illumination 
into  a  snare  ;  but  contrition  is  beyond  his  art.'  We  are 
meant  to  feel  the  strength  of  the  forces  that  would  pull 
us  downward  as  well  as  of  those  which  draw  us  upward  ; 
indeed  we  can  hardly  know  one  without  the  other.  '  I 
strove  towards  thee,'  says  St.  Augustine,  'and  was 
repulsed  by  thee  that  I  might  taste  death.  The  dis- 
turbed and  darkened  vision  of  my  mind  was  being  healed 
from  day  to  day  by  the  keen  salve  of  wholesome  pains. 
I  became  more  wretched,  and  thou  nearer.' 

The  ecstatic  state,  under  whatever  names  it  may  be 
distinguished  in  its  various  manifestations,  is  for  the 
great  Neoplatonist  an  exceedingly  rare  experience  ;  and 
it  is  noteworthy  that  we  find  no  tendency  to  cheapen 
it  in  the  later  writers  of  his  school.  For  the  mystics  of 
the  cloister,  on  the  contrary,  it  was  by  no  means  un- 
common ;  and  so  far  was  it  from  being  reserved  for  the 
holiest  saints  in  their  most  exalted  moods,  that  beginners 
in  the  ascetic  life  were  warned  not  to  be  uplifted  by  such 
visitations,  which  were  often  granted  as  an  encourage- 
ment to  young  aspirants.  Some  of  the  most  famous 
female  mystics,  especially,  were  frequently  entranced, 
their  ecstasies  sometimes  lasting  for  many  hours,  though 
half  an  hour  is  so  often  mentioned  that  it  may  be  regarded 
as  a  normal  duration  of  such  states.  This  difference 
does  not  seem  to  be  connected  with  Christianity,  which 
in  its  pure  form  gives  no  encouragement  to  violent 
religious  emotion.  Some  of  the  philosophical  Christian 
mystics,  like  Eckhart,  though  they  lived  in  the  golden 

1  The  allusion  is  to  the  Revelations  of  Julian  of  Norwich. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  153 

age  of  monastic  Christian  mysticism,  do  not  seem  to 
have  experienced  these  abnormal  visitations.  Others, 
like  Bohme  and  Blake,  certainly  were  visionaries.  Bohme 
used  to  hypnotise  himself  by  gazing  intently  on  a  bright 
object,  a  method  which,  with  variations,  has  been 
adopted  by  many  Oriental  mystics.  There  is  no  trace 
of  this  self-hypnotisation  in  Plotinus,  though  intense 
abstraction  and  concentration  of  thought  may  doubtless 
have  the  same  result  as  protracted  gazing  upon  some 
chosen  object.  But  Plotinus  is  careful  to  insist  that  the 
vision  must  be  waited  for.  '  When  the  Spirit  perceives 
this  Divine  light,  it  knows  not  whence  it  comes,  from' 
without  or  from  within  ;  when  it  has  ceased  to  shine,  we 
believe  at  one  moment  that  it  comes  from  within  and  at 
another  that  it  does  not.  But  it  is  useless  to  ask  whence 
it  comes  ;  there  is  no  question  of  place  here.  It  neither 
approaches  us  nor  withdraws  itself ;  it  either  manifests 
itself  or  remains  hidden.  We  must  not  then  seek  it,  but 
wait  quietly  for  its  appearance,  and  prepare  ourselves 
to  contemplate  it,  as  the  eye  watches  for  the  sun  rising 
above  the  horizon,  or  out  of  the  sea.  .  .  .  The  One  is 
everywhere,  and  nowhere.'1  The  note  of  personal  experi- 
ence cannot  be  missed  in  these  words.  The  fine  simile 
of  the  watcher  in  the  early  morning,  his  gaze  fixed  on 
the  eastern  sky,  recalls  the  verse  of  Malachi :  '  Unto 
you  that  fear  my  name  shall  the  sun  of  righteousness 
arise  with  healing  in  his  wings.'  But  the  question  has 
not  yet  been  fully  answered,  why  states  of  trance  are 
so  much  more  common  among  'the  Christian  mystics. 
I  believe  that  a  good  deal  may  be  attributed  to  tradition 
and  expectation.  Just  as  young  people  in  some  Protestant 
sects  experience  '  sudden  conversion '  at  the  age  of 
adolescence,  while  in  other  Christian  churches  this  is 
almost  unknown  or  regarded  as  a  rare  phenomenon,  so 
visions  and  trances  come  often  when  they  are  looked  for, 
and  seldom  when  they  are  not  expected.  The  whole 
practice  and  discipline  of  the  cloister  involved  a  greater 

1  5-  5-  3. 


154         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

strain  and  tension  than  the  traditions  of  Hellenic  moral 
training  would  have  approved.  Attempts  to  induce 
the  mystical  state  were  frequent  and  mischievous,  and 
warnings  against  this  practice  are  found  in  the  best 
spiritual  guides  of  the  Middle  Ages.  For  instance,  in  the 
little  fourteenth-century  manual  from  which  I  have 
already  quoted,  we  have  a  graphic  account  of  the  delu- 
sions which  often  assailed  the  aspirant  after  mystical 
experiences,  delusions  which  in  those  times  were  naturally 
set  down  to  the  ghostly  enemies  of  mankind.1 

The  mystical  state  never  occurs  except  as  a  sequel  to 
intense  mental  concentration,  which  the  majority  of 
human  beings  are  unable  to  practise  except  for  a  few 
minutes  at  a  time.  Our  minds  are  continually  assailed 
by  a  crowd  of  distracting  images,  which  must  be  reso- 
lutely refused  an  entrance  if  we  are  to  bring  any  difficult 
mental  operation  to  a  successful  issue.  The  necessity 
of  this  concentration  is  insisted  on  by  all  the  mystics, 
so  that  it  is  superfluous  to  give  quotations.  Most  of 
them  speak  of  producing  an  absolute  calm  in  the  soul, 
in  order  that  God  may  speak  to  us  without  interruption. 
They  often  tell  us  that  the  will  must  be  completely 
passive,  though  the  stern  repression  of  the  imagination 
which  they  practise  is  only  possible  by  a  very  exhausting 
effort  of  the  will.  All  external  impressions  must  be 
ignored ;  the  contemplative  must  be  impervious  to 
sights  and  sounds  while  he  is  at  work.  In  extreme 
cases  a  kind  of  catalepsy  may  be  produced,  from  which 
it  is  not  easy  to  recover  ;  but  this  is  not  a  danger  to  be 
apprehended  by  many.  The  mystical  experience  is  not 
necessarily  associated  with  meditation  on  the  being  and 
attributes  of  God.  Any  concentrated  mental  activity 
may,  it  seems,  produce  it.  Philo,2  for  instance,  thus 
describes  what  he  has  felt  himself  while  engaged  in 
philosophical  study.  '  Sometimes,  when  I  have  come 
to  my  work  empty,  I  have  suddenly  become  full,  ideas 

1  The  Cloud  of  Unknowing,  Chap.  52. 

*  Migrat,  Abrah,  7.    Drummond,  Philo  Judceus,  Vol.  i,  p.  15. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  155 

being  in  an  invisible  manner  showered  upon  me,  and 
implanted  in  me  from  on  high  ;  so  that  through  the 
influence  of  divine  inspiration  I  have  become  filled  with 
enthusiasm,  and  have  known  neither  the  place  in  which 
I  was  nor  those  who  were  present,  nor  myself,  nor  what 
I  was  saying,  nor  what  I  was  writing,  for  then  I  have 
been  conscious  of  a  richness  of  interpretation,  an  enjoy- 
ment of  light,  a  most  keen-sighted  vision,  a  most  distinct 
view  of  the  objects  treated,  such  as  would  be  given 
through  the  eyes  from  the  clearest  exhibition/  The 
philosophical  problem  which  he  was  debating  was  almost 
visualised  before  his  mind's  eye,  as  it  is  with  all  philosophi- 
cal mystics.  The  Platonist  does  not  contemplate  '  a 
ballet  of  bloodless  categories/  but  a  rich  and  beautiful 
world,  in  which  the  imagination  clothes  spiritual  thoughts 
with  half-sensuous  forms — a  world  of  inspired  poetry  and 
glorious  vision. 

Wordsworth1  in  a  well-known  passage  describes  how 
the  vision  comes  to  a  poet's  mind. 

Sensation,  soul  and  form 
All  melted  into  him  ;   they  swallowed  up 
His  animal  being  ;   in  them  did  he  live 
And  by  them  did  he  live  ;  they  were  his  life. 
In  such  access  of  mind,  in  such  high  hours 
Of  visitation  from  the  living  God, 
Thought  was  not ;   in  enjoyment  it  expired. 
No  thanks  he  breathed  ;   he  proffered  no  request ; 
Rapt  into  still  communion  that  transcends 
The  imperfect  offices  of  prayer  and  praise, 
His  mind  was  a  thanksgiving  to  the  power 
That  made  him ;    it  was  blessedness  and  love. 

Dante,  in  the  Thirty-third  Canto  of  the  Paradiso,  tells 
the  same  story. 

La  mia  vista,  venendo  sincera, 
e  piu  e  piu  entrava  par  lo  raggio 
dell'  alta  luce,  che  de  se  e  vera. 
Da  quinci  innanzi  il  mio  veder  fu  maggio 

che  il  parlar  nostro  ch'  a  tal  vista  cede, 
e  cede  la  memoria  a  tanto  oltraggio. 
1  Excursion,  Book  i. 


156         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Qual  e  colui  che  somniando  vede, 

che  dopo  il  sogno  la  passione  impressa 
rirnane,  e  1'altro  alia  mente  non  riede  ; 

Cotal  son  io,  che  quasi  tutta  cessa 
mia  visione,  ed  ancor  mi  distilla 
nel  cor  lo  dolce  che  nacque  de  essa  .  .  . 

Cosi  la  mente  mia,  tutta  sospensa, 

mirava  fissa,  immobile  ed  attenta, 
e  sempre  del  mirar  faceasi  accessa. 

A  quella  luce  cotal  si  diventa, 

che  volgersi  da  lei  per  altro  aspetto 
e  impossibil  che  mai  si  consenta — 

Pero  che  il  Ben,  ch'  e  del  volere  obbietto, 
tutto  s'accoglie  in  lei,  e  fuor  di  quella 
e  diffetevo  cio  che  li'  e  perfetto.1 

Some  musicians  tell  us  of  a  similar  experience.  Mozart2 
has  left  it  on  record  that  his  symphonies  came  into  his 
mind  not  phrase  by  phrase,  but  as  a  totum  simul,  accom- 
panied by  a  wonderful  feeling  of  exaltation  and  happi- 
ness. '  When  and  how  my  ideas  come  I  know  not,  nor 
can  I  force  them.  Those  that  please  me  I  retain  in  my 
memory  and  am  accustomed,  as  I  have  been  told,  to 
hum  them  to  myself.  ...  All  this  fires  my  soul,  and 
provided  I  am  not  disturbed  my  subject  enlarges  itself, 
becomes  methodised  and  defined,  and  the  whole,  though 
it  be  long,  stands  almost  complete  and  finished  in  my 
mind,  so  that  I  can  survey  it  like  a  fine  picture  or  a 
beautiful  statue,  at  a  glance.  Nor  do  I  hear  in  my  imagina- 

1  '  My  sight,  becoming  pure,  entered  deeper  and  deeper  into  the 
ray  of  that  high  light  which  in  itself  is  true.  Thenceforth  my  vision 
was  greater  than  our  language,  which  fails  such  a  sight ;  and  memory 
fails  before  such  transcendence.  As  he  who  sees  in  a  dream,  and  after 
the  dream  the  impress  of  the  emotion  remains,  and  the  rest  returns 
not  to  the  mind,  such  am  I  ;  for  almost  all  the  vision  fades,  and  there 
yet  flows  from  my  heart  the  sweetness  born  of  it.  .  .  .  Thus  did  my 
mind,  all  in  suspense,  gaze  fixedly,  immovable  and  intent,  and  was 
ever  kindled  by  its  gazing.  Before  that  light  one  becomes  such,  that  one 
could  never  consent  to  turn  from  it  to  any  other  sight.  FortheGood, 
which  is  the  object  of  the  will,  is  in  it  wholly  gathered,  and  outside  it 
that  is  defective  which  in  it  is  perfect.' 

1  Holmes'  Life  and  Correspondence  oj  Mozart,  p.  317.  Quoted  by 
Rufus  Jones,  Studies  in  Mystical  Religion,  p.  xxii.  It  should  be  said 
that  some  other  great  musicians  seem  to  have  composed  in  a  manner 
different  from  that  of  Mozart. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  157 

tion  the  parts  successively,  but  I  hear  them  as  it  were 
all  at  once.  What  a  delight  this  is  I  cannot  express.  All 
this  inventing,  this  producing,  takes  place  in  a  pleasing 
lively  dream.  But  the  actual  hearing  of  the  whole  together 
is  after  all  the  best.  And  this  is  perhaps  the  best  gift  I 
have  my  divine  Master  to  thank  for.'  This  passage  is  of 
great  psychological  interest,  because  beauty  of  sound 
is  essentially  dependent  on  temporal  succession.  If  all 
the  bars  of  a  symphony  were  played  simultaneously,  the 
result  would  be  anything  but  beautiful.  The  totum  simul 
of  his  compositions  which  floated  before  Mozart's  con- 
sciousness and  gave  him  such  exquisite  delight  was  the 
idea  of  the  whole  piece,  which  after  being  worked  out 
in  a  succession  of  sounds,  independent  of  each  other  as 
vibrations  of  the  air,  but  unified  by  the  Soul  as  express- 
ing a  continuous  meaning,  were  visualised  as  a  rich  but 
indissoluble  idea  by  Spirit.  This  last  intuition  is  not 
simultaneous  but  timeless.  There  are  few  better  illus- 
trations of  the  psychological  truth  of  the  Platonic  scheme. 
In  the  medieval  mystics  the  '  darkness  '  of  the  vision 
is  more  emphasised.  They  describe  a  state  in  which  the 
imagination  no  longer  illuminates  even  the  most  spiritual 
intuitions  of  the  Soul.  Angela  of  Foligno1  says  that  at 
one  time  she  had  had  clear  and  distinct  visions  of  God. 
'  But  afterwards  I  saw  Him  darkly,  and  this  darkness  was 
the  greatest  blessing  that  could  be  imagined.  The  soul 
delighteth  unspeakably  therein,  yet  it  beholdeth  nought 
which  can  be  related  by  the  tongue  or  imagined  in  the 
heart.  It  sees  nothing,  and  yet  sees  all  things,  because 
it  beholds  the  Good  darkly,  and  the  more  darkly  and 
secretly  the  Good  is  seen,  the  more  certain  is  it,  and 
excellent  above  all  things.  Even  when  the  Soul  sees  the 
divine  power,  wisdom,  and  will  of  God,  which  I  have 
seen  most  marvellously  at  other  times,  it  is  all  less  than 
this  most  certain  Good  ;  because  this  is  the  whole,  and 
those  other  things  only  part  of  the  whole.'  She  goes  on 
to  say  that  though  she  has  had  the  '  dark  '  vision  of 
>  See E.  Underbill.  Mysticism,?.  418. 


158         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

God  '  countless  times/  yet  on  three  occasions  only  she 
has  been  uplifted  to  the  heights  of  the  vision.  '  It  seems 
to  me/  she  adds,  '  that  I  am  fixed  in  the  midst  of  it 
and  that  it  draweth  me  to  itself  more  than  anything  else 
which  I  ever  beheld,  or  any  blessing  which  I  ever  received, 
so  that  there  is  nothing  which  can  be  compared  to  it/ 
The  rarity  of  the  vision,  as  well  as  its  character,  makes 
Angela's  experience  very  like  that  of  Plot  inns. 

It  is  not  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  this  book,  to 
collect  recorded  experiences  of  ecstatics  and  visionaries. 
The  literature  of  the  subject  is  already  large,  and  much 
material  \vhich  till  lately  was  almost  inaccessible  is  now 
available  for  those  who  wish  to  study  the  psychology  of 
mysticism.  The  common  impression  about  Plotinus, 
that  ecstasy  is  an  important  part  of  his  system,  is  errone- 
ous ;  it  has  been  thrust  into  the  foreground  in  the  same 
way  in  which  Western  critics  of  Buddhism  have  ex- 
aggerated the  importance  of  Nirvana  in  that  religion. 
In  both  cases  the  doctrines  have  also  been  widely  mis- 
understood. Nirvana  does  not  mean  annihilation  after 
death,  nor  does  the  philosophy  of  Plotinus  culminate 
(as  Pfleiderer  supposes)  in  a  '  convulsed  state  '  which  is 
the  negation  of  reason  and  sanity. 

The  vision  of  the  One  is  the  crowning  satisfaction  of  that 
love  and  longing  (fyea-is,  Sehnsuchf)  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  '  makes  the  world  go  round '  for  Plotinus.  It  is 
the  vovs  epwv  which  sees  the  vision.  But  how  can  any- 
one love  the  Absolute  ?  It  seems  to  me  that  the  emotion 
which  the  mystics  so  describe  is  not  a  simple  one.  There 
is  such  a  thing  as  a  longing  for  deliverance  from  individual 
life  itself,  a  craving  for  rest  and  peace  in  the  bosom  of  the 
eternal  and  unchanging,  even  at  the  price  of  a  cessation 
of  consciousness.  It  is  not  annihilation  that  the  mystic 
desires — annihilation  of  anything  that  truly  exists 
is  inconceivable  ;  but  the  breaking  down  of  the  barriers 
which  constitute  separate  existence.  Unchanging  life  in 
the  timeless  All — this  is  what  he  desires,  and  this  the 
vision  promises  him,  But  when  this  is  the  ground  of  his 


THE  ABSOLUTE  159 

yearning  for  the  Absolute,  he  is  not  content  with  a 
momentary  glimpse  of  the  super-existent  ;  he  wishes  to 
have  done  with  temporal  existence  altogether.  '  Leave 
nothing  of  myself  in  me,'  is  his  prayer,  as  it  was  that  of 
Crashaw  in  his  invocation  of  St.  Teresa.  In  this  mood 
he  is  willing  to  accept  what  to  many  is  the  self-stultifica- 
tion of  mysticism,  that  the  self,  in  losing  its  environment, 
loses  also  its  content,  and  grasps  zero  instead  of  the 
infinite.  All  distinct  consciousness  is  the  consciousness 
of  a  not -self,  of  externality ;  and  this  is  just  what  he 
hopes  to  lose  for  ever.  This  love  for  the  Absolute  seems 
to  be  anti-selfish  emotion  raised  to  a  passion.  It  can 
hardly  express  itself  except  by  negations,  or  by  such 
symbols  as  darkness,  emptiness,  utter  stillness.  The 
Godhead  is  the  divine  Dark,  the  infinite  Void,  ein  ewige 
Stille.  But  the  '  loving  Spirit  '  which  has  found  its  bliss 
and  its  home  in  the  rich  and  beautiful  world  of  the 
Platonic  Ideas  has  no  such  longing  for  '  self -nought  ing/ 
It  desires  only  to  see  the  eternal  fount  from  which  the 
river  of  life  flows  ever  fresh  and  full.  The  joy  of  the 
vision,  to  such  a  one,  is  the  joy  of  overleaping  the  last 
metaphysical  barrier,  that  which  prevents  subject  and 
object  from  being  wholly  one.  He  knows  that  beyond 
the  subject -object  relation  there  can  be  no  concrete  life 
or  consciousness,  and  he  does  not  dream  of  finding  a 
permanent  home  above  the  spiritual  world.  But  there 
is  for  him  no  joy  comparable  to  the  assurance  that  he  is, 
in  very  deed  and  truth,  all  the  glory  that  has  been  re- 
vealed to  him — that  there  is  'nothing  between.'  There 
is  an  unfathomable  something  in  his  own  heart  which 
claims  this  final  consummation  of  communion  as  his 
own  ;  and  he  returns  to  the  harmonious  beauty  and 
order  of  the  spiritual  world  indescribably  enriched  by 
that  brief  initiation. 

There  is  and  must  be  an  element  of  illusion  in  the 
vision  of  the  Godhead.  It  never  remains  so  formless  as 
the  contemplative  thinks  it  to  be.  The  imagination  at 
once  constructs  a  form  of  formlessness — a  shoreless 


160         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

ocean,  a  vast  desert,  a  black  night,  and  the  mind  which 
thinks  that  it  contemplates  the  Absolute  really  visualises 
these  symbols  of  the  unlimited.  But  the  idea  of  the  One, 
the  Godhead,  the  ultimate  source  of  all  that  is  good  and 
true  and  beautiful,  is  capable  of  inspiring  love,  and  has 
inspired  love  in  many  noble  spirits. 

A  Christian  will  press  the  question  asked  above  (p.  132)  : 
Is  this  '  intellectual  love  of  God  '  the  crown  of  love  to 
man,  or  is  it  sometimes  a  substitute  for  it  ?  What  would 
Plotinus  have  said  to  the  plain  question,  '  He  that  loveth 
not  his  brother  whom  he  hath  seen,  how  can  he  love 
God  whom  he  hath  not  seen  ?  '  I  believe  that  Platonism 
can  answer  this  challenge  better  than  Indian  mysticism, 
though  in  practice  nothing  can  be  much  more  beautiful 
than  the  gentle  and  selfless  benevolence  of  the  Oriental 
saint.  Love,  for  Plotinus,  passes  through  a  process  of 
purification  and  enlightenment,  like  our  other  affections 
and  faculties.  In  a  sense  it  becomes  depersonalised,  more 
so  than  many  of  us  would  think  desirable  ;  but  when 
a  Christian  teacher  bids  us  to  '  love  the  Christ  in  our 
brethren/  when  he  repeats  the  famous  saying,  '  When 
thou  seest  thy  brother  thou  seest  thy  Lord/  he  is  saying 
very  much  what  Platonism  says  in  other  wrords.  We 
begin,  St.  Paul  says,  by  knowing  other  men  'after  the 
flesh/  and  loving  them  after  the  flesh  ;  but  we  end,  or 
should  end,  by  knowing  and  loving  them  as  immortal 
spirits,  our  fellow-citizens  in  that  heavenly  country  where, 
as  Plotinus  says,  the  most  perfect  sympathy  and  trans- 
parent intimacy  exist  among  blessed  spirits.  And  the 
doctrine  of  the  One  as  the  supreme  object  of  love  really 
secures  this — that  human  spirits  in  their  most  exalted 
moods  may  share  not  only  a  common  life  and  a  common 
happiness,  but  a  common  hope  and  a  common  prayer. 

Nevertheless,  we  must  admit  that  the  whole  character 
of  the  mysticism  of  Plotinus  is  affected  by  the  fact  that 
the  ideal  object  of  the  quest  is  a  state  and  not  a  person. 
At  no  point  in  the  ascent  is  God  conceived  as  a  Person 
over  against  our  own  personality.  The  God  whom 


THE  ABSOLUTE  161 

Plotinus  mainly  worships — the  Spirit — is  transcendent  as 
well  as  immanent  in  the  world  of  Soul,  but  purely  im- 
manent in  his  own  world,  Yonder.    In  that  world  He  is 
no  longer  an  object  but  an  atmosphere.     The  ineffable 
Godhead  above  God  is  of  course  supra-personal.    There 
is  therefore,  in  the  Plotinian  mysticism,  none  of  that  deep 
personal  loyalty,  none  of  that  intimate  dialogue  between 
soul  and  soul,  none  of  that  passion  of  love — resembling 
often  too  closely  in  its  expression  the  earthly  love  of  the 
sexes — which  are  so  prominent  in  later  mystical  litera- 
ture.   Compare,  as  a  favourable  example  of  this  type,  the 
exquisite  Revelations  of  Julian  of  Norwich,  full  of  tender 
reverent  affection  for  the  heavenly  Christ.    We  do  not 
feel  quite  clear  what  is  the  object  which  excites  the  ardour 
of  the  Soul  or  Spirit  in  Plotinus.    There  is  an  intense 
desire  to  see  and  realise  perfection  ;  to  be  quit  of  all  the 
contrarieties  and  contradictions  of  earthly  life  ;  to  return 
to  the  haven  where  the  pangs  of  home-sickness  are  no 
more.    These  are  the  chief  objects  of  his  desire  ;  and  for 
him  and  for  many  they  are  enough.    They  were  enough 
for  Spinoza,  and  for  Goethe.    '  What  specially  attracted 
me   in   Spinoza '    (Goethe   writes)    '  was   the   boundless 
disinterestedness  which  shone  forth  from  every  sentence. 
That  marvellous  saying,  "  Whoso  loves  God  must  not 
desire  God  to  love  him  in  return,"  with  all  the  premisses 
on  which  it  rests  and  the  consequences  that  flow  from  it, 
permeated  my  whole  thinking.     To  be  disinterested  in 
everything,  and  most  of  all  in  love  and  friendship,  was 
rny  highest  desire,  my  maxim,  my  constant  practice  ;  so 
that  that  bold  saying  of  mine  at  a  later  date,  "  If  I  love 
thee,  what  is  that  to  thee  ?  "    came  directly  from  my 
heart.'1    Disinterestedness  is  exactly  what  this  type  of 
philosophy,  if  it  is  erected  into  a  rule  of  life,  can  give 
us  ;  and  a  very  noble  gift  it  is  ;  but  there  is  another  road 
of  ascent,  by  personal  affection  for  man,  and  even  (in 
many  Christian  saints)  for  God  or  Christ  ;    and  those 
whose  temperament  leads  them  by  this  path  are  likely 
1  Goethe,  quoted  in  Hume  Brown's  The  Youth  of  Goethe,  p.  210. 
II.— M 


162         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

to  find  the  mountain-track  trodden  by  Plotinus  cold, 
bleak,  and  bare.  It  may  even  be  true  that  this  type  of 
religious  philosophy  is  likely  to  be  specially  attractive  to 
those  whom  circumstances  have  cut  off  from  domestic 
happiness  and  the  privilege  of  friendship,  or  who  are 
naturally  slow  to  love  their  kind.  In  all  ages  there  are 
some  who  fancy  themselves  attracted  by  God,  or  by 
Nature,  when  they  are  really  only  repelled  by  man.  But 
in  dealing  with  the  great  mystics  such  cavils  are  not  only 
unjust  but  impertinent.  Their  loneliness  is  the  loneliness 
of  the  great  mountain  solitudes  ;  the  air  which  we 
breathe  at  those  heights  is  thin  but  pure  and  bracing  ; 
and  there  is  in  each  one  of  us  a  hidden  man  of  the  heart 
who  can  love  and  be  loved  super-individually.  This  is 
true  of  the  love  of  the  Christian  saint  for  Christ.  St.  Paul 
says  that  even  if  we  begin  by  '  knowing  Christ  after  the 
flesh/  that  is  a  stage  which  must  be  left  behind.  As 
Bengel  says,  '  Convey sio  fit  ad  Dominum  ut  Spiritum.' 
In  fact,  the  difference  between  Neoplatonic  and  Christian 
devotion  may  easily  be  exaggerated.  The  Christian  can- 
not feel  for  the  exalted  Christ  the  same  emotion  which 
he  would  have  felt  for  the  Galilean  Prophet  ;  his  love  is 
worship  for  a  divine  Being,  the  source  of  all  that  is 
lovable,  and  desire  for  spiritual  communion  with  the 
living  Power  who  has  '  brought  life  and  immortality  to 
light.'  The  spiritual  love  of  Plotinus  is  not  very  different. 
It  is  at  any  rate  true  to  say  that  the  Christian  Platonists 
of  Alexandria,  the  Cappadocian  Fathers,  and  Greek 
theology  generally,  regarded  the  heavenly  Christ  as  a 
Being  with  most  of  the  attributes  of  the  Neoplatonic 
New?. 


LECTURES  XX,  XXI 
ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS 

EUCKEN  says  that  it  is  the  special  glory  of  Chris- 
tianity that  its  ethics  are  metaphysical  and  its 
metaphysics  ethical.  But  this  is  equally  true  of  Neo- 
platonism.  The  connexion  of  ethics  with  metaphysics 
became  closer  and  closer  throughout  the  history  of  Greek 
thought.  The  first  Greek  philosophy  was  generalised 
natural  science  ;  ethical  precept  at  this  time  was  largely 
handed  down  in  proverbs  and  aphorisms,  as  it  still  is 
in  China.  But  for  Socrates  the  aim  of  philosophy  was 
to  discover  '  how  a  man  may  spend  his  life  to  the  best 
advantage.'  ;l  and  after  him  this  remained  to  the  end 
of  antiquity  the  avowed  object  of  metaphysical  studies. 
Aristotle,  like  Spinoza,  was  entirely  convinced  that  the 
search  for  truth  is  morally  the  noblest  career  that  a  man 
can  choose.  It  is,  he  says,  the  exercise  of  that  which  is 
highest  in  our  nature,  and  concerned  with  the  highest 
things  (the  being  and  laws  of  the  universe)  ;  it  gives  the 
purest  enjoyment  to  those  who  practise  it  ;  and  it  is, 
of  all  modes  of  life,  the  least  dependent  on  external  con- 
ditions.2 

Stoicism  and  Epicureanism  were  both,  first  and  fore- 
most, attitudes  towards  life  ;  they  claimed  to  regulate 
conduct  in  every  particular.  These  two  philosophers  had 
the  merit  of  teaching  men  how  to  live  in  this  world  ; 
later  thought  inclined  to  the  contemplative  and  almost 
monastic  ideal  of  the  philosophic  life,  and  made  ethics 
a  study  rather  of  how  to  live  out  of  society  than  in  it.  In 

1  Plato,  Republic,  p.  344. 

2  Cf.  Carveth  Read,  Natural  and  Social  Morals  p.  42. 

163 


164         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Plotinus  we  are  conscious  of  the  same  want,  on  the  ethical 
side,  which  makes  itself  felt  in  medieval  books  of  devo- 
tion and  spiritual  guidance.  The  concrete  problems  of 
social  morality  receive  too  little  attention,  and  the 
tone  is  that  of  Plato's  dictum  in  the  Laws,  '  Human 
affairs  are  not  worth  taking  very  seriously ;  the  mis- 
fortune is  that  we  have  to  take  them  seriously/  It  was 
one  of  the  chief  objects  of  philosophy  to  teach  men  not 
to  take  them  very  seriously.  It  had  become  the  province 
of  the  philosopher  to  administer  the  consolations  of 
religion  to  those  who  were  in  affliction,  or  troubled 
about  the  health  of  their  souls.  In  the  second  and  third 
centuries  the  philosopher  not  only  claimed  to  be  '  a  priest 
and  servant  of  the  gods  '  j1  his  recognised  position  was 
that  of  spiritual  guide,  father  confessor,  private  chaplain, 
and  preacher.  For  the  educated  layman,  poetry  and 
philosophy  were  still  the  great  ethical  instructors. 

Plotinus  has  not  written  a  book  about  ethics,  like 
Aristotle.  Even  on  friendship,  which  takes  such  a 
prominent  place  in  classical  morals,  he  has  not  much  to 
say.  He  tells  us  that  the  political  virtues,  which  precede 
the  stage  of  purification  in  which  the  ascent  is  begun 
in  earnest,  must  by  all  means  be  practised  first,2  but  he 
touches  upon  them  very  lightly.  They  teach  the  value 
of  order  and  measure,  and  take  away  false  opinions.3 
His  biographer  tells  us  that  he  induced  Rogatianus  the 
senator,  one  of  his  disciples,  to  give  up  the  active  life  of 
a  high  official,  and  betake  himself  to  philosophic  con- 
templation. It  is  the  ideal  of  the  cloister,  already  vic- 
torious over  the  Stoic  ideal  of  civic  virtue.  But  in 
Plotinus  the  world-renouncing  tendency  is  not  carried 
to  its  extreme  lengths.  He  himself  lived,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  strenuous  and  active  life,  as  a  valued  counsellor 
of  emperors,  a  beloved  teacher  and  spiritual  guide,  and 
a  conscientious  guardian  and  trustee.  Even  the  later 
Neoplatonists  who  were  contemporary  with  the  craze 

1  lepets  TIS  Kal  vTTovpyfa  deuv,  Marcus  Aurelius,  3,  4. 

2  I.    3.   6.  3    I.   2.   2. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  AESTHETICS     165 

for  eremitism  among  the  Christians,  insisted  that  the 
philosopher  must  qualify  as  a  good  citizen  before  aspiring 
to  higher  flights.  In  the  life  of  Proclus  by  Marinus,  the 
biographer  includes  under  the  *  political  virtues  '  of  his 
hero,  contempt  for  filthy  lucre,  generosity,  public  spirit, 
wise  political  counsel,  friendship,  industry,  and  all  the 
cardinal  virtues.  Nevertheless,  Plotinus  never  asks  the 
very  important  question  which  Plato  (in  the  Republic) 
did  ask,  in  a  form  which  shows  a  very  just  apprehension 
of  its  gravity.  '  How  can  the  State  handle  philosophy 
so  as  not  to  be  ruined  ?  '  It  is  the  question  which  for 
us  takes  the  form,  '  How  can  a  State  take  the  Sermon 
on  the  Mount  for  its  guide  without  losing  its  independence 
and  therewith  the  opportunity  of  having  an  organic 
life  at  all  ? ' 

Purification  (/cd#a/o<n?)  is  the  first  stage  of  the  ascent, 
when  the  '  political  virtues  '  have  been  mastered.  In 
most  of  what  he  says  about  this  stage,  Plotinus  has  been 
closely  followed  by  Augustine.1  To  purify  the  Soul 
signifies  '  to  detach  it  from  the  body  and  to  elevate  it  to 
the  spiritual  world.'2  The  Soul  is  to  strip  off  all  its  own 
lower  nature,  as  well  as  to  cleanse  itself  from  external 
stains  ;  what  remains  when  this  is  done  will  be  '  the 
image  of  Spirit.'3  '  Retire  into  thyself  and  examine  thy- 
self. If  thou  dost  not  yet  find  beauty  there,  do  like  the 
sculptor  who  chisels,  planes,  polishes,  till  he  has  adorned 
his  statue  with  all  the  attributes  of  beauty.  So  do  thou 
chisel  away  from  thy  Soul  what  is  superfluous,  straighten 
that  which  is  crooked,  purify  and  enlighten  what  is  dark, 
and  do  not  cease  working  at  thy  statue,  until  virtue 
shines  before  thine  eyes  with  its  divine  splendour,  and 
thou  seest  temperance  seated  in  thy  bosom  with  its  holy 
purity.'4 

This  '  purification  '  is  mainly  a  matter  of  constant  self- 
discipline,  and  especially  discipline  of  the  thoughts. 
Plotinus  gives  no  rules  for  the  ascetic  life,  and  no  precepts 

1  See  especially  De  Musica,  6,  13-16. 

8  3-  6.  5.  »  5.  3.  9.  «  i.  6.  9. 


166         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

which  point  to  severe  austerities.  Outward  action  for 
him  means  so  little,  except  as  the  necessary  expression 
and  '  accompaniment  '  of  inward  states,  that  he  could 
not,  without  great  inconsistency,  attach  importance  to 
such  exercises.  He  would  have  us  live  so  simply  that  our 
bodily  wants  are  no  interruption  to  our  mental  and 
spiritual  interests  ;  but  beyond  this  he  does  not  care  to  go. 
Platonism,  the  tendency  of  which  is  to  make  the  intellect 
passionate  and  the  passions  cold,  has  not  much  need  of 
asceticism  of  the  severer  type.  The  ascetics  of  antiquity 
were  not  the  Platonists  but  the  Cynics,  whose  object  was 
to  make  themselves  wholly  independent  of  externals. 
Plotinus  was,  however,  the  inheritor  of  an  old  tradition 
about  self  -discipline  (GWT/CJ/W)  ;  and  it  may  be  interesting 
to  describe  briefly  what  that  tradition  was. 

We  need  not  hunt  for  traces,  in  civilised  Greece,  of  the 
most  rudimentary  form  of  asceticism  —  the  abstinence 
from  foods  which  are  supposed  to  be  tabu.  This  is  bar- 
barous superstition,  though  it  may  contain  other  ideas  in 
germ.  These  other  ideas  are,  speaking  generally,  two  : 
the  consciousness  of  sin,  calling  for  propitiatory  expia- 
tion, and  the  notion  that  '  the  corruptible  body  presseth 
down  the  soul.'  As  early  as  the  sixth  and  seventh  cen- 
turies B.C.  Greece  had  its  fasting  saints  and  seers,  and 
abstinence  from  food  before  initiation  into  the  mysteries 
was  probably  a  very  ancient  custom.  The  '  Orphic 
rule  '  was  adopted  by  communities  formed  for  living  the 
higher  life,  as  early  as  the  sixth  century,  and  was  specially 
popular  in  Magna  Graecia.  The  disciples  of  '  Orpheus  ' 
were  strict  vegetarians,  counting  even  eggs  forbidden  ; 
some  vegetables,  especially  beans,  were  also  condemned  ; 
and  close  contact  with  birth  and  death  —  the  mysterious 
beginning  and  end  of  life  —  was  a  defilement.1  This  was 

1  Cf.  Euripides,  Frag.  475,  v.  16-19. 


teal 
,  TT)v  T' 


See  also  Plato,  Laws,  782. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS      167 

no  mere  survival  of  tabu,  nor  was  it  primarily  a  way  of 
mortifying  the  flesh.  The  Greeks,  and  the  Romans  too, 
were  not  great  flesh-eaters  ;  beef  was  left  to  athletes  in 
training.  The  main  reason  for  abstaining  from  a  meat- 
diet  was  the  idea  that  it  is  a  species  of  cannibalism.  The 
unity  of  all  life  was  an  important  part  of  the  mystical 
tradition,  which  acknowledges  no  breaks  in  the  great 
chain  of  existence.  For  this  reason  Empedocles,  according 
to  Aristotle,1  taught  that  to  kill  for  food  things  that  hava 
souls  is  forbidden  by  that  universal  law  which  pervades 
the  whole  earth  and  the  firmament  above.2  A  vegetarian 
diet  became  the  rule  among  philosophers  who  were  influ- 
enced by  Pythagoreanism,  which  was  an  Orphic  revival.3 
Porphyry,  for  instance,  was  a  rigid  abstainer  from  meat. 
The  other  way  of  asceticism  consisted  in  abstinence 
from  marriage.  The  cult  of  celibacy  appeared  in  Chris- 
tianity as  soon  as  it  touched  the  Hellenistic  world  ;4 
its  beginnings  can  be  traced  even  in  the  New  Testament. 
Galen  and  other  Pagan  writers  show  that  the  practice 
of  lifelong  continence  by  the  Christians  made  a  great  im- 
pression on  their  neighbours  ;  it  was  considered  a  proof 
of  such  self-control  as  could  be  expected  only  from 
philosophers.  Plotinus  was  himself  an  ascetic  in  this  as 
in  other  ways.  But  his  attitude  towards  human  love 
is  not  the  same  as  that  of  the  Christian  ascetics.  The 
cause  of  sexual  love,  he  says,  is  the  desire  of  the  Soul 
for  the  beautiful,  and  its  instinctive  feeling  of  kinship 
with  the  beautiful.  There  are  secret  sympathies  in  nature 
which  draw  us  to  what  is  like  ourselves  ;  and  just  as 
nature  owes  its  origin  to  the  beautiful  in  the  spiritual 
world,  which  makes  the  Soul  desire  to  create  after  that 

1  Rhet.  a.  13.  2. 

*  Rohde,  Psyche,  2.  126,  says  :  '  The  things  from  which  they  [the 
Orphists]  kept  themselves  pure  were  those  which  represented  in  the 
symbolism  of  religion,  rather  than  involved  in  actual  practice,  depend- 
ance  upon  the  world  of  death  and  impermanence.'  This  is,  I  think, 
to  underrate  the  moral  reasons  which  made  them  vegetarians. 

8  Complete  vegetarianism,  however,  was  a  comparatively  late 
counsel  of  perfection.  Zockler,  Askese,  p.  105. 

'  The  Essenes  in  Palestine  also  practised  celibacy. 


168         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

pattern,  so  the  human  Soul  not  only  loves  the  beautiful 
in  the  visible  world,  but  desires  to  create  it — to  '  beget  in 
the  beautiful/  Thus  there  is  something  laudable  in  the 
impulse  which  leads  to  sexual  desire.  But  although  our 
love  of  spiritual  beauty  inspires  the  love  which  we  feel 
for  visible  objects,  these  visible  objects  do  not  really 
possess  spiritual  beauty.  And  so  it  is  an  error  to  suppose 
that  the  longing  of  the  Soul  can  be  satisfied  by  union 
with  visible  objects  of  love.  This  error  is  the  cause  of 
carnal  desires,  from  which  it  is  better  for  the  philosopher 
to  abstain.1  True  beauty  should  be  sought  in  beautiful 
actions,  and  in  beautiful  thoughts.  But  earthly  loves, 
according  to  all  Platonists,  may  be  the  beginning  of  the 
ascent  to  the  spiritual  world.  The  lover  has  at  any  rate 
received  his  call  to  the  philosophic  life.  This  gentle 
idealism  is  preferable  to  the  harsh  dualism  of  flesh  and 
Spirit,  from  which  Christian  asceticism  has  not  always 
been  free.  There  is  no  hint  in  Plotinus  that  earthly 
beauty  is  a  snare  of  the  devil,  or  that  there  is  something 
contaminating  to  the  saint  in  the  mere  presence  of  the 
other  sex.  We  may  suspect  that  when  persons  hold  this 
view,  the  reason  is,  if  they  are  women,  that  Cupid  has  left 
them  alone,  and,  if  they  are  men,  that  Cupid  will  not 
leave  them  alone.  The  reason  for  chastity,  in  the  Platon- 
ists, is  not  that  we  ought  to  be  ashamed  of  the  natural 
instincts,  but  that  sensual  indulgence  impedes  the  ascent 
of  the  Soul  from  the  material  to  the  spiritual  world, 
riveting  the  chains  which  bind  it  to  Matter,  and  prevent- 
ing it  from  seeing  and  contemplating  supersensuous 
beauty.2  That  earthly  love  in  its  completest  form — the 
mutual  love  of  husband  and  wife — may  be  a  sacrament 
of  heavenly  love,  was  a  truth  hidden  from  the  eyes  of 
Catholic,  Gnostic,  and  Neoplatonic  ascetics  alike.3 

1  See  i.  2.  5,   with  Porphyry's  comments,  ' A<f>opfj.al   34.      Plotinus 
allows  only  '  natural '  desires,  and  these  are  not  to  be  '  uncontrolled 
by  the  will '  (aTrpoaipera) . 

2  A  disciple  of  lamblichus  (De  Mysteriis,  4.  n)  says  that  prayers 
are  not  heard  if  the  suppliant  is  '  impure  '  in  this  sense. 

3  Benn  rightly  says  that  the  story  of  Crates  is  the  only  romance  in 
Greek  philosophy.    '  A  young  lady  of  noble  family,  named  Hipparchia, 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     169 

One  object  of  asceticism  is  to  '  keep  under  '  the  body 
by  diminishing  its  energy  and  activities.  Suso,  for 
example,  asks  :  '  How  can  a  man  gain  a  perfect  under- 
standing of  the  spiritual  life,  if  he  preserves  his  forces 
and  natural  vigour  intact  ?  It  would  indeed  be  a  miracle. 
I  have  never  seen  such  a  case.'1  Plotinus  would  not  have 
assented  to  this.  '  Use  your  body  '  (he  says)  '  as  a 
musician  uses  his  lyre  :  when  it  is  worn  out,  you  can  still 
sing  without  accompaniment.'  And  again,  '  the  good 
man  will  give  to  the  body  all  that  he  sees  to  be  useful  and 
possible,  though  he  himself  remains  a  member  of  another 
order.'2  Health,  he  says,  makes  us  feel  more  fyee  in -the 
enjoyment  of  the  good  ;  though  hardly  any  bodily  ills 
need  seriously  impede  this.  But  he  does  say  that  some 
experience  of  ill-health  is  better  for  the  spiritual  life 
than  a  very  robust  constitution  ;  and  this  is  probably 
true.  There  are  some  people  who  seem  too  rudely 
healthy  to  be  spiritually  minded.  But  deliberate  injury 
to  the  bodily  health  is  a  very  different  thing.  Many 
of  the  exercises  practised  by  the  mystics  of  the  cloister 
were  admirably  designed  to  produce  nervous  excite- 
ment, hypnotic  trance,  and  exhaustion.  These  in  their 
turn  produced  the  '  mystical  phenomena  '  which  they 
valued  so  highly,  but  which  in  truth  consisted  mainly  of 
hallucinations,  or  of  stupor  induced  by  extreme  mental 
and  bodily  fatigue.  There  is  no  trace  of  this  in  Plo- 
tinus. His  attitude  is  exactly  that  of  Shakespeare's 
146111  sonnet : — 

fell  desperately  in  love  with  him,  refused  several  most  eligible  suitors, 
and  threatened  to  kill  herself  unless  she  was  given  to  him  in  marriage. 
Her  parents  in  despair  sent  for  Crates.  Marriage,  for  a  philosopher, 
was  against  the  principles  of  his  sect,  and  he  at  first  joined  them  in 
endeavouring  to  dissuade  her.  Finding  his  remonstrances  unavailing, 
he  at  last  flung  at  her  feet  the  staff  and  wallet  which  constituted  his 
whole  worldly  possessions,  exclaiming,  '  Here  is  the  bridegroom,  and 
that  is  the  dower.  Think  of  this  matter  well,  for  you  cannot  be  my 
partner  unless  you  follow  the  same  calling  with  me.'  Hipparchia  con- 
tented, and  henceforth,  heedless  of  taunts,  conformed  her  life  in  every 
respect  to  the  Cynic  pattern  '  (Greek  Philosophers,  p.  331). 

1  Sermons,  transl.  by  Thiriot,  2.  358. 

2  i.  4.  16. 


170         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Poor  soul,  the  centre  of  my  sinful  earth, 
My  sinful  earth  these  rebel  powers  array, 
Why  dost  thou  pine  within  and  suffer  dearth, 
Painting  thy  outward  walls  so  courtly  gay  ? 
Why  so  large  cost,  having  so  short  a  lease, 
Dost  thou  upon  thy  fading  mansion  spend  ? 
Shall  worms,  inheritors  of  this  excess, 
Eat  up  thy  charge  ?   is  this  thy  body's  end  ? 
Then,  soul,  live  thou  upon  thy  servant's  loss, 
And  let  that  pine  to  aggravate  thy  store : 
Buy  terms  divine  in  selling  hours  of  dross  ; 
Within  be  fed,  without  be  rich  no  more : 

So  shalt  thou  feed  on  death,  that  feeds  on  men, 
And  death  once  dead,  there's  no  more  dying  then. 


And  yet  we  cannot  wholly  approve  of  Plotinus'  atti- 
tude towards  our  humble  companion,  '  my  brother  the 
ass/  as  St.  Francis  calls  his  body.  The  philosopher  him- 
self is  reported  to  have  said  that  he  was  ashamed  of  his 
body,  as  a  reason  for  refusing  to  have  his  portrait  painted. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  Enneads,  on  this  subject,  so  whole- 
some as  the  following  beautiful  passage  from  Krause. 
'  Spirit  and  body  are  in  man  equally  original,  equally 
living,  equally  divine  ;  they  claim  to  be  maintained  in  the 
same  purity  and  holiness,  and  to  be  equally  loved  and 
developed.  The  spirit  of  man  wishes  and  requires  of  his 
body  that  it  shall  helpfully  and  lovingly  co-operate  with 
him  in  all  his  spiritual  needs,  that  it  shall  enlarge  his  field 
of  view,  exercise  his  art,  and  unite  him  through  speech 
with  other  men  ;  and  kindly  Nature  does  not  disappoint 
this  expectation,  for  the  spirit  is  dear  and  precious  to 
her,  and  she  heaps  love  and  good  things  upon  it.  But  the 
body  should  be  just  as  dear  and  precious  to  the  spirit. 
Let  the  spirit  esteem  the  body  like  itself,  and  honour  it 
as  an  equally  great  and  rich  product  of  the  power  and  love 
of  God.  Let  it  support,  help,  and  delight  the  body  in  the 
organic  process  of  its  development  to  health,  power,  and 
beauty.  Let  it  form  it  into  the  mirror  of  a  beautiful 
soul ;  and  let  it  consecrate  and  hallow  it  for  the  free 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     171 

service  of  the  purposes  of  reason  that  are  only  worthy 
and  good.' * 

The  conflict  with  evil  is  regarded  by  Plotinus  rather 
as  a  process  of  emancipation,  a  journey  through  darkness 
into  light,  than  as  a  struggle  with  a  hostile  spiritual  power. 
Human  wickedness  is  never  absolute.  '  Vice  is  still 
human,  being  mixed  with  something  contrary  to  itself.'2 
This  is  akin  to  the  mystical  doctrine  that  even  in  the 
worst  man  there  remains  a  spark  of  the  Divine,  which 
has  never  consented  to  evil  and  can  never  consent  to 
it.  Even  Tertullian,  it  is  interesting  to  find,  has  the 
same  doctrine.  In  a  fine  passage  of  the  De  Anima3  he 
says  :  '  The  corruption  of  nature  is  another  nature, 
having  its  own  god  and  father,  the  author  of  corruption. 
And  yet  there  remains  the  original  good  of  the  soul,  which 
is  divine  and  akin  to  it  and  in  the  true  sense  natural.  For 
that  which  is  from  God  is  not  so  much  extinguished  as 
obscured.  It  can  be  obscured,  because  it  is  not  God  ;  it 
cannot  be  extinguished,  because  it  is  from  God.  ...  In 
the  worst  there  is  something  good,  and  in  the  best  there 
is  something  of  the  worst.'  Plotinus  says  that  the  bad 
man,  '  deserting  what  the  Soul  ought  to  contemplate, 
receives  in  exchange  '  for  his  true  self  '  another  Form/  a 
spurious  self.  But  this  false  Form  is  rather  like  a  coating 
of  mud  concealing  the  real  self.  '  Hence  all  virtue  is  a 
cleansing*  (/caflapcn?).4  The  doctrine  of  the  'other 
Form,'  which  the  bad  man  gets  in  consequence  of  his 
base  desires,  may  be  illustrated  from  Hylton's  Scale  of 
Perfection.  '  Now  I  shall  tell  thee  how  thou  mayest  enter 
into  thyself  to  see  the  ground  of  sin  and  destroy  it  as 
much  as  thou  canst.  Draw  in  thy  thoughts.  And  what 
shalt  thou  find  ?  A  dark  and  ill-favoured  image  of  thine 
own  soul,  which  hath  neither  light  of  knowledge  nor 
feeling  of  love  for  God.  This  is  the  image  of  sin,  which 

1  Krause,  The  Ideal  of  Humanity  (English  translation  by  W. 
Hastie,  D.D.),  p.  31-2.  This  admirable  philosopher  has  been  far  too 
much  neglected  both  in  England  and  in  his  own  country. 

8  Ho  opposes  the  Gnostic  doctrine  of  '  total  depravity.' 

8  Chap.  41.  *  i.  6.  5,  6. 


172         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

St.  Paul  calleth  a  body  of  sin  and  death.  It  is  like  no 
bodily  thing.  It  is  no  real  thing,  but  darkness  of  con- 
science and  a  lack  of  the  love  of  God  and  of  light.  Go 
as  if  thou  wouldest  beat  down  this  dark  image,  and  go 
through-stitch  with  it.'1  The  characteristic  maxim  of 
Plotinus,  '  Never  cease  working  at  thy  statue/  suggests 
a  scheme  of  self-improvement  more  like  that  of  Goethe 
than  the  Christian  quest  of  holiness.  There  is  little 
mention  of  repentance  in  our  author  :  he  urges  us  to 
make  the  best  of  a  nature  which  is  fundamentally  good, 
though  clogged  with  impediments  of  various  kinds.  The 
Neoplatonist  does  not  make  matters  easy  for  himself  ; 
but  his  world  is  one  in  which  there  are  no  negative 
values,  no  temperatures  below  zero.  The  last  enemy  is 
chaos  and  disintegration  of  the  Soul,  not  its  reintegration 
in  the  service  of  evil.  And  if  the  higher  Soul  is  the  man 
himself,  the  man  himself  never  sins.  Like  Spirit,  the 
higher  Soul  is  ava^aprrirog  .2  This,  however,  is  not 
allowed  to  paralyse  the  will  to  virtue  ;  for  though  the 
Soul  itself  is  not  within  the  time-process,  in  which  evils 
occur,  the  process  is  within  it,  and  concerns  it.  Plotinus 
is  valuable  also  when  he  says3  that  most  vice  is  caused 
by  '  false  opinions  '  fyevSeis  Sogcu)  —  untrue  valuations 
and  ignorances  of  all  kinds.  Modern  philanthropy  would 
be  more  beneficent  if  we  steadily  combated  '  false 
opinions  '  whenever  we  met  them,  instead  of  assuming 
that  good  intentions  cover  all  practical  foolishness. 

1  Flight  from  the  world/  as  recommended  by  Neo- 
platonism,  had  the  double  motive  of  liberating  the  Soul 
from  the  cares  and  pleasures  of  this  life,  and  of  making 
it  invulnerable  against  troubles  coming  from  outside. 
The  latter  motive  is  very  prominent  in  all  the  later 
Greek  philosophy.  The  '  flight  '  mainly  consists  in  renun- 

1  Hylton,  Scale  of  Perfection,  Chap.  4  (abridged). 
The   philosophical  principle  which  underlies  this  is,  tvtpyeia  OVK 


€<TTIV  dXXotacrtj  ;   no  activity,  for  better  or  worse,  can  change  funda- 
mental nature.  '  This,  a  Christian  might  say,  is  the  reason  why  a  lost 
soul  must  always  be  miserable  ;   it  can  never  be  at  home  in  hell. 
3  3.  6.  2. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     173 

elation  of  those  things  which  the  natural  man  regards  as 
goods,  and  which  from  their  nature,  and  from  the  fact 
that  all  other  men  covet  them,  are  most  liable  to  be 
taken  away  from  us.  They  include  also  some  painful 
emotions  not  of  a  self-regarding  nature,  such  as  extreme 
compassion,  which  may  ruffle  the  composure  of  the  sage 
against  his  will.  Only  weak  eyes,  in  Seneca's  opinion, 
water  at  another's  misfortunes.  '  The  end  of  all  philos- 
ophy/ says  Seneca  again,  '  is  to  teach  us  to  despise  life.'1 
According  to  Lucian's  Demonax,  happiness  belongs  only 
to  the  free  man,  and  the  free  man  is  he  who  hopes  nothing 
and  fears  nothing/2  The  desire  to  be  invulnerable  is 
natural  to  most  men,  and  it  has  been  the  avowed  or 
una vowed  motive  of  most  practical  philosophy.  To  the 
public  eye,  the  Greek  philosopher  was  a  rather  fortunate 
person  who  could  do  without  a  great  many  things  which 
other  people  need  and  have  to  work  for.  Those  philos- 
ophers who  most  disdainfully  rejected  pleasure  as  an 
end,  made  freedom  from  bodily  and  mental  disturbance 
the  test  of  proficiency  and  the  reward  of  discipline.  On 
this  side,  the  influence  of  Stoicism  is  very  strong  in  all 
the  later  Greek  thought.  Even  suicide,  the  logical 
corollary  of  this  system  (since  there  are  some  troubles 
to  which  the  sage  cannot  be  indifferent),  is  not  wholly  con- 
demned by  Plotinus,  though  he  has  the  credit  of  dis- 
suading Porphyry  from  taking  his  own  life.3  The  Stoics 
were  well  aware  that  a  man  has  no  right  to  cut  himself 
off  from  the  sorrows  of  his  kind  ;  he  must  try  to  relieve 
them.  But  he  is  to  preserve  an  emotional  detachment  ; 
or  perhaps  he  would  say  that  he  wishes  to  show  the  same 
courage  in  bearing  his  neighbour's  misfortunes  as  in 
bearing  his  own.  We  remember  La  Rochefoucauld  and 

1  Letters,  3.  5.  2  Lucian,  Demonax,  20. 

3  The  authoritative  passage  on  suicide  for  the  school  of  Plato  is 
Phaedo,  p.  62,  where  Socrates  says  that  a  soldier  must  not  desert  his 
post.  Plotinus  argues  that  the  suicide  can  hardly  leave  this  life  with 
a  mind  free  and  passionless  ;  if  he  had  vanquished  fear  and  passion  he 
would,  almost  always,  be  content  to  live.  But  in  i.  4'.  16  he  says  that 
the  Soul  is  '  not  prevented  from  leaving  the  body,  and  is  always  master 
to  decide  in  regard  to  it.' 


174         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

smile.  Plotinus  certainly  errs  in  not  emphasising  the 
necessity  of  deep  and  wide  human  sympathy,  for  the 
growth  of  the  Soul.  It  follows  really  from  his  doctrine 
of  Soul,  which  is  in  no  way  individualistic  ;  but  he  is 
a  little  too  anxious  to  make  his  higher  orders  of  Being 
comfortable.  The  good  man  must  enjoy  an  inner  calm 
and  happiness.  Greek  and  Roman  ethics  always  seem 
to  us  moderns  a  little  hard.  Greek  civilisation  was  singu- 
larly pitiless  ;  the  lot  of  the  aged  and  the  unfortunate  was 
acknowledged  to  be  cruel,  but  this  knowledge  raised 
no  qualms  of  conscience.  The  same  pitilessness  reappears 
in  the  culture  of  the  Italian  Renaissance  ;  it  may  have 
some  obscure  connexion  with  a  flowering-time  of  the  arts. 
Roman  hardness  was  of  a  different  kind,  more  like  the 
hardness  of  the  militarist  clique  in  Germany  ;  the  Stoical 
philosophy  seemed  to  have  been  made  for  Romans.  The 
contrast  between  the  Christian  ideal  of  emancipation 
from  self  by  perfect  sympathy,  and  the  Stoical  ideal  of 
emancipation  by  perfect  inner  detachment,  is  very 
significant.  It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason  that  the  later 
Platonism  could  do  so  little  to  regenerate  society.  The 
philosopher  saved  himself ;  his  country  he  could  not  save. 
It  is  fair,  however,  to  add  that  Plotinus  repudiates  the 
suggestion  that  the  good  man  ought  to  desire  injustice 
and  poverty  to  exist,  as  giving  a  field  for  his  virtues.  He 
may  possibly  have  heard  this  said  by  some  of  his  neigh- 
bours.1 

The  practical  results  of  extreme  moral  idealism  are 
shown  in  the  attitude  of  Plotinus  towards  national  mis- 
fortunes. We  are  a  little  surprised  to  find  so  pious  a  man 
refusing  to  pity  the  victims  of  aggression  who  have 
trusted  in  heaven  to  protect  them.  '  Those  who  by 
evil-doing  have  become  irrational  animals  and  wild  beasts 
drag  the  ordinary  sort  with  them  and  do  them  violence. 
The  victims  are  better  men  than  their  oppressors,  but  are 
overcome  by  their  inferiors  in  so  far  as  they  are  themselves 
deficient  ;  for  they  are  not  themselves  good,  and  have  not 

»  6.  8.  5. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  AESTHETICS     175 

prepared  themselves  for  suffering.  .  .  .  Some  are  un- 
armed, but  it  is  the  armed  who  rule,  and  it  befits  not  God 
himself  to  fight  for  the  unwarlike.  The  law  says  that 
those  shall  come  safely  out  of  war  who  fight  bravely,  not 
those  who  pray.  .  .  .  The  wicked  rule  through  lack  of 
courage  in  the  ruled  ;  and  this  is  just.'1  In  the  next 
section  he  offers  something  very  like  a  challenge  to  Chris- 
tian ethics,  and  I  think  he  has  the  Christians  in  his  mind 
throughout  this  discussion.  '  That  the  wicked  should 
expect  others  to  be  their  saviours  at  the  sacrifice  of  them- 
selves is  not  a  lawful  prayer  to  make  :  nor  is  it  to  be  ex- 
pected that  divine  Beings  should  lay  aside  their  own  lives 
and  rule  the  details  of  such  men's  lives,  nor  that  good  men, 
who  are  living  a  life  that  is  other  and  better  than  human 
dominion,  should  devote  themselves  to  the  ruling  of 
wicked  men.'  The  philosopher,  it  seems,  will  not  be 
much  perturbed  if  his  country  is  successfully  attacked 
by  a  powerful  enemy.  If  the  citizens  are  enslaved,  that 
does  not  matter  to  the  Soul ;  if  they  are  killed,  death  is 
only  a  changing  of  the  actor's  mask.  If  people  must  take 
these  things  seriously,  they  ought  to  learn  to  fight  better  ; 
God  helps  those  who  help  themselves.  This  cool  accept- 
ance of  monstrous  acts  of  tyranny  and  injustice  does  not 
commend  itself  to  us  just  now,  nor  does  it  seem  to  accord 
well  with  the  doctrine  that  the  Soul '  came  down  '  to  give 
order  and  reason  to  the  outer  world. 

Purification  (KaBapo-is)  is  in  one  sense  a  stage  through 
which  the  Soul  must  pass  in  order  to  reach  a  higher,  in 
another  it  is  a  task  that  can  never  be  completed  while 
we  live  here.  In  the  former  sense,  it  passes  insensibly 
into  the  higher  stage  of  Enlightenment.  We  are  often  told 
that  Greek  philosophy,  in  and  after  Aristotle,  spoke  of  the 
'  ethical '  virtues  in  connection  with  the  lower  stage,  and 
of  the  '  intellectual '  virtues  in  connection  with  the  higher. 
These  words  in  their  English  dress  have  caused  a  great 
deal  of  misunderstanding.  The  '  ethical '  virtues  are  not 
the  constituents  of  all  moral  excellence  ;  they  are  those 

1  3-  2.  8. 


176         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

virtues  which  we  begin  to  practise  mainly  on  authority, 
and  which  at  last  become  matters  of  habit  (?009).  And 
the  '  intellectual '  virtues  are  not  those  which  require 
exceptional  brain-power — if  there  are  any  such  virtues  ; 
they  are  for  the  most  part  the  same  as  the  ethical  virtues, 
only  now  they  are  understood  and  willed  with  conscious 
reference  to  their  ultimate  ends.  The  immediate  ends 
are  of  course  willed  by  the  practical  moralist ;  but  these 
are  not  seen  in  their  relation  to  universal  laws  until  the 
stage  of  enlightenment  is  reached. 

There  is  a  sense  in  which  virtue  seems  to  be  dehumanised 
by  entering  upon  this  higher  level.  Its  object  of  study 
or  contemplation  is  now  what  is  above  man  ;l  more 
especially  it  occupies  itself  with  the  nature  of  God.  Now 
here  we  do  indeed  come  to  a  parting  of  the  ways.  Plotinus, 
like  his  great  predecessors,  honestly  and  heartily  believed 
that  the  philosophic  life  is  morally  the  highest.  He 
thought  so,  not  because  it  happened  to  be  his  own  trade  ; 
he  made  it  his  own  trade  because  he  thought  it  the 
highest.  The  life  of  active  philanthropy,  without  refer- 
ence to  anything  beyond  the  promotion  of  human  com- 
fort and  the  diminution  of  suffering,  would  have  seemed 
to  him  to  need  further  justification,  as  indeed  it  does. 
What  is  it  that  we  desire  most  for  our  fellow-men,  and  for 
ourselves  ;  and  why  ?  Altruistic  Epicureanism  would 
not  have  appealed  to  him  much  more  than  egoistic  ;  and 
the  not  infrequent  modern  phenomenon  of  the  religious 
or  social  worker  who,  though  personally  unselfish  and 
self-denying,  is  a  hedonist  in  his  schemes  for  improving 
society,  would  have  seemed  to  him  to  indicate  mental 
confusion.  If  happiness  is  identified  with  comfort  and 
pleasure,  he  does  not  even  think  it  desirable  ;  if  with 
higher  states  of  the  mind,  we  may  trust  to  being  happy 
as  soon  as  we  are  inside  the  enchanted  garden  of  the 
spiritual  world.  The  good  life  is  an  end  in  itself.  If 
any  man  seeks  anything  else  in  the  good  life,  it  is  not  the 
good  life  that  he  is  seeking — nor  will  he  tfmd  it.  But 
1  Bosanquet,  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value,  p.  398-401. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     177 

this  is  not  the  Stoical  pursuit  of  virtue  for  its  own  sake — 
the  rather  harsh  and  bullying  ethics  of  Kantians  ancient 
and  modern.  Experience  has  shown  that  as  soon  as 
Stoicism  ceases  to  be  buttressed  by  pride — an  unamiable 
kind  of  pride,  generally — its  ethical  sanctions  lose  their 
cogency.  There  are  too  many  unresolved  contradictions 
in  Stoicism  ;  its  moral  centre  is  in  personal  dignity,  the 
consciousness  of  which  is  not  universal,  nor  indefectible. 
Some  may  doubt  whether  it  is  altogether  desirable.  For 
the  Platonist,  the  only  true  motive  is  the  desire  to  '  be- 
come like  to  God/  an  approximation  which,  it  is  needless 
to  say,  can  take  place  only  in  the  region  of  will,  love,  and 
knowledge.  This,  which  is  the  Soul's  highest  good  and 
the  realisation  of  its  true  nature,  is  its  own  reward  ;  from 
it  proceed,  as  if  automatically,  all  good  actions.  But  the 
best  life  is  impossible  without  the  '  wisdom  which  is  from 
above  ' ;  and  this  demands  a  consecration  and  discipline 
of  the  intellect  no  less  than  of  the  will.  If  the  ultimate 
good  is  to  be  something  rather  than  to  do  something,  the 
philosophic  life,  in  Plotinus'  sense,  is  the  best,  and  we 
can  understand  what  Blake  meant  when  he  said,  '  The 
fool  shall  not  enter  into  heaven,  be  he  never  so  holy/ 

Thus  for  Plotinus  all  the  virtues  are  in  a  sense  a  prepara- 
tion for  contemplation  (Oecopla).1  The  object  of  contem- 
plation is  the  Good,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  one  of  his 
names  for  the  Absolute.  The  chief  test  whether  we  are 
really  pursuing  the  Good  is  that  the  Good  cannot  be 
desired  for  any  reason  outside  itself.  Heaven  is  in  our 
Souls  or  nowhere.2  If  we  associate  pleasure  with  the 
Good  as  an  essential  aspect  of  it,  we  are  not  thinking  of  the 
Good,  but  only  of  our  good.3  There  is  nothing  wrong  in 
this  ;  we  must  set  before  us  relative  and  partial  goods 
while  we  are  ourselves  imperfect.  Thus  the  good  of 
Matter  is  form,  the  good  of  the  body  is  the  Soul,  the  good 
of  the  Soul  is  virtue,  and  above  virtue  Spirit,  the  good 
of  Spirit  is  the  One,  the  '  first  nature.'  In  Matter,  form 
produces  order  and  beauty  ;  in  the  body,  Soul  produces 
1  i  .3.  i.  2  3-  4-  6.  3  6.  7.  25. 

II,— N 


'178         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

life  ;  in  the  Soul,  Spirit  produces  wisdom,  virtue,  and 
happiness  ;  and  in  Spirit  '  the  first  light  '  produces  a 
Divine  light  which  transforms  it,  makes  it  see  the  God- 
head, and  share  the  ineffable  felicity  of  the  First  Principle. 
Although  Plotinus  puts  the  life  of  Spirit  '  above  virtue/1 
he  is  far  from  any  Nietzschian  idea  of  exalting  his  sage 
'  beyond  good  and  evil/  He  insists  that  it  is  by  virtue 
that  we  resemble  God,  and  that  '  without  genuine  virtue 
God  is  but  a  name.2  He  urges,  against  the  Gnostics,  that 
it  is  useless  to  bid  men  '  look  towards  God/  without 
telling  them  how  they  are  to  do  it  .  3  He  does  not  deny  the 
value  of  the  Peripatetic  conception  of  the  end  as  '  good 
living  '  (evfa>/a),  nor  of  the  Stoic  advice  '  to  accomplish 
one's  own  proper  work/  nor  even  of  the  Epicurean  '  good 
condition  '  (evTrdOeia).*  There  is  truth  in  all  these 
ideals.  The  higher  life,  Spirit,  and  happiness,  are  identi- 
cal —  a  good  not  extraneous  to  ourselves,  but  one  which 
we  already  possess  potentially.  We  are  '  the  activity 
of  the  spiritual  principle/5 

We  have  said  that  for  Plotinus  all  the  virtues  are  in 
a  sense  a  preparation  for  contemplation  (0&*pia).  The 
tendency  of  modern  thought  in  the  West  is  to  view  this 
conception  of  human  life  with  impatience,  and  to  insist 
that  on  the  contrary  all  contemplation  is  useless  unless 
it  is  a  preparation  for  action.  The  two  ideals  are  not  so 
far  apart  as  they  appear  ;  or  rather  we  should  say  that 
a  deeper  consideration  of  the  problem  of  conduct  tends 
to  bring  them  together.  We  must  as  usual  begin  with  an 
attempt  to  understand  the  exact  meaning,  not  of  '  con- 
templation '  and  '  action/  but  of  Oewpla  and  Trpafa. 
Qecopla  in  the  Ionic  philosophy  meant  '  curiosity  '  ;  a 
traveller  like  Hecataeus  or  Herodotus  might  be  said  to 
visit  foreign  lands  Oewpia?  eveica.  In  the  mysteries  the 
word  was  applied  to  a  dramatic  or  sacramental  spectacle 
such  as  the  representation  of  a  suffering  God.  Pythagoras 


1  I.  2.  3»  ^  aper^j  rf/vxfy,  vov  d£ 
8  2.  9.  15,  &V€V  apery*  a\rj6ivf)s 
3  2.  9.  15.  *  I.  4.  i.  6  I.  4.  9. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  AESTHETICS     179 

is  said  to  have  been  the  first  to  give  it  a  new  meaning, 
as  the  contemplation,  not  of  the  sacrament,  but  of  the 
underlying  truths  which  sacraments  symbolise.  He 
found  in  the  observation  of  the  heavenly  bodies  a  potent 
aid  to  this  kind  of  contemplation  ;  unlike  Plato,  who 
speaks  with  contempt  of  star-gazing.1  Plato  in  a  well- 
known  passage  describes  the  philosopher  as  the  spectator 
of  all  time  and  existence.2  In  Plotinus  the  true  and  per- 
fect contemplation,  the  '  living  contemplation/  is  the 
interplay  of  Spirit  and  the  spiritual  world.3  But  this 
is  no  idle  self -enjoyment.  The  quietness  (fiwxla)  of 
Spirit  is  unimpeded  activity  ;  its  being  is  activity  ;  it 
acts  what  it  contemplates.4  Contemplation  is  activity 
which  transcends  the  action  which  it  directs.  '  If  the 
creative  force  (Xo'yo?)  remains  in  itself  while  it  creates, 
it  must  be  contemplation.  Action  itself  must  be  different 
from  the  Ao'yo?  which  directs  it ;  the  Ao'yo?  which  is 
associated  with  action  (trpagis)  and  oversees  it,  cannot 
itself  be  action.'6  Creation  is  contemplation  ;  for  it  is 
the  consummation  (a7roTeXeo-/xa)  of  contemplation,  which 
remains  contemplation  and  does  nothing  else,  but  creates 
by  virtue  of  being  contemplation .  All  things  that  exist  are 
a  by-play  of  contemplation  (irapepyov  Oewptas)  ;6  because, 
though  action  is  the  necessary  result  of  contemplation,  con- 
templation does  not  exist  for  the  sake  of  action,  but  for  its 
own  sake.  Action  is  either  a  weakness  of  contemplation 
or  its  accompaniment,  the  former  if  it  has  no  motive  or 
object  beyond  itself,  the  latter  if  it  results  from  some 
spiritual  activity.  This  seems  to  me  quite  sound. 
Thoughtless  and  objectless  action  indicates  a  weakness 
of  the  Soul,  which  ought  to  control  all  our  external  life. 
Spinoza  would  say  that  contemplation  is  action  inspired 
by  reason,  while  all  other  action  is  '  passive/  reaction  to 
external  stimuli.  The  only  proper  '  action  '  is  purposive 

1  Plato,  Republic,  529. 

8  Plato,  Republic,  486;    and  compare  Theaetetus,  173. 

3  3-  8-  8.  *  5.  3.  7;   and  cf.  3.  8.  3,  rj  7rofy<ns  Oeupla.  iffrlv. 

5  3-  8-  3-  6  3-  8.  8. 


i8o         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

action,  in  which  fortitude,  high-mindedness  and  nobility 
are  displayed.1  But  for  Plotinus,  contemplation  is  a 
rather  less  intellectual  process  than  for  Spinoza.  It  is 
an  intuition  which  inevitably  leads  to  appropriate  action. 
I  believe  that  this  is  truer  to  experience  than  is  usually 
supposed.  As  Mr.  Bosanquet  says,  '  The  presence  of  ade- 
quate ideas  which  are  inoperative  in  moral  matters  is 
vastly  exaggerated.'2  Ideas  inadequately  held,  which  do 
not  pass  into  action,  are  not  knowledge.  The  moral 
effort  (so  perhaps  Plotinus  would  have  us  to  believe)  is 
in  making  our  ideas  adequate,  in  passing  from  dreams  to 
thoughts,  in  converting  visions  into  tasks,  floating  ideas 
into  acts  of  will.  When  the  thing  to  be  done  has  quite 
clearly  taken  possession  of  our  minds,  it  will  be  done, 
he  tells  us,  with  a  sort  of  unconsciousness. 

That  this  self-possession  which  he  calls  contemplation 
is  difficult  to  win,  Plotinus  does  not  dispute.  It  requires 
the  use  of  a  faculty  which  all  indeed  possess,  but  which 
few  use.  Even  so  Spinoza  concludes  his  Ethics  with  a 
passage  which,  except  for  difference  of  style,  might  have 
been  written  by  Plotinus  himself.  '  The  wise  man  is 
scarcely  at  all  perturbed  in  spirit,  but  being  conscious  of 
himself  and  of  God,  and  of  things,  by  a  certain  eternal 
necessity,  never  ceases  to  be,  but  always  possesses  true 
acquiescence  of  his  spirit.  If  the  way  which  I  have 
pointed  out  as  leading  to  this  result  seems  exceedingly 
hard,  it  may  nevertheless  be  discovered.  Needs  must 
it  be  hard,  since  it  is  so  seldom  found.  How  would  it  be 
possible,  if  salvation  were  ready  to  our  hand,  and  could 
without  great  labour  be  found,  that  it  should  be  by 
almost  all  men  neglected  ?  But  all  things  excellent  are 
as  difficult  as  they  are  rare.'  Now  this  confession  of 
difficulty  should  be  enough  to  give  pause  to  those  who 

1  Spinoza,  Ethics,  3.  i.  59. 

2  Bosanquet,  Gifford  Lectures,  Vol.  i.  34  8.     So  Mill  says,  '  Specula- 
tive philosophy,  which  to  the  superficial  appears  a  thing  so  remote 
from  the  business  of  life  and  the  outward  interests  of  men,  is  in  reality 
the  thing  on  earth  which  most  influences  them,  and  in  the  long  run  over- 
bears every  other  influence  save  those  which  it  must  itself  obey/ 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     181 

think  that  the  praise  of  contemplation  is  a  denial  of 
Kingsley's  advice  to  '  do  noble  things,  not  dream  them, 
all  day  long.'  For  dreaming  is  very  easy  work.  '  Traumen 
ist  leicht,  denken  ist  schwer.'  The  clear  disciplined  think- 
ing which  Plotinus  called  dialectic  is  not  merely  an 
organon  of  abstract  speculation.  It  '  gives  us  reality  at 
the  same  time  as  the  idea  of  it.'  And  the  outgoing  move- 
ment which  produces  good  actions  is  the  natural  and 
necessary  activity  of  contemplation.  This  doctrine  has 
never  been  better  stated  than  by  Ruysbroek.1  '  Pure 
love  frees  a  man  from  himself  and  his  acts.  If  we  would 
know  this  in  ourselves,  we  must  yield  to  the  Divine,  the 
innermost  sanctuary  of  ourselves.  .  .  .  Hence  comes 
the  impulse  and  urgency  towards  active  righteousness 
and  virtue,  for  Love  cannot  be  idle.  The  Spirit  of  God, 
moving  within  the  powers  of  the  man,  urges  them  out- 
wards in  just  and  wise  activity.  .  .  .  Christ  was  the 
greatest  contemplative  that  ever  lived,  yet  He  was  ever 
at  the  service  of  men,  and  never  did  His  ineffable  and 
perpetual  contemplation  diminish  His  activity,  or  His 
exterior  activity.'  Those  only  need  quarrel  with  the 
Neoplatonic  doctrine  of  contemplation  who  do  not  allow 
that  clear  thinking  should  precede  right  action.2 

The  Soul  when  joined  to  the  body  is  inclined  to  evil 
as  well  as  good.3  The  choice  must  be  made.  But  are 
we  in  any  sense  free  agents  ?4  We  have  an  impression 
that  we  are  free  ;  but  how  do  we  come  by  it  ?  We  feel 
that  we  have  a  certain  liberty,  just  when  our  freedom 
of  action  is  threatened  by  fate  or  by  violence.  Finding 

1  Ruysbroek,  Flowers  of  a  Mystic  Garden.     Quoted  by  Herman, 
Meaning  and  Value  of  Mysticism,  p.  88. 

2  Charles  Peguy  says  excellently  :    '  Ce  sont  les  mystiques  qui  sont 
meme  pratiques  et  ce  sont  les  politiques  qui  ne  le  sont  pas.    C'est  nous 
qui  somrnes  pratiques,  qui  faisont  quelque  chose,  et  c'est  eux  qui  ue 
le  sont  pas,  qui  ne  font  rien.    C'est  nous  qui  amassons  et  c'est  eux  qui 
pillent.    C'est  nous  qui  batissons,  c'est  nous  qui  fondons,  et  c'est  eux 
qui  demolissent.    C'est  nous  qui  nourissons  et  c'est  eux  qui  parasitent. 
C'est  nous  qui  faisons  les  ceuvres  et  les  homines,  les  peuples  et  les  races. 
Et  c'est  eux  qui  ruinent.' 

8  irttpvKC  yap  tir  <fyx0w,  I.  2.  4. 
*  C?TI  itf  wlv  to  T\rrx.tou,  6.  8.  I. 


182         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

with  a  sort  of  surprise  that  in  such  cases  we  are  forced 
to  act  against  our  real  will,  we  realise  the  general  possi- 
bility of  resisting  external  pressure  and  asserting  our 
freedom.  What  we  call  our  freedom,  then,  is  simply  the 
power  of  obeying  our  true  nature.  But  what  is  our  true 
nature  ?  Man  is  a  complex  being.  Free-will  certainly 
does  not  belong  to  our  desires,  or  to  our  passions,  or  to 
sensation,  or  to  imagination  ;  these  things  are  too  often 
our  masters.  We  are  not  completely  free  agents  so  long 
as  our  desires  are  prompted  by  finite  needs.1  And  the 
union  of  the  Soul  with  the  body  makes  us  dependent  on 
the  general  order  of  the  world,  over  which  we  have  no 
control.  But  though  we  are  complex,  we  are  also,  as 
persons,  each  of  us  a  whole.2  It  is  the  chief  characteristic 
of  psychical  and  spiritual  life,  that  the  whole  is  present 
in  each  part.  We  are  therefore  not  merely  cogs  in  a 
great  machine  ;  we  are  the  machine  itself,  and  the  mind 
which  directs  it.  But  this  is  only  fully  true  of  the  person- 
ality which  has  realised  its  own  inner  nature  ;  the  man  of 
ordinary  experience  '  shares  in  Being  and  is  a  kind  of 
Being,  but  is  not  master  of  his  own  Being.'3  The  imper- 
fect man  is  pulled  and  pushed  by  forces  which  are  ex- 
ternal to  himself,  just  because  he  is  himself  still  external 
to  his  true  Being.  If  we  could  see  the  course  of  events 
as  they  really  are,  we  should  find  that  the  chain  of 
causation  is  inviolable,  but  that  '  we  ourselves  are  causa- 
tive principles.'4  What  is  free  in  us  is  that  spontaneous 
movement  of  the  Spirit  which  has  no  external  cause  ;5 
it  is  the  will  of  the  higher  Soul  to  return  to  its  own  Prin- 
ciple. The  element  of  freedom  in  our  practical  activities 
is  this  underlying  motive,  the  spiritual  activity  of  the 
Soul.  When  the  Soul  becomes  Spirit,  its  will  is  free  ;  the 
good  will,  in  attaining  its  desire,  becomes  spiritual 

1  6.  8.  4. 

a  bffov  8t  avTol,  ohelov  o\ov,  2.  2.  2  ;   an  important  saying. 

3  6.  8.  12. 

*  dpXQ-i  Sf  Ka.1  &v6p<t)TToi.     Ktvovvrai.  yovv  irpos  TO,  K0,\d  oiKeiq.  tpuffei  Kal 
o.\jrri  ai)re£oi/<rios,  3.  2.   lo. 

*  6.  8.  1-6.  * 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     183 

perception,  and  Spirit  is  free  in  its  own  right.1  This  re- 
sembles Spinoza's  definition  of  freedom:  'We  call  that 
free  which  exists  in  virtue  of  the  necessities  of  our  nature, 
and  which  is  determined  by  ourselves  alone/ 

Plotinus  distinguishes  invariable  sequence  from  causa- 
tion, and  points  out  that  rigid  determination  excludes 
the  very  idea  of  causation.2  If  'one  Soul,'  oper- 
ating through  all  things,  determines  every  detail,  as 
every  leaf  of  a  plant  is  implicit  in  its  root,  this 
'  exaggerated  determinism  '  (TO  o-^oSpov  rfj?  a^ay/o/?) 
destroys  the  very  idea  of  causation  and  necessary  se- 
quence, for  'all  will  then  be  one.'  We  shall  then  be  no 
longer  ourselves,  nor  will  any  action  be  ours  ;  we  shall  be 
mere  automata,  with  no  will  or  reasoning  faculty.  But 
we  must  maintain  our  individuality  (Sec  ettaa-rov  e/ca<rroi> 
e«/cu),3  and  we  must  not  throw  the  responsibility  for 
our  errors  upon  '  the  All.'  In  another  place4  he  says  that 
'  providence  is  not  everything  '  ;  otherwise  there  would 
be  no  room  for  human  wisdom,  skill,  and  righteousness  ; 
indeed  there  would  be  nothing  for  providence  to  provide 
for.  The  world  does  not  consist  only  of  mechanical 
sequences  ;  it  contains  also  real  causation.  Each  in- 
dividual soul  is  a  little  '  first  cause  '  (irpMrovpyog  airia)  ; 
and  the  universal  Soul  is  above  the  contradiction  of 
necessity  and  freedom.  '  Necessity  and  freedom  do  not 
contradict  each  other  ;  necessity  includes  freedom.'5 

As  for  the  wicked,  their  misdeeds  proceed  necessarily 
from  their  character.  Our  character  is  our  destiny  ;  but 
our  character  is  also  our  choice  ;  we  must  remember  that 
we  have  lived  other  lives  before  our  present  existence.6 

It  is  not  correct  to  say,  with  Mr.  Whittaker,7  that 
Plotinus  is  '  without  the  least  hesitation  a  determinist.' 
He  is  quite  convinced  that  mechanical  necessity  cannot 
explain  psychical  or  spiritual  life,  and  in  these  higher 


1  17  W  /3oi/\r?<rtj  i)  v6i}<rts,  6.  8.  6.  *  3.  I.  4. 

8  3.  i.  4  and  7.  *  3.  2.  9. 

*  ov  8ia<t>o>vci  d\\?7\<Kj  .  .  ij  re  wdyKi)  Kai  rb  fKQvffiov,  twelve?  #xe 
fKofoiov  ^  dvdyKTj,  4.  8.  5. 

•  3.  3.  4.  *  The  Neoplatonists,  p.  77. 


154         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

spheres  he  denies  that  necessity  and  free-will  are  incom- 
patible. Virtue  is  not  so  much  free  as  identical  with 
freedom  ;  it  is  the  unobstructed  activity  of  the  higher 
Soul.  But  though  he  endeavours  to  show  the  justice  of 
holding  men  responsible  for  their  actions,  and  of  divine 
and  human  punishments,  he  nowhere  clears  up  the 
difficulty  about  the  original  choice  of  a  character  which 
inevitably  produces  evil  actions.  Temptation,  he  says, 
is  a  gradual  perversion  of  a  living  being  which  has  the 
power  of  self-determined  movement  (Kivtjcris  avregova-ios).1 
The  inability  to  lead  the  divine  and  happy  life  is  a  moral 
inability.2  The  necessity  is  within  us.3  He-says  in  effect 
that  it  takes  all  sorts  to  make  a  world,  and  that  we  must 
expect  to  meet  with  all  degrees  of  goodness  and  badness. 
If  we  knew  all,  we  might  see  that  badness  even  conduces 
to  the  perfection  of  the  whole.4 

The  conception  of  Chance  (ri>x*i)  has  only  a  small  place 
in  this  philosophy.  Anaximenes  had  shrewdly  remarked 
that  chance  is  only  our  name  for  the  incalculable.5  Plato 
in  the  Tenth  Book  of  the  Laws  names  Nature,  Chance, 
and  Art  as  the  three  causes  of  events  ;  but  he  leaves  no 
room  for  the  operations  of  chance,  except  perhaps  in 
the  chaos  which  has  not  yet  received  Forms.  In  Aristotle6 
chance  and  spontaneity  are  merely  defects  (a-reprja-eis)  ; 
but  he  also  says  that  events  which  have  an  efficient  though 
not  a  final  cause  may  be  said  to  be  due  to  chance.  This 
gives  the  word  a  legitimate  use.  A  maidservant  empties 
slops  out  of  a  window  ;  that  is  not  chance,  but  her 
habit.  An  old  gentleman  is  walking  in  the  street  ;  that 
is  not  chance,  since  he  is  on  his  way  home.  But  it  may 
be  called  chance  that  he  happened  to  be  passing  at  the 
moment  when  the  slops  descended.  In  any  other  sense 
the  word  should  perhaps  be  excluded  from  philosophy, 
which  has  no  room  either  for  uncaused  events  or  for  the 
conception  of  a  whimsical  fate.  However,  the  prag- 

13-2.4,  8  3.  2.  10,  avrol  a 

8  ib.  rb  TTjs  AvdyKrjs  OVK  ZfaOcv.  4  3.  2.  5  ;    3.  3.  5. 

6  Stobaeus,  Eel.  2.  346. 
'  Ritchie,  Philosophical  Studies,  p.  202. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     185 

matisls  seem  bent  on  rehabilitating  this  discredited 
deity.1 

The  dispute  about  free-will  is  usually  a  futile  quarrel 
between  those  who  attribute  freedom  to  a  man  apart 
from  his  character,  and  those  who  attribute  freedom  to 
character  apart  from  the  man.  Necessity  is  merely  the 
nature  of  things  ;  and  what  we  call  mechanism  is  itself 
a  form  of  the  struggle  for  life.  The  laws  of  mechanism 
are,  as  Lotze  says,2  '  only  the  will  of  the  universal  Soul/ 
and  it  is  not  surprising  that  nature,  so  guided,  should 
have  the  appearance  of  an  unbroken  chain.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  hold,  with  Renouvier,  that  phenomena  are 
discontinuous,  but  we  do  deny  that  one  phenomenon 
'  causes  '  another.  What  we  call  free  will  seems  to  depend 
on  the  fact  of  consciousness,  and  the  presence  of  an  ideal. 
In  other  words,  he  who  asserts  free  will  asserts  the  reality 
of  final  causes. 

The  general  character  of  the  Neoplatonic  ethics  will 
be  clear  from  what  has  been  said.  The  fundamental 
contrast,  for  all  Greek  philosophy  and  especially  for 
Platonism,  is  not  between  egoism  and  altruism,  but 
between  a  false  and  a  true  standard  of  values.  The  Soul, 
whether  from  its  own  choice  and  love  of  adventure,  or  by 
the  will  of  the  higher  powers,  has  exchanged  the  peace  of 
eternity  for  the  unrest  of  time,  and  is  or  should  be  engaged 
on  the  return  journey  to  our  heavenly  home.  '  Our 
beginnings  must  be  our  ends  '  ;3  we  must  strive  to 
realise  '  the  best  part  of  our  nature,  that  which  in  the 
spiritual  world  we  already  are.'  The  great  moral  danger 
is  that  we  should  forget  ourselves  and  God.  '  When  the 
Soul  has  once  tasted  the  pleasures  of  self-will,  it  indulges 
its  opportunities  of  independence,  and  is  carried  so  far 
away  from  its  Principle  that  it  forgets  whence  it  came. 
Such  Souls  are  like  children  brought  up  in  a  foreign 
country,  who  forget  who  they  are  and  who  are  their 

1  Professor  Pringle  Pattison  has  some  good  remarks  on  this.  The 
Idea  of  God,  p.  185-6. 

*  Microcosmus,  Vol.  I,  p.  396  (English  Tr.).  8  3.  9.  2. 


186         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

parents.  They  have  learnt  to  honour  everything  rather 
than  themselves,  to  lavish  their  reverence  and  affection 
upon  external  things,  and  to  break,  as  far  as  they  can,  the 
links  that  bound  them  to  the  Divine.  Believing  them- 
selves to  be  lower  than  the  things  of  the  world,  they 
regard  themselves  as  mean  and  transitory  beings,  and 
the  thought  of  the  nature  and  power  of  the  Deity  is 
driven  out  of  their  minds.'1  This  self -contempt,  which  is 
the  cause  why  so  many  are  content  to  lead  unworthy 
and  useless  lives,  isolates  us  also  from  our  fellows,  whom 
we  respect  no  more  than  we  respect  ourselves.  A  kind 
of  moral  atomism  becomes  our  philosophy.  We  lose  all 
sense  of  human  solidarity,  and  become  like  faces  turned 
away  from  each  other,  though  they  are  attached  to  one 
head.  If  one  of  us  could  turn  round,  he  would  see  at 
once  God,  himself,  and  the  world.  And  he  would  soon 
find  that  the  separate  self  is  a  figment ;  there  is  no 
dividing-line  between  himself  and  the  world.  The 
'  external '  world  is  that  part  of  the  higher  self  of  which 
he  has  not  yet  been  able  to  take  possession.  '  All  Souls 
are  all  things  ;  each  of  them  is  characterised  by  the 
faculty  which  it  chiefly  uses  ;  some  unite  themselves 
to  the  spiritual  world,  others  to  the  discursive  reason, 
others  to  desire.  Souls,  while  they  contemplate  diverse 
objects,  are  and  become  that  which  they  contemplate/2 
The  ascent  cannot  be  made  all  at  once  ;  the  lower  stages 
are  rungs  to  climb  by.3  The  end  is  unification  ;  '  good- 
ness is  unification  and  unification  is  goodness.4  Sym- 
pathy is  thus  based  on  the  recognition  of  an  actual  fact, 
our  membership  one  of  another.  Philosophy  reveals  this 
relationship,  just  as  science  reveals  our  physical  kinships 
and  affinities.  But  this  membership  is  in  truth  not  of  the 
physical  or  psychical  but  of  the  spiritual  order.  Neo- 
pla tonic  morality  thus  remains  throughout  theocentric. 
Souls  are  members  of  a  choir  which  sing  in  time  and 
tune  so  long  as  they  look  at  their  conductor,  but  go 

1  5. 1. 1.  8  4-  3-  8.  3  5.  3-  9- 

*  Proclus,  Inst.  Theol.  13. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS      187 

wrong  when  their  attention  is  diverted  to  other  things.1 
Philanthropy,  therefore,  is  not  the  end  of  true  morality, 
but  its  necessary  consequence.  It  is  natural  to  love  our 
neighbours  as  ourselves,  when  once  we  have  understood 
that  in  God  our  neighbours  are  ourselves.  The  higher 
part  of  the  self,  including  our  '  reason  '  (TO  Xoyiicov) 
is  not  divided  among  individuals  ;  sympathy,  then,  is 
the  natural  result  of  a  real  identity.2 

The  highest  stage  hardly  belongs  to  ethics  :  it  is  dealt 
with  in  the  preceding  chapter.  But  the  noble  doctrine 
that  '  there  is  progress  even  in  heaven  '3  must  be  again 
quoted  in  this  connexion.  Plotinus  is  as  emphatic  as  the 
New  Testament  that  we  must  put  on  the  new  man  ;4 
though  this  is  otherwise  expressed  by  saying  that  '  we 
see  ourselves  as  Spirit.'  Love  becomes  more  and  more 
important  as  we  ascend  further.  Love  is  '  an  activity 
of  the  Soul  desiring  the  Good.'5  Plotinus  follows  Plato 
in  using  mythical  language  about  Love.  There  are 
different  '  Loves  ' — daemonic  Spirits — belonging  to  dif- 
ferent grades  in  the  hierarchy  of  existence.  The  Universal 
soul  has  a  Love  '  which  is  its  eye,  and  is  born  of  the  desire 
which  it  has  '  for  the  One.6  There  is  a  still  higher  Love 
which  is  wholly  detached  from  material  things.  Love 
is  not  a  relation  between  externals,  but  between  Spirit 
and  Spirit.  It  is  unity  in  duality,  the  reconciliation  of 
these  opposites,  known  in  experience.  Human  Love  is 
the  sacrament  of  the  union  of  Souls  Yonder.  It  is 
immortal ;  almost  immortality  itself.  We  need  not  be 
surprised  that  the  Neoplatonists  use  e/oco?  where  the 
Christians  used  aydirtj.  For  Plato  and  all  his  followers 
the  love  of  physical  beauty  is  a  legitimate  first  stage  in 
the  ascent  to  the  love  of  the  divine  Ideas.  Plotinus  says 
that  three  classes  of  men  have  their  feet  on  the  ladder — 

1  6.  9.  8.,  quoted  above,  p.  137. 

2  See  the  whole  chapter,  4.  9  :    Ei  iracrat  al  \l/vxo.l  pia. 

3  I.  3.  I,  2,  KaKci  padiffTeov  TTJV &vu  iropetav. 

4  5-  3-  4»  [5«]  Trai'TeXwj  &\\ov  ycvfodai.    Cf.  Plato,  Phaedo,  64,  on  the 
mystic  death. 

*  3-  5-  4-  *  3-  5-  3« 


188         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

the  philosopher,  the  friend  of  the  Muses,  and  the  lover.1 
The  intellect,  aesthetic  sensibility,  and  love  are  the  three 
'  anagogic  '  faculties.  He  knows  that  they  are  apt  to 
flow  over  into  each  other. 

It  remains  to  notice  that  Plotinus  attaches  importance 
to  a  calm  cheerfulness  of  temper.  '  The  good  man  is 
always  serene,  calm,  and  satisfied  ;  if  he  is  really  a 
good  man,  none  of  the  things  which  are  called  evils  can 
move  him.'  2  Here  again  we  see  the  influence  of  the 
Stoics. 

The  defects  of  Plotinian  ethics  are  in  part  common  to 
the  school,  and  in  part  common  to  the  age.  The  follow- 
ing passage,  true  in  the  main,  is  marred  by  its  last 
sentence.3  '  Men  complain  of  poverty  and  of  the  unequal 
distribution  of  wealth,  in  ignorance  that  the  wise  man 
does  not  desire  equality  in  such  things,  nor  thinks  that 
the  rich  has  any  advantage  over  the  poor,  or  the  prince 
over  the  subject.  He  leaves  these  opinions  to  the  vulgar, 
and  knows  that  there  are  two  sorts  of  life,  that  of  virtuous 
people,  who  can  rise  to  the  highest  degree  of  life,  that  of 
the  spiritual  world  ;  and  that  of  vulgar  and  earthly 
persons,  which  is  itself  double  ;  for  sometimes  they 
dream  of  virtue  and  participate  in  it  to  some  small  extent, 
and  sometimes  they  form  only  a  vile  crowd,  and  are 
only  machines,  destined  to  minister  to  the  first  needs  of 
virtuous  men.'  Plotinus  here  uses  the  haughty  tone 
of  an  intellectual  aristocrat,  and  assumes  without 
hesitation  that  the  thinker  has  a  right  not  only  to 
his  leisure,  but  to  be  supported  by  the  labour  of  those 
who  cannot  share  his  virtues.  But  we  must  remember 
that  a  Neoplatonic  saint  would  live  so  as  to  be  a  very 
light  burden  on  the  community,  and  that  it  is  well  worth 
while  for  a  State  to  encourage  a  few  persons  to  devote 
themselves  to  such  a  life  as  Plotinus  lived.  The  only 

1  i.  3.  i,  0t\6<ro0oj,  ftovfftKos,  tywrtKos  dva/creot.  But  compare  also  the 
important  statement  in  4.  3.  8,  that  there  are  three  upward  paths — 
frl/yyeia,  yvu<ru,  and  fy>e£is — practical,  intellectual,  and  affective 
activity. 

?    I.  4.   12.  3   2.  9.  9. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     189 

error  (if  it  is  made)  is  in  supposing  that  humble  occupa- 
tions are  a  bar  to  the  highest  life.  The  notion  that  the 
dignity  of  work  is  determined  by  the  subjects  with  which 
it  is  concerned,  and  not  by  the  manner  in  which  it  is 
executed,  is  a  mischievous  error  which  Greek  thought 
never  outgrew,1  and  which  still  survives  in  the  learned 
professions.  The  effects  of  it  were  far-reaching,  and  had 
not  a  little  to  do  with  the  decay  of  Greek  culture.  Early 
Christianity  was,  in  principle  at  least,  free  from  this 
fault,  but  it  was,  on  the  whole,  blind  to  the  joy  of  pro- 
ductive activity,  which  Plotinus  recognises  in  his  doctrine 
of  the  Soul  as  creator,  and  to  the  value  of  industry  in 
secular  things  as  a  service  of  God,  a  side  of  ethics  which 
was  not  developed  till  the  Reformation.  There  is  a 
beautiful  passage  of  Lotze  which  is  entirely  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  Neoplatonism,  and  which  Plotinus 
might  have  uttered  if  he  had  lived  in  a  happier  period 
than  the  third  century.  '  As  in  the  great  fabric  of  the 
universe  the  creative  Spirit  imposed  upon  itself  unchange- 
able laws  by  which  it  moves  the  world  of  phenomena, 
diffusing  the  fullness  of  the  highest  good  throughout 
innumerable  forms  and  events,  and  distilling  it  again 
from  them  into  the  bliss  of  consciousness  and  enjoyment  ; 
so  must  man,  acknowledging  the  same  laws,  develop 
given  existence  into  a  knowledge  of  its  value,  and  the 
value  of  his  ideals  into  a  series  of  external  forms  proceed- 
ing from  himself.  To  this  labour  we  are  called  ;  and  the 
most  prominent  intellects  in  all  ages  have  devoted  them- 
selves to  the  perfecting  of  the  outward  relations  of  life, 
the  subjugation  of  nature,  the  advancement  of  the  useful 
arts,  the  improvement  of  social  institutions,  though  they 
knew  that  the  true  bliss  of  existence  lies  in  those  quiet 
moments  of  solitary  communion  with  God  when  all 
human  daily  toil,  all  culture  and  civilisation,  the  gravity 

1  Mr.  Zimmern,  in  his  brilliant  and  delightful  book,  The  Greek 
Commonwealth,  indignantly  denies  that  the  craftsman  was  not  re- 
spected in  free  Greece.  But  surely  the  Athenian  'scholar  and  gentle- 
man '  spoke  of  the  fidvavvoi  very  much  as  our  grandparents  spoke  of 
'the  lower  orders,' 


190         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

and  the  burden  of  noisy  life,  shrink  into  a  mere  pre- 
liminary exercise  of  powers.'1 

Another  defect  is  the  moral  isolation  of  the  Neo- 
platonic  saint.  In  the  most  typical  Christian  contem- 
platives  we  find  that  sorrow  for  the  sins  of  others,  and 
pity  for  the  world,  often  fill  their  hearts.  Take  as  an 
example  the  short  record  of  Margaret  Kempe,  an  obscure 
precursor  of  Julian  of  Norwich.  '  If  she  saw  a  man  had 
a  wound,  or  a  beast ;  or  if  a  man  beat  a  child  before  her, 
or  smote  a  horse  or  another  beast  with  a  whip,  she  thought 
she  saw  our  Lord  beaten  or  wounded.  If  she  saw  any 
creature  being  punished  or  sharply  chastised,  she  would 
weep  for  her  own  sin  and  compassion  of  that  creature.' 
So  Thomas  Traherne  exclaims  :  '  0  Christ,  I  see  thy 
crown  of  thorns  in  every  eye,  thy  bleeding,  naked, 
wounded  body  in  every  soul ;  thy  death  liveth  in  every 
memory ;  thy  crucified  Person  is  embalmed  in  every 
affection  ;  thy  pierced  feet  are  bathed  in  everyone's 
tears  ;  and  it  is  my  privilege  to  enter  with  thee  into 
every  soul.'2  The  ideas  of  corporate  penitence  and 
atoning  sympathy  are  not  to  be  found  in  Plotinus.  He  does 
not  seem  to  realise  that  '  apathy,'  which  implies  an 
external  attitude  towards  sin,  sorrow,  and  failure,  closes 
one  of  the  chief  lines  of  communication  by  which  the  Soul 
may  pass  out  of  its  isolation  and  identify  itself  with  a 
larger  life.  A  modern  writer  would  add  that  it  is  a  fatal 
bar  to  understanding  and  solving  any  social  or  moral 
problem.  The  call  to  seek  and  save  that  which  was  lost, 
the  moral  knight-errantry  which  '  rides  abroad  redressing 
human  wrongs,'  the  settled  purpose  to  confront  '  the 
world  ' — that  is  to  say,  human  society  as  it  organises 
itself  apart  from  God,  a  network  of  co-operative  guilt  with 
limited  liability,  with  another  association  of  active 
'  fellow-workers  with  God  ' — this  call  is  but  faintly 
heard  by  philosophers  of  this  type,  and  they  leave  such 
work  to  others. 

1  Lotze,  Microcosmus,  Book  III.  Chap.  5. 

I  Quoted  by  Herman,  Meaning  and  Value  of  Mysticism,  pp.  91,  TOO, 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  AESTHETICS      191 

The  dependence  of  Souls  on  each  other  for  the  achieve- 
ment of  their  perfection  is  a  truth  which  Christianity 
taught  and  Neoplatonism  neglected .  '  In  every  individual 
spirit/  says  Krause,  '  particular  faculties  predominate  for 
the  glorification  of  the  whole,  and  all  other  faculties  are 
then  found  in  diminishing  strength  and  capacity  as  they 
are  removed  from  those  which  are  the  ruling  elements 
in  its  individuality.  The  individual  spirit  can  only 
attain  perfection  through  free  social  intercourse  on  all 
sides  with  the  spiritual  world.  What  it  cannot  bring 
forth  by  its  own  activity  it  receives  spontaneously  from 
others,  who  communicate  it  out  of  the  fullness  of  their 
own  being.  This  ever  new  stimulus  and  nourishment 
of  the  proper  life  of  the  spirit,  and  the  potential  univer- 
sality of  all  spiritual  formation,  thus  lie  in  the  social 
intercourse  of  spirits  with  each  other.'  Christianity 
promises  to  make  men  free  ;  it  never  promises  to  make 
them  independent.  The  self-sufficiency  (avrapKeia)  of 
St.  Paul  is  an  independence  in  relation  to  external  con- 
ditions, but  not  in  the  same  degree  in  relation  to  his 
fellow-men.  We  need  each  other ;  and  therefore  we 
can  never  be  quite  so  invulnerable  as  ancient  philosophy 
hoped  to  make  us.  Human  solidarity  is  a  guarantee  of 
pure  freedom  in  the  eternal  world  ;  in  the  world  of  soul- 
making  it  is  a  bond  of  union,  but  still  a  bond.  Therefore 
we  must  both  give  and  take,  without  grudging  and  with- 
out pride  ;  we  must  find  our  complement  in  others,  and 
in  our  turn  must  help  to  bear  their  burdens.  Even 
Buddhism  learned  this  truth  better  than  Neoplatonism. 
Buddha  himself  said  that  he  would  not  enter  Nirvana 
till  he  could  bring  all  others  with  him.  The  sense  of 
organic  unity  with  our  fellows  ought  to  make  it  intoler- 
able for  us  to  reach  the  One  alone.  Perhaps  it  is  even 
impossible  to  do  so. 

But  we  must  not  end  this  section  with  words  of  censure. 
Plotinus  himself  was  lovable  and  beloved,  and  he  could 
not  have  used  his  great  gifts  to  better  advantage  for 
posterity.  The  uader-valuation  of  human  sin  and 


192         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

suffering  which  comes  from  an  intense  preoccupation  with 
the  eternal  world  is  not  a  common  defect,  and  it  is  a 
defect  which  is  not  far  from  heroic  virtue.  It  is  only  in 
a  lower  type  of  mystics  that  it  is  dangerous — in  that  class 
of  aspirants  to  heavenly  wisdom  who  make  the  tragic 
mistake  of  imagining  that  they  are  what  they  only  dream 
about,  and  who  in  consequence  miss  that  creative  activity 
in  the  outer  world  without  which  the  Soul  cannot  gain 
its  freedom  or  perform  its  task. 

Religion 

The  philosophy  of  Plotinus  is  a  religious  philosophy 
throughout,  because  for  him  reality  is  the  truly  existing 
realisation  of  the  ideal.  There  is  no  separation  between 
the  speculative  and  ethical  sides  of  his  system.  If  it  is 
true  that  all  practice  leads  up  to  contemplation,  it  is 
equally  true  that  contemplation  is  itself  the  highest  kind 
of  action,  and  necessarily  expresses  itself  in  moral  con- 
duct. But  for  him  the  practice  of  the  presence  of  God, 
in  which  religion  consists,  is  very  loosely  connected  with 
the  myths  and  cultus  of  the  popular  faith.  Plotinus  him- 
self felt  no  need  of  these  aids  to  piety.  He  even  surprised 
his  disciples  by  his  indifference  to  public  worship,  and 
almost  shocked  them  by  the  answer  he  gave  to  one  who 
questioned  him  on  the  subject.  '  It  is  for  the  gods,'  he 
said,  '  to  come  to  me,  not  for  me  to  go  to  them.'  Like 
most  mystics,  he  saw  no  reason  for  '  esteeming  one  day 
above  another,'  and  one  place  above  another.  And  it 
was  part  of  his  faith  that  the  Soul  must  prepare  itself 
for  a  divine  visitation,  but  not  demand  it  or  try  to  force  it. 
The  words,  '  I  will  hearken  what  the  Lord  God  shall  say 
concerning  me/  express  his  attitude  in  devotion.  In  this 
neglect  of  the  externals  of  religion  he  differed  from  his 
greatest  successor,  Proclus,  who  was  initiated  into  nearly 
all  the  mysteries,1  and  spent  much  of  his  time  in  devo- 

1  lamblichus  (Vita  Pyth.  3. '14)  says  the  same  of  Pythagoras,  and 
Julian  (Orat.  7)  advises  ^.e^vfiffdai  Trdvra  ra 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     193 

tional  exercises  ;  but  he  was  in  agreement  with  the  mysti- 
cal tradition.  In  the  Hermetic  writings,  the  whole  duty 
of  man  is  declared  to  be  '  to  know  God  and  injure  no 
man  '  ;  and  the  only  religious  practice  (QprjarKcla)  which 
belongs  to  true  religion  is  '  not  to  be  a  bad  man.'1  As  for 
the  myths,  the  Neoplatonic  doctrine  is  thought  out  wholly 
on  the  line  of  the  philosophical  tradition  ;  the  myths  are 
completely  plastic  in  the  hands  of  the  allegorising  meta- 
physician.2 His  treatment  of  the  gods  is  rather  like 
Hegel's  treatment  of  the  Christian  Trinity.3  The  older 
philosophers  sometimes  looked  upon  the  popular  religion 
as  a  rival  or  an  obstacle  ;  Plotinus  twists  it  about  in  the 
most  arbitrary  manner  to  serve  as  an  allegorical  present- 
ment of  his  system.4  His  real  gods  were  not  Zeus, 
Athene,  and  Apollo,  but  the  One,  Spirit,  and  the  Soul  of 
the  World.  These  are  often  said  to  be  the  Neoplatonic 
Trinity  ;  and  though  the  suggested  parallel  with  Christian 
theology  is  misleading,  it  is  true  that  Plotinus  explicitly 
deifies  these  three  principles.  The  One,  as  has  been  said, 
is  much  the  same  as  the  Godhead  of  Eckhart  and  other 
mystics.  Of  Spirit  he  says,5  '  We  have  then  to  conceive 
of  one  nature — Spirit,  all  that  truly  exists,  and  Truth. 
If  so,  it  is  a  great  God.  Yes,  this  nature  is  God — a  second 
God.'  (The  triad  in  this  sentence  is  equivalent  to  vov$ — 
vorjra — i/otyo-i?.)  And  elsewhere6  he  gives  us  in  an 
ascending  scale  '  the  best  men,  good  daemons,  the  gods 
who  dwell  on  earth  and  who  contemplate  the  spiritual 

1  See  the  quotations  in  Zeller,  p.  252  ;  and  for  the  last  passage  here 
quoted  compare  the  almost  identical  precept  in  the  Epistle  of  James 
i.  27.  Porphyry  has  the  fine  saying  that  '  the  best  sacrifice  to  the  gods 
is  a  pure  spirit  and  a  passionless  soul.' 

8  Whittaker,  The  Neoplatonists,  p.  100. 

8  e.g.  Apollo  is  '  unity  in  difference.'  Schopenhauer  goes  further 
than  Hegel.  '  If  I  wished  to  try  to  resolve  the  deepest  mystery  of 
Christianity,  that  of  the  Trinity,  in  the  fundamental  concepts  of  my 
philosophy,  I  might  say  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  resolute  negation 
of  will ;  the  man  in  whom  this  is  manifested  is  the  Son.  He  is  identical 
with  the  will  which  affirms  life  and  hence  produces  the  phenomenon 
of  the  visible  world,  that  it  is  say  the  Father'  (The  World  as  Witt  and 
Idea,  Vol.  3). 

*  Cf.  3.  5.  8,  9  ;    4.  3.  14  ;    5.  1.7  ;    5.  8.  12. 

6  5-  5-  3-  '  2.  9.  9. 

II,— O 


194         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

world,  and  above  all  the  ruler  of  the  whole  universe,  the 
all-blessed  Soul ;  thence  we  should  sing  the  praise  of  the 
gods  of  the  spiritual  world,  and  over  all  the  great  king  of 
that  world  ' — i.e.  Now. 

Nevertheless  Plotinus  leaves  room  for  the  gods  of  the 
popular  worship.  Like  Aristotle,  he  holds  that  the  uni- 
verse contains  beings  more  divine  than  man — '  daemons,' 
and  '  gods  '  who  are  daemons  of  a  superior  order.  But 
he  calls  in  his  theory  about  the  compenetration  of  all 
spiritual  substances  to  fuse  his  '  gods  '  into  one  God, 
who  none  the  less  'remains  multiple.'  The  following 
passage  is  instructive  :  '  Suppose  that  the  world,  remain- 
ing in  all  its  parts  what  it  is  and  not  confounded,  is  con- 
ceived of  in  our  thought  as  a  whole,  as  far  as  possible. 
.  .  .  Imagine  a  transparent  sphere  placed  outside  the 
spectator,  in  which  one  can  see  all  that  it  contains,  first 
the  sun  and  the  other  stars,  then  the  sea,  the  land,  and 
all  living  creatures.  When  you  thus  represent  in  thought 
a  transparent  sphere  containing  all  things  that  are  in 
movement  or  repose,  or  sometimes  one  and  sometimes 
the  other,  keep  the  form  of  the  sphere,  but  suppress  the 
ideas  of  mass  and  extension,  and  banish  all  notions  derived 
from  Matter.  Then  invoke  the  God  who  made  the  world 
of  which  you  have  formed  an  image,  and  implore  him  to 
descend.  Let  him  come  bringing  his  own  world  with  him, 
with  all  gods  that  are  in  it,  he  being  one  and  all,  and  each 
of  them  being  all,  coming  together  into  one  ;  and  being 
distinguished  in  their  powers,  but  all  one  in  their  single 
great  power  ;  or  rather  the  one  [God]  is  all  [the  gods]. 
For  he  suffers  no  diminution  by  the  birth  of  all  the  gods 
who  are  in  him.  All  exist  together,  and  if  each  is  distinct 
from  the  others,  they  have  no  local  separation,  nor  any 
sensible  form.  .  .  .  This  [the  sphere  of  the  Divine]  is 
universal  power,  extending  to  infinity,  and  infinite  in  its 
powers  ;  and  so  great  is  God  that  his  parts  are  also 
infinite.'1 

Plato  had  maintained  strongly  that  religion  must  be 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  AESTHETICS     195 

mythological  in  its  earlier  stages.  Education  must  begin 
with  what  is  untrue  in  form,  though  it  may  represent  the 
truth  as  nearly  as  possible,  under  inadequate  symbols.1 
He  lays  down  certain  standards  (TVTTOI  fleoAoy/a?) 
whereby  we  may  distinguish  '  true '  myths  from  false. 
God  is  good  and  the  cause  only  of  good  ;  He  is  true  and 
incapable  of  change  or  deceit.  '  True  myths  '  ascribe 
these  qualities  to  God  ;  false  myths  contradict  them. 
So  Plato  does  not  disapprove  of  the  '  medicinal  lie/ 
which  has  been  used  to  justify  all  religious  obscurantism. 
But  he  would  banish  all  who  try  to  misrepresent  the 
character  of  God  and  the  moral  law  in  the  interest  of  a 
priestly  caste  or  a  corporation. 

Aristotle,  who  entirely  rejects  the  ideas  of  communion 
with  God  and  of  anything  like  a  covenant  between 
God  and  man,  holds  that  '  the  rest  of  the  tradition  [about 
the  gods]  has  been  added  later  in  mythical  form  with  a 
view  to  the  persuasion  of  the  multitude,  and  to  its  legal 
and  utilitarian  expediency/2  He  attributes  no  scientific 
or  philosophical  value  to  mythology.  Nevertheless  he  is 
anxious  to  show  that  popular  theology  and  the  worship  of 
the  sun  and  stars  have  some  value  and  justification. 
Hence  perhaps  his  curious  theory  of  concentric  circles, 
which  is  puzzling  to  his  readers,  who  cannot  be  sure  how 
far  it  is  meant  to  be  taken  literally.  Plotinus  and  Dante 
have  both  borrowed  for  him  here  ;  and  in  both  the  same 
difficulty  is  felt.3 

<>  It  is  interesting  that  Origen  finds  it  possible  to  pour 
scorn  on  the  philosophers  who,  though  they  boast  of  their 
knowledge  of  God  and  Divine  things  obtained  from 
philosophy,  yet  run  after  images  and  temples  and  famous 
mysteries  ;  whereas  the  Christian  knows  that  the  whole 
universe  is  God's  temple,  and  can  pray  as  well  in  one 
place  as  another,  shutting  the  eyes  of  sense  and  raising 

1  Plato,  Republic,  p.  376  sq. 

*  Aristotle,  Metaphysics,  10740.     Cf.  Webb,  Problems  in  the  Rela- 
tions of  God  and  Man,  p.  225. 

3  Wallace,  Lectures  and  Essays,  p.  35. 


196         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

upwards  the  eyes  of  the  soul.  '  Passing  in  thought 
beyond  the  heavens,  he  offers  his  prayers  to  God.'  It  is 
plain  that  neither  Origen  nor  Plotinus  would  have  seen 
anything  but  nonsense  in  Herrmann's  dictum  that 
'mysticism  is  Catholic  (as  opposed  to  Protestant)  piety.' 
lamblichus  and  Proclus  might  have  admitted  a  partial 
truth  in  it. 

'  The  gods  of  the  spiritual  world  are  all  one,  or  rather 
one  is  all.'1  A  second  class  of  divine  beings  are  the  sun 
and  stars.2  This  world  is  '  the  third  god.'3  The  earth  is 
conscious  and  can  hear  our  prayers,  though  not  as  we 
hear  sounds  ;4  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  stars.5  But 
all  their  motions  are  determined  by  'natural  necessity,' 
not  by  thought.6  The  influence  which,  in  his  opinion,  the 
heavenly  bodies  have  on  human  affairs  is  not  the  result 
of  caprice  or  predilection,  nor  can  it  be  deflected  by  any 
sorceries  ;  it  is  part  of  the  chain  of  sympathies  which  runs 
through  all  nature.  Prophecy  is  thus  rationalised  as. 
scientific  prevision,  based  on  the  study  of  analogy.7  The 
vulgar  astrology,  then  so  widely  practised,  receives  no 
countenance  from  Plotinus.  The  stars  may  indicate 
coming  events  ;  they  cannot  cause  them.8  But  he  is 
even  more  indignant  with  the  Gnostics  (and  no  doubt 
also  with  the  orthodox  Christians),  for  denying  the 
divinity  of  the  sun  and  stars,  which  seem  to  him  far  higher 
in  the  scale  than  human  beings. 

The  daemons,  or  lower  order  of  Divine  beings,  are 
confined  to  those  spheres  of  existence  which  are  below 
the  spiritual  world.  If  the  ideal  Daemon  (6  avroSaijuitav) 
is  in  the  spiritual  world,  we  had  better  call  him  a  god.9 
'  The  nature  of  the  universe  is  a  mixture,  and  if  we 

1  5.  8.  9.     So  Damascius  says,  'All  the  gods  are  one  God.' 

*  3-  5-  6.  6col  Sci/repoi  /ACT'  €K(ivovs  /ecu  /car'  e/ceivoi/j  roi)y  vorjrovs 
tfrprrjutvoi.  txtlvuv.  For  the  great  influence  of  worship  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  at  this  time  see  Cumont,  Oriental  Religions  and  Roman  Paganism, 
p.  162  sq.  ;  Gilbert  Murray,  Hibbert  Journal,  Oct. ,1910;  Dill,  Roman 
Society,  p.  585  sq. 

3  3.  5.  16.  4  4.  4.  20.  5  4.  4.  30.  •  3.  5.  6. 

7  3.  6  ;    referred  to  by  Berkeley,  Sim,  §252. 

1  3-  I-  5-  *  3-  5-  6. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     197 

separate  from  it  the  separable  soul,  what  is  left  is  not 
great.  If  we  include  the  separable  soul,  the  nature  of  the 
universe  is  a  god  ;  if  we  omit  this,  it  is,  as  Plato  says, 
a  great  daemon,  and  its  affections  are  daemonic/1  The 
daemons  then  are  powers  proceeding  from  the  Soul  as 
a  dweller  on  the  earth  ;  their  power  is  confined  to  the 
region  '  below  the  moon.'2  They  are  everlasting  (ai'Sioi), 
and  can  behold  the  spiritual  world  above  them  ;  but  they 
have  bodies  of  '  spiritual  Matter/  and  can  clothe  them- 
selves in  fiery  or  airy  integuments  ;  they  can  feel  and 
remember,  and  hear  petitions.3 

If  this  rather  crude  spiritism  appears  unworthy  of 
Plotinus,  we  have  to  remember  that  he  inherited  a  long 
tradition  on  the  subject,  which  he  could  hardly  cast  aside. 
The  belief  in  daemons  carries  us  back  to  the  primitive 
animism  which  preceded  the  Olympian  mythology. 
Almost  all  the  philosophers  dealt  tenderly  with  this 
deeply-rooted  faith.  The  Pythagoreans  especially 
cherished  the  belief  ;  they  regarded  the  daemons  as 
representing  the  Souls  of  the  dead.  The  air  is  full  of 
them  ;  they  are  often  visible  ;  and  they  send  dreams  and 
warnings  to  men,  nay,  even  to  animals.  They  are  a  kind 
of  guardian-angels  while  we  live,4  and  flit  about  like 
ghosts  when  we  are  dead.  When  Heracleitus  said  that 
'  each  man's  character  is  his  daemon/  he  meant  that  our 
fate  is  determined  by  our  inner  qualities,  and  not  by  any 
external  power.  There  are  bad  daemons  as  well  as  good  ; 
these  are  the  disembodied  Souls  of  wicked  men.  Socrates, 
as  is  well  known,  believed  that  he  heard  a  warning  voice 
from  time  to  time,  restraining  him  from  doing  what  he 
was  about  to  do,  and  this  was  called  '  the  daemon  of 

1  2.    3.   9,   /te/i(y/t/i'?;   >/  ToPcfc  TOU  TCHTO?   $(Vtj,   A.CU  ff  T<J  ri}v  tf/vxty  TT/V 
ai'roP  xuft^ff€l€t  r^>  "^onritv  ou  fttya..      #f<is  jut.v  ovv  ^Kfivr]?  <rvvapiO/j.ov- 


Ka.1  rd  irdBr/  rd  £v  ai/r<p  5ai/j.6via.      Cf. 
Plato,  Symp.  122  ;    Tim.  89. 

2  3.  5.  6.     '  Every  being  above  the  moon  is  a  god.' 


*  Marcus  Aurelius,    5.  27,   6  Sa/ywwv,  5v  eVaano  irpojT<irr)i>  /cat 
o  Zevj  £5wKci>.     See    the  excellent   discussion  of  the  subject  in  Rohde, 
Psyche,  Vol.  2,  pp.  316-318. 


£98         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTlNUS 

Socrates. '  Plato,  speaking  mythically,  makes  the  daemons 
the  sons  of  gods  by  nymphs  or  some  other  mothers.1 
Every  man  has  a  daemon  who  attends  him  during  life 
and  after  death,  watching  over  his  charge  like  a  shepherd. 
The  daemon  is  the  intermediary  between  gods  and  men  ; 
he  carries  our  prayers  to  the  gods,  and  transmits  to  us 
the  wishes  of  Heaven.  Love  is  '  a  great  daemon.'2  In  the 
Timaeus,  however,  he  seems  to  identify  the  daemon  in 
each  man  with  his  higher  Soul.  The  Stoics  firmly  believed 
in  daemons,  who  in  our  life-time  share  our  good  and  evil 
fortune,  and  after  our  death  float  about  the  lower  air. 
Each  man's  Soul  may  be  called  the  daemon  born  with 
him.  Plutarch  says  that  the  Souls  of  good  men,  '  when 
set  free  from  rebirth  and  at  rest  from  the  body,'  may 
become  daemons.3 

Under  the  Empire,  there  was  a  fusion  between  the 
Greek  '  daemon  '  and  the  Roman  '  genius,'  which  also 
hovered  on  the  borderland  of  divinity.  Tibullus  writes  : — 

'  At  tu,  Natalis  (=  Genius),  quoniam  deus  omnia  sentis, 
Adnue  ;   quid  ref ert  clamne  palamne  roget  ?  ' 4 

In  a  more  familiar  passage,  Horace  describes  the  genius  as 

'  Natale  comes  qui  temperat  astrum, 
Naturae  deus  humanae,  mortalis  in  unum 
Quodque  caput.'6 

So  Apuleius  says  that  the  genius  is  '  is  deus  qui  est  animus 
suus  cuique,  quamquam  sit  immortalis,  tamen  quodair 
modo  cum  homine  gignitur.'6  But  the  Romans  paid 
honour  also  to  the  '  genius  '  of  an  institution,  such  as  a 
legion,  or  even  a  permanent  tax.  I  do  not  think  that 
the  Greek  daemon  was  ever  placed  in  charge  of  an  institu- 
tion. On  the  other  hand,  the  belief  in  evil  daemons  grew  ; 

Apol.  27. 

Plato,  Ph&do,  107  ;    Polit.  271  ;    Symp.  202. 
Plutarch,  Rowuhis,  28.    Glover,  Hibbert  Journal,  Oct.,  1912, 
Tibullus,  4.  5.  20. 
Horace,  Ep.  2.  2.  183. 

Apuleius,  De  Deo  Socr.  15.    Warde  Fowler,  Roman  Ideas  of  Deity, 
p.  19. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     199 

Plutarch  tries  to  explain  moral  temptation  in  this  way. 
'  A  typical  utterance,  from  this  point  of  view,  is  that 
which  was  attributed  to  Charondas  in  the  spurious 
proems  of  his  Laws :  "  If  a  man  is  tempted  by  an  evil 
spirit,  he  should  pray  in  the  temples  that  the  evil  spirit 
may  be  averted."1  There  is  nothing  of  this  kind  in 
Plotinus,  who  is  far  less  inclined  to  moral  dualism  than 
Plutarch.  The  whole  belief  in  intermediate  beings  is 
part  of  the  current  religion  of  the  time,  and  has  no  inner 
connexion  with  the  philosophy  which  we  are  considering.2 
The  kindred  subject  of  magic  and  sorcery  is  dealt  with 
in  a  curious  manner  by  Plotinus.  The  spiritual  man  is 
above  all  such  dangers,  for  his  conversation  is  in  heaven, 
where  no  evil  influences  can  penetrate.  He  who  contem- 
plates the  eternal  verities  is  one  with  the  object  of  his 
contemplation  ;  and  no  one  can  be  bewitched  by  him- 
self.3 The  higher  soul  is  also  exempt.  It  is  only  the 
irrational  soul,  which,  by  allowing  itself  to  be  entangled 
among  the  temptations  of  covetousness,  self-indulgence, 
ambition,  or  fear,  becomes  liable  to  injuries  from  magical 
arts.  Magic  can  influence  our  external  activities  ;  for 
example,  it  can  cause  diseases,  and  even  death.  This 
power  belongs  to  the  law  of  sympathies  which  runs 
through  nature  ;4  the  daemons  have  power  within  their 
own  sphere,  which  extends  to  the  '  irrational '  part  of 
nature.  Porphyry,  however,  tells  us  that  when  a  certain 
Olympius,  from  Alexandria,  tried  to  bewitch  Plotinus, 
his  sorceries  recoiled  upon  his  own  pate,  and  after  suffer- 
ing excruciating  pains  he  was  obliged  to  desist  !  In  the 
same  section  of  his  biography  Porphyry  says  that  an 
Egyptian  priest,  wishing  to  give  proof  of  his  powers 
during  a  visit  to  Rome,  begged  Plotinus  to  come  and  see 
him  evoke  the  daemon  of  Plotinus  himself.  Instead  of 
the  daemon  there  appeared  a  god,  which  caused  the 

1  Farnell,  The  Higher  Aspects  of  Greek  Religion,  p.  116. 

2  Porphyry,  however,  believes  in  evil  spirits,  and  he  is  followed 
by  the  later  Neoplatonists.    See  an  excellent  note  by  Bouillet,  Vol.  2, 

P-  533-  3  4-  4-  43- 

4  4.  4.  41-43.    See  further  references  in  Cumont,  p.  273. 


200         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

enchanter  to  congratulate  Plotinus  on  having  a  being  of 
the  higher  rank  to  watch  over  him.1  It  is  not  likely 
that  the  philosopher  was  himself  the  authority  for  this 
story,  any  more  than  that  lamblichus  encouraged  the 
belief  that  he  floated  in  the  air  when  he  said  his  prayers. 
It  was  a  superstitious  and  unscientific  age  ;  and  Neo- 
platonism  was  not  well  protected  on  this  side.  Indeed, 
by  admitting  the  reality  of  witchcraft,  it  helped  to 
elevate  superstition  into  a  dogma.2 

Prayer,  in  the  wider  sense  of  any  '  elevation  of  the  mind 
towards  God/  was  of  course  the  very  life  of  religion  for 
the  Neoplatonists.3  But  the  efficacy  of  petitionary 
prayer  was  a  problem  for  them,  both  because  of  their 
belief  in  the  regularity  of  natural  law,  and  because  it  was 
not  easy  for  them  to  admit  that  the  higher  principle  can 
be  affected  in  any  way  by  influences  from  beneath. 
Plotinus  would  have  us  approach  the  higher  spiritual 
powers  by  contemplation  and  meditation,  without 
proffering  any  requests  ;  it  is  the  lower  spirits  that  are 
amenable  to  petitions,  this  kind  of  prayer  being  in  fact 
a  branch  of  sympathetic  magic.  All  the  attractions 
and  repulsions  that  pervade  nature  are  for  him  a  kind  of 
magic  (yorjrela  or  /mye/a)  ;  '  the  true  magic  is  the 
friendship  and  strife  that  exist  in  the  great  All.'4  Love, 
with  all  its  far-reaching  influence  in  the  world,  is  the 
first  wizard  and  enchanter.  Only  contemplation  is  above 
enchantments  (ayoriTevTos) .  Magic  in  this  sense  is  only 
an  empirical  knowledge  of  the  subtle  laws  of  attraction 
in  nature  ;  prayer  works  no  miracles,  but  only  sets  in 
motion  obscure  natural  forces.  But  Plotinus  attaches 
small  value  to  this  kind  of  praying.  The  only  prayers 
that  seem  to  him  worthy  of  the  name  are  the  unspoken 

1  Cf.  3.  4.  6,  dalftwi*  rovTif}  [ry  ffirovSatip']  6e6s. 

2  Porphyry    did    not    really    encourage    theurgy,    and    Augustine 
thought  he  was  a  little  ashamed  of  his  theosophical  friends.    Cf .  Chaig- 
net  (Vol.  5,  p.  62),  who  argues  that  theurgy  is  no  integral  part  of  Neo- 
platonisra.     Proclus,  however,  was  credited  with  miracles. 

3  Porphyry,   Ad  Marcell.  24,  -q  ^7ri(rrpo(f>^  irpbs  rbv  Qebv  fjiivr)  ffwrypla. 
The    word   '  salvation  '   became  as  familiar  to   Neoplatonists    as    to 
Christians.  4  4.  4.  40. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     201 

yearnings  of  the  Soul  for  a  closer  walk  with  God.  Of 
this  '  prayer  of  quiet  '  he  speaks  finely  in  5.  I.  6.  The 
desire  which  all  creatures  feel  to  rise  towards  the  source 
of  their  being  is  itself  prayer  ;  so  that  Proclus  can  say, 
in  a  striking  sentence,  that  '  all  things  pray,  except  the 
Supreme  (the  One).'  The  Oriental  mystic  Kabir  expresses 
the  same  thought.  '  Waving  its  row  of  lamps  the  universe 
sings  in  worship  day  and  night.  There  the  sound  of  the 
unseen  bells  is  heard  ;  there  the  Lord  of  all  sitteth  on  his 
throne.'  It  is  plain  that  Plotinus  would  have  entirely 
agreed  with  George  Meredith's  words  :  '  He  who  rises 
from  his  knees  a  better  man,  his  prayer  has  been  granted.' 
The  whole  object  of  prayer  is  to  become  one  with  the 
Being  to  whom  prayer  is  addressed,  and  so  to  win  the 
blessed  life.  '  Even  here  below  a  wise  life  is  the  most 
truly  grand  and  beautiful  thing.  And  yet  here  we  see 
but  dimly  ;  yonder  the  vision  is  clear.  For  it  gives 
to  the  seer  the  faculty  of  seeing,  and  the  power  for  the 
higher  life,  the  power  by  living  more  intensely  to  see 
better  and  to  become  what  he  sees.'1 

So  the  whole  of  religion  is  summed  up  in  the  vision  of 
God.  It  is  the  experimental  verification  of  the  act  of 
faith  in  which  religion  begins,  by  virtue  of  '  the  conscious- 
ness inherent  in  the  finite-infinite  being,  so  far  as  his  full 
nature  affirms  itself,  that  he  is  one  with  something  which 
cannot  be  shaken  or  destroyed,  and  the  value  of  which 
is  the  source  and  standard  of  values.'2  This  is  the  sub- 
stance of  the  Neoplatonist's  creed.  What  Mr.  Bosanquet 
calls  the  finite-infinite  nature  of  the  finite  spirit  is  a  truth 
revealed  to  our  consciousness  with  increasing  clearness 
as  we  advance  morally  and  intellectually.  Plotinus 
repeatedly  appeals  to  the  religious  experience  of  his 
readers  ;3  he  knows  that  he  cannot  carry  us  with  him 
further  than  we  have  the  power  to  see  for  ourselves.  For 


1  6.  6.   1  8,  Kdi  tirravQa  ^pSia^tos  fon/rd  ec[j.vbv  KO.I  TO  Ka\bv  /car'  d\-fj$€iav 
tt  KO.LTOL  d./.u'5pus  opdrai  ^/cet  5^  Ka8apu>s  oparai.      diSiixri  y&p  T<$  bpuvri  tipaffiv 
SVVO.IMV  ei's  rb  ,ua\XoJ>  ftjv  /cat  fj.d\\ov  furovuy  fwvra  opav  /cat  yevtffdat 
*  Bosanquet,  The  Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual,  p.  241. 
3  e.g.  6.  8.  19. 


202         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTlNUS 

it  is  as  the  greater  Self  that  we  come  to  know  God,  not 
as  a  separate  anthropomorphic  Being  over  against  our- 
selves. Our  struggle  to  reach  Him  is  at  the  same  time  a 
struggle  for  self -liber  at  ion.  We  lose  our  Soul  in  order 
to  find  it  again  in  God.  There  is  no  barrier  between  the 
human  and  Divine  natures.  The  human  -  Soul  has  only 
to  strip  itself  of  those  outer  integuments  which  are  no 
part  of  its  true  nature,  in  order  to  expand  freely  by  means 
of  the  '  organic  filaments  '  which  unite  it  with  all  spiritual 
being.  This  expansion  is  at  the  same  time  an  intensi- 
fying of  life,  an  '  awakening  '  from  the  dream  of  sensuous 
existence.  Our  environment,  which  we  make  while  it 
makes  us,  changes  all  the  time.  Our  perception  becomes 
spiritual  intuition  ;  the  air  we  breathe  becomes  the 
atmosphere  of  eternity,  not  of  time.  The  problem  of 
immortality  is  changed  for  us  in  such  a  way  that  it 
ceases  to  be  a  vague  and  chimerical  hope  and  becomes 
an  experience — sentimus  et  experimur  nos  aeternos  esse, 
as  Spinoza  says.  The  question  of  the  survival  in  time 
of  the  empirical  ego  loses  its  interest,  since  the  empirical 
ego  is  no  longer  the  centre,  much  less  the  circumference, 
of  our  thoughts.  The  Soul  that  never  dies  is  not  some- 
thing that  belongs  to  us,  but  something  to  which  we 
belong.  We  shall  belong  to  it  after  we  are  dead,  as  we 
belonged  to  it  before  we  were  born.  Its  history  is  our 
history,  and  its  super-historical  existence  is  our  immor- 
tality. The  life  of  this  great  Soul  to  which  we  belong 
has  two  aspects — contemplation  and  creation.  Its  gaze 
is  turned  steadily  upon  the  eternal  archetypes  of  all  that 
is  good  and  true  and  beautiful  in  the  universe.  It  adores 
God  under  these  three  attributes,  by  which  He  is  known 
to  man.  The  inner  religious  life  consists  of  continual 
acts  of  recollection,  when  we  '  turn  away  our  eyes  lest 
they  behold  vanity/  and  resolutely  try  to  realise  the 
glories  of  the  unseen  world  which  encompasses  us.  The 
other  activity  of  the  Soul,  creation  of  good,  true,  and 
beautiful  things  and  actions  in  the  world  of  space  and 
time,  follows  so  naturally  and  necessarily  from  a  right 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  /ESTHETICS     203 

direction  of  the  thought  and  will  and  affections,  that  it 
is  not  worth  while  to  bring  forward  other  motives  for 
leading  an  active  and  useful  life.  The  true  contemplative 
cannot  be  selfish  or  indolent.  He  makes  the  world  better, 
both  consciously  and  unconsciously,  by  the  very  fact 
that  his  conversation  is  in  heaven.  It  is  other-worldli- 
ness  that  alone  can  transform  the  world. 

If  any  man  is  disposed  to  take  Plotinus  as  his  guide, 
not  only  in  the  search  for  truth,  but  in  the  life  of  devotion, 
he  will  naturally  ask  to  what  Being  his  prayers  should 
be  addressed,  and  his  acts  of  worship  offered.  We  have 
seen  that  the  sphere  of  the  Divine  (TO,  6eia)  includes  not 
only  the  One,  but  Spirit  and  the  Universal  Soul.  In  spite 
of  the  unity  which  forbids  any  notion  of  separate  existence 
in  the  eternal  world,  there  are  distinctions  between  the 
three  Divine  Hypostases  which  make  the  question  legiti- 
mate and  inevitable.  I  have  already  suggested  that 
when  our  thoughts  are  turned  towards  anything  that  we 
hope  for  in  space  and  time,  we  shall  most  naturally 
address  ourselves  to  the  Universal  Soul,  which  upholds 
the  course  of  this  world  and  directs  it,  and  seems  to  be 
itself  engaged  in  the  great  conflict  between  good  and 
evil.  When  we  are  praying  for  spiritual  progress  and  a 
clearer  knowledge  of  God,  or  when  we  are  longing  for 
the  bliss  of  heaven  and  the  rest  that  remaineth  for  the 
people  of  God,  it  is  to  the  Great  Spirit,  the  King,  as 
Plotinus  calls  him,  that  we  shall  turn.  Lastly,  if  ever  we 
are  rapt  into  ecstasy,  and  pass  a  few  minutes  in  the 
mystical  trance,  we  shall  hope  that  we  are  holding  com- 
munion with  the  One — the  Godhead  who  '  dwelleth  in  the 
light  that  no  man  can  approach  unto.'  No  stress  need 
be  laid,  for  purposes  of  devotion,  on  the  Neoplatonic 
doctrine  of  the  three  Divine  hypostases.  But  it  seems 
to  me  that  we  do  in  fact  envisage  God  under  these  three 
aspects  in  our  prayers  and  meditations,  and  that  without 
much  violence  we  might  even  classify  theologians  and 
religious  thinkers  under  these  three  heads.  Some  would 
have  us  worship  the  Soul  of  humanity,  or  the  Soul  of  the 


204         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

world  ;  others  the  Lord  of  the  eternal  and  spiritual 
realm  ;  others  the  ineffable  Godhead.  It  is  one  of  the 
strong  points  of  Plotinus  that  he  finds  room  for  all 
three,  and  shows  how  we  may  pass  from  one  into 
another. 

A  brief  comparison  between  Neoplatonism  and  Chris- 
tianity is  necessary  for  an  understanding  of  the  former, 
though  this  book  is  not  written  as  a  contribution  to  Chris- 
tian apologetics.  I  will  first  summarise  the  opinions  of 
Rudolf  Eucken,  in  his  valuable  book  entitled  Lebensan- 
schauungen  Grosser  Denker.  '  That  which  unites  Plotinus 
with  Hellenism,  must  separate  him  from  Christianity. 
In  criticising  the  Christian  Gnostics,  he  blames  them 
first  for  overvaluing  humanity.  For  him  mankind  is  a 
mere  part  of  the  world,  the  whole  of  which  is  penetrated 
by  the  Divine  power.  He  blames  them  for  despising 
and  despiritualising  the  world,  which  contains  spiritual 
beings  far  higher  than  the  common  run  of  men.  He 
blames  them  for  unpractical  activity.  Those  who  are 
too  proud  to  fight  must  acquiesce  in  the  victory  of  the 
bad  cause.  Whether  these  criticisms  apply  to  Christen- 
dom as  well  as  to  the  Gnostics,  we  need  not  here  discuss  ; 
in  any  case  Plotinus  follows  the  Hellenic  tradition  in 
asserting  the  co-ordination  of  humanity  with  the  All, 
the  soul-life  and  even  the  deification  of  natural  forces, 
the  expectation  of  happiness  from  active  conduct,  the 
high  estimation  of  thought  and  knowledge  as  the  Divine 
spark  in  man.  Plotinus  is  really  further  removed  from 
Christianity  than  these  statements  express,  but  he  is 
also  more  akin  to  it  than  the  collision  between  the  two 
allows  to  appear.  In  both  we  find  an  uncompromising 
inwardness  and  a  drawing  of  all  life  towards  God,  and  in 
both  rather  by  a  renunciation  of  the  world  than  by  co- 
operation with  it.  But  Plotinus  finds  this  inwardness 
in  an  impersonal  spirituality,  Christianity  in  a  develop- 
ment of  the  personal  life.  In  the  former  all  salvation 
comes  from  the  power  of  thought,  in  the  latter  from 
sincerity  of  heart.  Such  a  fundamental  difference 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     205 

implies  a  different  answer  to  the  most  important  problems 
of  life.  In  Plotinus  we  find  an  abandonment  of  the  first 
world,  a  fading  of  time  in  the  light  of  eternity,  a  repose 
in  view  of  the  Whole.  In  Christianity  we  find  an  entrance 
of  the  eternal  into  time,  a  world-historical  movement,  a 
power  working  against  the  irrationality  of  the  actual. 
In  the  former  we  have  a  disappearance  of  man  before  the 
endlessness  of  the  All ;  in  the  latter,  a  transposition  of 
man  and  humanity  into  the  central  point' of  the  All.  In 
the  former,  an  isolation  of  the  thinker  on  the  heights  of 
contemplation  of  the  world  ;  in  the  latter  a  close  welding 
together  of  individuals  in  full  community  of  life  and 
sorrow.'  He  ends  by  finding  a  contradiction  in  Neo- 
platonism  between  the  doctrine  of  inwardness  and  the 
fundamental  impersonality  of  the  world  of  which  man 
is  a  part. 

Baron  Von  Hiigel  also  finds  a  radical  inconsistency 
between  Plotinus  the  metaphysician  and  Plotinus  the 
saint,  a  criticism  which  has  often  been  made  in  the  case 
of  Spinoza.  I  have  already  quoted  (p.  147)  the  words 
in  which  the  Baron  brings  the  charge  that  '  in  Plotinus' 
philosophy  God  is  exiled  from  his  world  and  his  world 
from  him/  while  at  the  same  time  he  attaches  special 
value  to  his  '  constant,  vivid  sense  of  the  spaceless, 
timeless  character  of  God ;  of  God's  distinct  reality  and 
otherness,  and  yet  of  his  immense  nearness  ;  of  the  real 
contact  between  the  real  God  and  the  real  soul,  and  of 
the  precedence  and  excess  of  this  contact  before  and 
beyond  all  theories  concerning  this,  the  actual  ultimate 
cause  of  the  soul's  life  and  healing.  Indeed,  reality  of  all 
kinds  here  rightly  appears  as  ever  exceeding  our  intuition 
of  it,  and  our  intuitions  as  ever  exceeding  our  discursive 
reasonings  and  analyses.'1 

There  is  much  in  these  estimates  that  deserves  respect- 
ful attention.  Eucken's  enumeration  of  differences  is 
very  illuminating.  But  in  my  judgment  this  writer  over- 
states the  intellectualism  of  Plotinus,  while  Baron  Von 

1  Von  Htigel,  Eternal  Life,  p.  85  sq. 


206         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

Hugel  follows  too  closely  those  French  critics  (such  as 
Vacherot),  who  regard  the  method  of  abstraction — of 
'  peeling  the  onion  ' — as  the  characteristic  instrument  of 
Plotinian  dialectic.  As  I  have  insisted  more  than  once 
in  this  book,  we  cannot  understand  Plotinus  unless  we 
realise  that  the  spiritual  world,  with  its  fullness  of  rich 
content,  is  for  him  the  real  world,  and  the  ultimate  home 
of  the  Soul.  This  is  quite  consistently  the  conclusion 
of  the  dialectic,  and  I  can  see  no  contradiction  between 
the  philosophy  and  the  religion  of  Neoplatonism.  Nor 
does  it  seem  to  me  that  these  two  sides  of  the  Plotinian 
teaching  have  shown  any  tendency  to  fall  apart  in  his 
disciples.  The  whole  system  is  still  coherent,  as  he 
left  it,  a  strong  argument  that  it  is  not  vitiated  by  inner 
contradictions. 

The  criticism  of  Augustine  remains,  in  my  opinion, 
the  most  profound  that  has  proceeded  from  any  Christian 
thinker.  We  have  to  remember  that  Augustine  was  con- 
verted to  Platonism  before  he  was  converted  to  Chris- 
tianity;  that  by  'the  Platonists '  he  meant  Plotinus 
and  his  school ;  and  that  he  became  a  Christian  because 
he  found  something  in  Christianity  which  he  did  not  find 
in  Plotinus.  What  that  was,  he  tells  us  very  clearly. 
'  In  the  books  of  the  Platonists,  which  I  read  in  a  Latin 
translation,  I  found,  not  indeed  in  so  many  words,  but 
in  substance  and  fortified  by  many  arguments,  that  "  In 
the  beginning  was  the  Logos,  and  the  Logos  was  with 
God,  and  the  Logos  was  God  ;  and  the  same  was  in  the 
beginning  with  God  ;  and  that  all  things  were  made  by 
him,  .and  without  him  was  nothing  made  that  was  made  ; 
in  him  was  life,  and  the  life  was  the  light  of  men  ;  and 
the  light  shineth  in  darkness  and  the  darkness  compre- 
hended it  not."  Further,  that  the  soul  of  man,  though  it 
bears  witness  to  the  light,  is  not  itself  that  light,  but 
God,  the  Logos  of  God,  is  the  true  light  that  lighteth 
every  man  that  comet h  into  the  world.  And  that  "  he 
was  in  the  world,  and  the  world  was  made  by  him,  and 
the  world  knew  him  not."  But  that  "  he  came  unto  his 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  /ESTHETICS     207 

own,  and  his  own  received  him  not  ;  but  as  many  as 
received  him,  to  them  gave  he  power  to  become  sons 
of  God,  even  to  them  that  believe  on  his  name  "  —  this 
I  could  not  find  there.  Also  I  found  there  that  God  the 
Logos  was  born  not  of  flesh,  nor  of  blood,  nor  of  the  will 
of  a  husband,  nor  of  the  will  of  the  flesh,  but  of  God.1 
But  that  "  the  Logos  was  made  flesh  and  dwelt  among 
us,"  this  I  found  not  there.  I  could  discover  in  these 
books,  though  expressed  in  other  and  varying  phrases, 
that  "  the  Son  was  in  the  form  of  the  Father,  and  thought 
it  not  robbery  to  be  equal  with  God,"  because  by  nature 
he  was  the  same  substance.  But  that  "  he  emptied 
himself,  taking  upon  him  the  form  of  a  servant,  being 
made  in  the  likeness  of  men  ;  and  being  found  in  fashion 
as  a  man  he  humbled  himself  and  became  obedient  unto 
death,  even  the  death  of  the  Cross  ;  wherefore  also  God 
exalted  him,  etc.  ;  this  those  books  do  not  contain.  For 
that  before  all  times  and  above  all  times,  thy  only-be- 
gotten Son  abideth  unchangeable  and  coeternal  with  thee, 
and  that  of  his  fullness  all  souls  receive,  that  they  may 
be  blessed,  and  that  by  participation  in  the  eternal  wisdom 
they  are  renewed,  that  they  may  be  wise,  that  is  there. 
But  that  in  due  time  he  died  for  the  ungodly,  that  thou 
sparedst  not  thine  only  Son  but  deliveredst  him  up  for 
us  all,  this  is  not  there.'2 

The  religious  philosophy  to  which  Augustine  was  con- 
verted, and  in  which  he  found  satisfaction,  was  the 
Platonism  of  Plotinus  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarna- 
tion added  to  it.  It  matters  not  for  our  present  purpose 
that  his  sympathies  were  afterwards  progressively 
alienated  from  the  ancient  culture,  so  that  even  the 
Confessions  does  not  accurately  represent  the  state  of 
mind  in  which  he  first  accepted  Christianity.3  What 


1  Augustine  clearly   read,  in  John  i.  13,  6$  {yew-tidy  for  of 

I  agree  with  Loisy  that  this   reading  has   better  attestation 
than  the  plural,  which  is  accepted  in  our  texts. 

2  Augustine,  Confessions,  7.  10. 

3  This  is  proved  conclusively  by  the  short  treatises  which  he  wrote 
in  the  years  immediately  after  his  conversion. 


208         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

we  have  to  note  is  that  '  the  Logos  made  flesh,  that  I 
found  not  there/  was  the  decisive  consideration  which 
made  him  a  Christian.  From  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarna- 
tion follows,  as  he  saw,  the  love  of  God  for  the  world, 
the  pity  and  care  of  God  for  the  weak  and  erring,  the 
supreme  self-sacrifice  of  God  to  seek  and  save  that  which 
was  lost.  We  are  here  concerned  with  the  Incarnation, 
not  as  an  isolated  historical  event,  but  as  the  revelation 
of  the  highest  law  of  the  spiritual  world  ;  that  God  not 
only  draws  all  life  towards  himself,  as  a  magnet  attracts 
iron,  and  not  only  '  moves  the  world  as  the  object  of  its 
love,'  in  Aristotle's  famous  words,  but  voluntarily 
'  comes  down  '  to  redeem  it.  If  this  is  true,  there  is  an 
end  of  the  theory  that  the  Soul  would  have  done  better 
not  to  have  entered  the  body  ;  for  the  same  moral  and 
spiritual  necessity  which  caused  the  supreme  manifesta- 
tion of  the  Divine  in  the  flesh,  must  also  send  Souls  into 
the  world  to  do  their  part  in  ransoming  the  creation  from 
the  bondage  of  corruption.  This  doctrine,  so  far  from 
being  in  contradiction  with  the  philosophy  which  is  the 
subject  of  this  book,  seems  to  me  to  complete  it.  It 
gives  an  adequate  motive  for  the  *  descent  of  the  Soul,' 
which  obviously  perplexed  Plotinus  ;  it  exalts  Love  as 
the  highest  and  most  characteristic  Divine  principle, 
the  motive  of  creation  and  of  redemption  alike  ;  it  enables 
us  to  see  the  social  as  well  as  individual  '  purification ' 
wrought  by  suffering,  and  entirely  forbids  that  moral 
isolation  which  has  seemed  to  us  a  weak  point  in  Plotinian 
ethics.  But  there  is  one  act  of  surrender  which  this 
doctrine  demands  from  us,  and  this  few  or  no  Greek 
philosophers  were  willing  to  make.  The  Christian  is 
neither  independent  nor  invulnerable.  He  needs  his 
fellows,  as  they  need  him  ;  and  he  must  be  content  '  to  fill 
up,  for  his  part,  what  is  lacking  in  the  afflictions  of  Christ 
for  his  Body's  sake.'  It  seems  sometimes  as  if  the 
Greek  thinkers,  with  all  their  contempt  for  pleasure  and 
pain,  shrank  in  the  last  resort  from  grasping  the  nettle 
of  suffering  firmly.  Nor  is  there  any  religion  or  philos- 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  AESTHETICS     209 

ophy,  except  Christianity,  which  has  really  drawn  the 
sting  of  the  world's  evil. 

A  concluding  paragraph  may  be  desirable  on  the 
attempts  made  by  Christian  Platonists  to  equate  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity  with  the  three  Divine  hypostases 
of  Neoplatonism.  I  have  already  said  that  the  attempt 
was  a  failure  ;  but  it  was  very  natural  that  it  should 
be  made  ;  just  as  in  later  times  the  Hegelians  attempted 
the  same  thing,  with  no  better  success.  Hegelianism 
would  seem  logically  to  place  the  Holy  Spirit  above  the 
Father  and  the  Son  ;  Platonism,  if  it  identifies  the  Logos- 
Christ  with  Noi/?,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  with  the  universal 
Soul,  cannot  maintain  that  the  three  Persons  are  co- 
equal. Numenius  may  have  influenced  Christian  thought 
in  this  matter,  before  the  rise  of  the  Neoplatonic  school. 
His  three  Gods,  as  Proclus  says,  are  the  Father,  the 
Creator  (or  instrument  in  creation)  and  the  World. 
According  to  Eusebius,  he  boasted  that  he  had  gone  back 
to  the  fountain-head  in  reviving  this  doctrine  of  '  three 
Gods.'  The  fountain-head  is  not  so  much  the  Timaeus, 
in  which  the  Demiurge  forms  the  World-Soul  according 
to  the  pattern  of  the  Ideas,  as  the  Second  Epistle  of  Plato, 
which  Plotinus  also  uses  as  an  authority.  But  in 
Numenius  the  Second  and  Third  Gods  (he  does  not  call 
them  Persons,  vTroo-Tacreis)  are  not  quite  distinct ;  '  the 
Second  and  Third  Gods  are  one.'1  It  is  interesting  to 
find  Origen2  saying  that  '  the  Stoics  call  the  World  as  a 
whole  the  First  God,  the  Platonists  the  Second,  and  some 
of  them  the  Third.'  This  hesitation  illustrates  the  great 
vagueness  of  Christian  speculative  thought  about  the 
Holy  Spirit,  down  to  the  fourth  century.  Clement  also 
refers  to  the  Second  Epistle  of  Plato,  and  tries  to  explain 
the  Trinity  Platonically.3  Justin  Martyr  had  done  the 
same  before  him.4  Theodoret6  says  explicitly,  '  Plotinus 

Euseb.,  Praep.  Ev.  n.  18,  i  and  24. 
Origen,  Contra  Celsum,  5.  7. 
Clement,  Strom.  4.  25  ;    5.  14  ;    7.  7. 
Justin,  Apol.  i.  60. 
Theodoret,  4.  750. 

II,— P 


210         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

and  Numenius,  developing  the  thought  of  Plato,  say  that 
he  has  spoken  of  three  transcendent  principles.  The 
immortal  principles  are  the  One,  Spirit  (1/01/9),  and  the 
universal  Soul.  We  call  the  One,  or  the  Good,  the 
Father  ;  Spirit,  we  call  the  Son  or  the  Logos  ;  the 
Platonic  Soul  our  divines  call  the  Holy  Spirit.'  Many 
other  examples  might  be  cited  from  patristic  literature, 
Plotinus  certainly  calls  his  three  Divine  principles 
'  hypostases  '  ;  but  he  never  thinks  of  calling  them 
persons.1  And  the  Cappadocian  Fathers,  Basil  and  the 
two  Gregorys,  are  determined  to  maintain  the  unity  of 
the  Godhead  against  prevalent  tendencies  to  tritheism. 
This  they  uphold  by  making  the  Father  the  one  fountain 
of  Godhead,  and  by  their  doctrine  of  co-inherence  (jrepi- 
X">p>i<ri?),  which  forbids  any  sharp  distinction  of  attributes 
in  the  Trinity.  They  thus  try  to  escape  the  subordina- 
tionism  of  Origen,  which  naturally  results  from  a  close 
following  of  Platonic  methods  of  thought.  Nevertheless, 
the  metaphor  of  emanation  is  used  to  express  the  relation 
of  the  Third  Person  to  the  First.  It  is  perhaps  difficult 
for  a  religious  philosopher  to  distinguish  between  the 
'  begetting  '  of  the  Son  and  the  '  procession  '  of  the 
Spirit.  Christian  Platonists  like  Eckhart  consistently 
teach  that  the  Son  is  continually  and  eternally  '  begotten  ' 
by  the  Father,  a  doctrine  which  takes  the  relation  between 
the  First  and  Second  Person  finally  out  of  the  region  of 
anthropomorphic  symbolism,  and  seeks  to  explain  it  as 
Plotinus  would  have  explained  it. 

^Esthetics 

Throughout  this  enquiry  we  have  been  hampered  by 
difficulties  of  nomenclature.  '  ^Esthetics  '  is  not  a  good 
name  for  the  philosophy  of  TO  Ka\6v,  the  beautiful,  noble, 
and  honourable.  AXo-Owis  is,  as  we  have  seen,  Plotinus' 


and  persona  are  by  no  means  identical.  Cf.  Augus- 
tine, De  Tnmtate,  5.9:  '  Ita  ut  plerique  nostri  qui  haec  Graecotractant 
eloquio  dicere  consueverint  nla.v  ot<ria.vt  T/>ets  vawrditmy,  quod  est,  Latine 
unam  essentiam,  tres  substantias.' 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  /ESTHETICS     211 

name  for  sensuous  perception.  But  the  beautiful,  in  this 
philosophy,  can  only  be  known  by  the  highest  faculty, 
which  apprehends  supra-sensuous  reality.  The  word 
'  aesthete  '  has  also  undignified  associations  in  modern 
English.  We  must  therefore  remember,  all  through  this 
section,  that  TO  KO\OV  includes  all  that  is  worthy  of  love 
and  admiration,  and  that  beautiful  objects,  as  perceived 
by  our  senses,  are  only  an  adumbration  of  a  Divine 
attribute  which  belongs  to  the  spiritual  order.  It  is 
impossible  to  separate  aesthetics,  thus  understood,  from 
ethics  and  religion.  Even  in  the  dialectic,  love  is  the 
guide  of  the  intellect,  and  opens  to  it  the  last  door  of 
which  love  alone  has  the  key. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Beautiful  is  expounded  formally 
in  one  chapter  of  the  Enneads  (i.  6),  an  admirably  clear 
statement  which  we  shall  do  well  to  follow. 

The  Beautiful  affects  chiefly  the  sense  of  sight ;  but 
also,  in  music,  the  sense  of  hearing.  In  a  higher  region, 
actions,  sciences,  and  virtues  are  beautiful.  Some  beauti- 
ful things  '  share  in  '  beauty ;  others,  like  virtue,  are 
beautiful  in  themselves.  The  Stoics  say  that  beauty 
consists  in  proportion,  and  in  harmonious  colour.1  If 
this  were  true,  beauty  would  reside  only  in  the  whole, 
not  in  the  parts,  and  simple  colours,  like  gold,  would  not 
be  beautiful,  nor  would  single  notes,  however  sweet,  be 
beautiful.  Still  less  can  this  canon  be  applied  to  intel- 
lectual, moral,  and  spiritual  beauty.  There  may  be  inner 
harmony  and  proportion  in  bad  things,  though  they  con- 
flict with  the  harmony  of  the  whole.  And  since  measure 
and  proportion  are  quantitative  ideas,  they  are  inapplic- 
able to  spiritual  realities.2  Beauty  is  a  property  in  things 
which  the  Soul  recognises  as  akin  to  its  own  essence, 
while  the  ugly  is  that  which  it  feels  to  be  alien  and 
antipathetic.  Beautiful  things  remind  the  Soul  of  its 
own  spiritual  nature  ;  they  do  so  because  they  partici- 

1  Cf.  Cic.  Tusc.  4.  13. 

a  This  is  not  quite  true.  Plotinus  says  elsewhere  that  the  '  political 
virtues  '  teach  us  measure  and  proportion. 


212         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

pate  in  form  (veroxfi  eMoi/?),  which  comes  from  the 
spiritual  world.  The  absence  of  such  form  constitutes 
ugliness  ;  the  absolutely  ugly  is  that  which  is  entirely 
devoid  of  '  Divine  meaning  '  (Oeios  Ao'yo?).  The  form 
co-ordinates  and  combines  the  parts  which  are  to  make 
a  unity,  and  this  unity  is  beautiful,  as  are  also  its  parts. 
They  become  beautiful  by  sharing  in  the  creative  power 
(Kotvwvta  \6yov)  which  comes  to  them  from  the  gods. 

When  we  pass  from  visible  and  audible  beauty  to  the 
beauty  which  the  Soul  perceives  without  the  help  of  the 
senses,  we  must  remember  that  we  can  only  perceive 
what  is  akin  to  ourselves — there  is  such  a  thing  as  soul- 
blindness.  Incorporeal  things  are  beautiful  when  they 
make  us  love  them.  But  what  constitutes  their  beauty  ? 
Negatively,  it  is  the  absence  of  impure  admixture.  An 
ugly  character  is  soiled  by  base  passions  ;  it  is  like  a  body 
caked  with  mud  ;  in  order  to  restore  its  natural  grace  it 
must  be  scraped  and  cleansed.  This  is  why  it  has  been 
said1  that  all  the  virtues  are  a  purification.  The  purified 
soul  becomes  a  form,  a  meaning,  wholly  spiritual  and 
incorporeal.  The  true  beauty  of  the  Soul  is  to  be  made 
like  to  God.  The  good  and  the  beautiful  are  the  same, 
and  the  ugly  and  the  bad  are  the  same.  The  Soul  becomes 
beautiful  through  Spirit ;  other  things,  such  as  actions 
and  studies,  are  beautiful  through  Soul  which  gives  them 
form.  The  Soul  too  gives  to  bodies  all  the  beauty  which 
they  are  able  to  receive. 

It  remains,  Plotinus  says,  to  mount  to  the  Good  towards 
which  every  Soul  aspires.  '  If  anyone  has  seen  it,  he 
knows  what  I  say  ;  he  knows  how  beautiful  it  is.  We 
must  approach  its  presence  stripped  of  all  earthly  en- 
cumbrances, as  the  initiated  enter  the  sanctuary  naked. 
With  what  love  we  must  yearn  to  see  the  source  of  all 
existence,  of  all  life  and  thought  !  He  who  has  not  yet 
seen  it  desires  it  as  the  Good  ;  he  who  has  seen  it  admires 
it  as  the  Beautiful.  He  is  struck  at  once  with  amazement 
and  pleasure  ;  he  is  seized  with  a  painless  stupefaction, 
»  Plato,  Phaedo,  69. 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     213 

he  loves  with  a  true  love  and  a  mighty  longing  which 
laughs  at  other  loves  and  disdains  other  beauties.  If  we 
could  behold  him  who  gives  all  beings  their  perfection, 
if  we  could  rest  in  the  contemplation  of  him  and  become 
like  him,  what  other  beauty  could  we  need  ?  Being  the 
supreme  beauty,  he  makes  those  who  love  him  beautiful 
and  lovable.  This  is  the  great  end,  the  supreme  aim,  of 
Souls  ;  it  is  the  want  of  this  vision  that  makes  men  un- 
happy. He  who  desires  to  see  the  vision  must  shut  his 
eyes  to  terrestrial  things,  not  allowing  himself  to  run 
after  corporeal  beauties,  lest  he  share  the  fate  of  Narcissus, 
and  immerse  his  soul  in  deep  and  muddy  pools,  abhorred 
of  Spirit.  And  yet  we  may  train  ourselves  by  contem- 
plating noble  things  here  on  earth,  especially  noble  deeds, 
always  pressing  on  to  higher  things,  and  remembering 
above  all  that  as  the  eye  could  not  behold  the  sun  unless 
it  were  sunlike  itself,  so  the  Soul  can  only  see  beauty  by 
becoming  beautiful  itself.' 

There  are  a  few  other  passages  which  throw  light  on 
the  doctrine  of  the  Beautiful.  The  relation  of  the 
Beautiful  to  the  Absolute,  the  Good,  is  discussed  in 
6.  7.  32,  a  passage  which  has  been  already  considered  in 
the  chapter  on  the  Absolute.1  I  have  there  shown  that 
Beauty  is  really  given  the  same  dignity  as  Truth  and 
Goodness  in  this  system.  In  another  place,2  Reality 
(ova- la)  is  identified  with  Beauty.  The  eternal  (TO  ai'Siov) 
is  said  to  be  '  akin  to  the  Beautiful.'3 

Plotinus  makes  a  distinct  advance  in  aesthetic  theory 
in  refusing  to  make  symmetry  the  essence  of  the  Beautiful. 
This  had  been  one  of  the  errors  of  Greek  art -criticism. 
Plotinus  does  not  anticipate  the  profound  saying  of 
Bacon,  '  There  is  no  excellent  beauty  that  hath  not  some 
strangeness  in  the  proportion  '  ;  but  he  insists  that  beauty 
is  essentially  the  direct  expression  of  reason,  or  meaning, 
in  sense,  by  aesthetic  semblance.  The  forms  of  beauty  are 
the  mode  in  which  the  creative  activity  of  the  universal 
Soul  stamps  the  image  of  itself  on  Matter.  Like  all  other 
1  p.  124  2  5-  s.  9.  •  3-  5- 1. 


214         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

creative  activity,  the  production  of  beauty  is  not  directly 
willed.  So  Krause  says,  '  If  Spirit  freely  rules  the  form 
of  what  is  individual  according  to  the  Idea,  beauty  arises 
of  itself  as  by  a  beneficent  necessity'  (p.  72).  The  ques- 
tion why  such  and  such  forms  express  spiritual  beauty  is 
not  much  discussed ;  the  answer  '  because  they  are 
symmetrical '  has  been  dismissed.  The  soul  recognises 
in  certain  forms  a  meaning  which  it  understands  and 
loves  ;  the  sensuous  forms  have  a  natural  affinity  to 
certain  ideas.  Plotinus  believed  that  beautiful  forms  in 
this  world  have  a  real  resemblance  to  their  prototypes  in 
the  spiritual  world.  Earth  is  a  good  copy  of  heaven  ; 
earthly  beauty,  we  must  remember,  is  the  creation  of 
Soul,  not  a  property  of  matter.  But  the  beauty  which 
we  find  in  objects  is  not  put  into  them  by  the  individual 
observer.  All  beauty  is  the  work  of  Soul,  but  not  of  the 
individual  Soul  which  admires  it.  The  individual  Soul 
can  only  appreciate  what  is  akin  to  itself ;  but  it  is  not 
the  perceiving  mind  of  the  individual  which  gives  to 
inert  matter  a  meaning  by  impressing  '  form  '  upon  it. 
That  would  be  to  make  the  individual  Soul  the  creator 
of  the  world,  which  Plotinus  says  we  must  not  do.  And 
yet  the  individual  Soul  is  never  wholly  separated  from 
the  universal  Soul ;  and  we  must  further  remember  that 
no  perception,  not  even  the  perception  of  external  objects, 
is  mere  apprehension.  Something  is  always  done  or  made 
in  the  act  of  perception.  The  Soul,  in  contemplating 
Beauty,  is  identifying  itself  with  the  formative  activity 
of  its  own  higher  principle. 

The  First  Chapter  of  the  Sixth  Ennead  contains  some 
new  ideas  which  are  not  in  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Those 
who  identify  Beauty  with  symmetry  regard  the  whole 
only  as  beautiful ;  the  parts  can  be  beautiful  only  in 
relation  to  the  whole.  But  Beauty  cannot  result  from 
a  collection  of  unbcautiful  things  ;  if  the  whole  is  beauti- 
ful, the  parts  also  must  be  beautiful.  In  the  Eighth 
Chapter  of  the  Fifth  Ennead  he  says  that  '  everything  is 
beautiful  in  its  own  true  Being.'  The  same  passage 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     215 

develops  the  curious  notion  of  the  supreme  holiness  and 
beauty  of  light.  '  Everything  shines  yonder.'  Much 
more  important  is  the  argument  by  which  Plotinus  finds 
room  for  Art  in  the  realm  of  the  beautiful.  The  artist 
realises  the  beautiful  in  proportion  as  his  work  is  real. 
The  true  artist  does  not  copy  nature.  Here  he  agrees 
with  Philostratus,  who  in  an  epoch-making  passage  says 
that  great  works  of  art  are  produced  not  by  imitation  (the 
Aristotelian  AU/X^CH?),  but  by  imagination  (<f>avTa<rta) , 
'  a  wiser  creator  than  imagination  ;  for  imitation  copies 
what  it  has  seen,  imagination  what  it  has  not  seen/ 
The  true  artist  fixes  his  eyes  on  the  archetypal  Logoi, 
and  tries  to  draw  inspiration  from  the  spiritual  power 
which  created  the  forms  of  bodily  beauty.  Art,  therefore, 
is  a  mode  of  contemplation,  which  creates  because  it 
must.  This  is  a  real  advance  upon  Plato  and  Aristotle. 
Plotinus  does  not,  like  Schopenhauer,  arrange  the  arts  in 
an  ascending  scale — sculpture,  painting,  poetry,  music  ; 
music  being  the  highest  because  it  works  with  the  most 
ethereal  medium  ;  but  this  is  genuine  Platonism.  There 
are  said  to  be  some  musicians  who  prefer  reading  the 
score  to  hearing  it  played.  If  such  men  exist,  they  are 
ultra-Platonists. 

What  would  Plotinus  have  said  to  Hegel's1  opinion 
that  we  have  left  behind  the  stage  of  culture  in  which 
art  is  the  highest  means  by  which  we  apprehend  the 
Divine  ?  We  can  no  longer  adore  images,  and  art  no 
longer  satisfies  our  religious  instincts.  Perhaps  this 
change  is  not  so  universal  as  Hegel  thought ;  but  Plotinus 
would  have  seen  nothing  unexpected  in  it.  By  emphasis- 
ing the  beauty  of  noble  actions,  Plotinus  agrees  with 
Kant  and  Lotze  that  beauty  consists,  partly  at  least,  in 
harmony  with  a  purpose.  Lotze  even  suggests  that  it 
arises  in  the  conflict  between  what  is  and  what  ought 
to  be  ;  but  this  is  not  Platonic.  It  is  unquestionable 
that  our  age  does  not  naturally  express  itself  in  beautiful 
forms.  The  self-consciousness  of  modern  architecture 
1  Hegel,  Works,  Vol.  10,  Part  i. 


216         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

illustrates  well  the  doctrine  of  Plotinus  that  we  spoil  our 
creations  by  thinking  too  much  about  them.  But  it 
would  be  rash  to  assume  that  a  time  will  never  come 
when  we  shall  again  create  beautiful  things  without 
knowing  why  they  are  beautiful.  The  ugliness  of  our 
civilisation  can  hardly  be  set  down  to  the  fact  that  we 
have  advanced  beyond  the  artistic  mode  of  self-expression. 

Plotinus  is  not  very  happy  in  his  treatment  of  ugliness. 
Ugliness  is  not,  as  he  supposes,  absence  of  form  ;  it  is 
false  form.  The  ugliest  thing  in  nature,  a  human  face 
distorted  by  vile  passions,  revolts  us  because  the  evil 
principle  seems  there  to  have  set  its  mark  on  what  was 
meant  to  bear  the  image  of  God.  Ugliness  is  '  dirt  in  the 
wrong  place.'  This  is  in  effect  what  Plotinus  says  when 
he  tells  us  that  all  virtue  is  purification  ;  but  he  never 
admits  that  there  can  be  '  defilement  of  the  flesh  and 
spirit/  though  all  real  ugliness  consists  not  in  the  incrus- 
tation of  incorporeal  purity  by  something  alien  to  itself, 
but  in  indications  that  the  Soul  itself  has  been  stained 
and  perverted.  There  is  nothing  repulsive  in  the  sight 
of  a  marble  statue  half-covered  with  mud,  or  in  a  fine 
picture  blackened  with  dirt  and  smoke  ;  yet  this  is  the 
type  of  ugliness  which  Plotinus  gives  us  in  his  theory 
of  evil.  While  we  sympathise  with  his  determination  to 
make  no  compromise  with  metaphysical  dualism,  we 
cannot  help  feeling  that  his  optimistic  view  of  the  world 
causes  him  to  *  heal  slightly '  the  wounds  of  humanity, 
in  aesthetics  as  in  morals. 

But  there  is  deep  truth  in  this  philosophy  of  the 
Beautiful.  We  cannot  see  real  beauty  while  we  are 
wrapped  up  in  our  petty  personal  interests.  These  are 
the  muddy  vesture  of  decay,  of  which  we  must  rid  our- 
selves. Art  is  the  wide  world's  memory  of  things,  and 
beauty  is  the  universal  and  spiritual  making  itself  known 
sensuously,  as  Hegel  says.  ^Esthetic  pleasure  is  in  truth 
the  pleasure  of  recognition  and  consequent  liberation. 
The  soul  sees  the  reflection  of  its  own  best  self ;  and 
forthwith  enters  into  a  larger  life.  This  is  effected  by 


ETHICS,  RELIGION,  AND  ESTHETICS     217 

recognising  some  of  its  hidden  sympathies  in  nature. 
Very  much  of  the  pleasure  which  we  find  in  poetry  and 
painting  arises  from  brilliant  translations  of  an  idea  from 
one  language  to  another,  showing  links  between  diverse 
orders  of  being,  symbols  of  the  unseen  which  are  no 
arbitrary  types,  or  evidences  of  the  fundamental  truth 
about  creation,  that  the  universal  Soul  made  the  world 
in  the  likeness  of  its  own  principle,  Spirit.  Ultimately 
all  is  the  self-revelation  of  the  One  and  the  Good. 

Among  later  writers  on  aesthetics,  Schiller,  Schelling, 
Hegel,  Schopenhauer,  and  Hartmann  are  all  indebted 
to  Plotinus.  So  is  Goethe,  who  regards  the  unity  of  the 
True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good  as  the  absolute  ground 
of  all  Being.  Shaftesbury,  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  was  a  kindred  spirit.  He  finds  that  there  are 
three  orders  or  degrees  of  beauty — '  first,  the  dead  forms, 
which  have  no  forming  power,  no  action,  or  intelligence. 
Next,  the  forms  which  form  ;  that  is,  which  have  intelli- 
gence, action,  and  operation.  Thirdly,  that  order  of 
beauty  which  forms  not  only  such  as  we  call  mere  forms, 
but  even  the  forms  which  form.  For  we  ourselves  are 
notable  architects  in  Matter,  and  can  show  lifeless 
bodies  brought  into  form,  and  fashioned  by  our  own 
hands  ;  but  that  which  fashions  even  minds  themselves 
contains  in  itself  all  the  beauties  fashioned  by  those 
minds,  and  is  consequently  the  principle,  source,  and 
fountain  of  all  beauty.  Therefore  whatever  beauty 
appears  in  our  second  order  of  forms,  or  whatever  is 
derived  or  produced  from  thence,  all  this  is  eminently, 
principally,  and  originally  in  this  last  order  of  supreme 
and  sovereign  beauty.  Thus  architecture,  music,  and 
all  which  is  of  human  invention,  resolves  itself  into  this 
last  order/1 

It  is  not  easy  to  find  much  similarity  to  Plotinus  in 
the  aesthetic  theory  of  Croce,  which  is  just  now  attracting 
much  attention.  He  holds  that  beauty  does  not  belong 

1  Shaftesbury,  Moralists,  Part  3,  Sect.  2. 


218         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

to  things  ;  it  is  not  a  psychic  fact,  it  belongs  to  man's 
activity,  to  spiritual  energy.  Esthetic  activity  is 
imaginative  and  concrete  intuition,  as  opposed  to  the 
logical  and  general  conception.  It  belongs  to  the  Will, 
and  its  manifestations  are  Soul-states — passion,  senti- 
ment, personality.  '  These  are  found  in  every  art  and 
determine  its  lyrical  character/  Art  is  expression. 
Croce  insists  rightly  that  we  cannot  appreciate  a  work 
of  art  without,  in  a  sense,  reproducing  the  work  of  the 
artist  in  ourselves. 


LECTURE  XXII 
CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS 

I  HAVE  admitted  that  throughout  these  lectures  I  have 
studied  Plotinus  as  a  disciple,  though  not  an  uncriti-/> 
cal  one.  I  hold  that  this  is  the  right  attitude  towards  a 
great  thinker ;  and  if  an  ancient  philosopher  is  not  a 
great  thinker,  I  do  not  think  it  is  worth  while  to  spend 
several  years  in  studying  him.  I  should  not  care  to  write 
a  book  about  a  philosopher  whose  system  seemed  to  me 
entirely  out  of  date,  or  vitiated  by  fundamental  errors. 
Such  books  are  not  uncommon ;  but  they  seldom  really 
elucidate  the  thought  of  the  author  who  is  so  criticised, 
and  the  tone  of  superiority  which  they  assume  is  un- 
becoming. A  great  writer  has  a  message  for  other  times 
as  well  as  for  his  own  ;  but  in  order  to  bring  this  out  it  is 
by  no  means  incumbent  on  his  modern  expositor  to 
observe  the  same  proportions,  or  the  same  emphasis,  as 
his  author  ;  nor  need  he  be  afraid  of  using  modern  terms 
and  trains  of  thought  to  develop  speculations  which  his 
author  handles  only  as  a  pioneer.  I  know,  for  example, 
that  the  doctrine  of  reality  as  a  kingdom  of  values,  on 
which  I  have  laid  stress,  is  not  explicit  in  Plotinus  ;  and 
that  on  the  other  side  the  Platonic  and  Aristotelian 
categories  occupy  much  more  space  in  the  Enneads  than 
in  my  book  about  them.  But  I  have  tried  throughout 
to  deal  with  Neoplatonism  as  a  living  and  not  as  a  dead 
philosophy,  and  to  consider  what  value  it  has  for  us  in  the 
twentieth  century.  My  own  convictions  are,  of  course, 
derived  from  many  other  sources  besides  the  later  Greek 
philosophy,  and  I  may  have  sometimes  read  them  into 
my  author.  But  I  still  think  that  his  real  contribution 

219 


220         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTiNUS 

to  the  never-ending  debate  about  ultimate  truth  and 
reality  is  more  likely  to  be  brought  out  by  the  method 
of  respectful  discipleship  than  by  the  criticism  of  those 
who  have  been  content  to  classify  the  Enneads  among 
other  specimens  of  extinct  philosophies,  and  to  place 
their  author,  as  they  hope,  on  his  right  shelf  in  their 
collection  of  fossils. 

I  said  in  my  introductory  lecture  that  I  hoped  we 
might  find  in  Plotinus  some  message  of  comfort  in  our 
present  distress.  The  greater  part  of  my  book  was 
written  long  before  the  war,  and  the  materials  were  put 
together  without  any  direct  reference  to  contemporary 
problems.  It  was  indeed  a  pleasure  to  me  to  escape 
from  politics  and  controversies  into  a  purer  air.  When 
I  began  my  task,  our  civilisation  was  plethoric,  congested, 
dyspeptic.  The  complacent  and  sometimes  blatant  self- 
confidence  of  the  Victorian  Age  had  given  place  to  wide- 
spread and  growing  discontent.  The  great  accumula- 
tions of  a  hundred  prosperous  years  seemed  to  be  only 
apples  of  Sodom.  Universal  covetousness  had  out- 
stripped the  means  of  gratifying  it  ;  the  possessors  of 
wealth  were  frightened,  the  less  fortunate  majority  were 
sour  and  bitter.  The  ideas  on  which  the  great  industrial 
structure  was  based  were  becoming  discredited.  The 
thinly  veiled  materialism  of  nineteenth  century  science 
was  tottering  under  blows  dealt  from  every  side,  with  the 
result  that  a  coherent  though  very  unsatisfactory  phil- 
osophy of  life  had  lost  its  grip,  and  left  nothing  in  its 
place  but  a  sentimental  irrationaiism  and  scepticism, 
powerless  against  the  inroads  of  superstition  and  the 
waves  of  popular  emotion.  The  Government  of  the 
country  had  fallen  into  a  state  of  the  most  pitiable  im- 
becility, cowering  before  every  turbulent  faction,  and 
attempting  to  buy  off  every  threat  of  organised  lawless- 
ness. In  the  midst  of  great  outward  prosperity,  the 
symptoms  of  national  disintegration  had  never  been  so 
menacing.  Certain  idols  of  the  market-place  com- 
manded the  lip-service  of  the  politician  and  the  journalist ; 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  221 

but  of  robust  faith  and  clear  vision  there  was  Iktle  or 
none.  I  now  lay  down  my  pen  amid  more  tragic  scenes. 
Civilisation  lies  prostrate,  as  a  maniac  who  after  burning 
her  house  and  murdering  her  children  is  bleeding  to 
death  from  self-inflicted  wounds,  her  wealth  and  credit 
destroyed,  her  hopes  of  reasonable  and  orderly  progress 
shattered.  The  parallel  between  the  decay  of  our  social 
order,  the  beginning  of  which  I  think  we  are  now 
witnessing,  and  the  economic  ruin  of  the  Roman  empire 
in  the  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  centuries  seems  now  even 
closer  than  when  I  wrote  my  introductory  lecture.1  In 
particular,  the  fate  of  the  curiales,  the  middle  class,  in 
the  Roman  empire  is  likely  to  repeat  itself  in  this  country. 
That  unfortunate  bourgeoisie  was  saddled  with  nearly  the 
whole  weight  of  a  continually  increasing  taxation.  At 
last,  as  Sir  Samuel  Dill  tells  us,2  'the  curial's  personal 
freedom  was  curtailed  on  every  side.  If  he  travelled 
abroad,  that  was  an  injury  to  his  city ;  if  he  absented 
himself  for  five  years,  his  property  was  confiscated.  He 
could  not  dispose  of  his  property,  which  the  State  re- 
garded as  security  for  the  discharge  of  his  financial  obli- 
gations. The  curial  in  one  law  is  denied  the  asylum  of 
the  Church,  along  with  insolvent  debtors  and  fugitive 
slaves.  When  he  is  recalled  from  some  refuge  to  which 
he  has  escaped,  his  worst  punishment  is  to  be  replaced 
in  his  original  rank.  .  .  .  Many  fled  to  a  hermitage, 
others  hid  themselves  among  miners  and  lime-burners.'  3 
The  money  wrung  from  the  taxpayers  went  partly  for 
wars  and  the  army,  partly  to  a  host  of  officials,  and  partly 
in  doles  to  the  rabble  of  the  great  cities.  A  fiscal 
tyranny  hardly  less  galling  may  be  in  store  for  the  class 

1  Those  who  think  this  forecast  too  unfavourable  may  be  briefly 
reminded  (i)  that  we  have  mortgaged  our  economic  future  beyond  the 
possibility  of  redemption  ;  (2)  that  fraudulent  bankruptcy  is  no  remedy 
where  the  social  organism  rests  on  credit ;  (3)  that  the  conditions  which 
made  recovery  possible  after  1815 — cheap  labour,  thrifty  administra- 
tion, and  freedom  from  foreign  competition — are  conspicuously  absent. 

1  Roman  Society  in  the  Last  Century  of  the  Western  Empire,  p.  214. 

3  The  parallel  was  drawn  out,  before  the  war,  by  Mr.  Flinders  Petrie, 
in  his  little  book  called  Janus  in  Modern  Life, 


222         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

to  which  most  of  us  here  belong.  It  will  therefore  be 
our  wisdom  to  see  what  philosophy  can  do  for  us  in 
helping  us  to  bear  the  inevitable. 

If  we  consider,  in  the  light  of  Platonism,  the  causes 
which,  at  a  week's  notice,  turned  Europe  into  a  co- 
operative suicide  club,  we  are  driven  to  look  for  some 
super-individual  psychical  force,  and  it  is  tempting  to 
think  of  the  old  hypothesis  of  an  evil  World-Soul.  On 
this  plausible  theory,  the  race-spirit  is  an  irreclaimable 
savage  dressed  in  the  costume  of  civilisation,  who  has 
remained  morally  and  intellectually  l  on  the  level  of  the 
Stone  Age.  His  acquisitions  have  been  purely  external ; 
his  nature  has  not  been  changed.  Civilised  man,  we  may 
remind  ourselves,  when  at  peace  usually  devotes  that 
part  of  his  time  which  is  at  his  own  disposal  to  playing  at 
those  occupations  which  are  the  serious  business  of  the 
savage.  His  games  are  mock  battles  ;  his  sports  mock 
hunting ;  his  sacred  music  (a  cynic  might  say)  recalls 
the  howls  by  which  the  savage  tries  to  attract  the  atten- 
tion of  his  god.  But  from  time  to  time  he  grows  tired 
of  shams,  and  craves  for  the  real  thing,  hot  and  strong. 
So  Driesch  in  his  Gifford  lectures  says  that  '  mankind  is 
/always  advancing,  but  man  always  remains  the  same.' 
v  A  biologist  might  remind  us  that  since  there  is  no  natural 
selection  in  favour  of  morally  superior  types,  there  is  no 
reason  to  expect  any  real  progress  in  the  human  species. 

Now  it  is  quite  true  that  the  thought -habits  of  a  hun- 
dred thousand  years  are  not  likely  to  have  been  very 
much  modified  by  a  few  centuries  of  civilisation,  inter- 
rupted as  they  have  been  by  the  almost  unmitigated 
^  barbarism  of  the  Dark  Ages  between  Justinian  and  the 
twelfth  century.  But  all  pessimistic  estimates  of  human 
nature  based  on  survivals  of  savage  instincts  are  con- 
demned by  the  doctrine  which  Plotinus  asserts  as  strongly 

1  It  is  well  established  that  the  brain-capacity  of  the  Neanderthal 
race,  in  spite  of  their  ape-like  appearance,  was  as  great  as  that  of 
modern  Europeans,  while  the  Cro-Magnon  skulls  are  considerably 
above  the  average  of  any  existing  ract. 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  223 

as  Aristotle,  that  the  '  nature  '  of  everything  is  the  best 
that  it  can  grow  into  ;    and  that  the  best  of  human 
nature  is  divine.    We  have  to  remember  that  outbreaks 
of  moral   savagery  in   civilised   humanity   arc   neither 
normal  nor  habitual  nor  the  result  of  a  bad  will.    They 
no  longer  appear  without  stimulation  ;    they  are  not 
consciously  willed ;    they  are  now  a  disease.     On  the 
other  hand,  the  noble  qualities  of  heroism  and  self- 
sacrifice,  which  have  never  been  more  conspicuous  than 
in  the  course  of  this  tragedy,  are  consciously  willed  ; 
they  are  essential  parts  of  our  human  character  as  it  is. 
Our  complex  nature,  no  doubt,  contains  elements  which 
link  us  to  pre-human  ancestors  ;   the  transformations  of 
the  embryo  before  birth,  which  seem  to  recapitulate  the 
whole  course  of  biological  evolution,  are  a  proof  of  that  ; 
but  does  it  not  also  contain  anticipations  of  a  higher 
state  than  we  have  yet  reached,  but  which  we  have  a 
right  to  claim  as  human  because  we  find  it  manifested  in 
human  beings  ?    The  ascent  .of  the  soul  to  God,  which  is 
made  by  thousands  in  the  short  span  of  a  single  life,  may 
be  an  earnest  of  what  humanity  shall  one  day  achieve. 
Nor  is  it  quite  correct  to  deny  all  progress  within  the 
historical  period.    There  are,  after  all,  horrors  described 
in  the  Old  Testament,  in  Greek  history,  in  Roman  history, 
in  medieval  history,  which  only  the   Bolsheviks  have 
rivalled,  and  which  indicate  a  degree  of  depravity  which 
we  may  perhaps  hope  that  civilised  humanity  has  out- 
grown.   And  if  there  has  been  perceptible  progress  in  the 
last  two  thousand  years,  the  improvement  may  be  con- 
siderable in  the  next  ten  thousand,  a  small  fraction, 
probably,  of  the  whole  life  of  the  species.    The  Soul  of 
the  race  is  no  demon,  but  a  child  with  great  possibilities.1 
It  is  capable  of  what  it  has  already  achieved  in  the 
noblest  human  lives,  and  the  character  which  it  has 
accepted  as  the  perfect  realisation  of  the  human  ideal  is 
the  character  of  Christ. 

1   I  have  said  in  the  course  of  these  lectures  that  there  is  no  law  of 
progress.     But  there  is  no  law  which  forbids  progress. 


224         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

We  should  also  greatly  misapprehend  the  causes  of 
this  tragedy  if  we  sought  them  merely  in  atavistic  in- 
stincts. Hobbes  enumerates  the  causes  of  war  as  '  com- 
petition, distrust,  and  glory.1  We  should  supplement 
these  with  the  help  of  Plato's  diagnosis,  that  a  warlike 
atmosphere  indicates  disease  within  the  State.  In  this 
case  a  military  monarchy,  with  an  admirable  scientific 
organisation  for  peace  as  well  as  war,  found  itself  threat- 
ened by  intestine  troubles.  A  successful  war  seemed  to 
its  rulers  to  be  the  only  prophylactic  against  a  democratic 
revolution,  and  to  be  the  less  of  two  evils.  We  know 
what  Plato  thought  of  the  rule  of  the  '  stinged  drones,'  the 
demagogues  ;  and  we  may  perhaps  understand  him — 
and  the  Germans — better  ten  years  hence.  Our  opponents 
would  probably  have  preferred  to  keep  the  advantages  of 
military  organisation,  without  another  great  war.  But 
there  is  a  fatal  logic  about  militarism.  A  man  may  build 
himself  a  throne  of  bayonets,  but  he  cannot  sit  on  it  ; 
and  he  cannot  avow  that  the  bayonets  are  meant  to  keep 
his  own  subjects  quiet.  So  the  instrument  has  to  be 
used  ;  an  occasion  for  war  has  to  be  found  ;  and  the 
nation  has  to  be  sedulously  indoctrinated  with  fanatical 
patriotism,  and  hatred  or  contempt  for  the  alien.  Fear 
and  distrust  are  also  artificially  stimulated  ;  and  this  is 
easily  done.  As  Bentham  said  very  truly  about  his  own 
countrymen  :  '  The  dread  of  being  duped  by  other 
nations — the  notion  that  foreign  heads  are  more  able, 
though  at  the  same  time  foreign  hearts  are  less  honest 
A  than  our  own,  has  always  been  one  of  our  prevailing 
weaknesses.'  Patriotism,  once  kindled  into  a  flame,  has 
the  tremendous  power  of  all  spiritual  ideas.  In  our 
time  it  connects  itself  with  the  idea  of  nationality,  pro- 
ducing not  only  great  self-devotion,  but  inordinate  pride, 
and  esprit  de  corps  pushed  to  insanity.  The  present 
struggle  has  all  the  bitterness  and  blundering  cruelty  of 
religious  wars  ;  no  faith,  our  opponents  think,  need  be 
kept  with  the  enemies  of  their  god.  The  true  moral  is  that 
V  Videas  are  terrible  things  ;  they  are  stronger  than  private 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  225 

interest,  stronger  than  reason,  stronger  than  pity,  stronger 
than  conscience.  In  the  future  we  shall  see  a  great  con- 
flict between  the  idea  of  nationalism  and  that  of  inter- 
nationalism, which  divides  men  differently,  by  classes,  or 
religions,  or  types  of  culture.  We  shall  hear  again  such 
tirades  as  this  of  Lamartine  : 

'  Nations  !  Mot  pompeux  pour  dire  barbarie  I 
L'amour  s'arrdte  t'il  ou  s'arretent  vos  pas  ? 
Dechirez  ces  drapeaux,  une  autre  voix  vous  crie  : 
L'egoisme  et  la  haine  ont  seuls  une  patrie  ; 
La  Fraternity  n'en  a  pas/ 

But  we  shall  be  sadly  deceived  if  we  suppose  that 
internationalism,  any  more  than  nationalism,  means 
peace  and  goodwill. 

There  is  no  ground  for  pessimism  about  the  future  of 
the  race,  if  we  take  very  long  views  ;  and  there  is  every 
reason  to  hope  that  as  individuals  we  are  not  debarred 
from  the  highest  life.  '  Living  one's  own  life  in  truth  is , 
living  the  life  of  all  the  race,'  says  Tagore.  But  we  shall 
need  all  that  religion  and  philosophy  can  do  for  us  in  the 
troublous  time  which  certainly  awaits  us.  The  Stoic  and 
Pythagorean  disciplines  will  again  come  into  their  own. 
In  ancient  times  a  considerable  austerity  of  life  was 
expected  from  the  philosopher,  and  one  of  the  chief 
attractions  of  philosophy  was  that  it  made  its  votary 
indifferent  to  most  of  the  things  which  other  men  desire. 
For  us,  too,  to  get  rid  of  the  superfluous  will  be  the  only 
road  to  freedom.  But  it  should  be  a  Greek  austerity,  & 
beautiful,  well-ordered  and  healthy  life,  not  like  the 
squalor  (more  Cynic  than  Neoplatonic)  of  the  Emperor 
Julian  and  the  Christian  monks.  The  cult  of  the  simple 
life  is  difficult  only  when  it  is  left  to  a  few  eccentrics. 
When  it  is  professed  and  followed  by  a  whole  class,  it  is 
easy.  It  should  be  based,  as  it  was  in  antiquity,  on  a 
separation  of  real  from  factitious  wants.  As  soon  as  we 
cease  to  be  afraid  of  fashion  (of  <S6£d,  as  the  Greeks  said), 
we  can  cut  down  superfluities  right  and  left  without  being 
any  the  poorer  in  comfort  or  in  happiness.  The  cheerful 

II— Q 


226         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

acceptance,  by  the  richer  classes  in  this  country,  of  the 
loss  of  all  the  luxuries  and  comforts  to  which  they  are 
accustomed,  is  a  good  omen  for  the  future.  It  does  not 
detract  from  the  nobility  of  their  conduct  to  say  that 
they  have  found  these  sacrifices  easier  to  bear  than  they 
expected.  Our  motive  must  not  be  the  selfish  one  of 
making  ourselves  invulnerable.  We  have  a  precious 

^tradition  to  preserve  at  all  costs — the  deposit  of  truth 
committed  to  the  Hebrews,  the  Greeks,  and  the 
Romans,  which  is  now  threatened  by  a  collapse  of 
authority  which  may  end  in  barbarism.  What  the  Church 

^did  in  the  Dark  Ages,  the  combined  forces  of  Chris- 
tianity and  humanism  must  do  now.  We  need  a  class 
withdrawn  from  the  competitive  life.  The  struggle 
for  existence,  when  individual,  sharpens  a  man's  faculties 
and  develops  his  intelligence  ;  the  collective  struggle 
tends  to  make  a  man  a  mere  cog  in  a  machine  and 
narrows  him  to  a  poorer  life.  And  yet  individual  com- 
petition is  only  an  inchoate  stage  towards  group-com- 
petition ;  the  right  to  combine  is  the  logical  develop- 
ment of  laisser  faire ;  the  strike,  and  war,  are  its 
fruits.  Unrestricted  competition,  it  appears,  must  end  in 
civil  and  international  war.  Group-competition  sinks 
from  inanition  in  the  absence  of  external  danger,  and  the 
group  organised  for  competition  decays  rapidly  when 
this  stimulus  is  withdrawn  ;  on  the  other  hand,  when 
the  competition  is  acute  and  effective,  the  competitors 

.destroy  each  other,  or  the  victor  becomes  parasitic  on 

'•the  vanquished  and  at  last  disappears.  Hence  the  only 
final  integration  is  a  spiritual  one,  for  spiritual  move- 
ments are  non-competitive,  and  on  this  plane  only  is  there 
real  community  of  interests.  Moral  progress  is  only 
possible  by  the  resistance  of  individuals  to  herd-instincts, 
and  the  resistance  itself  is  a  movement  of  the  race-spirit ; 
there  are  no  really  independent  thinkers.  It  is  a  struggle 
for  self -adaptation  to  a  changing  environment.  Our 
task  is  very  much  the  same  as  that  which  was  laid  on 
Plotinus  and  his  successors  in  their  day.  They  also  had 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  227 

a  precious  tradition  to  preserve  ;  and,  as  happens  so 
often  in  human  life,  they  won  their  victory  through 
apparent  defeat.  They  resisted  Christianity,  and  were 
beaten  ;  but  the  Church  carried  off  so  much  of  their 
honey  to  its  own  hive  that  Porphyry  himself  would  have 
been  half  satisfied  if  he  had  seen  the  event.  For  us,  the 
whole  heritage  of  the  past  is  at  stake  together ;  we 
cannot  preserve  Platonism  without  Christianity,  nor 
Christianity  without  Platonism,  nor  civilisation  without 
both. 

Neoplatonism  differs  from  popular  Christianity  in  that 
it  offers  us  a  religion  the  truth  of  which  is  not  contingent/ 
on  any  particular  events,  whether  past  or  future.  It 
floats  free  of  nearly  all  the  '  religious  difficulties  '  which 
have  troubled  the  minds  of  believers  since  the  age  of 
science  began.  It  is  dependent  on  no  miracles,  on  no 
unique  revelation  through  any  historical  person,  on  no 
narratives  about  the  beginning  of  the  world,  on  no 
prophecies  of  its  end.  No  scientific  or  historical  dis- 
covery can  refute  it,  and  it  requires  no  apologetic  except 
the  testimony  of  spiritual  experience.  There  is  a  Christian 
philosophy  of  which  the  same  might  be  said.  There  are 
Christians  who  believe  in  the  divinity  of  Christ  because 
they  have  known  Him  as  an  indwelling  Divine  Spirit ; 
who  believe  that  He  rose  because  they  have  felt  that  He 
has  risen  ;  who  believe  that  He  will  judge  the  world  be- 
cause He  is  already  the  judge  of  their  own  lives.  Such 
independence  of  particular  historical  events,  some  of 
which  are  supported  by  insufficient  evidence,  gives  great 
strength  and  confidence  to  the  believer.  But  it  does  not 
satisfy  those  who  crave  for  miracle  as  a  bridge  between 
the  eternal  and  temporal  worlds,  and  who  are  not  happy 
unless  they  can  intercalate  '  acts  of  God  '  into  what  seems 
to  them  the  soulless  mechanism  of  nature.  Christianity, 
however,  is  essentially  a  struggle  for  an  independent 
spiritual  life,  and  it  can  only  exert  its  true  influence  in  the 
world  when  it  realises  that  spiritual  things  are  spiritually 
discerned,  and  when  it  stands  on  its  own  foundations, 


228         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

without  those  extraneous  supports  which  begin  by 
strengthening  a  religion  and  end  by  strangling  it. 

In  most  other  respects  the  two  systems  are  closely 
allied.  Neoplatonism,  like  Christianity,  gives  us  a  clear 
and  definite  standard  of  values,  absolute  and  eternal. 
What  this  standard  is  has,  I  hope,  been  sufficiently  shown 
by  quotations  in  these  lectures.  It  may  be  objected  that 
Plotinus  gives  us  only  principles  and  outlines,  without 
imparting  much  help  in  concrete  problems,  such  as  the 
choice  of  a  profession,  the  use  of  money,  and  the  political 
duties  of  a  citizen.  The  same  criticism  might  be,  and 
has  been,  brought  against  the  ethics  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment. But  the  man  who  studies  Plotinus  as  a  moral 
guide  will  not  often  be  at  a  loss  except  in  problems  which 
it  is  not  the  province  of  religion  or  philosophy  to  solve. 
The  vitally  important  thing  is  that  we  should  believe  in 
Goodness,  Truth,  and  Beauty  as  Divine  and  absolute 
principles,  the  source  and  goal  of  the  whole  cosmic 
process,  and  not  as  imaginings  of  the  human  mind,  or 
ideal  values,  which  have  no  existence.1 

Closely  connected  with  this  faith  in  absolute  values  is 
that  conception  of  eternal  life  which  has  been  discussed, 
perhaps  at  disproportionate  length,  in  these  lectures.  I 
know  that  some  of  my  hearers  and  readers  will  probably 
think  that  I  have  been  too  ready  to  separate  immortality 
from  the  quality  of  duration,  and  to  sink  individuality 
in  the  all-embracing  life  of  soul  and  spirit.  As  regards 
the  first,  I  agree  that  our  accepted  methods  of  moral 
valuation  assume  that  duration  has  a  meaning  and  value 
for  the  life  of  spirit.  We  prefer  what  we  call  the  higher 
goods  partly  because  we  find  that  they  are  the  most  dur- 
able ;  and  the  idea  of  teleology  is  inseparable  from  that 
of  value.  Persistence,  as  I  have  said,  seems  to  be  the 
time-form  of  eternity,  and  progress  the  time-expression 
of  the  Divine  goodness.  With  regard  to  our  individuality, 

1  Mr.  Clutton  Brock's  new  book  (1918),  Studies  in  Christianity,  is 
excellent  on  this  subject.  He  shows  that  for  a  Christian  'absolute 
value  '  and  '  love  '  are  the  same  thing. 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  229 

Plotinus  would  not  object  to  the  statement  that  spirit  is 
individual  in  each  of  us,  because  it  is  potentially  all  in 
each  of  us.  To  deny  the  individuality  of  spirit  would  be 
to  believe  in  votjrd  without  i/ou? ;  and  we  are  often  warned 
against  supposing  that  the  Great  Spirit,  or  the  Universal 
Soul,  is  split  up  among  individual  spirits  or  souls.  The 
'  offspring  '  of  spirit  is  not  fragmentary  spirit -life,  but  souls 
living  in  worlds  half -realised.  In  ethics,  the  sense  of 
guilt  is  the  awful  guardian  of  our  personal  identity,  but 
the  sense  of  forgiveness  is  the  blessed  assT^ance  that  we 
are  sharers  in  a  higher  personality  than  the  self  that  sins. 
The  great  difficulty,  how  to  account  for  individuation,  is 
lessened  when  we  think  of  the  individual  focus  as  poten- 
tially all-embracing.  We  are  limited,  not  so  much  because  , 
we  are  distinct  individuals  as  because  we  are  half-baked 
souls.  The  perfect  man  would  not  be  less  perfect  because 
he  lived  in  a  particular  century  and  country.  A  broad 
mind  is  not  cramped  by  a  narrow  sphere.  We  should  not 
be  wiser  if  we  lived  in  a  dozen  scattered  bodies.  It  seems 
to  me  that  when  Bradley  finds  finite  centres  '  inexplic- 
able/ and  when  he  is  driven  to  say  that  '  the  plurality  of 
souls  is  appearance  and  their  existence  is  not  genuine/ 
his  difficulty  is  caused  by  his  theory  that  the  absolute 
'  divides  itself  into  centres/  which  is  surely  impossible.1 
The  notion  -that  all  individuals  are  (as  it  were)  shaken  up 
together  in  a  bag,  the  absolute,  thus  neutralising  each 
other's  defects,  seems  very  crude.  Plotinus,  I  venture  to 
think,  navigates  successfully  the  narrow  channel  between 
these  rocks  and  the  opposite  error  of  pluralism.  The  soul 
needs  real  otherness  ;  else  there  could  be  no  love,  and  no 
worship  ;  but  it  needs  also  real  identity,  and  for  the  same 
reason. 

Neoplatonism  respects  science,  and  every  other  activity  / 
of  human  .reason.     Its  idealism  is  rational  and  sane 
throughout.    The  supremacy  of  the  reason  is  a  favourite 
theme  of  the  Cambridge   Platonists  of  the  seventeenth 

1   cf.  Pringle-Pattison,  The  Idea  of  God,  p.  287,  who  comments  on 
the  similar  treatment  of  the  problem  by  Lotze  and  Bosanquet. 


230         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

century,  who  had  drunk  deep  of  the  Neoplatonic  spirit. 
'  Sir,  I  oppose  not  rational  to  spiritual/  writes  Whichcote 
to  Tuckney,  '  for  spiritual  is  most  rational/  And  again, 
'  Reason  is  the  Divine  governor  of  man's  life  ;  it  is  the 
very  voice  of  God/  l  The  difference  between  this  rever- 
ence for  man's  intellectual  endowments,  which  always 
characterises  true  Platonism,  and  the  sentimental, 
superstitious  emotionalism  of  popular  '  mysticism  '  is 
much  more  than  a  difference  of  temperament.  It  is 
because  he  is  in  rebellion  against  nature  and  its  laws,  or 
because  he  is  too  ignorant  or  indolent  to  think,  that  the 
emotionalist  flies  to  the  supernatural  and  the  occult. 
Very  difficult  is  the  Platonic  spirit,  which  breathes  in 
such  acts  of  devotion  as  this  of  Wordsworth  : 

'  Wisdom  and  Spirit  of  the  Universe  ! 
Thou  Soul,  that  art  the  eternity  of  thought ! 
And  givest  to  forms  and  images  a  breath 
And  everlasting  motion  !   not  in  vain, 
By  day  or  starlight,  thus  from  my  first  dawn 
Of  childhood  didst  thou  intertwine  for  me 
The  passions  that  build  up  our  human  soul, 
Not  with  the  mean  and  vulgar  works  of  man, 
But  with  high  objects,  with  enduring  things, 
With  life  and  nature,  purifying  thus 
The  elements  of  feeling  and  of  thought, 
And  sanctifying  by  such  discipline 
Both  pain  and  fear/ 

^But  while  reverencing  the  natural  order  as  the  modus 
operandi  of  the  universal  soul,  Neoplatonism  asserts  con- 
sistently that  the  world  as  seen  by  the  spiritual  man  is  a 
very  different  world  from  that  which  is  seen  by  the  carnal 
man.  Spiritual  things  are  spiritually  discerned  ;  and 
the  whole  world,  to  him  who  can  see  it  as  it  is,  is  irradiated 
by  Spirit.  A  sober  trust  in  religious  experience,  when 
that  experience  has  been  earned,  is  an  essential  factor  in 
Platonic  faith.  Our  vision  is  clarified  by  the  conquest  of 
fleshly  lusts,  by  steady  concentration  of  the  thoughts, 
will,  and  affections  on  things  that  are  good  and  true  and 
lovely  ;  by  disinterestedness,  which  thinks  of  no  reward, 
1  See  my  Christian  Mysticism,  p.  20. 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  231 

and  by  that  progressive  unification  of  our  nature  which 
in  the  Gospels  is  called  the  single  eye.  '  It  is  everywhere 
the  whole  mind/  says  Lotze,  '  at  once  thinking,  feeling, 
and  passing  moral  judgments,  which  out  of  the  full  com- 
pleteness of  its  nature  produces  in  us  these  unspoken  first 
principles.'  Julian  of  Norwich  says  the  same  thing  in 
simpler  and  nobler  words  :  '  Our  faith  cometh  of  the 
natural  love  of  the  soul,  and  of  the  clear  light  of  our 
reason,  and  of  the  steadfast  mind  which  we  have  of  God 
in  our  first  making.'  *  There  are  three  avenues  to  the 
knowledge  of  God  and  of  the  world  and  of  ourselves — 
purposive  action,  reasoning  thought,  and  loving  affec- 
tion, a  threefold  cord  which  is  not  quickly  broken.  To 
quote  Wordsworth  again  : 

'  We  live  by  admiration,  hope,  and  love, 
And  even  as  these  are  well  and  wisely  fixed, 
In  dignity  of  being  we  ascend.' 

So  the  whole  of  Platonism,  on  its  religious  side,  may  be 
summed  up  in  the  beatitude,  '  Blessed  are  the  pure  in 
heart,  for  they  shall  see  God/  For,  in  the  words  of 
Smith,  the  Cambridge  Platonist, '  Such  as  men  themselves 
are,  such  will  God  appear  to  them  to  be/ 

If  we  see  things  as  they  are,  we  shall  live  as  we  ought ; 
and  if  we  live  as  we  ought,  we  shah1  see  things  as  they  are. 
This  is  not  a  vicious  circle,  but  the  interplay  of  contempla- 
tion and  action,  of  Oewpla  and  irpa£*?,  in  which  wisdom 
consists.  Action  is  the  ritual  of  contemplation,  as  the 
dialectic  is  its  creed.  The  conduct  of  life  rests  on  an  act  of 
faith,  which  begins  as  an  experiment,  and  ends  as  an 
experience.  Platonism  affirms,  no  doubt,  a  very  deep 
optimism  ;  it  claims  that  the  venture  of  faith  is  more  than 
justified  ;  but  has  anyone  who  has  tried  it  left  on  record 
that  the  experiment  has  failed  ? 

Nevertheless,  it  is  the  extreme  optimism  of  the  Neo- 
platonic  creed  which  gives  us  pause.  Are  there  not 
certain  stubborn  facts  in  life,  facts  more  than  ever 

1  See  my  Personal  Idealism  and  Mysticism,  p.  4. 


232         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

apparent  just  now,  for  which  it  fails  to  account  ?  Would  a 
perfectly  good  and  wise  man  see  the  world  we  live  in  as  it 
is  and  pronounce  that  '  it  is  very  good  '  ?  Would  he  not, 
in  proportion  to  the  clearness  of  his  vision  of  what  the 
world  ought  to  be,  be  filled  with  grief,  pity,  and  indigna- 
tion at  what  it  is  ?  The  brave  man  may  conquer  his  own 
fears,  and  make  light  of  his  own  misfortunes  ;  but  ought 
he,  like  the  Stoic  sage,  to  practise  benevolence  without 
pity,  acquiescence  in  inevitable  evil  without  revolt,  and 
to  love  the  Lord  without  hating  the  thing  that  is  evil  ? 
v  Plato  recognised  that  we  cannot  get  rid  of  moral  evil 
without  pain.  But  how  slight  is  the  emphasis,  and  how 
little  he  grasps  the  law  of  vicarious  suffering  !  The  Cross 
is  '  foolishness  to  the  Greeks/  as  St.  Paul  says.  And  yet 
the  place  which  Plotinus  gives  to  Love  should  have 
carried  him  all  the  way.  If  the  vision  of  the  Godhead  is 
reserved  for  the  '  spirit  in  love/  it  follows  from  the 
principles  of  this  philosophy  that  God  is  love  ;  for  we  can 
only  see  what  we  are.  But  if  God  is  love,  He  must  '  de- 
clare His  almighty  power  most  chiefly  in  showing  mercy 
and  pity ' ;  He  must  reveal  Himself  most  fully  in  the 
supreme  activity  of  love,  that  is,  self-sacrifice.  If  this 
is  admitted,  it  follows  that  the  most  inalienable  and 
distinctive  attribute  of  Divinity  is  no  longer  deathless- 
ness,  or  unlimited  power  or  freedom  from  inner  per- 
turbation ;  it  is  sympathy,  and  willingness  to  suffer  for 
others.  If  this  is  the  character  of  the  Deity,  it  must  be 
our  ideal,  for,  as  Plotinus  says, '  our  aim  is  not  to  be  with- 
out sin,  but  to  be  what  God  is/  Suffering  must  be  either 
accepted  or  shirked  by  every  man  in  a  world  where  'truth's 
for  ever  on  the  scaffold,  wrong  for  ever  on  the  throne/1 
We  have  seen  that  other  religions  besides  Christianity 
worshipped  a  suffering  and  even  a  dying  God  ;  but  the 
Neoplatonist  would,  I  fear,  have  shrunk  from  such  a  doc- 
trine with  horror,  or  dismissed  it  with  contempt.  It  would 
have  seemed  to  undo  all  the  work  of  deliverance  which 
his  philosophy  had  built  up  for  him,  and  to  plunge  him 

1  Lowell. 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  233 

back  into  the  slough  of  despond,  the  morass  of  pleasures 
and  pains.  How  can  a  perfectly  good  man,  much  more  a 
God,  feel  pain  and  grief  ?  Is  he  unable  to  control  these 
emotions,  or  is  he  dissatisfied  with  the  inevitable  opera- 
tions of  nature,  which  the  sage  accepts  as  preordained  ? 
Can  a  Divine  creator  be  dissatisfied  with  his  own  work,  and 
submit  to  martyrdom  in  order  to  undo  the  evil  which  his 
own  laws  have  indirectly  caused  ? 

And  yet  until  we  accept  the  doctrine  that  vicarious 
suffering,  that  scandal  of  the  moral  world  on  the  theory 
of  individualism,  is  Divine,  the  sting  of  the  world's  evil 
remains  undrawn.  '  Vicarious  suffering,'  I  have  said 
elsewhere,1  '  which  on  the  individualist  theory  seems  so 
monstrous  and  unjust  as  to  throw  a  shadow  on  the 
character  of  God,  is  easy  to  understand  if  we  give  up  our 
individualism.  It  is  a  necessity.  For  the  sinner  cannot 
suffer  for  his  own  healing,  precisely  because  he  is  a  sinner. 
The  trouble  which  he  brings  on  himself  cannot  heal  his 
wounds.  Redemption  must  be  vicarious ;  it  must  be 
wrought  by  the  suffering  of  the  just  for  the  unjust.' 
Irenaeus  says  that  Christ,  '  for  His  immense  love  towards 
us,  was  made  what  we  are,  that  He  might  make  us  what  He 
is.'  Plotinus,  as  we  have  seen,  insists  that  no  man  may 
deliver  his  brother,  and  there  is,  of  course,  a  sense  in 
which  this  is  true  ;  but  it  seems  to  me  that  he  fails  to 
apply  his  doctrine  of  the  unity  and  solidarity  of  soul-life 
exactly  where  it  might  be  most  fruitful. 

Love  and  suffering  cut  the  deepest  channels  in  our  souls, 
and  reveal  the  most  precious  of  God's  secrets.  Even  in 
national  life  we  can  see  that  the  characteristic  utterances 
of  ages  of  prosperity — the  Augustan  Ages  of  history- 
are  less  penetrating  and  of  less  universal  significance  than 
those  which  have  been  wrung  from  nations  in  agony. 
The  uses  of  chastisement  have  been  often  celebrated. 
Plaio  in  the  Gorgias  argues  that  it  is  a  misfortune  to 
escape  punishment,  when  we  have  deserved  it  ;  Augus- 
tine says,  '  Nulla  poena,  quanta  poena  ! '  But  the  journey 
'  Personal  Idealism  and  Mysticism,  p.  178. 


234         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

which  brings  at  last  both  wisdom  and  salvation  is  not  a 
sad  one.  '  Hard  and  rugged  is  the  path  of  virtue,'  says 
Heriod,  '  at  first ;  but  when  one  comes  to  the  top,  it  is 
easy,  though  it  be  hard.' 

The  philosophy  which  holds  that  we  are  independent 
and  impervious  monads,  solida  pollentia  simplicitate 
makes  it  so  utterly  impossible  to  find  justice  in  the  world, 
that  some  of  our  pluralist s  have  fallen  back  on  the  old 
theory  of  a  limited,  struggling  God,  who  does  his  best  tc 
overcome  insuperable  obstacles.  This  dualism  corre- 
sponds to  the  attitude  of  the  pure  moralist,  who  is  occu- 
pied in  combating  evil  without  trying  to  account  for  it 
but  it  is  intolerable  both  for  philosophy  and  for  religion 
Platonism  and  Christianity  prefer  to  reject  individualism 
No  injustice  is  done  in  the  real  world,  because  the  indi- 
vidual who  is  the  subject  of  claims  is  an  abstraction,  and 
the  real  self,  the  soul,  is  willing,  for  a  time,  to  bear  the 
sins  and  sorrows  of  others.  In  the  language  of  Christi- 
anity, the  good  man  is  willing  to  '  fill  up,  for  his  part 
what  was  lacking  in  the  afflictions  of  Christ  for  his  Body's 
sake,  the  Church.'  And  the  sacrifice  is  effectual ;  the 
redemption  is  won.  Evil,  which  can  never  be  overcome 
by  evil,  can  be  overcome  by  good.  The  Christian  doc- 
trine that  if  one  soul  has  triumphed  completely  in  this 
combat,  all  share  in  the  victory,  is  quite  intelligible  or 
Neoplatonic  principles,  in  spite  of  the  sentence  in  th( 
Enneads  which  seems  to  glance  at  the  doctrine  in  c 
hostile  manner.1  It  is  not  intelligible  to  a  moderr 
individualist,  nor  can  it  be  defended  by  changing  it,  a« 
Western  theology  has  often  done,  into  a  forensic  trans- 
action. 

V  Humanity  needs  martyrs.  Plotinus  says  that  it  doe< 
not  much  matter  if  the  good  are  killed  by  the  bad,  for  11 
only  means  that  the  actors  change  their  masks ;  the 
good  man  does  not  really  die.  But  this  is  a  kind  o: 

1  Compare  the  remarkable  lines  of  Sophocles  : 
a.pK£iv  -yelp  ol/mat  KOVTI  pvplwv  /Jilav 

eKTlvov<rav,  ty  ftfvovs  ira-py. — O.  C.  498. 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  235 

docetism.  It  cheapens  the  sacrifice,  which  only  the  heroic 
victim  has  the  right  to  do.  Our  dying  soldiers  may  say 
and  feel, 

'  Nil  igitur  mors  est  ad  nos,  neque  pertinet  thilum ' ; 

but  we  must  not  say  it  for  them.1  The  evils  wrought  by 
sin  in  the  world  are  not  imaginary.  We  are  only  justified 
in  hoping  that  they  are  the  symptoms  by  which  the  disease 
may  work  itself  out.  The  disease  is  the  selfishness, 
stupidity,  and  moral  ugliness  which  obstruct  the  mani- 
festation in  the  world  of  the  Divine  attributes  of  goodness, 
wisdom,  and  beauty.  The  symptoms  are  the  suffering 
through  which  these  evils  are  recognised  as  evil.  The 
fact  of  suffering  is  not  an  evil  but  a  good,  since  it  is  the 
chief  means  of  progress,  of  which  it  implies  the  possibility. 
A  common  error  in  our  day  is  horror  at  the  symptoms  and 
neglect  of  the  disease. 

There  were  many  before  the  war  who  wished  to  be  y 
Christians  without  the  Cross ;  there  are  still  some,  but 
they  are  fewer.  The  soldier  and  the  soldier's  family  have 
learnt  the  lesson  without  difficulty ;  those  who  have 
used  the  war  to  increase  their  own  wages  or  profits  have 
yet  to  learn  it.  The  jealous  determination  not  to  put 
into  the  common  stock  a  pennyworth  more  than  we  are 
allowed  to  take  out  of  it  has  embittered  modern  life  more 
than  any  economic  inequalities. 

Human  happiness  depends  on  the  ratio  between  the 
human  costs  of  living  and  the  return  which  we  get  for 
them  ;  and  human  costs  are  very  different  from  work 
and  wages.  They  are  determined  by  our  standard  of 
values.  Who  are  the  happiest  people,  so  far  as  we  can 
judge  ?  I  should  say,  the  real  Christians,  whose  affec- 
tions are  set  on  things  above  ;  whose  citizenship  is  in 
heaven  ;  whose  thoughts  are  occupied  with  things  that 
are  pure,  noble,  and  of  good  report ;  who  believe  that  all 
things  work  together  for  good  to  those  who  love  God  ; 

1  Plotinus  himself  says  that  the  indifference  of  the  soldier  to  death 
is  a  proof  that  the  Soul  knows  itself  to  be  indestructible.  This, 
I  think,  is  true. 


236         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

and  whose  labour  is  costless  to  themselves,  because  it  is  ; 
labour  of  love.  Next  to  these,  the  happiest  are  thos 
whose  lives  are  devoted  to  some  great  super-persona 
interest,  such  as  science,  art,  literature,  or  philosophy 
And  thirdly,  those  who,  without  any  clear  vision,  follo\ 
duty  as  the  '  stern  daughter  of  the  voice  of  God/  an< 
strive  to  '  live  ever  in  their  great  Taskmaster's  eye. 
And  who  are  the  most  unhappy  ?  The  selfish,  especiall; 
the  envious,  the  grasping,  and  the  fearful.  These  ar 
the  men  whose  work,  whether  well  paid  or  ill,  costs  then 
most ;  and  no  social  readjustments  can  satisfy  them 
because  such  desires  are,  as  Plato  says,  insatiable  an< 
incapable  of  being  gratified.  Envy  especially  is  a  passio] 
to  which  no  pleasure  is  attached.  Unhappy  also  are  the; 
who  worship  the  various  idols  of  the  market-place,  th 
fetishes  of  herd-morality.  In  proportion  as  their  devc 
tion  is  sincere,  they  must  feel  the  bitterness  of  disap 
point ment ;  where  it  is  insincere,  they  become,  Plotinu 
would  say,  like  the  parrots  and  monkeys  whom  the; 
imitate. 

Neglect  of  these  truths  has  thrown  our  whole  view  c 
life  out  of  perspective,  and  it  is  more  distorted  now  tha: 
in  times  which  it  is  fashionable  to  despise.  The  Purita] 
idea  was  that  productive  work  is  the  best  service  of  Goc 
the  task  for  which  we  were  sent  into  the  world,  to  prepar 
ourselves  for  the  rest  of  eternity.  By  attributing 
sacramental  virtue  to  secular  labour  they  made  a  rea 
ethical  advance  ;  for  this  is  what  we  miss  in  Platonisr 
and  Catholicism.  But  Puritanism  was  incapable  of  in 
telligent  self-criticism  ;  and  in  practice  led  to  a  vas 
accumulation  of  money  and  commodities  without  an; 
wisdom  in  using  them.  Protestant  civilisation  has  i 
consequence  been  ugly  and  tasteless,  and  all  classes  alik 
have  been  weighed  down  by  the  supposed  necessity  c 
satisfying  wants  which  in  reality  had  no  existence.  Ii 
defect  of  any  rational  standard  of  good,  a  merely  quantita 
tive  valuation  took  its  place.  The  success  of  a  nation  wa 
measured  by  its  statistics  of  trade  and  population,  thi 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  237 

success  of  a  man  by  the  number  of  pounds  sterling  that 
he  was  '  worth.'  Our  litanies  were  tables  of  figures  ;  the 
word  '  expansion  '  stirred  in  us  a  luscious  sense  of  pride. 
But  though  the  Puritan  ethics  were  unintelligent,  they 
were  not  entirely  out  of  touch  with  the  laws  of  nature, 
like  some  of  the  fetishes  which  we  now  delight  to  honour. 
There  has  never  been  a  time  when  the  ruinous  error  that 
we  can  revoke  the  laws  of  nature  by  ignoring  them  has 
been  more  prevalent  than  in  modern  social  politics. 
'  Science/  it  has  been  wisely  said,1 '  is  not  the  handmaid 
but  the  purgatory  of  religion  ' — and  of  politics.  A  bad 
philosophy  leaves  us  in  such  a  cruel  world  that  we  dare 
not  look  the  facts  in  the  face.  This  is  the  origin  of 
sentiment alism,  ultimately  the  most  merciless  of  all 
moods.  The  dethronement  of  these  modern  idols  is  one  of 
the  greatest  services  which  a  sound  philosophy  can  render 
to  humanity. 

But  how  shall  we  bring  our  criticism  of  life  to  bear  on 
the  chaotic  mass  of  prejudice,  sentiment  alism,  and 
cupidity  which  goes  by  the  name  of  public  opinion  ? 
Plotinus  will  tell  us  that  if  we  want  to  help  others,  we 
must  testify  that  which  we  have  seen.  No  one  needs 
more  than  the  Platonist  to  '  make  his  life  a  true  poem/ 
for  in  his  philosophy  moral  effort  and  moral  experience 
supply  the  materials  for  spiritual  intuition  and  creation. 
The  '  civic  virtues/  as  we  have  seen,  must  be  practised,  but 
as  a  kind  of  symbol  or  sacrament  of  the  eternal  order.  The 
philosopher,  Plato  thinks,  will  not  willingly  take  part  in  the 
politics  of  his  city,  but  will  live  as  a  citizen  of  '  his  own 
country,  of  which  a  type  is  laid  up  in  heaven/  Opinions 
may  differ  as  to  how  far  Plato's  good  man  can  mix  in 
politics  at  the  present  time  ;  but  unless  the  philosopher 
thinks  often  and  earnestly  how  he  may  help  to  build  a  city 
of  God  on  earth,  he  is  likely  to  miss  his  way  to  the  heavenly 
city.  It  would  be  a  worthy  and  fruitful  task  to  try  to 
work  out  some  of  the  problems  of  human  society  in  the 

1  By  the  late  A.  C.  Turner,  Fellow  of  Trinity,  Cambridge,  on  the 
Roll  of  Honour  in  this  war. 


238         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

light  of  Christian  Platonism.  The  difficulty  of  finding  a 
decent  form  of  civil  government  has  hitherto  baffled 
human  ingenuity.  This  unsolved  problem  has  been  and 
still  is  the  deepest  tragedy  of  history.  Nation  after  nation 
fails  to  answer  the  riddle  of  the  Sphinx,  and  is  hurled 
down  or  torn  in  pieces.  The  strength  and  weakness  of 
military  Monarchies  have  been  summarised  in  this 
lecture  ;  and  we  must  add  the  probability  that  the 
monarch  may  be  a  fool  or  a  knave.  Readers  of  the 
Republic  will  know  where  to  look  for  a  true  character 
of  Democracy.  Theocracy,  which  in  theory  should  be 
the  best  of  all  governments,  is  in  practice  one  of  the 
worst,  since,  except  in  brief  periods  of  spiritual  exalta- 
tion, the  priesthood  has  no  physical  force  behind  it,  and 
must  rely  on  superstition  and  bigotry,  which  accordingly 
have  to  be  stimulated  by  keeping  the  nation  in  ignorance 
and  intellectual  servitude.  The  problem  of  the  reformer 
is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  we  must  accept  the  heavy 
burdens  of  the  past.  The  wisest  man  can  only  achieve 
an  application  of  the  living  past  to  the  living  present. 
Plotinus,  as  we  have  seen,  expresses  no  preference  for 
one  form  of  government  over  another.  His  remedy  for 
all  social  evils  is  to  suppress  the  lusts  that  war  in  our 
members,  and  to  correct  our  standard  of  values,  remem- 
bering that  we  make  our  own  world,  by  the  reaction  of 
our  Soul  upon  its  environment,  and  of  the  environment 
upon  our  Soul.  Many  of  our  discontents  are  externalised 
soul-aches.  By  brooding  over  them  we  hurt  our  Souls 
and  immerse  them  in  '  Matter. '  A  restoration  of  internal 
and  external  peace  is  possible  only  when  we  rise  to  the 
vision  of  the  real,  the  spiritual  world.  When  we  consider 
the  achievements  of  any  nation  which  even  for  fifty 
years  has  grasped  a  fringe  of  the  mantle  of  God,  we  shall 
not  think  that  Christ,  or  Plato,  is  bidding  us  to  lose 
substance  for  shadow.  The  Soul  of  the  race  mocks  at 
the  triumphs  of  Sennacherib  and  Attila.  They,  and 
Cleon,  are  only  remembered  because  their  victims  have 
thought  it  worth  while  to  hold  them  up  to  infamy.  Human 


CONCLUDING  REFLECTIONS  239 

societies  arehappyin  proportion  as  they  have  their  treasure 
in  that  class  of  goods  which  are  not  lessened  by  being 
shared.  As  Proclus  says, '  Goods  that  are  indivisible  are 
those  which  many  may  possess  at  once,  and  no  one  is  worse 
off  in  respect  of  them  because  another  has  them.  Divisible 
goods  are  those  in  which  one  man's  gain  is  another  man's 
loss/1  This  is  after  all  the  truth  which  the  philosopher 
and  the  minister  of  religion  must  preach  incessantly  ;  for 
numquam  nimis  dicitur  quod  numquam  satis  discitur. 
Neither  those  who  bow  before  the  Crucified  nor  those 
who  venerate  the  hero  of  the  Phaedo  can  have  any  dealings 
with  the  men  who  wish  to  make  the  Christian  Church  the 
jackal  of  any  dominant  political  party.  Such  movements 
are  always  with  us.  They  fill  chapters  in  the  history  of 
ecclesiasticism,  but  they  have  no  connexion  with  either 
religion  or  philosophy. 

Is  there  any  marked  difference  in  the  upward  path,  as 
traced  by  the  Platonic  mystic,  and  other  schemes  which 
have  gained  wide  acceptance  ?  The  essence  of  Neo- 
platonic  mysticism  is  the  belief  that  the  Soul,  which  lives 
here  in  self-contradiction,  must  break  in  succession  every 
form  in  which  it  tends  to  crystallise.  This  is  where  it 
differs  most  from  Catholicism,  as  generally  taught. 
Catholicism  promises  peace  as  the  immediate  result  of 
submission  and  obedience,  and  even  Catholics  of  New- 
man's calibre  have  recorded  that  their  spiritual  journeys 
were  '  of  course  '  over,  and  their  mental  histories  at  an 
end,  when  they  came  to  rest  in  the  Catholic  fold.3  But 
for  the  mystic  there  is  no  halting-place,  no  rest  from  the 
striving  to  see  what  he  cannot  yet  see,  and  to  become  what 
as  yet  he  is  not.  To  stop  short  anywhere  is  to  leave  the 
quest  unfinished.  Cases  of  arrested  development  are  the 
rule,  not  the  exception.  The  world  arrests  most  of  us  ; 

1  Proclus,  in  Alcib.,  p.  439. 

1  I  do  not,  of  course,  mean  that  the  Catholic  '  counts  himself  to 
have  apprehended  '  before  his  probation  is  over.  But  the  search  for 
truth  is  not  put  before  him  as  an  abiding  motive.  I  do  not  think  that 
he  has,  qua  Catholic,  much  sympathy  with  Clement,  who  held  that  if 
the  saint  were  offered  the  choice  between  the  possession  of  truth  and 
the  search  for  it,  he  would  without  hesitation  choose  the  latter. 


240         THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 

the  Church  others.  Some  are  now  arrested  by  '  the 
social  state/  which  (says  Tarde)  '  is,  like  the  hypnotic 
state,  only  a  form  of  dream/  So  a  supra-social  philosophy 
is  often  called  unsocial ;  Plotinus,  like  other  mystics,  has 
incurred  this  censure.  To  the  Platonist,  all  earthly  forms 
of  association  are  at  best  adumbrations  of  a  true  society  ; 
he  cannot  give  himself  entirely  to  any  of  them.  He  must 
expect  to  outgrow  many  early  enthusiasms  before  the  end 
of  his  course,  For  this  life  is  a  '  schola  animarum,'  as 
Origen  said  ;  and  we  are  learners  to  the  end.  The  future 
is  hidden  from  us ;  but  through  the  darkness  the  light 
of  heaven  burns  steadily  before  us ;  and  we  know  that 
'  yonder/  amid  the  eternal  ideas,  of  Truth,  Goodness,  and 
Beauty,  is  our  birth-place  and  our  final  home. 

'  Si  n6tre  vie  est  moins  qu'une  journ6e 
En  1'eternel ;   si  1'an  qui  fait  le  tour 
Chasse  nos  jours  sans  espoir  de  retour ; 
Si  perissable  est  toute  chose  n6e  ; 
Que  songes-tu,  mon  ame  emprisonnee  ? 
Pourquoi  te  plait  1'obscur  de  notre  jour, 
Si,  pour  voler  en  un  plus  clair  sejour, 
Tu  as  au  dos  1'aile  bien  empennee  ? 
La  est  le  bien  que  tout  esprit  desire, 
La  le  repos  ou  tout  le  monde  aspire, 
La  est  1'amour,  la  le  plaisir  encore  ! 
La,  6  mon  ame,  au  plus  haut  ciel  guidee 
Tu  y  pourras  reconnaitre  1'idee 
De  la  beaute  qu'en  ce  monde  j 'adore.' 


ADDENDA 

VOL.  I 

Page  76.  Proclus  quotes  with  approval  the  saying  of 
lamblichus,  that  the  whole  theoretical  philosophy  of 
Plato  is  to  be  found  in  the  Timaeus  and  Parmenides. 

Page  86.  The  word  metempsychosis,  though  it  does 
not  accurately  describe  the  Neoplatonic  doctrine  of  re- 
birth, is  not,  as  is  sometimes  asserted,  a  modern  coinage. 
It  occurs  first  (I  think)  in  Proclus,  in  his  commentary  on 
Plato's  Republic  (Vol.  II,  p.  340,  Kroll's  edition). 

Page  145.  In  one  isolated  passage  (in  Timaeum,  147) 
Proclus  throws  out  an  interesting  suggestion  to  account 
for  some  of  the  ugliness  and  evil  of  the  world.  He  says 
that '  the  laughter  of  the  gods  gives  substance  to  the  con- 
tents of  the  world.'  It  is  the  myth  of  Ares  and  Aphrodite 
surprised  by  Hephaestus  which  suggests  this  theory  to 
him ;  but  I  have  often  thought  that  we  may  be  wrong 
in  not  admitting  a  sense  of  humour  in  the  Creator.  The 
absence  of  this  sense  is  accounted  a  defect  in  a  human 
character  ;  and  there  are  some  animals,  such  as  the 
mandrill,  the  hippopotamus,  and  the  skunk,  which  surely 
can  only  have  been  made  for  a  joke.  We  may  have  the 
same  suspicion  about  some  members  of  our  own  species. 
If  this  is  so,  the  laughing  philosophers  may  be  nearer  the 
truth  than  their  always  solemn  rivals,  and  we  may  allow 
ourselves  to  smile  at  some  misadventures  which  worry  the 
pure  moralist. 

Page  152.  Can  we  divide  the  imperfections  of  our  view 
of  the  world  into  two  classes — (i)  those  which  proceed 
from  error,  failure,  ignorance  in  ourselves,  (2)  those 

II.— R  241 


242        THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PLOTINUS 

which  proceed  from  the  fact  that  as  self-conscious  units 
we  are  involved  in  the  process  of  working  out  a  Divine 
idea  ?  We  should  not  even  wish  to  reach  the  goal  without 
traversing  the  course,  and  while  so  employed  we  are 
subject  to  psychic,  not  noetic  conditions.  Thus  we  must 
accept  time,  space,  and  evil  as  realities  for  us,  though 
we  know  that  they  are  not  so  for  Spirit.  The  fact  that 
for  us  Soul  is  tethered,  as  it  were,  to  a  particular  human 
life  shows  that  the  universal  Soul  is  not  conscious  in  us. 
Our  individual  souls  are  teleological  units,  each  working 
out  some  creative  thought.  '  We  '  are  that  creative 
thought  objectified.  (The  self-conscious  '  I '  is  much  less 
than  this.)  This  limitation  then  must  be  accepted  as 
necessary  in  this  life ;  we  look  to  a  more  '  glorious 
liberty '  when  our  task  is  done. 

Page  174.  Teleology  really  needs  no  proof ;  it  is 
almost  a  necessity  of  thought,  an  universal  postulate. 
It  is  the  time-form  of  value,  and  without  valuation  there 
can  be  no  thinking.  We  should  ask  ourselves  why  '  All's 
well  that  ends  well '  is  an  accepted  proverb,  and  '  All's 
well  that  begins  well '  an  absurdity.  Why  do  we  say, 
,  Respice  finem,'  and  '  Call  no  man  happy  before  he  dies  '  ? 
It  is  not  because  time  acquires  more  value  as  it  goes  on  ; 
it  is  because  every  process  has  a  meaning,  and  the  whole 
is  stultified  by  final  failure. 

Page  177.  On  continuity  or  evolution.  Damascius, 
one  of  the  later  disciples  of  Plotinus,  has  an  exceedingly 
interesting  passage  on  this  subject  (De  Principiis  §112), 
in  which  he  says  that  all  movement  is  discontinuous,  and 
progresses  '  by  leaps  '  (Kara  aX/xara).  This  sounds  like 
an  anticipation  of  the  modern  doctrine  (De  Vries,  &c.) 
of  evolution  by  mutations,  not  by  almost  imperceptible 
modifications  ;  but  it  has  a  metaphysical  importance,  as 
asserting  that  even  the  slightest  real  change  breaks 
continuity.  It  disposes  of  mechanical  causation.  So 
Leibnitz  says,  '  Le  principe  de  continuite  est  chez  moi ' ; 
it  is  psychic  or  spiritual.  Materialism,  if  consistent  with 


ADDENDA  243 

itself,  is  atomism  ;  the  essence  of  it  (including  all  monad- 
ism)  is  disconnexion.  So  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell  has  said 
that  '  all  monism  must  be  pantheistic,  all  monadism 
atheistic.'  Atomism,  no  less  than  materialism,  was  an 
object  of  Plotinus'  polemic.  It  is  inconsistent  not  only 
with  any  spiritual  philosophy,  but  with  any  doctrine 
of  evolution.  Darwinism,  properly  understood,  does  not 
naturalise  man  ;  it  spiritualises  nature  ;  it  is  a  doctrine 
of  final  causes.  '  Origins  '  and  '  Finalism  '  are  obviously 
the  same  road  viewed  from  the  two  ends.  Nineteenth- 
century  naturalism  was  a  revolt  against  the  ignava  ratio 
of  supernaturalism.  But  Neo-vitalism  is  in  danger  of  re- 
introducing  the  dualism ;  or  perhaps  it  shows  that  we 
have  not  yet  explained  the  dualism  in  experience,  out  of 
which  it  grows.  Driesch,  for  example,  sets  life  and 
mechanism  against  each  other,  and  speaks  of '  temporary 
suspensions/  which  are  too  much  like  miracles.  Tyndall, 
in  his  famous  address  (1874)  was  accused  of  materialistic 
atheism  because  he  found  in  Matter  '  the  promise  and 
potency  of  all  life/  But  this  is  objectionable  only  if  we 
identify  Matter  with  ponderable  stuff. 

Page  210.  Our  ideals  are  the  Logoi  which  shape  our 
lives  from  within. 

Page  216.  Krause,  like  Plotinus,  holds  that  the 
fellowship  of  higher  and  lower  is  immediate  and  direct ; 
between  beings  on  the  same  plane  it  is  mediate  and  in- 
direct. We  know  each  other  only  through  God. 

Page  228.  I  ought  to  have  said  that  some  ancient 
thinkers  appear  to  have  given  a  more  exalted  place  to 
<t>avra<ria.  Proclus,  on  Plato's  Republic  (p.  107),  says 
that  '  some  of  the  ancients  identify  ^avraa-i^  with  vow, 
while  others  distinguish  them,  but  say  that  there  is  no 
a<f>dvTacrTo$  i/oyw/  I  confess  that  this  statement 
surprises  me,  and  I  do  not  know  who  the  '  some  '  were. 
Proclus  says  that  there  is  a  double  vov?,  one  '  that  which 
we  are  ' ;  the  other  '  that  which  we  put  on/  The  latter 
is  '  the  imaginative  i/ofe/  before  which  '  the  daemons  who 


244        THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  PLOTINUS 

preside  over  nature  '  place  myths  and  ritual  and  religious 
symbols  of  all  kinds,  in  which  the  imaginative  vov$  finds 
delight.  The  myths  are  not  true  in  the  literal  sense,  but 
they  keep  the  Soul  in  contact  with  truth.  So  the  imagina- 
tion is  a  veritable  revealer  of  Divine  things.  He  adds 
the  very  remarkable  complaint  that  when  the  ancient 
mysteries  and  myths  were  believed  in, '  all  the  space  round 
the  earth  was  full  of  all  kinds  of  good,  which  the  gods 
give  to  men,  whereas  now,  without  them,  all  is  lifeless  and 
cut  off  from  the  light  of  heaven.'  Proclus  craved  for 
something  like  the  Catholicism  which  we  know.  '  Epais- 
sissez-moi  la  religion/  said  Madame  de  Sevigne,  '  dans  la 
crainte  qu'elle  s'evapore.'  Elsewhere  Proclus  says  that 
imagination  is  vov$  TIS  TraOtjTiKos,  hindered  in  its 
internal  activity  by  the  fall  into  Matter. 

Page  234.  The  passage  on  Soga,  at  the  end  of  Book  5 
of  Plato's  Republic,  is  often  ridiculed,  but  it  is  one  of  the 
keys  of  Platonism.  '  Opinion  '  has  as  its  subject-matter 
neither  full  reality  nor  the  completely  unreal,  but  a  field 
partly  real  and  partly  unreal.  Degrees  of  reality  are 
absurd  only  if  we  divorce  reality  from  value,  which  cannot 
be  done. 

Page  245.  '  My  Soul.'  Dr.  L.  P.  Jacks,  in  his  brilliant 
essay  called  '  The  Universe  as  Philosopher,'  says  very 
truly  that  we  seem  unable  even  to  think  except  in  terms 
of  proprietorship.  It  is  very  different  in  the  East.  For 
us,  riches  are  not  so  much  the  cause  of  our  forgetting 
God,  as  the  form  under  which  we  try  to  remember  Him. 
God  is  the  proprietor  of  the  world.  So  too  a  man  '  has  ' 
a  Soul,  an  experience,  a  personality.  '  Who  is  the  owner 
of  these  job-lots  ?  '  He  is  behind  the  scenes,  not  to  be 
found.  Why  again  does  a  man  talk  of '  my  religion,'  '  my 
philosophy,'  but  never  of  '  my  science  '  ?  The  possessive 
case  is  an  obsession  with  Western  thinkers. 
\L  Page  253.  The  harmony  achieved  by  the  Will  is  for 
ever  finite  and  incomplete.  Will  is  the  principle  of 
becoming,  become  self-conscious. 


ADDENDA  245 

VOL.  II 

Page  38.  Professor  Taylor  has  suggested  to  me  that 
'  understanding  '  would  be  the  best  equivalent  for  vo^a-is* 
Coleridge,  as  is  well  known,  chose  the  word  to  render 
Verstand,  a  lower  faculty  than  Vernunft  ;  but  it  might  be 
restored  to  its  proper  dignity. 

Page  87.  The  reference  is  to  a  fanciful  derivation 
(from  the  Cratylus)  of  Kpovos  from  KO'/OO?  and  */o£?. 

Page  103.  Mr.  Bosanquet's  words,  that  reliance  on  the 
future  has  become  a  disease,  may  be  illustrated  by  a 
passage  in  Carlyle's  '  Past  and  Present '  (Book  3,  chapter 
14).  '  Us  s'en  appelaient  a  .  .  .'  '  A  la  posterite  ?  '  '  Ah, 
Monsieur,  non,  mille  fois  non  !  They  appealed  to  the 
Eternal  God  ;  not  to  posterity  at  all !  C'etait  different/ 

Page  105.  Dialectic  is  the  logic  of  religion  which 
always  leads  us  beyond  our  premisses.  And  compare 
Bradley,  Logic,  Book  3,  Part  i,  chap.  2.  '  The  idea  that 
this  is  a  sort  of  experiment  with  conceptions  in  vacuo  is 
a  caricature.  .  .  .  The  opposition  between  the  real,  in 
that  fragmentary  character  in  which  the  mind  possesses 
it,  and  the  true  reality  felt  within  the  mind,  is  the  moving 
cause  of  the  unrest  which  sets  up  the  dialectic  process. 
.  .  .  The  process  goes  on  till  the  mind,  therein  implicit, 
finds  a  product  which  answers  its  unconscious  idea  ;  and 
here,  having  become  in  its  own  entirety  a  datum  to  itself, 
it  rests  in  the  activity  which  is  self-conscious  in  its  object/ 

Page  113.  Bradley 's  '  absolute  experience '  corre- 
sponds closely  to  Plotinus'  aOpoa  e7ri/3o\ri' 

Page  128,  note.     For  Timaeus  read  Second  Epistle. 

Page  145.  The  '  Spirit  in  love '  is  not  in  a  state  of 
passive  emotion.  Proclus  says,  o  ju.ev  6eio<f  e/ow?  evepyeia 
ea-nv,  just  as  Spinoza  says,  '  Mentis  amor  intellectuals 
ergaJDeum  actio  est/ 

is  Page  169,    The  idealist  who  is  not  somethinb  of  an 
ascetic  is  generally  a  dilettante  or  a  self-deceiver. 


246        THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  PLOTINUS 

Page  191.  It  appears  sometimes  as  if  Plotinus  were 
oblivious  of  those  social  organisms  which  come  between 
the  individual  and  the  universal  Soul.  Proclus  cannot 
be  charged  with  this  defect.  In  his  treatise  De  Decem 
Dubitationibus,  which  only  survives  in  a  medieval  Latin 
translation,  he  says  :  '  Omnis  civitas  et  omne  genus  unum 
quodque  animal  est  maiori  modo  quam  hominum  unus 
quisque,  et  immortalius  et  sanctius.' 

Page  197.  The  later  Neoplatonists  believed  in  an  order 
of  '  angels,'  superior  to  the  daemons,  who  operate  on  the 
plane  of  vov$}  as  the  daemons  on  that  of  ^i/xv.  The  angels 
are  specially  commissioned  to  liberate  the  Soul  from 
Matter.  Proclus  even  argues  that  Plato  knew  of  the 
angels,  so  that  the  belief  in  them  is  not  derived  from 
'  barbarous  '  (i.e.  Christian)  sources.  See  references  in 
the  index  to  Kroll's  edition  of  Proclus  on  the  Republic. 
There  are  several  passages  in  Proclus  where  TrvevfjLara  and 
seem  to  be  identical. 


Page  213.  The  Sublime  is  the  symbol  of  abstract  Will  ; 
it  suggests  to  us  contending  forces  held  in  check  by  mighty 
power.  This  impression  is  often  conveyed  by  inorganic 
masses,  which  are  prevented  from  being  merely  beautiful 
by  an  element  of  TO 


Page  215.  The  later  Neoplatonists  rebelled  against 
Plato's  disparagement  of  art  and  poetry.  Proclus  says 
that  Plato  is  himself  as  true  a  poet  as  Homer,  and  that 
he  would  certainly  have  been  turned  out  of  his  own 
Republic. 

Page  226.  I  agree  with  the  concluding  words  of  Dr. 
A.  J.  Hubbard's  thoughtful  book,  The  Fate  of  Empires. 
'  That  which  is  temporal  is  never  an  end  in  itself,  but 
becomes  only  the  means  of  expressing  the  cosmocentric 
purpose  of  our  lives.  Thus  a  true  and  stable  civilisation 
can  never  be  more  than  a  by-product  of  religion.  It  is 
to  be  attained  by  those  alone  by  whom  it  is  not  sought  : 
and  we  see  that  in  the  long  run  the  world  belongs  to  the 


ADDENDA  247 

unworldly ;  that  in  the  end  empire  is  to  those  to  whom 
empire  is  nothing ;  and  we  remember  with  a  sense  of 
awe  the  most  astonishing  of  the  Beatitudes  :  Blessed  are 
the  meek,  for  they  shall  inherit  the  earth/  Dr.  Hubbard's 
main  thesis  is  the  view  which  is  also  taken  by  Mr.  Whit- 
taker  (The  Neoplatonists,  p.  269),  that  in  human  history 
'  the  choice  has  been  between  Egyptian  or  Byzantine 
[or  Chinese]  fixity  on  the  one  hand,  and  movement 
through  upheavals  and  submergences  on  the  other/ 

Page  236.  I  am  more  and  more  convinced  that  Chris-  l 
tianity  as  a  religious  philosophy  is  a  development  from 
the  later  Platonism,  which  contains  Aristotelian  and 
Stoical  elements.  Calvinism  is  simply  baptised  Stoicism, 
and  accordingly  it  has  a  place,  though  not  very  securely, 
within  Christianity.  Mr.  E.  V.  Arnold,  in  his  able  book 
Roman  Stoicism,  emphasises  (I  think  rather  too  much)  the 
Stoical  element,  especially  in  St.  Paul.  But  it  is  difficult 
to  separate  Latin  Stoicism  and  Latin  Platonism.  The 
adoption  of  the  Stoical  -rrvev/ma  for  vov$  by  the  Christians 
is  certainly  significant.  The  creed  of  many  modern 
scientists  has  affinities  to  Stoicism  and  Calvinism.  Other 
philosophies,  such  as  Epicureanism,  Indian  pantheism, 
Persian  dualism,  modern  pluralism,  agnosticism,  seem 
to  me  to  resist  any  attempt  to  Christianise  them.  It 
would  clarify  our  ideas  about  Christianity  if  we  recog- 
nised that  it  is  based  on  a  definite  view  of  the  world,  which 
is  not  universally  accepted,  but  which  forms  the  basis  not 
only  of  a  religion  but  of  the  greatest  of  all  philosophies. 
We  should  then  be  able  to  discriminate  between  the  vital 
part  of  Christianity  and  the  superstructure  which  belongs 
to  the  history  of  ecclesiasticism  rather  than  of  religion. 
The  all-important  modification  of  Platonism  which  we 
owe  to  Christ  Himself  has,  I  hope,  been  emphasised 
sufficiently  in  these  lectures. 


INDEX 


Absolute  (rb  &/,  rd  irpurov,  rb  ayad6i>) 
104-162.  The  Path  of  Dialectic, 
105-107  ;  the  Absolute  as  the  One, 
107-109 ;  as  beyond  existence, 
109-116  ;  as  infinite,  116-118  ;  as 
First  and  Final  Cause,  118-122; 
the  Path  of  Beauty,  122-125  ;  the 
Path  of  Perfection,  125-142  ;  the 
Vision  of  the  One,  142-164 

Achelis,  49 

Action  (irpdfc),  178-180 

Activity  (Mfytm)t  in  Aristotle,  10; 
in  the  spiritual  world,  59,  65  ;  in 
the  Absolute,  113 

./Eneas  of  Gaza,  34 

Esthetics,  210-218 

Acvum,  99-101 

Aliotta,  Idealistic  Reaction  against 
Science,  61,  62,  64,  113 

Amelius,  42 

Ammonius  Saccas,  37 

Anaxagoras,  128 

Angela  of  Foligno,  157 

Angelus  Silesius,  1 14 

Aphrodite  in  Plotinus,  149 

Apuleius,  198 

Aristotle,  on  immortality,  10,  II  ; 
38,  87  ;  psychology  of,  49  ;  criti- 
cism of  Plato,  49  ;  categories  of, 
58  ;  65  ;  on  eternity,  98,  99  ;  on 
dialectic,  105 ;  163  ;  on  purifica- 
tion, 165  ;  on  mythology,  195 

Art,  Plotinus  on,  213-216. 

Arts  and  Sciences  in  the  spiritual 
world,  89 

Asceticism,  165  sq. 

Athenagoras,  16 

Augustine,  34,  90 ;  on  eternity,  93  ; 
on  the  Godhead,  in;  118,  152, 
233 

B 

Bacon,  116;  on  beauty,  213 
Barbour,  G.  P.,  69 
Basil,  210 


Beauty,  as  an  attribute  of  Reality, 
74-5 ;  the  Path  of,  122-125  ;  doc- 
trine of,  210-218 

Being  (rd  6v),  46,  58-60;  distin- 
guished from  ovffla,  60 ;  as  a 
category,  75 

Bengel,  162 

Benn,  A.  W.,  168 

Bentham,  224 

Bergson,  64,  66,  85 

Berkeley,  196 

'Beyond  existence,'  109-116 

Blake,  152 

Boedder,  B.,  99 

Boethius,  99,  100 

Bohme,  152 

Bolzano,  54 

Bosanquet,  B.,  30,  85,  107,  114,  176, 
1 80,  229 

Bouillet,  39,  45,  64,  89,  122 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  39,  40,  65,  70,  74, 
79,  104,  114,  229 

Brooke,  Rupert,  87 

Browne,  Sir  T.,  150 

Browning,  R.,  21,  71 

Bruno,  G.,  31 

Buddha,  191 

Buddhism,  29,  117,  191 

Burnet,  Prof.,  4,  108,  126 


Cappadocian  Fathers,  210 
Categories  (7^77),  in  Plato,  50;   of 

spiritual  world,  57-74;  in  Aristotle, 

58;  74 
Cathari,  51 

Catholic  mysticism,  146 
Causality,  !  18-122;  183 
Celibacy,  167 
Chaignet,  57,  122 
Chance,  184 

'  Chorus  of  Souls,'  137,  138 
Chrysippus,  n 
Cleanthes,  n 
Clement,  on  immortality,  14  ;  37  ;  on 

the  Godhead,  1 1 1  ;  on  the  Trinity, 

209 


249 


250 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 


Cloud  of  Unknowing,  The,  146,  154 
Glutton  Brock,  80,  228 
Colour  and  Light,  131 
Concentration,  154 
Contemplation  (Qcupla),  177-183 
Contemplative  Lift,  The,  2 
Conversion,  Sudden,  153 
Cornford,  3,  5,  52 
Crashaw,  159 
Crates,  168 
Creation,  119,  179 
Creurer,  45,  122 
Croce,  217 
Cumont,  196 
Cutten,  143 
Cynics,  166 


Daemons,  196-199 

Damascius,  196 

Dante,  155,  195 

'  Dark  Night  of  the  Soul,'  150-152 

David,  A.,  Le  Modemisme  Boudd- 

histe,  29,  117 

Davidson,  The  Stoic  Creed,  1 1 
Delacroix,  72,  84,  112,  150 
Demiurge,  128 
*  DC  Mundo*  94 
Denis,  on  Origen,  19,  127,  149 
Determinism,  181-185 
Dialectic,  105-107 
Dicrearchus,  6 
Dill,  Sir  S.,  13,  196,  221 
Diogenes  Laertius,  3,  105 
'  Dionysius  the  Areopagite,'  2,  112 
Driesch,  222 
Drummond,  J.,  on  Philo,  14,  154 


Eckhart,  72,  84,  107,  112,  114,  149, 
152,  210 

Ecstasy,  2,  134-162 

Eleatics,  52 

Empedocles,  5,  21,  30,  167 

Epicurean  ethics,  163 

Erigena,  John  Scotus,  107,  112 

Eschatology,  see  Immortality 

Essenes,  167 

Essentia  in  Augustine,  1 1 1 

Eternity  (al&v),  92-103;  relation  to 
perpetuity,  92  ;  to  reality  (ofola), 
93  ;  as  God  manifesting  his  own 
nature,  94 ;  relation  to  the  Abso- 
lute, 94,  95 ;  to  future  existence 
in  time,  96 ;  in  experience,  97  ; 
category  of  aevum,  99 ;  as  an  ethical 
postulate,  101 ;  symbols  of,  102 


'Ethical  virtues, '  175 

Ethics  of  Plotinus,  163-192 

Eucken,  R.,  67,  81,  147,  163 

Eucleides  of  Megara,  1 10 

Euripides,  3,  166 

Eusebius,  209 

Evil,    conflict    with,    171  ;    as    the 

Ugly,  124;  inadequate  recognition 

of,  in  Plotinus,  232 


Faber,  72 

Faith  (Trforts),  in  Proclus,  76 

Farnell,    Higher   Aspects    of   Greek 

Religion,  199 
Fechner,  77 
Ficino,  45 

Forms  (ei8rj),  44,  45,  see  Ideas 
Fourier,  32 
Francis  of  Assisi,  170 
Free  Will,  181-185 


Galen,  12,  167 

Glover,  T.  R.,  193,  198 

Godhead,  see  Absolute 

Goethe,  21,  28,  31,  147,  161,  172, 
217 

Good,  The,  125-142,  and  see  Abso- 
lute 

Goodness,  Truth,  Beauty,  as  the 
supreme  values,  74 

Granger,  F.,  148 

Green,  T.  H.,  69 

Grote,  52 

Guyon,  150 

H 

Hartmann,  113,  ir 
Heaven  (ovpav6s), 
Hebrews,  Epistle  to  the,  77 
Hegel,  69,  107,  120,  121,  193,  209, 

2I5 

Heracleitus,  3,  II,  119,  129,  197 
Herbart,  49 
Herman,  Mrs.,  Meaning  and  Value 

of  Mysticism,  181,  190 
Hermetic  writings,  193 
Herodotus,  2 
l   Herrmann,  196 
Hesiod,  234 
Hobbes,  224 
Homer,  2,  133 
Horace,  198 
Hugel,  Baron  F.  von,   7,   100-102, 

147 
Hume,  148 


INDEX 


251 


Hume  Brown,  Prof.,  161 
Hylton,  171 
Hymn  to  Demeter,  133 
Hypostasis  and  Persona,  210 

I 

lamblichtis,  33,  in,  148,  168,  192 

Ibsen,  32 

Idealism,  modern,  not  in  Plotinus, 
42 

Ideas,  in  Plato,  9,  10,  49-57  ;  in 
Plotinus,  44,  56,  57 

Immortality,  1-36.  A  prerogative  of 
the  gods,  i  ;  in  Dionysiac  religion, 
2 ;  in  Ionian  philosophy,  3-7  >  in 
Pythagoreans,  6,  7  ;  in  Plato,  7- 
10  ;  in  Aristotle,  9,  10  ;  in  Stoics, 
n,  12  ;  in  School  of  Plato,  12,  13  ; 
in  Plutarch,  13,  14  ;  in  Philo,  14  ; 
in  Christian  Alexandrians,  14-20; 
in  Tertullian,  15 ;  in  Plotinus, 
19-24,  92-103  ;  ways  of  envisaging, 

25,  26 ;     as    timeless     existence, 

26,  27 

J 

James,  William,  151 
Jevons,  29 

Johannine  Christianity,  83,  151 
John  of  the  Cross,  149 

Jones,  Rufus,  156 
onson,  Ben,  69 
ulian  of  Norwich,  161,  231 
Justin  Martyr,  16,  209 

K 

Kant,  26,49,64,  69,  177,  215 

Karma,  29 

Kempe,  Margaret,  190 

Keyserling,  23,  38,  72 

Kingsley,  C.,  181 

Kirchner,  57 

Krause,  30,  31,  170,  191,  214 


Lamartine,  225 
Lanier,  Sidney,  102 
La  Rochefoucauld,  173 
Lavater,  31 
Leibnitz,  30 
Lemura/ia,  12 
Leo,  131 
Leroux,  32 
Lessing,  31 
Lichtenberg,  31 
Lindsay,  on  Bergson,  85 


Logoit  in  Stoicism,  18 

Logos,  37,  91 

Lotze,  34,  49,  80,  185,  189,  215,  231 

Love  (fyws),  in  Proclus,  76  ;  in 
Plotinus,  139,  187,  188  ;  as  a 
daemon,  198;  in  Christian  theo- 
logy, 232-234 

Lowell,  232 

Lucian,  12,  173 

Lucretius,  235 

Lutoslawski,  65 

M 

Macdonald,  G.,  72 

MacTaggart,  on  reincarnation,    4 

Maeterlinck,  32 

Magic  and  Sorcery,  199,  200 

Maimonides,  39 

Maine  de  Biron,  144 

Malebranche,  119 

Manicheans,  31 

Marcus  Aurelius,  II,  164,  197 

Marinus,  Life  of  Proclus,  165 

Materialism  of  Tertullian,  12,  13 

Maximus  of  Tyre,  13 

Menedemus,  54 

Mentalism,  51 

Messianism,  15 

Metempsychosis,  see  Rebirth 

Mill,  J.  S.,  1 80 

Molinos,  151 

Monad,  the,  in  Pythagoreans,  108 

Moore,  Origin  and  Nattire  of  Lifet 

56 
Movement  (K^O-IS),  in  Aristotle,  10 ; 

64-74 

Mozart,  155 
Miiller,  55,  64 
Miinsterberg,  75,  81 
Murray,  Prof.  Gilbert,  196 
Mysteries,  Greek,  192 
Mysticism  of  Plotinus,  142-162 
Mythology  in  Plotinus,  193 

N 

Narasu,  30 

National  misfortunes,  indifference  to, 

in  Plotinus,  174,  175 
Natorp,  52 
Natural  Laws,  78 
Necessity,  121,  196 
Nemesius,  34,  37 
Nettleship,  R.  L.,  125 
Nicholas  of  Cusa,  127 
Nietzsche,  178] 
Nirvana,  117,  191 
Numenius,  2092  ,- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINUS 


Occultism,  148,  149 
Olympius,  199 
One,  the,  see  Absolute 
Urigen,  o 


- 
Punishments, 


° 


--j    »*j 

Ovid,  12 


JT 

Panaetius,  n 
Parrnenides,  3,  4    r2   7o 

51 


^ 
,  C,  181 
Penn,  W.,86 

Perfection,  the  path  of,  125-162 
Permanence,  64-74 
Perpetuity  (didtbrr,,),  Q2 
Personal  idealism,  9,,  56 
Petrie,  Flinders,  221  5 
Philanthropy,  176,  187 
™ii  immortality,    14  .    on  t 


Progress,  68 
'Psychical  research,'  96 


,52 

Purification  (/cdfa/wir),  i6c-i77 
Puritanism,  236 
Pythagoras,  178,  179 

* 


197,  225 

^avaisson,  58 
Read,  Carveth, 


R 


Reasoning  (Xoyt^s),  88 


Phjbstratu^o^imagination  in  ar 

Pjndar,  3,  5,  30,  67 

HMO,  09  immortality,  3,  7_io .  0 
Spirit,  40;  categories  in;57_V4° 
on  life  m  the  spiritual  world  87 

^r1^9^011^16^'1^ 

107     on     beyond  existence,'  no 
on  beauty,  123;  on  the  Good,    26 
on  human  affairs,   164 ;    on   state 
morality     ,65;    on  suicide?  173 
on mythology,    195 ;  on  dinow, 
198;  on  war,  224, -on  democracy,' 

Pliny  the  Younger,  12 

Plutarch,    on  immortality,    13,    14  . 

'Political  virtues,' 164    i6c 
Porphyry,  33,  42>  rt^W 

Poussin,  on  Buddhism,  117 
Pre-existence,  in  Origen,  17 
PnnglePattison,  Prof., '185,220 
Proclus,  on  rebirth,    34;    on    Soul 

55;    on  the  attributes  of  ' 

7o ;  on  categories  of  the 


Religion  in  Plotinus,  192-218 
Renouvier,  185 
Rest  and  Activity,  64-74 
Resurrection  of  the  body,  15-18   2I 
Retribution  after  death,  32,  «    ' 
Richter,  41,  49,  58 
Rickaby,    Genera!  Metaphysics,   6r, 

R63hii8  D''    Philos°Phi^l  Studies, 
Rogatianus,  164 
Rohde,  3,  167,  197 
Ross,  on  Aristotle,  48 
Rossetti,  Christina,  96 
Rothe,  101,  117,  I27 
Royce,  146 
Russell,  Bertrand,  92 
Ruysbroek,  73,  181 

S 

Sabatier,  Paul,  70 
ame  and  Other,  the,  61-64 
chiller,  the  poet,  131 
chiller,  Dr.,  97 

chopenhauer,  32,  98,  193   2Je 
sciences  (^TrtoT^ucu)  44    ' 
cotus,  John,  see  Er'igena 
eneca,  12 
haftesbury,  217 


INDEX 


253 


Shakespeare,  91,  169 

Sidgwick,  H.,  51 

Simplicius,  52 

Simplification  (airXbxris),  145 

Smith,  J.,  the  Cambridge  Platonist, 
231 

Socrates,  doemon  of,  197 

Sophocles,  234 

Sorcery,  199,  200 

Sotion,  12 

Soul,  immortality  of,  see  Immortality; 
Soul  and  Spirit,  91 

Spencer,  Herbert,  115,  116 

Spinoza,  3,  27,  56,  69,  151,  161, 163, 
180 

Spirit  (vovs) :  reasons  for  choosing 
this  word,  37,  38 ;  Spirit  and  its 
world  the  real  world,  39  ;  unity  of 
vovs,  1/6770-1$  and  vorjrd,  40-49 ;  re- 
lation to  the  Ideas,  48-57  ;  cate- 
gories of  the  spiritual  world,  57- 
74 ;  the  spiritual  world  as  a  king- 
dom of  values,  74-81  ;  the  Great 
Spirit  and  individual  Spirits,  82- 
86  ;  life  of  blessed  Spirits,  86-92  ; 
eternity  and  Spirit,  92-103 

Spirit  =  TTi/eO/xa  in  Christian  theology, 
38,  91 

Spiritual  Body,  15,  17,  18,  21 

Stability  (orcum),  64-74 

Stallbaum,  49 

Stobaeus,  184 

Stoics,  on  immortality,  II,  12  ;  on 
end  of  the  world,  18  ;  ethics  of, 
163 

Substratum  (viroKe'iptvov),  93 

Sufis,  92 

Suicide,  173 

Sun-worship,  196 

Suso,  169 

Swedenborg,  31 

Symmetry  and  beauty,  213 

Sympathies,  doctrine  of,  196,  199 

Syrianus,  58 


Tagore,  225 

Tarde,  240 

Taylor,  Prof.  A.  E.,  52-56 

Taylor,  Thomas,  45 

Tennyson,  36 

Tension,  88 

TerL'Uian,  15,  16,  171 


Thales,  3 

Theodoret,  209 

Theophilus,  16 

Tibullus,  198 

Time  and  Eternity,  101,  102 

Traherne,  T.,  190 

Transmigration,  see  Rebirth 

Trendelenberg,  49 

Trinity,  Christian  and  Neoplatonic, 

193,  209,  210 

Truth  (dXiJfleta),  41,  75,  76,  93 
Turner,  A.  C.,  237 

U 

Ugly,  the,  124,  216 
Unconscious,  the,  113 
Underbill,  Miss,  73,  157 


Values,  Kingdom  of,  24-31 
Van  Helmont,  31 
Vegetarianism,  167 
Via  negativa,  145 
Virgil,  2 
Virtue,  126,  184 
Vision  of  the  One,  132-162 
Volkmann,  45 

W 

Wallace,  Psychology  of  Aristotle^  49 

Wallace,  Prof.,  195 

Ward,  Prof.  J.,  119 

Warde  Fowler,  Roman  Ideas  of  Deity  t 

198 

Webb,  C.  C.  J.,  190,  195 
Wesley,  J.,  144 
Whichcote,  B.,  230 
Whittaker,  T.,  21,  183,  193 
Will  in  the  Absolute,  113,  114 
Wisdom  (<ro<£ta),  76,  80 
Wordsworth,  155,  230,  231 
Wyttenbach,  122 


Zeller,  41,  49,  57,  58,  193 

Zeno,  52 

Zeno  the  Eleatic,  105 

Zimmern,  The  Greek  Commonwealth , 

189 
Zockler,  167 


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